Thicker Roof

"May 8th, 1943
Conclusions of the 16th Department of the GAU Artillery Committee

1. General part:

On April 27th, 1943, the Artillery Committee received a proposal from the Uralmash factory to transition from producing the roof of the 122 mm SU-122 SPG out of 20 mm thick high hardness armour to 30 mm thick medium hardness armour.

The Uralmash factory motivates this proposal with the fact that due to many cutouts and welds of various components the roof is overloaded and cracks appear, which have to be covered with 20 mm thick applique armour.

Armoured Long Livers

 "Order of the Minister of the Armed Forces to the Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces, Marshal of the Armoured Forces P.S. Rybalko on using unneeded armoured vehicles and spare parts for them

#452102
June 10th, 1947

Minister of the Armed Forces General of the Army comrade Bulganin permitted the use of unneeded armoured vehicles and spare parts for them in the following manner:

• 131 MK-3 [Valentine] tanks, 63 SU-122 SPGs and 282 SU-85 SPGs in need of repairs are to be converted into prime movers for use in the Armoured and Mechanized Forces instead of tractors.
  Functional SU-85 SPGs can be used for training and converted into prime movers as they break down.

Armoured Confusion: Mid-war

The history of Soviet wartime armoured vehicles bore several misconceptions. There are many reasons for this. A number of myths came from a lack of information. Sometimes historians' own guesses that had little to do with reality were interpreted as fact. Unfortunately, the authors of some myths are still considered experts to this day and these exercises in fiction are still cited as fact. Initially the author planned on two articles dedicated to misconceptions about the Great Patriotic War, but there were too many misconceptions for 1942-1943, and so the second article won't be the last.

SPG Feedback

 "Brief conclusions drawn from usage of [self propelled] artillery regiments within the Central Front

...

The following main conclusions can be drawn from the use of self propelled artillery in offensive and defensive fighting against numerous enemy tanks and infantry:

On the offensive:

1. SPGs of all types are well suited for escorting tank attacks on the offensive due to their mobility, armour, and firepower.
2. SPGs do not need time to transition from moving to firing modes and back, which allows the SPGs to follow tanks into action and support them without falling behind.
3. The SPG regiment needs to be used as one whole jointly with its supporting tank unit (tank brigade or regiment).

From Medium Assault Gun to Medium Tank Destroyer

Development of armoured vehicles in many nations proceeds in parallel. A clear example of this is the creation of German and Soviet medium SPGs. Initially, Soviet SPGs were built as tank destroyers. Later, under the influence of the German StuG III Ausf. B, the medium assault gun program was launched, which gave birth to the SU-122. By this time, the Germans had modernized the StuG III and transformed it into primarily a tank destroyer. This SPG was known as the StuG 40. In the USSR this process took longer, as there was no gun to combat German heavy tanks until the spring of 1943. That is when the SU-85 appeared, the most numerous Soviet medium SPG used in the war.

Lessons Learned

"Secret

To Comrade Beria

January 27, 1944

Based on the recommendations given by the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Army General comrade Malinovskiy, we report that:

1. Item 1 in comrade Malinovsky's letter proposed installation of spaced armour 30-50 mm thick on the SU-85 and SU-122 SPGs.
   We consider that it would be unacceptable to install 30-50 mm thick spaced armour on the SU-85 and SU-122 SPGs on the T-34 chassis due to excess weight and overloading of the front suspension, which would radically reduce the lifespan of the transmission and running gear.
   An experimental SPG with a 100 mm gun is being built which will have 75 mm of front armour. Trials will show how feasible this undertaking is.

Big Guns

"To the Chief of the 16th Department of the GAU Artillery Committee, Colonel comrade Zhevanik

I report on the work that I performed during my trip to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk from May 3rd to May 28th, 1943.

1. Kalinin factory #8.

Based on directions by Lieutenant General of Artillery Hohlov, I organized work to design and produce an experimental 85 mm tank gun. To achieve this, I supplied factory #8 with a copy of the tactical-technical requirements and necessary blueprints with the aid of the GAU military representative at factory #9. I negotiated with the factory's director, comrade Fratkin, as well as the chief engineer and chief designer. Based on this meeting, comrade Fratkin gave the order on May 4th to quickly begin work on designing the gun with the aim of completing blueprints by May 10th.

