Tsyganov's Armour

Additional armour developed by Engineer-Major N.F. Tsyganov, author of the BT-IS and BT-SV

Plenty of tank designers were among those who were repressed in the 1930s. 1937-38 was the most difficult period where a number of designers and military personnel linked to tank production were either executed or ended up with lengthy prison sentences. However, history sometimes lumps the latter in with the former. For instance, A.O. Firsov (chief designer of the T2K design bureau at factory #183) died in 1943 of natural causes and was not executed as is sometimes written. There are even more surprising cases where the allegedly executed party remained working at their old place of employment. For instance, Nikolai Nikolayevich Kozyrev, the chief tank designer at factory #37 and author of the T-37 and T-37A amphibious reconnaissance tanks, would have been very surprised to find out that he was executed. Kozyrev didn't even leave factory #37. It's true that N.A. Astrov replaced him as the head of tank design, but Kozyrev remained in important positions. By the fall of 1941 he occupied the post of chief engineer of factory #37. After evacuation to Sverdlovsk he continued working on tanks.

Tsyganov's BT-IS tank. The drives to the wheels can be seen. The BT-IS was an 8x6 vehicle, i.e. 6 of the wheels were powered.

Back to Battle

 "On the actions of liberated POWs and repatriated citizens in the 47th Guards Tank Regiment between January 18th and February 8th, 1945.

On January 14th, 1945, after the 9th Guards Tank Corps was introduced into a breach, the 47th Guards Tank Brigade fought at the vanguard of the corps.

In battles for Grójec, Mszczonow, and Sochaczew the brigade took heavy losses in the motorized riflemen submachine gunner battalion.

When Sochaczew (January 18th), Bromberg (January 22nd), and Kutzer (January 28th) were liberated, Russian POWs and repatriated citizens were freed from camps.

Coded Accounting

 "December 19th, 1944

Proposals to change marking and numbering of tanks, SPGs, and engines

The following system is to be used for numbering tanks and SPGs:

1. January and February 1945:
1. Leave the factory letter codes.
2. Keep the year and month, i.e. all factories will start serial numbers with 412.
3. Increment tanks and SPG serial numbers, for example:
1. Factory #183's first tank built in January of 1945 will have the number T412716 if the last tank built in December 1944 had the number T412715.
2. Factory #112's first tank built in January of 1945 will have the number G412316 if the last tank built in December 1944 had the number G412315, etc.

T-80 Production Woes

 "To the Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Engineer-Colonel comrade Afonin

1.

The poorly organized and irresponsible actions of the factory management as well as a lack of responsibility and assistance from the NKTP in the organization of a new tank factory throughout the first half of 1943 led to a drop in the quality and quantity of T-80 tanks produced at factory #40.

Training Time

 "Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0436
October 23rd, 1943
Moscow

Contents: on moving training tank units to a 6 month study period.

In order to raise the quality of crews trained in training tank and SPG regiments, I order to:

Establish a 6 month training period for personnel of all Red Army training tank units as of November 1st, 1943.

People's Commissar of Defense,
Marshal of the Soviet Union, I. Stalin"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin

Change in Ranks

The Red Army set a high standard for tank crew ranks in 1941, namely that commanders of nearly all tanks were officers. In 1945 Fedorenko petitioned the General Staff to roll that bar back a bit.

"October 17th, 1945

In order to fill the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army with well rounded officers and NCOs, I consider the following to be reasonable:

1. As of January 1st, 1946, set the length of training courses at tank academies to 3 years. Graduates are to be awarded the rank of Lieutenant and assigned as tank or SPG platoon commanders.
2. Enroll privates and NCOs with at least one year of combat experience and at least 7 years of schooling or civilian youths with at least 9 years of schooling in these academies.
3. Commanders of medium and light tanks and SPGs can hold the rank of Sergeant, Senior Sergeant, or Starshina, depending on their training and duration of service.
4. As of January 1st, 1946, set the length of training courses for NCOs in training regiments to 1 year.
5. Until a sufficient number of NCOs are trained, it is permitted to retain officers as commanders of light and medium tanks and SPGs.

I ask for your decision.

Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces, Marshal of the Armoured Forces, Ya. Fedorenko"

CAMD RF F. 38 Op.11389 D.46 L.40

Printed in Glavnoye Bronetankovoye Upravleniye Lyudi, Sobytiya, Fakty v dokumentakh, 1944-1945 p.716

Starshina Commanders

 "In 1941 order #0433 signed by then Deputy People's Commissar of Defense comrade Fedorenko ordered the assignment of Lieutenants and Junior Lieutenants as the commanders of medium and light gun tanks.

Based on this order, commanders of T-26 and BT tanks also have to be officers.

Considering the shortage of officers and less demanding training for commanders of T-26 and BT tanks compared to modern vehicles, I consider it possible and reasonable to appoint well prepared troops with the rank of Starshina who have a lot of experience in these tanks.

I ask for your decision.

