Tanks in the Snow

Tanks have problems with mud, as we have seen previously. What about snow?

"From the report of the 1st Shock Army on tanks in winter conditions:

Crossing winter snow:
On dirt roads near the front, T-34 and KV tanks pass without problems, but T-60s get stuck. The depth of snow is 25-50 cm. T-34s and KVs can cross without complications, but T-60s bury themselves in the snow at a depth of 25 cm, and their bottom gets stuck on the snow.

Tank elements of the 5th Army:

The T-60 cannot go up a grade of 15-20 degrees with medium ice cover.

From the report of the ABTU chief of the Western Front

A report on T-60, T-40, and T-30 tanks in winter conditions. During combat with German invaders from November 30th, 1941, to January 16th, 1942, we have determined that light T-60, T-40, and T-30 tanks cannot move over snow 30-40 cm deep. The narrow tracks cut the snow to the ground, the tank hits its bottom on the compressed snow, and the tracks spin idly. Examples: On January 13th, 1942, during the assault on Ilyinskoye, the 145th Tank Brigade used 17 T-60 tanks. All tanks, as soon as they went off-road for maneuvers, were stuck in the forest clearing. 5 T-60 tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade were tasked with taking Aksenovo. Despite all efforts on the crews' behalf, not one tank reached Aksenovo. All tanks were stuck in the snow during maneuvers."

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From a phone call between Stalin and Zaltsmann, January 24th, 1942:
"

1. The T-34 flies over heavy snow like a swallow. The KV performs worse. It is necessary to increase the diesel engine's power to 700 hp.
2. [Stalin] proposed increasing the performance by lightening the tank.
3. Take all measures to increase the tank's speed in conditions of deep snow. Tank brigades move quickly, but the KV falls behind."

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"Short conclusions and suggestions from combat experience of the 20th Army in the winter

