HPZ’s Unlucky First

August 20th, 1920, can be considered the starting point for Soviet tank building. It progressed pretty quickly. By 1921, the Red Army already had classifications for its new tanks. Captured British Mark V tanks were assigned to category B, or breakthrough tanks. Mk.A Whippet and Mk.B Hornet tanks were assigned to category S, manoeuvre tanks. Finally French Renault FT tanks and the Russian Renault were assigned to category M, support tanks. For obvious reasons, development of category B tanks was not expected until the future. They were too heavy and complicated for the nascent Soviet industry. A decision was made to focus on manoeuvre and support tanks. Work was conducted by the GUVP (Main Directorate of Military Industry) headed by Senior Engineer Shukalov as of August 1921. Until 1924, this department largely stood idle, since no decision was reached on who would build these tanks and how. There were various ideas discussed, including letting factories design their own tanks. There was already one such instance, although the development of the Teplokhod AN at the Izhora factory was never completed.

Final iteration of the 16 ton manoeuvre tank developed by the GUVP. This was a predecessor of the T-12 tank.

Tank Budgets

"Preparation of materiel

1. Tanks

Tank	Amount	Unit Cost	Total Cost
T-26 small tank	3500	40,000	140,000,000
T-26 infantry carrier	500	40,000	20,000,000
BT fast tank	2000	70,000	140,000,000
T-28 medium tank	825	100,000	82,500,000
T-35 large tank	150	125,000	18,750,000
T-75 tank	25	250,000	6,250,000
T-33 and T-41 reconnaissance tanks	3000	13,000	39,000,000
Total	10,000		446,500,000

Spare parts:

For tank	Total cost
T-18	3,200,000
T-24	350,000
T-26	30,000,000
BT	35,000,000
T-28	9,000,000
T-35	2,500,000
T-75	1,000,000
T-33 and T-41	4,000,000
T-27 tankette	7,500,000
Total spare parts	92,550,000

"

Via Nikita Barinov.

Unfortunately, the source doesn't say what year this budget came from. There are some hints though. The T-33 is a precursor of the T-37A tank. A prototype was built in the spring of 1932, but the tank did not do well in trials and was not accepted for mass production. Presumably, this budget was composed shortly before the decision to not produce the tank was made. The T-41 was also an amphibious reconnaissance tank, which underwent trials in the fall of 1932. The fact that Grotte's TG-1 tank is absent from the list altogether and the T-24 is only listed in the spare part production section agrees with this timeframe. This seems about the right time that something like a superheavy tank that cost twice as much as a T-35 would still be considered viable. 

First Soviet Tanks

The first tank built in the young Soviet Republic was the "Russian Renault", a poor copy of the most numerous and probably best tank of WWI. It is also known as "Freedom Fighter Comrade Lenin", after the name of the first tank of the batch. There were 15 Russian Renaults built in total at the Krasnoye Sormovo factory in Nizhniy Novgorod under the supervision of visiting engineers from the Putilov and Izhor factories. This group was headed by Sergei Petrovich Shukalov. The Putilov and Obukhov factories were pioneers of the Russian Empire when it came to mastering complicated machinery, and the Izhor factory specialized in producing armoured plates and parts for the Imperial army.

Teletank Development

"To Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko

Report

I report to you on the current status of armoured telemechanics:

Various organizations (NII-10, NII-20, Red Army NIST) performed work regarding telemechanization of tanks since 1929 under the orders of Red Army US and ABTU. Experimental prototypes of Renault, T-18, T-24, T-37, T-26, T-28, T-20, T-38, and BT-7 teletanks were produced.

By 1935, the issues of automation of the suspension and chemical armament of the tank were resolved, and a commission selected the TOZ-26 T-26 teletank developed by NII-20 as the most suitable teletank out of three experimental T-26 teletanks. This prototype was accepted for mass production. In 1936-37, factory #192 produced 35 groups and another 30 groups in 1938-39, slightly modernized vehicles with the index TOZ-8. In total, 130 special tanks were built, 65 control tanks and 65 teletanks (65 groups).