Attached: order of the People's Commissar of Defense.

Deputy Commander of Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Red Army, Colonel-General of the Tank Forces, B. Korobkov

Member of the Military Council of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Red Army, Colonel-General of the Tank Forces, N. Biryukov"

CAMD RF F.38 Op.11355 D.1518 L.35
Printed in Glavnoye Bronetankovoye Upravleniye Lyudi, Sobytiya, Fakty v dokumentakh, 1944-1945 p.421

Fathers of the SU-152

 "Order to the People's Commissariat of Tank Production #764s
Chelyabinsk
November 13th, 1942

On the creation of an SPG design group

In accordance with the order issued by People's Commissar of Tank Production comrade I.M. Zaltsman on the creation of SPGs on the KV and T-34 tank chassis, I order to:

1. Create an SPG design group within the Kirov factory's design bureau, as the factory is a producer of both T-34 and KV tanks.
2. Appoint engineer Lev Sergeyevich Troyanov to the position of Deputy Chief Designer of Tank Production at the Kirov Factory. Task him with leading the SPG design group.
3. Director of the UZTM factory comrade Muzrukov must permanently transfer designers Kurin, Ilyin, Rybin, and Vishnyakov to the Kirov factory by November 15th, 1942.

Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, Kotin"

Via Yuri Pasholok

Final Exam

"Questions that must be studied during evening training by privates and sergeants of the 8th Independent Guards Belaya Tserkov Order of Lenin Artillery Tank Destroyer Brigade of the Reserve of Supreme Command 

1. Combat qualities of your weapon.
2. Ballistic properties of your weapon.
3. Ammunition issued per each of our weapons.
4. Penetration of our weapons with AP and APCR ammunition.
5. Armour thickness of the T-6 (Tiger) tank.

Background Check

"Name: Koshkin, Mikhail Ilyich

Year of birth: 1898

Nationality: Russian

Education: engineer-designer

Party affiliation: party member since 1919

Party offenses: none

Membership in other parties: none

Membership in oppositional or anti-party groups: none

Membership in militaries fighting against the Soviet Union: none

Foreign contacts: none

Current position: Chief Designer

Recommended by: attestation commission

Recommended for: position of chief designer

Commissions' findings:

Comrade M.I. Koshkin is descended from poor peasants. He worked at factory #183 since December 28th, 1936, starting from the position of head of design department #100, then as the head of design bureau #24. On April 1st, 1939, he was nominated for the position of the factory's Chief Designer.

Tanker's Oath

"A Socialist Obligation of soldiers, commanders, and political workers of the 1st Tank Battalion, 100th Tank Brigade

To the People's Commissar of Tank Production, comrade V.A. Malyshev

We, the soldiers, commanders, and political workers, take on the following obligations based on the directions given to us by you when you visited our battalion to take care of our vehicles with love, strike the fascists without mercy, and fight for the Guards brigade. We swear to:

1. Carry out comrade Stalin's order #100 with honour. We will study our weapons to perfection, master the art of war, strike the fascist invaders until their annihilation.
2. We will fight such that every crew is granted the high government honour of the Order of the Patriotic War.
3. We will always keep our menacing tanks in full fighting order. In maintaining our expensive vehicles we swear to keep the engine running for 200 hours before medium repairs.
4. Each T-34 crew swears to destroy at least 5 German tanks on the front lines of the Patriotic War and to receive a T-34 tank as a gift from you for every 5 German tanks destroyed.
5. We swear to mercilessly defeat the fascist beasts in battle, to destroy their vehicles, to fight for the Guards brigade, and to honourably execute comrade Stalin's order to defeat the German fascists in 1942.

Death to German occupants!

This obligation is unanimously approved at the meeting of the 1st Tank Battalion, 100th Tank Brigade on June 9th, 1942.

Signed:

[signatures]"

RGAE F.8752 Op.4 D.220 pp. 13-14

Experiments in Tankograd

"People's Commissariat of Tank Production

#1041s

February 9th, 1942

To the Deputy Chair of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Tank Production, V.A. Malyshev

The creation and deployment of a powerful heavy tank production center in the Urals requires the rapid organization of a design center based on the concentration of tank and engine designers already gathered here and a special experimental production base that has yet to be created.

Penal Company

"HQ

371st Rifle Division

Personnel department

August 8th, 1942

#0770

To the Chief of Staff of the 30th ARmy

RE: #04/01114

I report that a penalty company could not be organized within the 371st Rifle Division due to a lack of personnel guilty of crimes against the Motherland. The tank units did not send anyone guilty of crimes against the Motherland either.

Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sakayev

Staff Military Commissar, Battalion Commissar Popov"

Via Yuri Pasholok

Study Guide

"Approved

Deputy Commander of the 2nd Tank Army

Major-General of the Engineering Tank Service

Yukin

September 9th, 1944

Directions for planning combat training of tank commanders and tank drivers

Due to insufficient training of tank commanders and drivers arriving in marching companies on issues of service, usage, and driving of tanks, especially in forested, swampy, or sandy terrain, the repair and usage department of the [illegible] considers it necessary to organize technical training for newly arriving commanders and drivers over the course of 20 days, a total of 80 hours.