1. Tanks of all types move freely on roads, but with difficulty off-roads. Practice shows that T-60 and T-40 tanks are best used for guarding headquarters and defending, as well as pursuing the enemy along roads and in settlements. Due to deep snow, T-40 and T-60 tanks cannot be used in offensive combat off roads. In all cases, the maneuvers of these tanks end at forests, difficult terrain, and forest clearings.
   It is better to get into initial positions at night, during morning fog, and during an artillery barrage. The initial positions must be carefully camouflaged. Pay special attention to hiding tracks on roads that the tanks used to get to their location, so that the enemy does not discover them from the air.
   In practice, it is not always possible to enter initial positions, and tank forces left for battle directly from where they were based. In this case, it is best to base tanks towards the rear, to avoid discovery and artillery or mortar fire.
2. For tanks operating far from roads, supplies of fuel and ammunition must be delivered as follows:
1. Transport the fuel as closet as possible on roads in tanks and cisterns, and then organize a distribution center for various units. The distribution center should have spare tanks filled up and ready to exchange.
2. Fuel is transported on roads on trailers towed by tractors.
3. Use sleds from infantry units, as well as the forces of tank units.
4. In some cases of prolonged operation away from roads, it may be necessary to issue tank units their own sleds for transport.
3. In order to keep tanks constantly ready for movement, it is necessary to periodically heat them.
   At night, keep tank commanders on duty too keep track of temperatures of vehicles, wake up drivers to perform warm-up, and keep track of who and when warmed up the vehicles. When warming up wheeled vehicles, it is desirable to lift the drive wheels with a jack, so that they do not make contact with the ground, in order to warm up the gearbox lubricant, as well as the oil.
4. Movement of tanks on clearings and through forests is difficult when there is a lot of snow. Before moving through such terrain, it is necessary to perform reconnaissance and select a route where the snow is even, and easier for a tank to traverse. When the snow is very deep, cut down small trees and use them as cover, so that the tracks do not cut through the snow.
   The maximum depth for all tanks is different. The KV tank can pass through short areas of 80-90 cm of loose snow, or 50-60 cm on bumpy terrain. Loose snow is easier to traverse.
   The T-34 is capable of traversing the same conditions as the KV, and can even perform better in some cases due to its light weight (compared to the KV).
   The T-60 has limited mobility in the snow. The thin track cuts through the snow until the tank is flat on its hull. The maximum depth for a T-60 is 30 cm, and 20-25 cm on bumpy terrain.
   Conclusions on using T-60 tanks:
1. Experience shows that when snow is 30-40 cm deep, the T-60 can only move on roads. Low temperatures lead to frequent warm-ups of the engine, and rapid expenditure of fuel. Less frequent warm-ups are not possible, as the water in the radiator freezes.
2. Use these tanks in areas where snow is shallow, in the south. Around Moscow, the snow is deep, and it is not possible for this tank to accompany infantry. The tanks may be used on roads, or to defend settlements, headquarters, etc.
5. When crossing rivers in the winter, careful reconnaissance is mandatory. The main information required is:
1. Entrance and exit to the ice.
2. Grade of the river shores.
3. Thickness of ice.
4. River depth.
5. Current speed.
6. Materials for strengthening the ice, and the amount of time available for this task.
6. In the winter time, steep shores affect the speed of crossing the river, especially for tanks with sliding chain tracks (T-26, T-30, T-60). While crossing, it is necessary to make sure that the ice does not crack, and water does not get on the tank. If it does, then a danger of freezing the control mechanisms arises. In these cases, it is necessary to clear out the water, or immediately warm up the vehicle to internal temperatures that would not allow the water to freeze.
   Strengthen the ice with any materials available: boards, planks, fascines, hay, branches, or any materials. If a forest is nearby, prepare blogs 10-15 cm in diameter and pine branches. If possible, cross with heavy tanks only if:
1. The ice is close to required thickness, and reinforced with light materials: branches, hay, boards.
2. The ice is artificially thickened. Use logs 12-15 cm in diameter. The first layer should be perpendicular to the current, then a light intermediate layer, and a layer of logs parallel to the current, so tanks do not move them while crossing. Cover them with straw, or, if brackets are available, hold them together with brackets. If the ice starts bending, you can still cross it, but with careful checking of the river depth. If the ice is not robust, use a checkered support underneath the covers. It will become robust when frozen over. Spaces of 1.5-2 meters are enough for supporting KV tanks, given a proper cover and good thickness of rods.
7. Commanders rarely perform reconnaissance of snow coverage in battle, but it is necessary to do. Correctly executed reconnaissance is very useful to the entire unit, including tank crews.
8. The enemy, during hurried retreats, mines narrow roads, settlements, and, as a rule, detours around blown up bridges. When entering new regions, send a detachment of sappers forward for reconnaissance.
   In battle, the unit commander should have a reserve of sappers with metal detectors, which will clear the way as the unit advances. The tank commander must maintain close communications with NIS, and request intelligence on mine fields and paths through them. Poor use of sappers results in loss of materiel. For example, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade lost 9 tanks to mines. 
9. Long term presence in tanks during low temperatures tires the crews out, reduces their mobility, and exposes them to frostbite. Between battles, warm up the crews by making fires underneath tarps, using chemical warmers, dugouts, and tents. Do not allow the crews to use tank exhaust for warms, as there were cases of poisoning.
10. If too much grease is present on moving parts of weapons (especially the firing mechanisms and gun elevation mechanisms), the gun will not operate in very low temperatures. Before an attack, test the guns, and remove excess lubricant from guns and machineguns. Replace heavy grease with light oils. 
11. In the summer, the Germans used tanks in massed formations. This allowed them to distribute fuel  and ammunition easily. Tanks could also be accompanied by infantry formations.
    In the winter, the tanks are used much differently. The battles at Krasnaya Polyana, Beliy Rast, Ozeretskoye, Kamenka, and Svistukha confirm this: the enemy left up to 40 tanks there. They were caught by our Russian winter there, and it seems were unable to move since. The enemy did not attempt to use these tanks, not even for counter-attacks.
    The enemy mostly uses their tanks as immobile guns, in ambushes, to cover retreating infantry, and in short-range counterattacks.
    Reasons for reduced tank use:
1. Rapid decrease in available tanks.
2. Deep snow, resulting in the inability to maneuver.
3. Rapid decrease in roads, on which fuel and ammunition can be sent to tank units.
4. Lack of crew training on operating in snow.
5. Lack of crew equipment, especially clothing.
6. Excellent capability of our tanks and AT artillery against enemy tanks.
7. Advances of our forces, destroying their supply system and taking the initiative previously held by their tank forces.
   All of these reasons caused the enemy to switch from active to passive use of tanks.
12. New tactical techniques for tank offensives: tanks support infantry in groups (platoon-company), in order to solidify its success with fire from concealment. When defending, tanks were used in small groups (3-5) in ambush. After the enemy was destroyed, the tanks moved to counter-attack, either alone or with infantry. 
13. Use of fuel to keep tanks warm, per day:
1. T-34: 35-40 kg
2. T-60 and T-30: 15-20 kg
3. BT: 25-30 kg
4. KV: 35-40 kg
14. Repair units are capable of performing medium repairs in field conditions. In December, 216 medium repairs were carried out on various brands of vehicles.
    The weak spots of KV and T-34 tanks are the main gearbox axle, main friction clutch disk, starter relay, idlers, engine block gaskets (in 1st Tank Brigade and 145th Tank Brigade, four T-34s are immobilized due to the gaskets). Weak spots for enemy artillery are turret rings, idlers, drive wheels. In order to keep using these tanks, spares are needed.
    It is hard to repair tanks in the cold, and productivity decreases. In order to increase productivity, it is necessary for repair units to set up next to settlements, and warm up in them. If possible, perform repairs indoors. If possible, equip units with two-person tents and mobile heaters, which will allow the brigades to perform repairs in any conditions. Two-three instructors in repairs of foreign tanks and vehicles are needed per brigade. 
15. Evacuating tanks in winter conditions:
    Tanks are difficult to tow in the winter, since the friction of the tractor against the ground is reduced, and the suspension of the towed tank is frozen, and often does not spin, which increases friction.
    Towing the tanks to evacuation centers must be done off-road, which is also complicated. In order to make towing heavy and medium tanks easier, skis should be placed underneath the tracks. When multiple tractors are used, they should not be used in a chain, but shoulder to shoulder, pulling from two points.
    During widespread offensives and rapid progress by our units, the amount of evacuation means is insufficient to quickly evacuate tanks to repair bases, restore them, and return them to battle, since railroads are damaged and towing the tanks to repair bases over large distances is time consuming, and further reduces the amount of available transport. Units are not fully equipped with tractors, which causes more complications.
    Tanks that are stuck in rivers and anti-tank traps need preparations before they are towed, and tank units must have special equipment such as winches, cables, powerful jacks, and other devices. It is desirable to have a special platoon in the repair company with winches that is capable of preparing tanks for towing, and towing them.
    Current equipment in the repair company is barely enough for our vehicles, and not enough for enemy medium or heavy vehicles. Currently, only light tanks and cars can be towed, while the enemy retreats and leaves behind many tanks, trucks, and a lot of equipment. It is necessary to increase the numbers of repair companies.
    When tanks are amassed on one section of the front, it is similarly necessary to amass evacuation means.

Chief of Armoured Forces of the 20th Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Malyshev

Commissar of the Armoured Forces of the 20th Army, Senior Battalion Commissar Vasilyev

Chief of the 1st Unit of the Armoured Forces of the 20th Army, Major Kravtsov"

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Tanks in the Water

The "System of tractor, tank, and armoured car armament of the Worker and Peasant Red Army", defined in 1929, contained 5 main types of tanks, one of which was the reconnaissance tank. One of the characteristics was "all-terrain capability (including water)". However, the tanks developed to match these requirements (T-37, T-38, T-40) were lightly armoured, and armed only with machine guns. Before the T-50's failure as the Red Army's next light tank, an attempt was made to make it amphibious at factory #37.

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"Currently, work is being done on an amphibious tank with thickened armour based on the existing T-50 tank. In order to finalize the thicknesses of armour plates that can be used, and the tactical-technical characteristics of the vehicle, the factory needs detailed component and overall blueprints of the T-50 tank.

The aforementioned blueprints are stored at the 1st department of NATI, under the index T-135. 

We ask you to order NATI to urgently send the aforementioned blueprints to our factory for temporary use (10-15 days), until we can receive blueprints from factory #174, or to allow our workers to copy the blueprints in NATI."

