The American tank industry finished WW2 in a strange position. On one hand, the Americans achieved an impressive amount. Starting the war with a few hundred light tanks and a few dozen medium ones, the Americans quickly caught up and in some ways even overtook the leading tank building nations of the world. The Medium Tank M4 was one of the finest medium tanks in the world when it was built. The Americans also achieved great things in SPG development. However, the Americans were in a difficult position by the end of the war. The looming crisis was not so obvious in 1945, but if one digs a bit deeper then the situation in American tank building begins to seem a lot more dire.
This blog is dedicated to bringing World War II era documents to the general public, with an overall focus on armoured warfare. Questions? Requests? Comments? Email me at tankarchives@gmail.com or find me on Twitter @Tank_Archives.
Showing posts with label Chaffee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chaffee. Show all posts
Monday, 25 October 2021
Monday, 1 February 2021
Light and Long Lasting
The light tank as a cheaper and more numerous version of a medium tank was obsolete by the end of WWII. The Germans were one of the first to stop building classical light tanks, the USSR followed soon after in the fall of 1943. The USA was the only major tank building nation to continue light tank development. The result of this development was the Light Tank M24, the best light tank of WWII. Its success is underlined by its longevity: some nations kept theirs in service into the 21st century!
Saturday, 14 September 2019
Gorilla, King Kong's Sister
Like other members of the Light Combat Team based on the M24 Chaffee chassis, the 155 mm Howitzer Motor Carriage M41 did not take part in WWII, but fought actively in Korea. Even though the Gorilla was not numerous and its career was short, this vehicle still deserves attention.
Saturday, 7 September 2019
A Fast Howitzer on a Light Chassis
Unlike American light tanks, which towards the war reached perfection in their class, light SPGs did not work out. The first successful design, the HMC M8, appeared towards the middle of the war. It did not satisfy the military and work on light SPGs continued. The result of this work was the HMC M37, a good design that appeared far too late. The production run was limited and it only saw battle after the end of WW2.
Thursday, 1 August 2019
Aquino Tank Weekend Reenactment Day 1
The battle for Aquino airport in Italy on May 19th, 1944, was a difficult one for the Canadian Ontario Regiment and the British 26th Armoured Brigade that they were supporting. The attack against the German defensive line covered by fog failed. Even though the Hitler Line fell only a few days later, the sacrifice of the Ontario Regiment is still commemorated by the Ontario Regiment Museum at the Aquino Tank Weekend every year.
Thursday, 18 July 2019
Light Tanks at Aquino
The Stuart and Chaffee are always a welcome sight, zooming around on the relatively small battlefield. Unfortunately I wasn't able to get a lot of footage of the Chaffee this year, so it's getting rolled into the Stuart video.
Friday, 28 July 2017
M24 Chaffee: Test Drive at the End of Lend Lease
Starting in the second half of 1943, the approach to sending British and American Lend Lease armoured vehicles to the USSR changed. Instead of immediate large scale shipments, the Western Allies sent a few samples of new vehicles. If the tank or SPG was satisfactory for the Soviet side, full scale shipments followed.
The first vehicle to arrive on this trial basis was the Light Tank M5A1. By that point, production of light tanks in the USSR was wrapping up, so the American novelty never made it into service. Nevertheless, the USSR received another foreign light tank. This was the Light Tank M24, the best American light tank of WWII.
Saturday, 26 September 2015
World of Tanks History Section: Adna Chaffee
The creator of the American armoured forces did not fight in a single large armoured battle. He was born on September 23rd, 1884, when tanks were far from the drawing board, and died on August 22nd, 1941, before the United States took an active part in the Second World War. However, Adna Romanza Chaffee Jr. did have combat experience.
He participated in the police action of American cavalry in Cuba in 1909, served in the Philippine occupational forces in 1914-1915, then transferred to France where he fought in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Here, Chaffee first encountered tanks, a new weapon that has not yet reached its full potential. Soon, this weapon would become Chaffee's life.
Anti-tank trenches of bureaucracy
The experience of WWI was carefully studied by militaries of the world. Did senior American commanders understand the significance of the tank as an independent mobile fighting unit? They did, but not fully, and not unanimously. Many senior officers considered that the horse was still viable.