A Different Angle

There is a strangely prevalent opinion in some circles that everything there was to know about WWII was already known, and that any new information is completely unnecessary revisionism. Those people are naturally wrong, as illustrated pretty conclusively by Yuri Pasholok. Something as fundamental as a measurement went uncorrected for decades.

Winding Down

"To comrade V. Molotov

In accordance with your decree on May 15th, 1943, on the letter from GAU Chief comrade Yakovlev regarding reducing the supply of tank guns for SU-122 and SU-76 SPGs in the second quarter of 1943, I report the following:

The GAU (comrade Yakovlev) asks to reduce the quota for the second quarter compared to what was approved by the GOKO #3292 on May 6th, 1943, for production of the SU-76, SU-122, and KV-8S:

• 76 mm ZIS-3 divisional guns: from 350 to 250
• 122 mm M-30 mod. 1938 howitzers: from 400 to 340

Cancel the order for 30 45 mm guns with the ZIS-5 elevation mechanism completely.

Regarding the reduction of 122 mm howitzers, comrade Yakovlev refers to the closeness of factory #9 and the Uralmash factory, for which it is satisfactory to have a two-week buffer of howitzers, no more than 65 units, but the factory does not have that many.

The People's Commissar of Tank Production (comrade Zaltsmann) does not disagree with comrade Yakovlev's proposal.

The GBTU (comrade Afonin) disagrees only with the reduction of M-30 howitzer supplies to Uralmash, as the reserve at Uralmash as of May 1st is only 12 units. Given that the quota for SU-122 SPGs in the second quarter of 1943 is 315, the reduction of howitzer supplies to 340 is excessive, especially since it does not fill the GAU's reserve for two weeks of production in the amount of 65 units.

I consider it reasonable to accept the proposal of comrade Yakovlev, with the exception of maintaining the amount of M-30 howitzers at 400 units.

E. Kruglov."

CAMD RF 38-11355-1743 p. 161

Mistimed Improvement

A notable event in the history of Soviet tank building took place in December of 1942. The SU-35, the first Soviet medium SPG, was put into production. There was the SG-122 that predated it, but it was a conversion of the German StuG III. The SU-35, however, was an entirely domestic design. Due to the urgency, the SU-35 was put into production without a second prototype. The SPG went into production straight from the drawing board. Nevertheless, the issue of modernization was raised at the highest levels in January of 1943. The result of the ensuing work was the SU-122M. However, this assault SPG's fate was not as fortunate: it never made it to production.

Assault Gun from the Urals

December of 1942 was a key month in the history of Soviet SPGs. Work on light and medium SPGs reached the stage of preparation for production. The Ural Factory of Heavy Machinebuilding (UZTM) was chosen to produce medium SPGs. There were two reasons for this. In addition to the fact that development of the U-35 SPG was coming to an end in Sverdlovsk, there was a strong manufacturing base here. Local production of T-34s, which started here in late September of 1942, ensured a supply of chassis for SPGs.

Taking into account the factory's abilities, GKO decree #2559 "On organization of production of SPGs at the Uralmash factory and factory #38" was signed on December 2nd, even before the start of U-35 trials. According to this document, UZTM was expected to deliver the first two SU-35 SPGs (later renamed SU-122) in December of 1942.

SU-122 Cost

"To UZTM Director, comrade Muzrukov

UZTM Military Representative, comrade Mitrofanov

GAU FPO Chief

NKTP Military Department Chief

Based on GKO decree #2559ss issued on December 2nd, 1942, you are instructed to produce and deliver products according to the attached deadlines, prices, blueprints, and technical requirements in the first quarter of 1943, totaling up to a price of 60 million rubles.

Note: the temporary cost of a SU-35 SPG for the 1st quarter, agreed upon with the NKTP, is 200,000 rubles. The cost of the cannon is not included in the price.

Unlucky SPG from Mytishi

On December 2nd, 1942, GKO decree #2559ss "On organization of production of self propelled guns (SPGs) at the Uralmash factory and factory #38" was signed. It became the final point in the long history of Soviet medium SPGs, which started out as tank destroyers, but turned into assault guns in the spring of 1942. On GKO's orders, the U-35, designed by the UZTM design bureau, was put into production, even though it had not even entered trials yet. This kind of order is explained by the desperate need for these kind of vehicles in the Red Army. Interestingly, instead of Sverdlovsk, Mytishi could have become the center for medium SPG development. The SPGs designed at factory #592 were, at the very least, no worse than those designed in Sverdlovsk.