However, even a T-50 doesn't exactly represent a decisive force. Now, a KV, that's something!

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"People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding

Central Construction Bureau #32

To the Chief Tank Directorate

This is a request for the dimensional and weight data on the "KV" type tank, currently active on the front. This data is necessary for the development of a raft that can carry a "KV" type tank on assault operations. Independently from this, we ask what type of tank weighs 46 tons, as it was the tank we were suggested to use for planning. 

We ask the head of the 5th Chief Directorate to confirm the necessity of receiving data on the KV tank.

Central Construction Bureau #32 Chief Fokin

Chief Engineer Nogid"

And then there are more improvised and less fortunate solutions.

Floating a tank over the surface of a water hazard is only one way of getting it across. If the shore is constantly under fire from the enemy, a more creative tactic must be used. During the Nevsky Pyatachok operation to break through Leningrad's blockade, F. Krylov, chief of EPRON (a nominally civilian rescue and underwater engineering organization, included in the Navy at the start of the war) proposed that the heavy vehicle and artillery be dragged underwater. This maneuver was practiced at the EPRON base, but its execution in battle was more difficult: sunken boats and vehicles, as well as constant artillery fire, impeded the divers' work. In total, only a handful of tanks (including two KVs) made it across. Vehicles that sank halfway across the crossing occasionally continued their journey to the other shore in this manner. However, far from all vehicles lost at that crossing were recovered. A number of tanks have been recovered fairly recently by the "Poisk" diving group.

While the river may be an engineer's enemy, it is a historian's ally. If a vehicle is lost in battle, odds are that no one knows where, and even if they do, it can still be hit by artillery, dragged away as scrap, stripped by looters after the war, etc. A vehicle that is lost in a river, especially if the location of the crossing is well recorded, is safe until some archive diggers can find it and recover it. 

"Order to the 58th Independent Tank SPG Regiment

March 30th, 1944

#18

During execution of a combat order, the regiment was performing a march on the route Kremte-Sloboda-Sarny. On February 3rd, 1944, the bridge over Sarny broke, and tank #3038 fell into the river with a crew of 4. 

Tank #3312, while on a march on the Alexandria-Klevan route, was crossing a bridge over the river Goryn' in the region of Tuchino on February 9th, 1944, when the bridge broke, and the tank sank in the river. I order that the following tanks be stricken from the inventory of the 58th Tank Regiment:

1. SU-76I T-3 #3038, engine #3440
2. SU-76I T-3, #3312, engine #542867

as irrecoverable losses during the execution of a combat task.

58th Independent Tank Regiment SPG commander, Major Novikov

HQ Commander, Major Sinchura"

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This, of course, is the SU-76I SPG mentioned in this article, the only 100% authentic SU-76I to have been found to date.

Tanks in the Mud

"I maintain the opinion that a man that has never seen these roads, here, in the South, during the Spring, cannot fully imagine what they are like. Imagine a highway, made of massive boulders placed side by side, sometime in the middle of a repair, when the workers pulled the stones out, and placed them right back, without the chance to rearrange or remove them. That's one.

Two. Imagine that, on top of these torn out boulders, there is a half a meter of mud. It has nowhere to go, since the mud is up to the same level to the sides of the road, and it is even deeper there. 

Three. Imagine that, after driving on that highway on an all terrain vehicle, furious from the constant climbing out, pushing the car, placing logs, straw, anything that can make the vehicle move again under the tires, you decide to forget the road and go through the fields. A sight overturns this decision, the sight of a tank turret, not even the tank itself, about 15 meters from the road. Upon closer inspection, the tank is undamaged, and merely sank in the mud. When I walked to, emphasis on the walked, a general that I knew back from Khalkin-Gol, he answered my profanity regarding the condition of the road with laughter, and replied that I was merely following his example. In order to keep up with his advance forces, he left his car behind two days ago, and has been walking since. 

And the last, most strangely comforting thing, is that the roads are covered with signs of German retreat. It is hard to be surprised by these things with my imagination, but after I came here, I am still shocked daily at the amount of abandoned German vehicles of all makes and models, combat and transport. There are famous Tigers and Panthers, intact and burned up, self propelled guns, massive APCs, small motorcycle-like APCs with one leading wheel, huge blunt-nosed Renault trucks stolen from France, endless Mercedes and Opel, staff cars, radios, field kitchens, AA guns, disinfection chambers, anything and everything the Germans came up with and fought with during their retreat is now broken or abandoned in the mud of these roads." 

-Konstantin Simonov, April 1944

Simonov isn't exaggerating in his writings. In order to successfully fight a war, you need to make sure your tanks can do a little off-road driving. This means putting them through trials like this: 

"6. Typical road segment, indicative of its condition"

"12. The vehicle is crossing a ravine with a stream. Vehicles typically get stuck here."

"Overall view of the heavily mudded and swamped road."

"The tank submerges in the mud 0.6 meters to 0.8 meters during motion."

If you are unprepared for mud, prepare to face losses. The following is a fragment of a German report on losses due to mud.

3 cannons and 33 vehicles is nothing to scoff at. However, contrary to popular belief, Russia isn't the only European country with mud in it. Soviet forces came across plenty of mud on their march through Germany. 

The British didn't have much fun in France.

 A Sherman that met a similar fate in Italy, Spring of 1944.

Spring of 1944 seems to have been very rainy in general. Here are some fragments from "Report on the supply of the offensive operations of the 1st Guards Tank Army in March-April of 1944":
"The army was carried by Studebakers, which lived up to their expectations. Aside from Studebakers, we had to use tanks that towed cars behind them."
...
"The Rear Directorate of the 1st Guards Tank Army was faced with great difficulty due to the mud in the Winter of 1943/44. Studebakers could barely move with the speed of 5-6 kph, while all other wheeled vehicles were completely paralyzed."

Sometimes, it doesn't even have to be a particularly muddy spring to ruin your day, all you have to do is find a stream.

From the combat diary of the 48th Tank Corps:

"July 5th, 1943

6:30. Infantry and tanks belonging to "Grossdeutschland" reached an anti-tank trench and a ravine East of Berezovo. There are a lot of minefields and barbed wire in front of it. Its crossing is going to be difficult, as despite a good weather forecast, the ravine is full of water. After last night's rain, everything turned to mud.