These disagreements were enhanced by the National Defense Act of 1920, which assigned tanks only one role: infantry support. Cavalry, where Chaffee served, was not supposed to have tanks. There was no talk of armoured forces as an independent branch, either. In order for it to appear, Chaffee and his allies would have to overcome the inertia of the American bureaucratic machine.
It was important to obtain authorization for at least a small mechanized unit and prove its usefulness in practice. This idea could be pushed through by a high ranking and respected field commander, whose opinion had weight to it in a discussion at any level. For instance, in the Soviet Union, Budyonniy was a proponent of total army mechanization. Americans that fought for the same thing did not have such a trump card. Major-General Chaffee, the main supporter of these reforms, earned his reputation only during peace time.
The American "tank lobby" won one small but significant victory over the bureaucrats: ordering a Combat Car for cavalry units. Even though it was a tracked vehicle with a rotating turret, it was not formally a tank, therefore Chaffee's opponents did not complain. This victory would soon become the foundation of the American tank program.
A willful general's theories
In 1928, Adna Chaffee managed to get his four year plan for the creation of a mechanized unit approved. However, Congress only allotted $284,000 for this task after two years, out of the required four million.
The foundation was laid, but the question of how to properly use these vehicles remained. The Americans could not follow the experience of other nations, as the doctrines of the leading tank-building nations, Britain, France, and Germany, varied wildly. Chaffee had to carefully analyze worldwide experience.
One of the first conclusions was that "with combined arms support, tank forces are the most powerful offensive force known today". WWII would confirm Chaffee's theory in less than 10 years.
His other theories also proved true. Indeed, the most effective way to use tanks turned out to be en masse, in corps or armies. Tanks without infantry, artillery, and air support turned out to be ineffective at cementing their success in battle. Chaffee's prediction that the coming years would see the increase in gun calibers and armour thickness was correct as well. Finally, the general remarked that the success of tanks on the battlefield was decided by "training and professional experience of specially selected and trained personnel. This training will take a large amount of time and cannot be replaced with any accelerated program".
In the end of 1934, Chaffee became the Budget and Law-making Coordinator in the Staff of the United States Army, giving him a real possibility of influencing the creation of independent tank and mechanized units with their own doctrine. He had one important thing left to do: confirm his assumptions in practice. This possibility arose in five years.
How to defeat regressives in two strikes
The Plattsburgh military exercise were held in the summer of 1939. Adna Chaffee participated as the commander of the 7th Cavalry (mechanized) Brigade and the "blue" side. His subordinates' actions against the "black" side were so successful that the exercise was stopped early, as the advantage of an aggressive tank offensive over traditional static defense was made very clear.
Chaffee widely applied speedy maneuvers, rapid change in the direction of attack, deep penetration into the enemy rear. In this way, he manages to paralyze the "black" team's attempt to adequately react to the changing situation. A combined arms attack with a concentrated fist of armour proved much more effective than infantry tactics with tanks pulled apart by battalion.
As the Plattsburgh exercises happened before the start of WWII, it is incorrect to state that he copied German Blitzkrieg. His strategy obviously was based on European experience, but it was independently created.
Despite the success of this doctrine, Chaffee decided that it needs serious improvements. In order to reach peak effectiveness, the tank "fist" needed infantry to hold ground and engineers to provide vital support. Chaffee worked on his mistakes and applied his new doctrine to large scale exercises in Louisiana a year later.
This time, the task was harder. Aside from standard objectives, Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade was assigned the 66th Infantry-Tank Brigade as reinforcements. In 48 hours, these two units were supposed to join into one, march for 120 km, and deliver an attack against an enemy.
Despite the fact that this strike unit was formed ltierally on the march, it successfully penetrated organized defenses and reached operational depth. Here is where the exercise ended.
Adna Chaffee's stunning success allowed him to decide the future of the American armoured forces. Senior officers, including Brigadier General George Patton, formed the tank forces as an independent branch of the armed forces with its own doctrine. Conservative infantry and cavalry officers were no longer permitted to make these decisions. Chaffee himself died in 1941 and never saw his creation in action, but he did the most important thing, just in time.
Original article available here.
He participated in the police action of American cavalry in Cuba in 1909, served in the Philippine occupational forces in 1914-1915, then transferred to France where he fought in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Here, Chaffee first encountered tanks, a new weapon that has not yet reached its full potential. Soon, this weapon would become Chaffee's life.