Through Adversity to the SU-122

It was clear by the spring of 1942 that work on a medium SPG on the T-34 chassis with an 85 mm gun in a rotating turret hit a dead end. The result of this work, which started back in the summer of 1940, was the U-20, which the military considered unsatisfactory. The project didn't leave the drawing board. Later, development of Soviet SPGs took a different path. A significant influence was the study of a captured StuG III Ausf. B. Later, factory #592 built a Soviet version on its chassis, called SG-122. It was clear, however, that converting foreign vehicles was not the end.

SU-122-2 in Combat

The CIA has a tendency of detecting all sorts of armoured vehicles that are as interesting as they are fictional, but this time they might have hit the mark.

CIA-RDP82-00457R005700310005-7

Two guns, like a SU-122, but larger. There can be only one answer!

One Armed Driver

"Award Order

1. Name: Khomenko, Ignat Stepanovich
2. Rank: Senior Sergeant
3. Position, unit: SU-122 mechanic-driver, 1817th SPG Regiment
   is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
4. Year of birth: 1914
5. Nationality: Ukrainian
6. Party affiliation: VKP(b) candidate
7. Participation in the Civil War and in subsequent action in defense of the USSR, Patriotic War (where, when): in the Patriotic War since August 1943
8. Wounds and concussions in the Patriotic War: deceased
9. In the Red Army since: 1941
10. Recruited by: Komsomolsk recruitment office, Komsomolsk-on-Amur
11. Prior awards: Order of the Red Star

Brief and specific description of personal heroism or achievements: A master of driving tanks and SPGs, Senior Sergeant I.S. Khomenko showed fearlessness, courage, bravery, heroism, and patriotism for his socialist Motherland and his people in battle for Gerasimovka and Russkaya Polyana.

On the night of November 16th to November 17th, he burst into the positions of fascists from SS Viking. division carrying infantry riders. With fire and tracks, he remorselessly destroyed any fascists that did not escape.

On the night of November 20th, 1943, he moved out at a breakneck pace and was the first to reach the Cherkassy railroad station with his submachinegunner riders at 8:00. In 20-25 minutes, the tracks of his menacing fighting machine were already on Cherkassy streets, remorselessly crushing fascists and their weapons.

An enemy shell tore off his right hand. Comrade Khomenko overcame his pain and refused to let go of his levers. With the last of his strength, using only his left hand, he drove on, crushing enemy vehicles and weapons. Without letting go of his controls, he met the death of brave men on the streets of Cherkassy.

His heroic deeds in the name of his Motherland make him worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

CAMD RF 33-793756-51

Double Barrels from Perm

In December of 1942, Soviet tank designers had the idea of creating a multi-barreled SPG on a modified T-34 chassis. One of the projects was developed at the Perm OKB-172, an unusual dual howitzer indexed SU-2-122. The project didn't move past the blueprint stage, and remained in the archives. What was it like?

The idea of multi-barreled artillery systems that could fire a salvo occupied the minds of tank designers from many countries. In one case, a design made it to mass production and even to battle: the light Marmon-Herrington MTLS-IGI4, armed with two 37 mm guns. 145 tanks were built, used in combat in the Pacific.

In the USSR, the most famous multi-barreled tank was the KV-7.An experimental prototype of the assault tank (it was never called an SPG) was designed in November of 1941 in Chelyabinsk on Stalin's orders. The KV-7 was armed with two 45 mm guns and one 76 mm ZiS-5 gun. The KV-7 could fire all three guns at the same time. A prototype was finished in December of 1941, and mass production was expected. Archive data reveals that KV-7 hulls were ordered before trials even began, and 20 of them were made. Trials in January of 1942 showed the poor execution of the simultaneous firing idea. The KV-7 was converted to use a pair of 76 mm guns, but the results were largely the same.

While the KV-7 was being worked on, a project on the T-34 chassis was developed in Nizhniy Tagil at factory #183. The tank, indexed T-34-3, had two 45 mm guns and one 76 mm gun in a rotating turret. Unlike the KV-7, this tank did not make it to metal. Activity on this topic ceased, but not for long.