...

10:45. "Grossdeutschland" managed to get an insignificant number of tanks across a heavily swamped ravine. One Tiger fell through, and blocked all movement. The engineers are hurriedly constructing crossings, but the building materials sink in deep mud. The regiment with Panthers is still south of Height 229.8. It will take much longer to cross the ravine than estimated. Vehicles and tanks of the division that are stuck in front of the ravine are constantly under attack from enemy aircraft, which caused notable losses, especially among officers. The grenadier regiment HQ took a direct hit from an enemy shell. The regimental adjutant, and two other officers are dead."

Another, similar episode happened to the 503rd s.Pz.Abt on October 4th, 1943. 

Tiger #331 attempts to cross the reinforced bridge to the other side of the river that appears to have already claimed one Tiger. 

#331 backed off. Why? You can clearly see where the bridge boards buckled under its weight. No matter how many logs you stack in the center, simple wood isn't going to support 56 tons of steel. 

Tiger # 332 decided to go around, and also met an unfortunate fate.

Pulling the Tiger proved ineffective. 

The diary of the 503rd reproduced in Schneider's Tigers in Combat I describes this episode laconically: "All tanks out of action."

The British came up with a creative solution to helping a tank get out of mud: rockets! They tried it out on the Universal Carrier.

That went about as well as you could expect.

Tank Inscriptions

Along with sponson guns and engine rooms, WWI British tanks inherited another thing from battleships: proper names. The first series of Soviet tanks continued that tradition. The practice of naming each tank waned as tanks became significantly more common than battleships, but returned in the time of war. The following photograph, for instance, is pretty famous.

That is a T-34 model 1942 #212-570, with an inscription that reads "Leningradets" (citizen of Leningrad). The tank belongs to the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade, other members of which were also awarded titles.

"Order to the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade #0124
November 4th. 1943

An announcement of order #0111 of the Commander of the Amoured and Mechanized Forces of the Leningrad Front follows:

"In order to preserve the proud traditions of great Russian commanders, whose names were cemented in the history of the art of war, in honour of the leaders and organizers of the heroic struggle of the Russian people against German fascism, in honour of our best soldier and officer tankers, loyal sons of the Soviet people, who demonstrated bravery, courage, and heroism, I order the naming of heavy and medium tanks in frontline units.
I am certain that the crews of the war machines that bear these glorious names, and their commanders, will exterminate the fascist scum with their skill in battle, and will write new pages of victory in the history of the Red Army, pages that are worthy of those names that serve as a symbol of selfless and heroic war of our people against a hated enemy.

I order the naming of these medium tanks of the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade:

• T-34 tank #212-309: For the Motherland
• T-34 tank #212-342: Alexandr Suvorov
• T-34 tank #212-640: Sergei Kirov
• T-34 tank #212-570: Leningradets
• T-34 tank #212-691: Petr Kraizelburg, after a courageous tanker, commander of the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade, and later a Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, who died the death of brave men in defense of our Motherland.
• T-34 tank #212-90: Vladimir Kiryanov, after a courageous sergeant, posthumously awarded an Order of the Red Banner, whose crew destroyed two field guns, 2 AT guns, 2 mounted machineguns, a mortar battery, two motorcycles, and up to 50 soldiers and officers of the enemy, who died the death of brave men defending the city of Lenin.
• T-34 tank #212-303: Nikolai Ovchinnikov, after a cavalier of the Order, a courageous tank officer that skilfully combined his personal courage with excellent command of his unit, who died the death of brave men in defense of our Motherland.
• T-34 tank #212-611: Alexandr Nevskiy
• T-34 tank #212-737: Semyon Dulkin, after a loyal son of the Soviet people, twice cavalier of the Order, commander of a tank battalion, who skilfully and remorselessly defeated German invaders and gave his life for the Motherland and its people.
• T-34 tank #212-150: Mihail Sokolov, after a fearless and wilful tank officer, cavalier of the Order, radiating honour and glory, a loyal Bolshevik, who committed his life to defending the Motherland and died the death of brave men in defense of the city of Lenin.
• T-34 tank #340-33: For the Soviet Ukraine

The application of inscriptions should be done in accordance with an order that was sent out earlier (order #017 from April 15th, 1943).

The vehicles with the aforementioned names should be handed over to the crews according to appendix #2 of the Combat Manual of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army.

Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Leningrad Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major-General of the tank forces, Baranov
HQ Chief of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Leningrad Front, Colonel Plevoy"

The commanders of the 1st and 2nd battalions should transfer the vehicles to the crews according to the manual. I am certain that the crews of these tanks that carry the names of brave warriors and loyal sons of the Russian people, fearless defenders of the Motherland, will be examples of endurance and defiance, skill, courage, and bravery, and will multiply the glory of their comrades that gave their lives for happiness of our people and independence of our country.

Commander of the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade, Colonel Volkov
HQ Chief of the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Afanasyev"

Tank names were in no way unique. Kirov's name previously was assigned to the SMK tank (Sergei Mironovich Kirov), and "For the Motherland" was the name of another prototype heavy tank, the KV-220. Alexander Suvorov and Alexander Nevskiy also had their names on captured StuGs in the 1228th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. "Suvorov" was also written on the side of a KV-1 from the 10th tank brigade.

LKZ manufacture KV-1, belonging to company commander Markov.

A tank's name wasn't just some paint on the side of the turret, but a proper name. For example, Markov's KV above is identified as "Suvorov tank" in his Hero of the Soviet Union award order.

Of course, you didn't have to die for the Motherland to name a tank. You could always buy your way in. A few examples are described in Wargaming's article, "Small parts of a large victory".

"The war with fascist forces was fought not only at the front, but in the rear. Millions of people of many professions that have never before held a rifle grabbed the levers of a tank or an airplane, pulled victory closer and closer with their labours. Many did not end there, and spent their own savings on the needs of the front. Over the four years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet citizens donated money for several thousand tanks, about 2500 airplanes, 8 submarines, many guns, mortars, hundreds of thousands of shells and bombs.