Anti-tank trenches of bureaucracy
The experience of WWI was carefully studied by militaries of the world. Did senior American commanders understand the significance of the tank as an independent mobile fighting unit? They did, but not fully, and not unanimously. Many senior officers considered that the horse was still viable.
These disagreements were enhanced by the National Defense Act of 1920, which assigned tanks only one role: infantry support. Cavalry, where Chaffee served, was not supposed to have tanks. There was no talk of armoured forces as an independent branch, either. In order for it to appear, Chaffee and his allies would have to overcome the inertia of the American bureaucratic machine.
It was important to obtain authorization for at least a small mechanized unit and prove its usefulness in practice. This idea could be pushed through by a high ranking and respected field commander, whose opinion had weight to it in a discussion at any level. For instance, in the Soviet Union, Budyonniy was a proponent of total army mechanization. Americans that fought for the same thing did not have such a trump card. Major-General Chaffee, the main supporter of these reforms, earned his reputation only during peace time.
The American "tank lobby" won one small but significant victory over the bureaucrats: ordering a Combat Car for cavalry units. Even though it was a tracked vehicle with a rotating turret, it was not formally a tank, therefore Chaffee's opponents did not complain. This victory would soon become the foundation of the American tank program.
A willful general's theories
In 1928, Adna Chaffee managed to get his four year plan for the creation of a mechanized unit approved. However, Congress only allotted $284,000 for this task after two years, out of the required four million.
The foundation was laid, but the question of how to properly use these vehicles remained. The Americans could not follow the experience of other nations, as the doctrines of the leading tank-building nations, Britain, France, and Germany, varied wildly. Chaffee had to carefully analyze worldwide experience.
One of the first conclusions was that "with combined arms support, tank forces are the most powerful offensive force known today". WWII would confirm Chaffee's theory in less than 10 years.
His other theories also proved true. Indeed, the most effective way to use tanks turned out to be en masse, in corps or armies. Tanks without infantry, artillery, and air support turned out to be ineffective at cementing their success in battle. Chaffee's prediction that the coming years would see the increase in gun calibers and armour thickness was correct as well. Finally, the general remarked that the success of tanks on the battlefield was decided by "training and professional experience of specially selected and trained personnel. This training will take a large amount of time and cannot be replaced with any accelerated program".
In the end of 1934, Chaffee became the Budget and Law-making Coordinator in the Staff of the United States Army, giving him a real possibility of influencing the creation of independent tank and mechanized units with their own doctrine. He had one important thing left to do: confirm his assumptions in practice. This possibility arose in five years.
How to defeat regressives in two strikes
The Plattsburgh military exercise were held in the summer of 1939. Adna Chaffee participated as the commander of the 7th Cavalry (mechanized) Brigade and the "blue" side. His subordinates' actions against the "black" side were so successful that the exercise was stopped early, as the advantage of an aggressive tank offensive over traditional static defense was made very clear.
Chaffee widely applied speedy maneuvers, rapid change in the direction of attack, deep penetration into the enemy rear. In this way, he manages to paralyze the "black" team's attempt to adequately react to the changing situation. A combined arms attack with a concentrated fist of armour proved much more effective than infantry tactics with tanks pulled apart by battalion.
As the Plattsburgh exercises happened before the start of WWII, it is incorrect to state that he copied German Blitzkrieg. His strategy obviously was based on European experience, but it was independently created.
Despite the success of this doctrine, Chaffee decided that it needs serious improvements. In order to reach peak effectiveness, the tank "fist" needed infantry to hold ground and engineers to provide vital support. Chaffee worked on his mistakes and applied his new doctrine to large scale exercises in Louisiana a year later.
This time, the task was harder. Aside from standard objectives, Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade was assigned the 66th Infantry-Tank Brigade as reinforcements. In 48 hours, these two units were supposed to join into one, march for 120 km, and deliver an attack against an enemy.
Despite the fact that this strike unit was formed ltierally on the march, it successfully penetrated organized defenses and reached operational depth. Here is where the exercise ended.
Adna Chaffee's stunning success allowed him to decide the future of the American armoured forces. Senior officers, including Brigadier General George Patton, formed the tank forces as an independent branch of the armed forces with its own doctrine. Conservative infantry and cavalry officers were no longer permitted to make these decisions. Chaffee himself died in 1941 and never saw his creation in action, but he did the most important thing, just in time.
Original article available here.