In the middle of December of 1942, the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat of Armament composed tactical-technical characteristics for an SPG with two 122 mm M-30 howitzers. This request was a project of personal initiative, since it did not receive high priority. It was proposed by Major-General of the Artillery Engineering service, A.A. Tolochkov, who was the chief of the experimental designs department. The requirements were as follows:

• The armament must consist of two 122 mm howitzers, using barrels and breeches from the M-30.
• The guns must have the same mount, but have separate recoil brakes, as similar as possible to those on the M-30.
• The mount and recoil mechanisms must be protected by armour.
• The vertical traverse must be from -5 degrees to +15 degrees, horizontal traverse of 15-20 degrees.
• The front armour must be 70 mm thick, side armour 30 mm, roof and rear 15-20 mm.
• T-34 components must be used as much as possible.
• The ground pressure must not exceed that of the T-34.
• The guns must be able to fire individually or simultaneously.
• 1 or 2 additional DT machineguns must be available as additional armament.

On May 12th, 1943, the GAU Artillery Committee received a letter from the city of Molotov (the name of Perm from 1940 to 1957). The letter, sent by OKB-172 chief, NKVD Lieutenant-Colonel N.A. Ivanov, contained two projects. One was a heavy 203 mm SPG on the KV-1S chassis, the other a medium SU-2-122 SPG, the same one that requirements were created for in 1942. Both projects were supervised by A.F. Smirnov.

It's worth mentioning what OKB-172 was. It was none other than a prison. The majority of its staff were imprisoned engineers that used to work in Leningrad. In 1941, they were evacuated to Perm. A wide variety of projects were created within the walls of OKB-172, including the 45 mm mod. 1942 gun. Smirnov, the supervisor of the SU-2-122 project, also worked on the MU-2 and B-2-LM naval guns. A part of the prisoners were pardoned due to their excellent work on June 19th, 1943, by decree of the State Committee of Defense #3612. The decree was proposed by Beria himself. As free men, Smirnov and others continued work in OKB-172.

The unusual requirements led to an unusual, yet very well thought out project. Aside from 12 pages of description, it had 5 pages of blueprints with overall views of the vehicle as well as the artillery system. It was obvious that the stock T-34 chassis was not enough for two 122 mm guns. The hull had to be lengthened by 890 mm, and an extra road wheel added. Remembering that T-34 parts had to be used as much as possible, the designers left the engine compartment and the driver's compartment without changes. Unlike the SU-122, where the driver's seat changed and the machinegun operator was done away with, the SU-2-122's front was the same as on the T-34. This was one of the things that lengthening the hull allowed to achieve. The longer hull also improved balance. Unlike the SU-122, the SU-2-122 did not increase pressure on the front road wheels.

The turret was replaced with a casemate (or, in terminology of the day, an immobile turret). In order to increase the available space, the sides of the casemate were wider than the top of the hull. The casemate sides were sloped to improve protection. As was specified in the requirements, the front armour was thickened to 70 mm.

The guns were mounted on a frame, attached to the front of the casemate. This solution, common for Soviet medium and heavy SPGs, had many advantages. A frame did not require a massive floor mount, which decreased complexity and freed up space in the fighting compartment. The artillery system was designed very well. The oscillating part of the M-30 (which, by the way, was produced at factory #172, where the design bureau was based) remained unchanged. Both howitzers were covered by one mantlet. The aiming mechanisms and sights were to the left of the guns. The gunner's seat was also placed on the left, and moved with the guns. The DT machinegun was to the right of the guns, the ball mount and mantlet borrowed from the T-34.

The crew of the SU-2-122 consisted of 6 men. The crewmen could move about freely, due to the size of the casemate, and even stand up fully. Each M-30 had its own loader. The SU-122 had one loader and one breech operator, working in much more cramped conditions. Here, loading was much simpler. The ammunition rack consisted of 70 shells, placed along the rear of the fighting compartment. This placement eased the work of the loaders. The estimated rate of fire of this gun would be 4-5 salvos per minute.

No further work was done on the SU-2-122. The design of a tank is a difficult process, and any decision has a drawback. In this case, it was the size and weight of the vehicle. The longer hull and roomy fighting compartment did not come for free. In this case, the mass of the SPG was estimated to be 34.5 tons, while the SU-122 weighed only 29.6 tons. The ground pressure increased, and average offroad speed decreased to 15 kph. The height was also an important parameter: the SU-2-122 was 2940 mm tall (the roof was 2740 mm off the ground), which was taller than the SU-152.