The money was collected in factories, farms, various government offices. For example, in 1943, a T-60 named "Malyutka" (child) fought at Stalingrad. The tank was built using money donated by kindergartens. The tank was driven by a woman named Ekaterina Petlyuk.

Many individuals bought entire vehicles. Mariya Oktyabrskaya, who bought a T-34 tank, fought in it as a part of the 26th Guards Brigade of the 2nd Tatsin Tank Corps. A peasant named Ferapont Golovatiy sent two fighters to the front, a Yak-1 and a Yak-3. A performer named Vladimir Yakhontov purchased an IS-2, and named it after his favourite poet: Vladimir Mayakovskiy. There are a great deal of these examples. We would like to remember some lesser known people that made their contribution to a great deed.

Vehicles were frequently purchased for specific soldiers, about which people read in newspapers. In February of 1944, a railroad worker named G.M. Kozyrev bought a Yak fighter for A. Bulgakov, using money he was saving for a house. Bulgakov made 136 sorties with that fighter, shooting down 14 enemy airplanes.

The story of one T-34-85 of the 36th Guards Tank Brigade is interesting. The head of a farm, Y. Shulga, sent it as a gift to his adopted son, Lieutenant I. Kisenko. The inscription on the tank read "From father Shulga to son Kisenko". The tank participated in liberation of Shulga's home village, and then fought in Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Another T-34, titled "Gift to my son", was given to A. Shirmanov by his parents, Ilya Andreevich and Maria Fillipovna on the day of the 25th anniversary of the Red Army. This tank fought starting on June 1943. A. Shirmanov died during battles for the Zhitomir region.

In many cases, tankers and pilots bought vehicles that they themselves fought in. The T-34 named "Amur Avenger" was paid for by N. Agapov, L. Rudnichenko, and I. Binyukov. The vehicle was used by the 12th Guards Tank Bridage. Agapov and Rudnichenko fought as a part of its crew, but Binyukov could not, due to an injury. Pilot L. Chaiko, gunner K. Shishkin, and mechanic P. Bobrov purchased an Il-10 airplane, and then fought in it as a part of the 2nd Baltic Front. Shishkin's father helped with the purchase of this expensive vehicle.

It is impossible to list all such cases in a short article, but every person that sacrificed their earnings for the front contributed to the victory over the most menacing enemy humanity has ever known."

Kolomiets and Moshanskiy add to the list of named tanks in Camouflage of Red Army Tanks 1930-1945, Zeughaus, 2007, grouped by year, but even the vast collection in the book does not fully exhaust the proper names of all tanks used by the Soviet Union in WWII.

The vehicles that survived the war in a condition suitable for further service had their names unceremoniously painted over during refurbishment.

The Incredible Story of Soviet Diesel Engines

Looks like the Soviets weren't the only ones with pre-war science fiction ray guns. Germany got in on that game as well.

"To comrade Stalin

January 1st, 1935

INO GUGB received the following information about military preparations in Germany.

1. Recently, in all German newspapers, a story was published about the emergency landing of three Polish aircraft on their territory because of fog.
   The real reason for this is not fog at all. In October of 1934, a Polish military delegation arrived in Berlin, which observed secret military inventions. A device for halting cars was demonstrated on the Berlin-Zossen highway, where there is a special device for turning off aircraft engines remotely from the ground. The Poles sent three of their airplanes to test this, which were taken down next to Elbing. In Elbing, antennas are installed openly for the purpose of taking down airplanes with ultrasonic waves.
   Because of this, Germany is racing to replace their aircraft engines with diesel engines.
2. In Heilsberg, underground fortifications are being dug, and heavy weapons are being installed.
3. Schichau plants are producing large amounts of barbed wire, grenades, and shell casings. Light military ships are also being built there.
4. In Pillau, there are underground storage facilities for oil and fuel that can completely supply the German fleet and aircraft in the Baltic.
5. Locks and dams in East Prussia can cause flooding of a large area, if necessary.
6. From November 15th, 1934 to February 15th, 1935, the Reichswehr is in full battle readiness. All leave taking place in this period has been cancelled.

Deputy Chief of the INO GUGB, Berman"

Stalin responds: 

"

1. Give all surplus in the NKO's budget to SNK, in order to:
1. Create an airplane diesel motor as soon as possible.
2. Invent a device to stop cars and bring down aircraft as soon as possible."

Of course, Germany had no such beam weapon, and Soviet experiments with diesel engines (at least for tanks) predate 1935 (the first diesel engine was installed on a BT-2 in 1933), but this is an amusing anecdote nevertheless. 

World of Tanks History Section: Tiger II

By August of 1942, when the newest heavy Tiger tank just entered the army, German high command already demanded a new, heavier and more powerful, vehicle. In the fall of the same year, Erwin Aders of Henschel and Ferdinand Porsche started building the new vehicle.

Each engineer approached the problem differently. Porsche didn't get very creative. He took his VK 45.01 (P), also known as the Porsche Tiger, and performed a series of changes, which were closer to cosmetic than functional. The VK 45.02 (P) received the same electric transmission as its predecessor, a similar twin gasoline Simmering-Graz-Pauker engine, 200 hp each, and the same six paired individual road wheels. The hull was changed by adding sloped armour, as well as the turret, which had to be changed for the new 88 mm KwK 43 gun. Porsche made two types of tank: one with a front turret, and one with a rear one.

Aders' project was closer to what was actually requested. In part, this was maximum parts commonality with the currently developed Panther II. Aders' heavy tank ended up preserving the Panther's proportions, with with thicker armour. The front plate was 150 mm thick, positioned at 50 degrees. 80 mm thick side armour was positioned at 25 degrees. The suspension, made of 10 paired road wheels, was partially borrowed from the Tiger, and partially from the Panther. The tank received a 700 hp Maybach engine and a cooling system made of four radiatiors, left and right of the engine. The gun mantlet and hull machine gun mounts were the same as on the Panther II.

Porsche considered the tender to be his, and ordered 50 turrets at the Krupp factories in Hessen. When the competition arrived, Hitler's sympathies lay with Henschel's creation. Porsche's project was declined due to an unreliable suspension, unreliable transmission, and a high use of deficit materials, such as copper.

Ironically, this is the second time when Porsche's project was declined, and later used elsewhere. The 50 turrets ordered from Krupp were installed on the first 50 Tiger IIs.