Thursday, 25 September 2014
World of Tanks History Section: Post-War Light Tanks
LTTB
The acronym has a rather oxymoronic meaning: Light Tank with Heavy Armour (Legkiy Tank Tyazhelogo Bronirovaniya). However, if one looks at the requirements sent by the military to the Omsk tank factory in 1944, everything falls in its place.
The LTTB was meant for recce in force. Because of this, it was supposed to have good armour protection from the front. The sides were about on the level of a T-34, up to 45 mm. The tank was first planned with a 76 mm gun, but it was later replaced with an 85 mm S-53.
In theory, this tank could be useful for the army. Fast, well protected, effectively armed. However, the production of the LTTB would have been too complicated. It would have to start from scratch, which means new assembly lines, extra spending, extensive trials. Neither the extra time nor money existed for this project, as the factory was busy producing T-34-85s. In the end, the design never left paper.
T-54 Lightened
The project was developed at factory #183 in Nizhniy Tagil, a producer of the regular T-54, in 1949. The vehicle was meant for special duties, for which the use of a regular T-54 was not possible.
The tank had thinner armour in the turret and hull, which allowed the reduction in mass from 36 tons to 31 tons. Additionally, the new vehicle would have had wider tracks, reducing ground pressure even further, and allowing for the vehicle to be used in difficult terrain.
Due to its lighter mass, the speed of the tank was expected to reach nearly 58 kph. The armament would have been the 100 mm D-10T. Work on the vehicle never made it past blueprints.
T37
This tank was designed as a replacement for the M24 Chaffee. The requirements for this vehicle were ready in early 1945. Work on the project started after the end of the war, when the American military budget was slashed.
The T37 received its designation in September of 1946. Initially, the military ordered three prototypes at the Detroit Arsenal, but this order was reduced to 2. The wooden mockup and technical documentation were ready by 1949. The vehicle was tested at Aberdeen in 1949-1950.
The T37 did not reach mass production. The Korean War, which began in 1950, forced some changes to the American design program. The T37 did not meet the new requirements, and a new vehicle was designed using it as a starting point, the T41.
M41 Walker Bulldog
The vehicle was initially indexed T41, and used many components of the T37. It was ready in 1948, and Cadillac Motors received an order for 100 vehicles, increased tenfold with the start of the Korean War, along with increased requirements for the engine, aiming mechanisms, and ammunition rack. In 1953, it was adopted into the Army under the index M41.
At first, the tank was to be called "little bulldog". However, after American General Walton Walker died in an airplane crash, the vehicle was renamed in his honour.
The Walker Bulldog was produced until the end of the 1950s, with over 3700 vehicles built. The tank was taken out of the American armed forces for its weak armour and armament, but continued service in some nations for many years.
T49
The Korean War and clashes of American vehicles with the T-34-85 forced the US military to consider greatly increasing the firepower of its vehicles, including light tanks.
In 1954, the T49 began trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The M41 chassis was equipped with a new turret and the 90 mm T231E3 gun. Trials of the T49 lasted until May of 1955, but the military demanded even greater firepower.
In the end, the T49 was equipped with a new 152 mm gun. T49 trials ended when a new chassis was developed, and the turret with the 152 mm gun was transferred over to it.
Spahpanzer Ru 251
This lesser known German experimental tank was based on the Kanonenjagdpanzer 4-5 vehicle with a 90 mm gun. Unusual, since usually SPGs are based on a tank chassis, and not the other way around.
The light, fast, and well armed Ru 251 was meant to replace the ageing Walker Bulldog in the German army. The Henschel company was tasked with production and testing. The tank was meant for reconnaissance battalions of tank divisions and other units. A notable feature of the vehicle was its speed, up to 80 kph. The Ru 251 had a 90 mm Rheinmetall gun.
According to known sources, there were two Ru 251 vehicles built.
Original article available here.
The acronym has a rather oxymoronic meaning: Light Tank with Heavy Armour (Legkiy Tank Tyazhelogo Bronirovaniya). However, if one looks at the requirements sent by the military to the Omsk tank factory in 1944, everything falls in its place.
The LTTB was meant for recce in force. Because of this, it was supposed to have good armour protection from the front. The sides were about on the level of a T-34, up to 45 mm. The tank was first planned with a 76 mm gun, but it was later replaced with an 85 mm S-53.