The main problem with the SU-2-122 was not the height or the weight. In the spring of 1943, production of the SU-122 was underway, and it did not require the T-34 chassis to change. Even the SU-122 was not enough for the military in May of 1943, as a captured Tiger was already tested, and showed that an SPG should have an 85 mm gun with AA 52-K gun ballistics. Nobody needed this double barreled tank, especially after the experience with the KV-7. As a result, this project remained in the archives, where it was discovered very recently.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

SU-2-122

I wrote about the SU-2-122 a while ago, a strange project to put two 122 mm howitzers on a lengthened T-34 chassis that ultimately lost out to the conventional SU-122. Yuri Pasholok posted a few blueprints of this oddity.

Counter-Counter-Attack Manual

"Orders to commanders of the 4th Ukrainian Front on fighting enemy tanks and SPGs in depth

When our forces penetrate enemy defenses and especially when they fight in depth, the enemy counterattacks with groups of tanks and SPGs. These groups act carefully from ambushes or fire on our attacking forces from two or more kilometers away. In areas where our infantry is not prepared to fight mobile enemy units, the offensive slows down or stalls.

The sensitivity of our first echelon troops to enemy tanks and SPGs can be explained by insufficiently effective organization of countermeasures to enemy tanks and SPGs. Current faults with our anti-tank defenses are as follows:

1. Infantry support artillery lags behind our lines, as a result of which when enemy tanks are encountered these guns are either silent or fire ineffectively from long distances.
2. Our tanks and SPGs also occasionally lag behind and maneuver poorly. There is insufficient cooperation between SPGs. As such, our tanks face significant losses when an ambush is encountered.
3. Observation of the battlefield is inadequate. There are no special observers looking for enemy tanks. Artillerymen often spot enemy tanks and SPGs either too late or not at all. There is no special signal for when tanks and SPGs are spotted.
4. Infantry and artillery does not use effective means to indicate the direction of tank attacks, so our artillery opens fire with a delay, fires in a disorganized fashion, often without observers.

In order to increase effectiveness when fighting enemy tanks and SPGs in depth and improve cooperation between infantry and tanks, commanders must do the following:

1. First echelon battalions (assault battalions) must be able to independently suppress and destroy enemy weapons, personnel, tanks, and SPGs. In order to achieve this, assign 3-4 tanks or SPGs, one 76 mm divisional gun battery, and 120 mm mortars. Guns and mortars need ropes to tow them behind advancing infantry by hand. An infantry squad must be assigned to each 76 mm gun to help their crews.
2. Each regiment in the first echelon of the advancing division must be assigned a 76 mm ZiS-3 gun battery with the sole objective of destroying enemy tanks and SPGs. These batteries must be maneuverable and daring. If tanks or SPGs appear out of effective range, the batteries must move forward under the cover of terrain or smoke. Attach men to these units from the rear and command platoons to help them push their guns. Equip the guns with ropes and entrenching tools.
   Each division must also have 1-2 122 mm guns or 152 mm gun-howitzers for the same purpose. These guns must follow infantry and destroy enemy tanks and SPGs at 1.5-2 kilometers. The divisional artillery commander must have a direct line of communication to these guns, either by radio or telephone.
3. SPG groups dedicated to battalion support must be composed of either mixed SU-76 and SU-122 SPGs, SU-152 SPGs, or SU-85 SPGs. Pay special attention to the cooperation between SPGs and AT gun batteries attached to the regiment or battalion.
4. As forces move out in areas where tanks are likely to appear, prepare suppressing and concentrated fire by one or two artillery squadrons or rocket artillery batteries, which open fire immediately as enemy tanks appear. When repelling tanks attacks, use carefully aimed indirect fire from heavy gun and howitzer batteries. 
5. In order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy tanks, especially heavy tanks, use smoke shells or bombs.
6. The main signal for signalling the approach of enemy tanks is smoke or mid-air detonations of shrapnel shells, as well as tracers from machineguns. Keep a supply of smoke or shrapnel rounds and tracers in forward batteries and machinegun squads.
7. Each observation point (artillery, infantry, tank, combined arms) must have special observers responsible for the detection of tanks that must report their appearance in the sector. Use aircraft, especially artillery spotters, to locate tanks in time.
8. Commanders of guns, batteries, squadrons, tanks, and SPGs, officers, sergeants and privates of other types of forces that excel at destroying enemy tanks and clear the way for infantry must be rewarded for each destroyed tank or SPG: the crew of the weapon responsible with an Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd class, the officer with an Order of the Red Banner.
9. These directions must be studied by all officers of artillery, infantry, tank, and engineering units.