The Tiger II started production in January of 1944. Despite deficits and a rapidly worsening situation, German high command had grandiose plans for this tank. 120 vehicles were to be built per month, 1237 in total. British aviation corrected those plans by bombing Kassel. As a result of this, only 20 tanks were built by May of 1944.

The first combat experience showed that the tank needed more work. Porsche's turret resulted in a large chance to send a shell ricocheting into the thin roof armour. Krupp had to design a new turret with a vertical front, to eliminate the chance of a ricochet. The thickness of the front turret armour was increased to 180 mm. The turret was also larger, increasing the ammunition capacity from 77 to 84 shells.

Aside from the turret, many small changes were made. The gun was improved, a new gun sight was installed, the engine compartment armour was improved. In November of 1944, the tanks received new tracks. In March of 1945, a device to clear the barrel of gases was put into production. It did not need a compressor, and used air compressed by the gun's recoil.

The closer the end of the war was, the harder it was to build tanks. Along with the modernizations, the tanks were simplified. Latest vehicles were not even painted on the inside. There was no time, they were needed on the battlefield.

Tiger IIs were used in heavy tank battalions, replacing Tiger Is. No new units were created for them. Usually, the replacement happened this way: battalions were recalled, arrived to the training facility at Ohrdruf or Paderborn, received their new tank, went through training, and returned to the front.

On the Western Front, the only tanks capable of combating the Tiger II were the Sherman Firefly, Challenger, Archer, Achilles, and, after September of 1944, M36 Slugger tank destroyers. Tiger IIs also suffered heavy losses from Allied aviation.

On the Eastern Front, the tank made its debut at the Sandomir foothold, during an attack of the Polish city of Staszow. In the battle, "King Tigers" of the 503rd heavy tank battalion were ambushed by the 53rd tank brigade and its assigned artillery. As a result, 24 Tiger IIs were knocked out by Soviet sources, and 11 by German. [I don't know what sources they are looking at, strategic maps of the area and memoirs from the Soviet side account for 13 Tiger II tanks knocked out] Three tanks were captured intact and delivered to the Kubinka proving grounds.

There is a legend that either Porsche himself or his son was killed at Staszow. The highlight of the story is that the man put so much faith into the invincibility of his tank, that he rode it into battle. In reality, Porsche was not the creator of the tanks at Staszow (some of the turrets were new, Henschel ones). If you're not feeling too lazy, you can check the dates of death of Dr. Porsche and his son. He died in 1951, and his son lived until 1998.

Despite the menacing armour and gun of the tank, it had many drawbacks. The "King Tiger" was very unreliable. Vehicles broke down after a very short march. Heavy tank battalions often went into battle with reduced numbers because of this. The worst part was the suspension. The tracks often jammed, drive wheels lasted only 300 hours. The side reductors were destroyed after only 250 hours of use. The overloaded engine overheated, the cooling system could not keep up. Finally, the tank was so heavy, that few bridges could hold it. This significantly reduced the operational maneuverability of the "King Tiger". By the end of the war, the Germans could no longer manufacture quality armour, so the tank's thick hide could not protect it from shells as well as earlier vehicles. Even on non-penetrating shots, fragments of armour flew off and struck the crew and components.

Overall, the Tiger II's characteristics were inferior to both its predecessor, and the Ferdinand tank destroyer. Theoretically, it could defeat any Allied tank. Realistically, it had no such ability. Soviet forces could easily outmaneuver it, hitting the sides or rear. The Allies relied on aviation, relentlessly bombing the German tank positions. There is evidence of 2100 airplanes that were readied to attack the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

In total, you could say that the Tiger II was one of the strongest tanks of WWII. However, the small numbers, many defects in its construction, and effective combat of Soviet and Allied troops prevented it from having an effect on the status of the fronts.

Today, at least nine "King Tigers" survive. In Russia, an example of this fascinating fighting machine can be seen at Kubinka.

Original article available here.

Recovery Inspection

When a tank is knocked out on the battlefield, odds are it's not a complete loss. A little welding here, some swapped parts there, and it will be as good as new! Foreign Tank Evacuation Instructions (1944) contains a handy table for figuring out if a tank you just came across is worth evacuating or not.

"VIII. Defect Identification

1. Defect identification involves an external inspection to determine the technical condition of a tank and the possibility of using it further.
2. Tanks are separated into three groups:
1. Worthy: may be used after a technical inspection or field repairs.
2. Requiring factory repairs.
3. Unworthy: burnt out or completely broken.
3. When determining the condition of a tank, inspect the main parts of the hull: the side, front, rear armour plates, as well as the bottom of the hull.
4. Main characteristics of tank technical conditions:

Worthy	Requiring repairs	Unworthy
In working order, may be used in combat without repairs.	Tanks with a number of penetrations no more than in appendix 16.	Burnt out.
With damage to individual armour elements.	The hull of the tank passes technical requirements for repair. The suspension, armament, and internal mechanisms may be damaged or absent.	Main armour plates have breaches as a result of high caliber shells or bombs.
With penetrations that can be sealed with armoured plugs.	Tanks missing turrets, removable parts of the hull (crew hatches, engine grille), as well as tanks where those parts are damaged.	Heavily damaged armour (chunks are torn out) as a result of mines.
		Clustered penetrations on main armour plates, greater in number than the limit in appendix 16.
		Deep dents, inhibiting normal operation of mechanisms.
		Damage to an area 1/3rd the size of the armour plate.
		Cracks 2/3rds of the way through the armour plate, and cracks reaching plate edges.
		Bent or burst armour plates that inhibit the operation of mechanisms.

After completing inspection, every vehicle must have a document composed (appendix 17), containing:

• The type and hull number of the tank.
• Completeness of parts.
• Technical condition of the tank (list of damages, if the tank can be repaired, list of salvageable components if it cannot, worthy/needs repairs/unworthy)."

Here is appendix 16, "Maximum acceptable number of breaches for reparable tanks".