Tank Quotas in 1931

"Minutes of the Revolutionary War Council meeting on changes to the tank program for 1931

May 8th, 1931

Present: comrades Voroshilov, Uborevich, Triandafilov, Martinovich, Halepskiy
Secretary: comrade Litunovskiy

1. T-27 Tankettes

Due to proficiency attained in mass T-27 manufacturing and discovery of excellent combat characteristics (mobility, off-road performance, possibility of using a 37 mm gun), the transition from the T-18 to the T-26, which shortens the requirements for small tanks by 65 vehicles, and a lack of selected medium tank, it is necessary to produce 200 additional tankettes in 1931. Accept comrade Martinovich's proposal to wait until the issues of producing T-26 tanks at the Bolshevik factory and hulls at the Podolsk factory are resolved before inquiring if factories can produce additional tankettes. MPS VSHKh should investigate this issue and report to the RVSS.

Consider comrade Martinovich's claim that VSNKh is preparing to gear up the Nizhniy Novgorod and 2nd automotive factories to produce no less than 15 thousand T-27 tankettes according to the government decision from February 20th, 1931.

2. T-26

T-26 orders are proceeding on time. Retain the previous order of 300 vehicles. Remind MPS VSNKh that, according to Bolshevik factory directors, the bottleneck of production is cast iron, and its reception is still not resolved. This threatens the timely delivery of T-26es.

3. T-18

Considering that the Motoviliha factory still hasn't mastered tank production, and the order for 75 T-18 tanks is delaying important artillery orders, cancel 65 T-18 tanks, leaving only the 10 tanks that have already been started. Send no more tank orders to Motoviliha.

4. Medium tank

1. T-24:
1. Retain the 1931 order for 80 T-24s with the corresponding amount of spare parts (mandatory).
2. Comrade Martinovich must immediately give HPZ this order and ensure that there is no extra produced, as we will not make any more of these vehicles.
2. TG:
1. Report to KO that the commission's decision on the TG medium tank cannot be realized in 1931, as the experimental prototype is still unfinished, and it is impossible to determine when it will be. As a result, there can be no standardized medium tank in 1931 for us to produce.
2. The Vickers 12-ton tank that we purchased must be meant for colonial forces (weak armour and armament), and does not measure up to our tank armament system.
3. Continue accelerated work on the TG experimental prototype. Take note of the schedule proposed by Leningrad region OGPU.
4. Ask permission to purchase the new 16-ton Vickers tank, of which we have been notified, which matches our requirements for armour, speed, and armament.
3. Christie tank:
1. Ask for permission to adopt the Christie tank into the mechanized forces as a high speed tank destroyer (BT).
2. Instruct comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy to calculate the maximum amount of BT tanks (existing type, with no changes) that can be produced this year at HPZ, considering that the T-24 order at that factory decreases by 220 units.
3. Simultaneously, instruct UMM to accelerate work on modernizing the Christie tank.

5. Heavy tank:

1. It is necessary to have at least a small number of heavy tanks in the RKKA.
2. UMM must discover information on heavy tanks in Italy, England, and, if possible, France, with the objective of buying such a tank, or at least blueprints.
3. Simultaneously, conduct independent work on such a tank.

6. On an engine factory for medium tanks

Ask the government to reverse its decision on February 20th, 1931, and allow construction of a factory for M-5 (Liberty) instead of the previously chosen M-6 (Hispano-Suiza).

UVVS chief Baranov must reserve 150 new M-5 engines from 1931 production and transfer them to comrade Halepskiy.

7. On armour

Report to the government that the task of cementing against armour piercing bullets is completed. The task of reducing the amount of ferrite alloys in the armour is also completed. Work on cementing steel against small caliber armour piercing shells continues. According to comrade Martinovich, a complete transfer to using cemented armour (Vibrak type) will happen in July 1931.

Keep in mind comrade Martinovich's statement that the required amount of firebrick to build 8 furnaces at the Izhor factory (for production of cemented armour) has been ordered on April 19th 1931 from abroad.

Comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy should ensure the fastest possible arrival of this order.

Chairman Voroshilov

Secretary Litunovskiy"

RGVA 4-14-414

1931 Tank Program

"Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) On the Tank program

February 20th, 1931

Building on the decree from November 30th, 1930 on the tank building program that specifies the requirements before 1932: 4,000 tankettes, 13,800 small tanks, and 2,000 medium tanks, the Politburo decrees:

1. Tankette

1. Approve the T-27 tankette with the Ford AA engine with the following characteristics:
1. Speed: 36-40 kph
2. Mass: 2 tons
3. Armour: 10-15 mm
4. Armament: 1 machinegun
5. Engine, watercooled, 40-45 hp
2. The tankette will be produced at automotive factory #2. The production will be mastered in 1931 by means of production of 400 tankettes. 
3. Considering that T-27 tankettes uses Ford truck components, in addition to armour and tracks, VSNKh is assigned the issue of creating a second manufacturing base for T-27 tankettes at the Nizhniy Novgorod automotive factory, assigning 20-25% of the factory's output to them.
4. VSNKh and NKVM must report in two months how many tankettes the factory can produce before spring of 1932.