Spread the word of rewards for destroyed enemy tanks and SPGs to privates and sergeants."

Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War, vol. 2, doc. 09.

World of Tanks History Section: Gorlitskiy's "Waffentrager"

Lev Izraelevich Gorlitskiy started the war in the role of the chief designer of artillery at factory #185 in Leningrad. From June to October of 1941, his department was tasked with placing weapons into long-term fortified positions to protect approaches to Leningrad. In October, the factory was evacuated to Sverdlovsk and became a part of the Ural heavy machinebuilding factory.

One year later, in October of 1942, Gorlitskiy headed a newly formed design bureau at Uralmash, tasked with developing SPGs. A very sharp need in them was felt after new Tiger tanks appeared on the battlefield.

Deadly Classic

Three SPGs developed by Lev Izraelevich in 1942-1944 contributed significantly to victory over Germany.

Gorlitskiy's first creation was the SU-122, an assault gun. A 122 mm howitzer was placed in an immobile casemate. The gun shot HE, later HEAT ammunition. Despite numerous drawbacks, the vehicle was received well. The gun was effective against soft targets and personnel, but the low muzzle velocity did not allow it to effectively engage tanks.

SU-85 (1943) was a specialized SPG, designed to fight German Tigers and Panthers. its 85 mm gun could penetrate their armour from short and medium distances, but could be ineffective at ranges over 800 meters.

In 1944, Gorlitskiy's design bureau developed a tank destroyer with a 100 mm gun: the SU-100. It was the most dangerous enemy of all German vehicles. The only tanks it had problems with at long distances were King Tigers, Jagdtigers, and Ferdinands.

The design of all of the above vehicles was classic for Soviet SPGs: a chassis of a serial tank, casemate in the front, decent frontal armour. This layout was simple and technologically sound, but had two drawbacks. One was that the front of the chassis was overloaded, which decreased reliability of the suspension. The second was that long anti-tank guns made it more likely that the gun will stick into the ground in an unlucky move.

These issues could not be resolved in the classic style, a new approach was necessary. Layouts with a rear fighting compartment were tested, but Gorlitskiy had even more novel ideas.

New Look at SPGs

Gorlitskiy wrote in his memoirs that he wanted to make a vehicle "with long term prospects, compatible with all modern requirements". Under the new system of SPGs, the vehicles would be a part of a support class. These SPGs had to be universal, with the ability to destroy enemy tanks, fortifications, and personnel equally well.

The first step of Gorlitskiy's design bureau was to carefully study domestic and foreign experience. German Waffentrager vehicles aroused their interest. These vehicles consisted of a tracked mount with a gun on top, protected only by a light shield. This was Gorlitskiy's inspiration for the SU-100P or "item-105".

The SU-100P was not like any fully armoured Soviet SPG. Gorlitskiy bet on mobility and firepower. A new chassis was designed with armour no thicker than 15 mm. It carried a D-10S gun on a rotating mount. The gun was covered by a small open cabin and had an unheard of horizontal gun traverse: 155 degrees. The vehicle could fire from direct or indirect positions.

The SU-100P chassis was made from scratch, In a rare case among Soviet designs, the engine compartment was located in the front. A new gearbox gave the tank's driver control at any speed and on a road of any complexity. For the first time in Soviet tank building, rubberized track link bearings were used, increasing the lifespan of tracks.

In 1955, after trials and improvements, the SU-100P was accepted by the Soviet Army, but only a small number was made: no more than 24 vehicles. The main reason for this was the "rocket boom" that reigned during Khrushchev's rule.

The SU-100P's chassis had better luck. It turned out to be very much in demand. Even during trials, the chassis was borrowed by two other vehicles: the SU-152G and SU-152 "Taran". Later, the chassis was lengthened to 7 road wheels and used by many vehicles. Among them are the BTR-122 tracked APC, Krug AA missile platform, and other launchers. The chassis was also used by the Akatsiya SPG, Tulpan self propelled mortar, and Giatsint-S 152 mm SPG.

Article author: Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here.