In theory, this tank could be useful for the army. Fast, well protected, effectively armed. However, the production of the LTTB would have been too complicated. It would have to start from scratch, which means new assembly lines, extra spending, extensive trials. Neither the extra time nor money existed for this project, as the factory was busy producing T-34-85s. In the end, the design never left paper.
T-54 Lightened
The project was developed at factory #183 in Nizhniy Tagil, a producer of the regular T-54, in 1949. The vehicle was meant for special duties, for which the use of a regular T-54 was not possible.
The tank had thinner armour in the turret and hull, which allowed the reduction in mass from 36 tons to 31 tons. Additionally, the new vehicle would have had wider tracks, reducing ground pressure even further, and allowing for the vehicle to be used in difficult terrain.
Due to its lighter mass, the speed of the tank was expected to reach nearly 58 kph. The armament would have been the 100 mm D-10T. Work on the vehicle never made it past blueprints.
T37
This tank was designed as a replacement for the M24 Chaffee. The requirements for this vehicle were ready in early 1945. Work on the project started after the end of the war, when the American military budget was slashed.
The T37 received its designation in September of 1946. Initially, the military ordered three prototypes at the Detroit Arsenal, but this order was reduced to 2. The wooden mockup and technical documentation were ready by 1949. The vehicle was tested at Aberdeen in 1949-1950.
The T37 did not reach mass production. The Korean War, which began in 1950, forced some changes to the American design program. The T37 did not meet the new requirements, and a new vehicle was designed using it as a starting point, the T41.
M41 Walker Bulldog
The vehicle was initially indexed T41, and used many components of the T37. It was ready in 1948, and Cadillac Motors received an order for 100 vehicles, increased tenfold with the start of the Korean War, along with increased requirements for the engine, aiming mechanisms, and ammunition rack. In 1953, it was adopted into the Army under the index M41.
At first, the tank was to be called "little bulldog". However, after American General Walton Walker died in an airplane crash, the vehicle was renamed in his honour.
The Walker Bulldog was produced until the end of the 1950s, with over 3700 vehicles built. The tank was taken out of the American armed forces for its weak armour and armament, but continued service in some nations for many years.
T49
The Korean War and clashes of American vehicles with the T-34-85 forced the US military to consider greatly increasing the firepower of its vehicles, including light tanks.
In 1954, the T49 began trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The M41 chassis was equipped with a new turret and the 90 mm T231E3 gun. Trials of the T49 lasted until May of 1955, but the military demanded even greater firepower.
In the end, the T49 was equipped with a new 152 mm gun. T49 trials ended when a new chassis was developed, and the turret with the 152 mm gun was transferred over to it.
Spahpanzer Ru 251
This lesser known German experimental tank was based on the Kanonenjagdpanzer 4-5 vehicle with a 90 mm gun. Unusual, since usually SPGs are based on a tank chassis, and not the other way around.
The light, fast, and well armed Ru 251 was meant to replace the ageing Walker Bulldog in the German army. The Henschel company was tasked with production and testing. The tank was meant for reconnaissance battalions of tank divisions and other units. A notable feature of the vehicle was its speed, up to 80 kph. The Ru 251 had a 90 mm Rheinmetall gun.
According to known sources, there were two Ru 251 vehicles built.
Original article available here.
Monday, 23 June 2014
Lever Forces
Driving a tank is not like driving a car. In order to turn, you do not simply turn a wheel, but must wrestle with levers controlling an engine with many hundreds of horsepowers, dragging a beast that weighs tens of tons. That is not an easy task. CAMD RF 38-11355-2884 (from litl-bro's repository) covers the forces involved in driving a T-34-85 and an IS-3.
The span the levers travel was divided into 6 equal parts. Forces for the first 5 include only the force to move the lever, but forces for the last part include the force to bring the friction clutch into action and stop the tank completely.
The first vehicle that is tested is a T-34-85 #381105 from factory #112 (Krasonye Sormovo). This tank travelled 1010 km before this test.
Now, for turning the tank in place.
The span the levers travel was divided into 6 equal parts. Forces for the first 5 include only the force to move the lever, but forces for the last part include the force to bring the friction clutch into action and stop the tank completely.
The first vehicle that is tested is a T-34-85 #381105 from factory #112 (Krasonye Sormovo). This tank travelled 1010 km before this test.