IS-6 Drama

"To GBTU representative, Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel comrade Markin

Having taken the post of the GBTU TU representative at factory #100 in April of 1944, I already reported that my work at the factory is made difficult because of the fact that the factory is hiding experimental work from me, which has now resumed at the factory. At first, this secrecy was obtained by organizing a special room, which only comrade Kotin and a short list of other people were permitted to enter. I was not included in this list (at the time, the design of the IS-6 tank was being kept secret from me).

Rules of Conduct

"Top Secret

Cipher #1141-1143

From 65th Army

Submitted August 10th, 1944, 21:00

Accepted August 10th, 1944, 21:41

Received by Ciphers Office on August 10th, 1944, 22:20

Special priority

#5270/Sh

To commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts and the 1st Ukrainian Front

All corps and division commanders of the above Fronts

CC: Politruk Zharov, comrade Vladimirov, comrade Bulganin, comrade Hrulev

During the liberation of Polish territory from German occupants, some units, formations, and trophy teams do not understand the specifics of our friendship with the Committee of National Liberation and entirely incorrectly include property belonging to Polish organizations, private citizens, and municipal governments as trophies. According to the agreement between the USSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Stavka of the Supreme Command orders that:

1. On Polish territory, defined as all land west of the Curzon line, "trophy" is taken to mean all armament, ammunition, military vehicles, military intendant and military technician equipment, fuel and lubricants of all types, general and special purpose transport, military warehouses, and other property of the enemy's armies.
2. Warehouses filled with property looted by the Germans from Polish citizens and Polish organizations (food, livestock, building materials, medicine, factory tools, transport, civilian goods, etc) are to be guarded and transferred with a receipt to the Polish government.
3. Any kind of possessions, transport, or equipment whatsoever belonging to private citizens, cooperative organizations, industrial organizations, or municipal governments does not count as trophies and cannot be taken.
4. Possessions without a lawful owner (including those who fled to Germany along with retreating Germans) and abandoned goods (grain or other food, livestock, prepared products, equipment, raw materials, goods at factories, etc) must be guarded and transferred with a receipt to the Polish government.
5. All complaints regarding unauthorized seizure of food or livestock from the population (including swapping horses) will be investigated. If the fact is confirmed, the possessions must be returned or compensation paid even if a specific culprit could not be identified.
6. All personnel, regardless of rank or position, are to be harshly punished up to and including judgement by a military tribunal for unauthorized seizure of possessions from civilians.
   Commanders and superiors who do not prevent unauthorized actions of their subordinates or assist in these acts must also be held criminally responsible.
7. All officers, NCOs, as well as commanders of trophy units and formations must be familiar with this order.

#220138
Stalin

Antonov"

Via Yuri Pasholok.

Lesson Plan

"March 20th, 1945

Syllabus for technical preparation of crews for usage of tanks and SPGs in spring-summer conditions

Objective: to teach the main rules of  moving over to using tanks and SPGs in the spring and summer and learn the specifics of using tanks and SPGs in the spring and summer.

Time allotted: 12 hours, one hour per day

Location: in classrooms and in vehicles

Training conducted by: technical deputy commanders of companies and battalions

U-18 Controversy

After the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War, People's Commissar of Tank Production Malyshev ordered each factory to write up a record of their activity during the war. This is what UZTM wrote about their attempt to convert the strange looking KV-7 into a functional SPG.

"U-18

This is a project of a KV-7 SPG with the powerful 152 mm ML-20 gun.

The gun is also installed using a frame mount. The aiming angles are +15 to -5 vertically, 7 degrees 30 minutes to each side horizontally, or 15 degrees in total. The gun has good ballistic performance (43-51 kg shells, 550-650 m/s muzzle velocity) which gives 98 mm of penetration from 1000 meters compared to 49 mm from the ZIS-5 gun.

The explosive charge of the 152 mm shell is three times greater than that of the 76 mm shell.

Organization

"Central Committee of the VKP(b) to comrade G.M. Malenkov

The straight PPSh magazine designed by comrade O.S. Petrenko was vetted by the GAU and approved for production in July of 1943 (after a ten month period when 20 magazines were produced at the Instrumental Local Production Factory by the Moscow City Council and tested at proving grounds).

T-54 Delays

"To the Chief of the GBTU TU, Engineer-Colonel comrade Blagonravov

RE: preparing production of the T-54

Order of the NKTP #217ss given in May 1945 instructed factory #183 to send blueprints of the T-54 turret to factories ##75, 264, 112, 174, and the Ilyich Mariupol Factory within 15 days of issue.

The same order factory #183 was instructed to explore the issue of producing the T-54 and present the NKTP with necessary measures to achieve this no later than August 1st.