Medium Tank

Part name	Penetrations with diameter up to 55 mm, with 450 mm between breaches	Penetrations with diameter 55-105 mm, with 500 mm between breaches
Hull side	5	3
Lower rear plate	3	2
Upper front plate	2	2
Lower front plate	3	3
Turret side	3	2
Turret rear	2	One penetration up to 75 mm is acceptable
Turret front	2	0

Additionally, up to three penetrations up to 30 mm in diameter are acceptable.

Heavy Tank

Part name	Penetrations with diameter up to 55 mm, with 450 mm between penetrations	Penetrations with diameter 55-105 mm, with 500 mm between penetrations
Hull side	6	4
Lower rear plate	4	2
Upper front plate	2	0
Lower front plate	3	1
Turret side	4	1
Turret rear	2	1
Turret front	2	1

Additionally, up to five penetrations up to 30 mm in diameter are acceptable.

Shoot on the Move

"Order from the People's Commissar of Defense #0727
September 19th, 1942
Moscow

Contents: on the combat practice of shooting on the move

The experience of the Patriotic War shows that our tankers do not use their tanks' full firepower in battle, and do not vigorously fire at the enemy from machineguns and cannons on the move, limiting themselves to firing cannons from short stops. The current practice of tank attacks without sufficient volume of fire creates favourable conditions for enemy anti-tank guns. This is incorrect, and reduces the firepower and morale impact of our tanks on the enemy, and increases losses from enemy artillery fire.

I decree that:

1. Tank units of the Acting Army must begin a tank attack with powerful fire from all armament on the tank. Firing on the move should be out primary means of affecting the enemy, especially their soldiers.
2. Increase ammunition capacity of tanks, to 114 shells on the KV, 100 on the T-34, and 90 on the T-70.
   Tank brigades should have three ammunition racks worth of ammunition, including the ammunition loaded in tanks.
3. In order to increase operational range, resume the practice of additional gas tanks on the KV (360 liters) and T-34 (270 liters). 
4. The GABTU chief must instruct the chiefs of tank schools to include firing on the move into the curriculum according to this order.
5. GAU KA and USG KA chiefs must make corrections to the supplies of shells, fuel, and lubricants issued to tank units.

People's Commissar of Defense, I. Stalin."

RGASPI 558-11-460

Izhor Steel

"Homogeneous tank armour from new silicon-manganese-molybdenum Izhor factory steel (IZ type)"

RGASPI 558-11-150

"To the People's Commissar of Heavy Manufacturing, comrade S. Ordzhonikidze.

Explanation note on homogeneous tank armour made from new Izhor factory steel (manganese-silicon-molybdenum "IZ" type steel).

Until the middle of 1932, tank armour produced at the Izhor factory was made from chrome-nickel-molybdenum steel, containing 0.8-1.2% chrome, 4-5% nickel, and 0.4-0.6% molybdenum. This steel was very expensive, as it required a large amount of expensive imported components. The need for high quality, and, at the same time, cheaper and independently produced armour forced the factory to perform research into types of steel based on domestically produced compounds. 

A step in the right direction was achieved with silicon-chrome "PI" type steel, containing no imported components other than chrome. "PI" steel was proposed to two factories, ours and Krasniy Putilovets. It was successfully adopted by our factory. However, the "PI" steel could not fully satisfy our needs, as the high chrome byproducts could not be used directly in production of armour, and, when used in other manufacturing processes, resulted in low quality products. 

This forced the factory to explore new types of steel, which combined high toughness and maximum independence from imports with reasonable byproducts. Research work at the factory discovered such a steel at the end of 1932. It was a manganese-silicon-molybdenum steel with the following composition:

• Carbon: 0.29-0.4%
• Manganese: 1.1-1.8%
• Silicon: 1.3-1.8%
• Molybdenum: 0.3-0.5%
• Phosphorous and sulphur: 0.035%

IZ steel (IZ: Izhorskiy Zavod) was extensively researched in our factory. Research was performed in 1932-1933, first on steel cast in the electric furnace, later in a Martin furnace. This research revealed the high armour and mechanical qualities of the IZ steel, and it became necessary to test its combat and manufacturing properties on a wide scale.

In the end of 1933, IZ steel was used for T-35 tanks, in 11 hulls. The amount of defective plates was deemed acceptable for a new type of steel. The number of defective plates was less than with "PI" type steel of equal thickness. However, armour made into hulls showed cracking defects.

These defects are caused by additional stress that the plate experiences during welding. This is especially noticeable in complicated welding processes, or when high hardness plates are being welded. The requirement for high hardness plates (2.7-2.9 mm Brinell diameter) was from an old RKKA request, since, at the time, it was the only way to achieve required toughness.

The factory processed and used high hardness steel according to those requirements, which was one of the main reasons for cracks on IZ steel T-35 hulls. Further research showed that it was possible to use softer steel (up to 3.1 mm Brinell diameter) without loss of toughness. The reduced hardness increases the ductility of the metal, which reduces cracks on the hulls after welding.

All of this was confirmed when 5 hulls for the T-37 amphibious tank were assembled at the "KES" factory in Podolsk. Unlike the hulls produced at the factory with KO type steel, the IZ type steel hulls had no cracks at all. 

In April-May of 1934, an experimental batch of 150 welded and riveted T-26 hulls and 42 welded T-37 hulls was produced. The factory has already mastered the new steel and production of armour from it. Despite the difficulty of using new steel, defective product at all stages of the process, as well as product found defective during shooting and crack inspections, was no higher than for PI steel in 1933, and much lower than for PI steel during its trial period. The production data from the most difficult period in the steel's use gives no doubt that tank armour should be produced from IZ steel. This was once more confirmed when the factory held a general trial of armour and armoured hulls produced from IZ steel in order to finally determine the service quality of armour made from it. The trials were held as follows:

A: Armour trials

1. Bullet-proofness of 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 15 mm armour from 29 batches, mostly forged in Martin furnaces.
2. Shell-proofness of 15 mm thick armour, which is the armour mostly used in T-26 hulls.
3. Bullet-proofness of armour in very low temperatures (-20, -30, -50 degrees,) and very high temperatures (+100 degrees).

B: Armoured hull trials

1. Bullet-proofness of the T-37 hull.
2. Shell-proofness of the riveted and welded T-26 hulls.
3. Effects of low temperatures (-50 and -70 degrees) and sharp temperature changes (from -50 to -70 degrees, and from +90 to +130 degrees) on cracking and deforming of riveted and welded T-26 hulls.
4. Bullet-proofness of a riveted T-26 hull subjected to alternating heating and cooling.