Lever position
|
Force in kg
| Difference in kg | |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
21.5
|
24.0
|
2.5
|
2
|
26.0
|
30.0
|
4.0
|
3
|
28.5
|
33.0
|
4.5
|
4
|
34.0
|
37.0
|
3.0
|
5
|
33.0
|
37.0
|
4.0
|
6
|
29.0
|
34.0
|
5.0
|
Now, for turning the tank in place.
Gear
|
Force in kg
|
Difference in kg
|
Turn radius
| |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| |||
1
|
37
|
34
|
3
|
In place (180 degrees)
|
2
|
40
|
38
|
2
|
Same
|
3
|
40
|
39
|
1
|
8 meters (extrapolated from 90 degree turn)
|
Next is another T-34-85, #872024, from factory #174 (Voroshilov factory). This tank travelled 1002 km before these trials.
Lever position
|
Force in kg
| Difference in kg | |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
26.0
|
24.5
|
1.5
|
2
|
29.0
|
30.0
|
1.0
|
3
|
33.0
|
32.0
|
1.0
|
4
|
37.0
|
37.0
|
0
|
5
|
37.0
|
37.0
|
0
|
6
|
35.0
|
35.0
|
0
|
Gear
|
Force in kg
|
Difference in kg
|
Turn radius
| |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| |||
1
|
42
|
39
|
3
|
In place (180 degrees)
|
2
|
46
|
44
|
2
|
Same
|
3
|
46
|
45
|
1
|
8 meters (extrapolated from 90 degree turn)
|
Next is a T-34-85 #664479 from factory #183 (HPZ). The tank was basically new, just out of factory trials, and travelled 100 km.
Lever position
|
Force in kg
| Difference in kg | |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
23.0
|
23.5
|
0.5
|
2
|
28.5
|
27.0
|
1.5
|
3
|
30.0
|
29.0
|
1.0
|
4
|
35.0
|
35.5
|
0.5
|
5
|
37.5
|
37.0
|
0.5
|
6
|
36.0
|
34.5
|
1.5
|
Gear
|
Force in kg
|
Difference in kg
|
Turn radius
| |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| |||
1
|
38
|
36
|
2
|
In place (180 degrees)
|
2
|
44
|
41
|
3
|
Same
|
3
|
44.5
|
44
|
1.5
|
8 meters (extrapolated from 90 degree turn)
|
As you can see, the new tank does a little bit better.
Now, for the IS-3. The tank travelled 500 km before trials. The lever range was split into only three sections:
- From the initial position to first position (the planetary mechanism friction clutch is off, the small brake belt is taut).
- First position to second (brake belt of the stopper drum is taut).
- Brake belt of the stopper is at maximum tautness.
Lever position
|
Force in kg
| Difference in kg | |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
32
|
30
|
2
|
2
|
16
|
16
|
0
|
3
|
30.0
|
30
|
0
|
The IS-3 is heavier, but more modern. As a result, driving it does not take more force than driving a T-34, and sometimes, much less force.
Lever position
|
Force in kg
| Difference in kg | |
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
23.0
|
23.5
|
0.5
|
2
|
28.5
|
27.0
|
1.5
|
3
|
30.0
|
29.0
|
1.0
|
4
|
35.0
|
35.5
|
0.5
|
5
|
37.5
|
37.0
|
0.5
|
6
|
36.0
|
34.5
|
1.5
|
Now, for turning around:
Gear
|
Forces to move the lever from the initial position
to the first (smooth turn) |
Turn radius in meters
|
Forces to move the lever from the first position
to the full position (turn in place) | ||
Right lever
|
Left lever
|
Right lever
|
Left lever
| ||
1
|
30
|
29
|
14
|
25
|
25
|
2
|
29
|
27
|
14
|
22-35
|
22-35
|
3
|
28
|
28
|
15
|
20-40
|
20-40
|
4
|
26
|
26
|
15
|
18-40
|
18-40
|
5
|
24
|
24
|
Maneuver not performed
| ||
6
|
20
|
23
| |||
7
|
16
|
20
| |||
CAMD RF 38-11355-2890 contains similar measurements for a much larger set of tanks. The conditions for turning around are different: instead of a half-turn or a quarter-turn, tanks made multiple turns. The first turn did not count, and only the subsequent turns (where the mud that was removed by the first turn did not affect the trial) were recorded.