2. Small tank

1. Approve the T-26 (Vickers) with the following characteristics:
1. Speed:
1. On roads: 35 kph
2. Off-road: 20-25 kph
2. Mass: 7.5 tons
3. Armour: 8-13 mm
4. Armament: one 37 mm gun and one machinegun or two machineguns
5. Engine: Armstrong-Sidley air cooled, 84-93 hp
2. In order to master production in 1931, produce 300 tanks of this type at the Bolshevik factory. Prepare for organization of production at Bolshevik and Stalingrad factories with their own engineering staff.
3. Bolshevik factory should be expected to produce 1,500 tanks per year and Stalingrad 12,000 tanks, with spare parts. The production base at Stalingrad must be ready by April 1st, 1932. The experimental plant must be ready by spring of 1932, which should produce 100 tanks per shift per year. In order to master production, the experimental plant must produce one batch of tanks in spring of 1932.

3. Medium tank

1. Approve the powerful TG tank as the main medium tank with the following characteristics (preliminary):
1. Speed:
1. Maximum: 40 kph
2. Average: 25 kph
2. Mass: 20 tons
3. Armour: 30/20/15
4. Armament:
1. 76 mm gun
2. 37 mm gun
3. 4-5 machineguns
5. Engine: 240 hp, air cooled
2. Propose acceleration of the tank building program to OGPU and NKVM, consider it the most important task in producing experimental tanks in 1931.
3. In order to master production, produce 50-75 tanks in 1931.
4. Considering the combat potential of this vehicle, be ready to produce 2000 tanks of this type by spring 1932.
5. The main manufacturing base will be at the Kharkov Locomotive Factory, in cooperation with the Stalingrad on the hull, engine, and steel casting.
   VSNKh is tasked with investigating if a second manufacturing base can be set up in the Urals.
6. After 80 T-24 tanks are produced, remove it from production and redirect the available resources to produce TG tanks.

4. Considering the possibility of a second manufacturing base for the TG tank in the Urals, cease production of small tanks at MMZ after existing components have been used.

5. Considering satisfactory results when producing T-27 tankettes with Ford AA components and preliminary successes at armouring and arming Kommunar and Caterpillar tractors to create infantry support tanks, consider it necessary to create a second echelon of infantry support tanks on automotive and tractor bases, for which NKVM and VSNKh must report in six months on the types, amount, and locations of production in 1932 and 1933.

6. On engines: supply tank factories with the following engines:

1. T-27 tankette: Ford AA engine from the Nizhniy Novgorod automotive factory
2. Small T-26 tank: Armstrong-Sidley engine from the Bolshevik and Stalingrad Tractor factories
3. For medium tanks: NKVM should accelerate investigations of medium tank engines and decide on a type in 1-2 months. Due to a lack of factories capable of producing powerful medium tank engines, NKVM should accelerate the construction of a factory that can produce sufficient engines for medium tanks by spring of 1932. Initially, aim the production at M-6 and Grotte engines. VSNKh, NKVM, and OGPU should design powerful diesel engines with 240-300 hp in 1931.

7. On armour

1. The consumption of armour by the current program is 50,000 tons of processed armour. The existing base (Izhor and Bolshevik factories) can provide 6,000 tons. 
2. VSNKh should organize a new manufacturing base at Stalingrad that can provide 46,000 tons of processed armour starting in spring of 1932.
3. Considering the necessity of increasing numbers of powerful medium tanks and tankettes, as well as production of second echelon infantry tanks on truck and tractor chassis, VSNKh should propose changes to the armour consumption.
4. The currently produced armour is inadequate compared to Vickers armour, despite the presence of twice as many coloured metals and ferrite alloys in our armour. NKVM and VSNKh should finish current investigations on increasing armour quality to Vickers levels and decreasing the amount of imported ferrite alloys in two months.

8. On small steel casting

In order to complete the tank program, 55,000 tons of small steel casts are required, with the Bolshevik factory's capacity of 4,000 tons. VSNKh should build a manufacturing base at the Stalingrad tractor factory capable of producing the missing amount."

RGASPI 17-162-9