All of these trials were successfully passed by IZ steel armour. This finally confirmed the necessity of producing tank armour using this type of steel. Precise details on testing are recorded in documents with participation from representatives from the RKKA UMM, Armour Council of the NKTP, and the Central Institute of Metals (see the attachment "Materials on the general trials of IZ steel armour"). The main results are given below, along with illustrations.

The data from the research work (composed into a special report), and results from wide use of IZ steel in production, as well as these armour trials allow the following characteristics of main IZ steel qualities to be determined, compared to PI steel.

1. Mechanical qualities: the toughness qualities (resistance to tearing and proportionality limit) for IZ and PI steels is approximately the same. Ductility properties (resistance to blows, compression, and bending) shows that IZ steel is more ductile.
2. Bullet and shell resistance: IZ armour of lower hardness resists bullets just as well as PI steel, and resists shells better than PI steel, giving a more favourable penetration type in the latter case.
3. Armoured hull properties: trials consisting of alternating freezing both types of T-26 hulls to low temperatures (-52 to -70 degrees) and heating them to high temperatures (+90 to +130 degrees), followed by heavy gunfire did not result in cracking defects or a reduction in toughness. This indicates that IZ steel is suitable for use in various climates, and that it is unaffected by sudden temperature changes.
4. Technological and economical advantages of IZ steel: due to the impact of high chrome byproducts on the quality of steel, PI byproducts cannot be used for production of high quality products such as tank armour. The factory was either forced to sell these byproducts at a very low price or use them for lower quality products (pipes, frames for locomotives, etc). No doubt, these chromed byproducts also reduced quality of the latter.
   With IZ steel instead of PI steel, the factory can solve its byproduct issue, since IZ byproducts may be used to produce high quality components. The factory will reduce its consumption of metals, and increase the quality of products produced at the factory. Additionally, the byproducts contain molybdenum, an element that does not burn out during casting, and the re-use of these byproducts will increase the factory's demand for ferromolybdenum. All this allows reduction of costs and increase in quality.

In conclusion, the manganese-silicon-molybdenum IZ steel is no worse than PI steel in its toughness, climate resistance, and mechanical qualities, and has a series of advantages over it. These advantages include the possibility of reusing all byproducts of the casting process and returning molybdenum into new casts.

Aside from this, the new steel guarantees mobilizational readiness of all factories to a much higher degree due to the production process and the materials used, as well as guarantees equal toughness at lower hardnesses.

Taking all of the above into account, the Izhor factory insists that the issue of IZ steel in the production of tank armour be explored as soon as possible.

Attachments: photo album with 40 photographs.

Signatures

June 10th, 1934"

RGASPI 558-11-150

The following pages contain technical details. The first is acceptable amounts of carbon and manganese in the steel. The graph is pretty hard to read, but someone was nice enough to write out the composition on the top in large letters:

• C: 0.29-0.4%
• Mo: 0.3-0.5%
• Mn: 11-18%
• P and S: 0.035%
• Si: 1.3-1.8%
• Cr: 0.3%

The next page is the numeric results of all those test above, which wouldn't really be interesting to anyone that's not a metallurgist, or anyone at all with nothing to compare them to. After that, photographs of trials: tearing resistance, compression resistance, impact resistance, bending resistance, microstructures under various conditions. These are probably also not interesting, but, as always, ask if you need them. The following section is more interesting to us: armour properties!

Bullet-proofness testing was done with 7.62x54r armour piercing AU model 1930 rounds and with regular lead rounds at various distances. Here are some photos.

26 AU armour piercing bullets at 26 meters against a 15 mm plate, no penetrations. Plate front is shown on the top, plate rear on the bottom.

20 AU bullets against a 13 mm plate from 200 meters, no penetrations. 

36 AU bullets from 450 meters against one side of a 10 mm plate and 17 regular bullets from the other side at 50 meters. No penetrations.

9.3 mm plate, 20 AU bullets from 570 meters and 14 regular from 14 meters. No penetrations. 

I think you get the idea, so I'll stop posting pictures and only post more results. An 8 mm plate cannot be penetrated from 600 meters by an AU bullet or from 50 meters by a regular bullet. One bullet causes an indeterminate penetration (penetration due to the same point in armour being struck multiple times). A 7.5 mm plate also resists regular bullets from 50 meters. A 6.4 mm plate can resist the bullet from 150 meters. 

Now we get to the temperature controlled trials. The next photograph is of the armour plate in a freezer (it still looks the same). 

The frozen armour plate after being shot at and thawing. No penetrations from either bullet type at 50 meters, two inconclusive penetrations. Another plate with a different type of weld goes through the same process, with no penetrations (not even inconclusive ones). Another type gets one inconclusive penetration. 

Next, we get to the cooling and trials of entire hulls, with slightly more interesting pictures.

Here is a T-26  hull in a freezer. The label helpfully points out that it is covered in snow. The record at the bottom shows the temperatures that the hull withstood: -10 when inserted into the freezer, frozen to -70 over 4 hours, and then warmed up to -60 degrees over 8 hours. The details for heating are on the next page. The hull was heated up to 90 degrees over 4 hours, and then cooled to 35 over 8 hours. 

Same thing for the riveted hull. The pictures shows frost on the side. The hull was at a balmy -8 when placed into the freezer, cooled to -57 over 4 hours, and warmed to -52 over 8 hours. It was then heated to 120 degrees over 3 hours, and cooled to 65 over 9 hours.

Both hulls were then sprayed with armour piercing bullets from a DT machinegun at 50 meters. The welded hull developed one 35 mm long shallow crack. The riveted hull developed no cracks. 

Next is the T-37 hull. The hull was shot at with a Maxim machinegun, using 230 regular bullets at 50 meters and 114 armour piercing bullets at 570 meters. No penetrations were found. 

Photographs of the T-37 hull before trials and various angles after trials.

Seems that this new miracle steel of theirs was pretty good. IZ steel in thicknesses between 4 and 20 mm was used until at least the start of the Great Patriotic War.

Happy New Year!

Happy 2014 to all my readers!