The following tanks underwent trials:
- T26E3 (Pershing), having travelled 1030 km
- M4A2(76) (Sherman), 4000 km
- M24 (Chaffee), 1200 km
- Jagdtiger, 260 km (this specific one)
- Panther, 648 km
- Tiger H, 900 km
- Comet, 1100 km
- T-34-85, 1010 km
- T-44, 570 km
First, the tanks that can neutral steer:
Name
|
Right lever forces
|
Left lever forces
|
Difference
|
Note
|
Panther
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Tank turned easily
|
Jagdtiger
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
SPG turned easily
|
Comet
|
20
|
21
|
1
|
Tank turned after three attempts
|
Then all of them in first gear.
Name
|
Radius (meters)
|
Right lever force |
Left lever force
|
Difference
|
T26E3
|
9.5
|
35
|
34
|
1
|
M4A2(76)
|
10
|
30
|
30
|
0
|
M24
|
7
|
12
|
11
|
1
|
Panther
|
6
|
6
|
6
|
0
|
Jagdtiger
|
7
|
4.5
|
4.5
|
0
|
Comet
|
3
|
16
|
18
|
2
|
T-34-85
|
In place
|
32
|
34
|
2
|
T-44
|
In place
|
13
|
12
|
1
|
IS-3
|
In place
|
41
|
39
|
2
|
Tiger H
|
6
|
13
|
14
|
1
|
The next table's turns were also done in first gear, but for a radius of 10 meters (the worst radius in the previous table).
Name
|
Right lever force
|
Left lever force
|
Difference
|
T26E3
|
34
|
32
|
2
|
M4A2(76)
|
30
|
30
|
0
|
M24
|
13
|
14
|
1
|
Panther
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Jagdtiger
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Comet
|
14
|
15
|
1
|
T-34-85
|
30
|
30
|
0
|
T-44
|
11
|
10
|
1
|
IS-3
|
32
|
32
|
0
|
Tiger H
|
10
|
12
|
2
|
Let's try a slightly easier task, turning in first gear with a 15 meter radius.
Name
|
Right lever force
|
Left lever force
|
Difference
|
T26E3
|
22
|
25
|
2
|
M4A2(76)
|
22
|
23
|
1
|
M24
|
9
|
9
|
0
|
Panther
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Jagdtiger
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Comet
|
12
|
12
|
0
|
T-34-85
|
27
|
29
|
2
|
T-44
|
10
|
10
|
0
|
IS-3
|
30
|
31
|
1
|
Tiger H
|
10
|
12
|
2
|
Minimum radius again, this time in second gear:
Name
|
Right lever force
|
Left lever force
|
Difference
|
T26E3
|
37
|
39
|
2
|
M4A2(76)
|
34
|
35
|
1
|
M24
|
16
|
17
|
1
|
Panther
|
12
|
15
|
3
|
Jagdtiger
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
Comet
|
19
|
21
|
2
|
T-34-85
|
35
|
36
|
1
|
T-44
|
11
|
12
|
1
|
IS-3
|
32
|
33
|
1
|
"Conclusions
- The most effort is required to turn the IS-3 (30-41 kg), T26E3 (23-39 kg), T-34-85 (27-36 kg) and M4A2-76 (22-35 kg).
- The least effort is required to turn German tanks T-V (5-15 kg), T-VI (10-14 kg), English "Comet I" tank (12-20 kg), German Jagdtiger SPG (5-14 kg) and domestic T-44 tank (10-13 kg).
The T-V, T-VI, Jagdtiger, and Comet require little effort due to a hydraulic servo and a special turning mechanism design (planetary mechanisms with additional power input from the engine).
The T-44 requires little effort due to altered input levers and a servo spring. - The M4A2-76 requires less effort than the T26E3, despite similar design. This is due to the tank's smaller size and longer lever lengths.
- The T-V, T-VI, Jagdtiger and Comet tanks can turn in place when the gearbox is set to the neutral gear due to a special planetary turning mechanism with additional power input from the engine.
- Turning domestic T-34-85 and IS-3 tanks, as well as American T-26 and M4A2-76 tanks requires great effort, and tires out drivers during long marches."
For those of you that think 35-40 kg is high, the effort required to turn a Pz38(t) reached 60 kilograms, according to Aleksei Kalinin's Panzerkampfwagen 38(t), Tactical Press, Moscow, 2013, page 125.
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