HPZ’s Unlucky First

August 20th, 1920, can be considered the starting point for Soviet tank building. It progressed pretty quickly. By 1921, the Red Army already had classifications for its new tanks. Captured British Mark V tanks were assigned to category B, or breakthrough tanks. Mk.A Whippet and Mk.B Hornet tanks were assigned to category S, manoeuvre tanks. Finally French Renault FT tanks and the Russian Renault were assigned to category M, support tanks. For obvious reasons, development of category B tanks was not expected until the future. They were too heavy and complicated for the nascent Soviet industry. A decision was made to focus on manoeuvre and support tanks. Work was conducted by the GUVP (Main Directorate of Military Industry) headed by Senior Engineer Shukalov as of August 1921. Until 1924, this department largely stood idle, since no decision was reached on who would build these tanks and how. There were various ideas discussed, including letting factories design their own tanks. There was already one such instance, although the development of the Teplokhod AN at the Izhora factory was never completed.

Final iteration of the 16 ton manoeuvre tank developed by the GUVP. This was a predecessor of the T-12 tank.

Steel Sarcophagus

All sorts of stories have been spun around the half-mythical P.1000 super-heavy tank. Enthusiasts even made up a name for it: Ratte, German for "rat". It's hard to get to the truth under all the tales, but we can try. Such a tank was really designed, and was really considered by the Third Reich. In addition, models of two variants of the P.1000 were built. 

A monster like for "genosse Duchatschewski"

The story of Edward Grotte, the creator of the P.1000, is no less interesting than his tanks. Herr Grotte's career in the Soviet Union is worthy of a separate article, at the very least. Here, the talented designer created a very original medium tank. The TG tank had powerful armament, thick armour, and a convertible drive. The originality of the project, including an engine Grotte designed himself, was the cause of its downfall. Nevertheless, one can say with certainty that the TG was more promising than German designs that were being tested at the TEKO proving grounds around that time.

TG-3

German engineer Eduard Grote is most famous for two tanks: his insane 1000-ton colossus and a much more reasonable, but still too expensive, medium TG-1 tank. His other projects are less known, including at least one other superheavy, and one medium tank, which will be described here.

"December 3rd, 1931
#5886

Minutes of the VOAO Technical Commission with the participation of the People's Commissar of Naval and Military Affairs to review the new tank project by engineer Grote.

Present:

• Chief of the experimental department at the Bolshevik factory, Barykov
• VOAO Design Bureau #3 Chief, Ginsburg
• VOAO Design Bureau #3 Senior Engineer, Professor V.I. Zaslavskiy, B.S. Andryhevich
• Assistant to the chief of the 2nd RKKA HQ directorate, A.V. Konanchuk

The commission reviewed a preliminary project for a new tank by engineer Grote, indexed TG-3, with the following characteristics.

The TG-3 project is an attempt by the author to design a fast 30-ton medium tank with a convertible drive based on his first design.

Two parallel engines are placed in the front of the tank, each separately connected by crankshafts with gearboxes and final drives, powering the track on its side. The tank is suspended from five large road wheels on each side. The two rear wheels propel the tank when tracks are removed. All armament is placed between the middle and rear of the tank. The vehicle is controlled by pneumatics (compressed air from special compressors). Crew: commander, two mechanics, five gunners, total 8 men.

Having reviewed the project, the commission deems that:

1. Combat elements
1. Armament: the front placement of the engine means that the turret and armament are in the rear of the tank, increasing the dead zone in front of the tank to 8-9 meters. The double transmission set in the fighting compartment drastically reduces the free space in it, and severely limits the usefulness of its armament (some of it is simply inaccessible), and also results in a severely inadequate amount of ammunition on board. The tank armament can be used in the following ways:
1. Short 75 mm gun: horizontal arc of 60 degrees.
2. One 37 mm gun or machinegun in the main turret: 360 degrees.
3. 37 mm guns in sponsons: 10-20 degree horizontal arc. If the 75 mm gun is being used, using these guns is difficult or impossible.
4. Two machineguns in the rear sponsons: shooting from these is difficult to impossible. One of the machineguns can cover a 40 degree arc.
   In general, if one was to get rid of the unnecessarily bloated armament, the following could be used with greater effectiveness: 75 mm gun and ONE machinegun in the front, and ONE 37 mm gun and ONE machinegun in the turret. Only TWO guns and THREE machineguns, instead of the proposed FOUR guns and FOUR machineguns. 
2. Visibility: the visibility for the driver is unacceptable, as the driver cannot see the ground in front of his tank closer than 25-30 meters. On an incline, the driver cannot see forward at all. The special periscope the author proposes to mount on the bottom of the front hull does not increase the angle of visibility. As a result, the tank will have unacceptable handling on obstacles.
3. Ability to cross trenches and walls: equivalent to a 16 ton medium tank, not a medium-heavy.
4. Fording depth: 0.75 meters. Less than the fording depth of a light tank. Water hazards are impassable.
5. Medium speed: based on the experimental nature of the engines, their power will be no better than 600 hp, with a tank that is likely going to weigh no less than 35 tons (both of these are opinions of the commission). The proposed maximum speed of 50-60 kph and high speeds on tracks will be unattainable with this engine power. With the selected gear ratios, the tank will have a lower maximum and average speed (half as much).
6. Transport via railroads: a 50 ton special platform for concentrated weight will be needed, and the tank will hang off the sides by 340 mm (total width: 3000 mm), which will make loading and unloading difficult.
7. Range: the 400-430 Liters of fuel provide no more than 30 hours of work for a diesel engine or 23 hours for a gasoline engine at 70% of full power, which is half of the current norm, and is unacceptable.
8. Armour: armour is no more than 20 mm.
2. Design elements:
1. Engine: the two-stroke experimental engine (oil or gasoline) is only shown to the commission via diagrams. The commission deems that there are no guarantees that the engine will have the necessary power or reliability, especially when turbocharged, as with Grote's previous engine.
2. Engine compartment: the position of the engines and transmission make it impossible to use any of our aircraft engines, to cool them adequately, vent exhaust, or install additional components (compressor). These components are positioned very generally by the author, and are partially missing. Exhaust and hot air will find their way to the fighting compartment, where they will make the crew's work in a crowded space difficult. In order to function normally, the engines must work synchronously, but the synchronicity is violated when the tank turns, which will result in drawbacks well known in English Tailor tanks and our own experimental vehicles.
3. Transmission: the provided dimensions of the gearboxes and convertible drive are impossible. The actual dimensions will be much larger, which will reduce the size of the fighting compartment, as stated above. The concentration of controls for the transmission, engines, and turns on an automobile type steering column will result in a complicated experimental design, which is unlikely to succeed, and is poorly thought through by the author. The transmission is primitive and inefficient. 
4. Suspension: the suspension is too heavy and excessively large.
5. The proposed road wheel balancer system is primitive, poorly thought out, and unreliable.
6. The aforementioned drawbacks limit the implementation of turning wheels. The vehicle's problems with maneuverability will be multiplied by the overloaded rear drive wheels. This factor will result in high ground pressure, and will reduce performance on roads and bridges, especially in mud. It is not possible to turn using only the friction clutches when on wheels.
7. The tracks are identical to the first proposal, but modified to make them easier to disconnect. The drawback of stretching has not been resolved. Installing spurs on these tracks will result in significant oscillations of the road wheels.
3. Conclusions:
1. As the first TG tank that has already seen trials, TG-3 is a project undertaken by Grote's initiative, who has a rich imagination and significant design experience, but no experience with tank designs. Both vehicles were designed by him alone with some corrections made to the first design after RKKA and OGPU critiques, but with no solid grounding in RKKA requirements. 
2. The new TG-3 project does not satisfy RKKA requirements due to its overall design and aforementioned defects. In terms of the overall layout, it is even worse than the first TG. The commission deems further development of this project senseless. 
3. Engineer Grote's desire for a special tank engine for tanks that weigh only 25-30 tons is notable. The commission considers that when designing tanks of this class, a special tank engine must be designed: small, simple, light, reliable, capable of being used in a variety of places.
4. Based on points 1-3 and our exhaustion of all positive experiences resulting from Engineer Grote's work, the commission considers it pointless to seek further assistance from him in further tank designs."

V. Lehn Collection

Tank Quotas in 1931

"Minutes of the Revolutionary War Council meeting on changes to the tank program for 1931

May 8th, 1931

Present: comrades Voroshilov, Uborevich, Triandafilov, Martinovich, Halepskiy
Secretary: comrade Litunovskiy

1. T-27 Tankettes

Due to proficiency attained in mass T-27 manufacturing and discovery of excellent combat characteristics (mobility, off-road performance, possibility of using a 37 mm gun), the transition from the T-18 to the T-26, which shortens the requirements for small tanks by 65 vehicles, and a lack of selected medium tank, it is necessary to produce 200 additional tankettes in 1931. Accept comrade Martinovich's proposal to wait until the issues of producing T-26 tanks at the Bolshevik factory and hulls at the Podolsk factory are resolved before inquiring if factories can produce additional tankettes. MPS VSHKh should investigate this issue and report to the RVSS.

Consider comrade Martinovich's claim that VSNKh is preparing to gear up the Nizhniy Novgorod and 2nd automotive factories to produce no less than 15 thousand T-27 tankettes according to the government decision from February 20th, 1931.

2. T-26

T-26 orders are proceeding on time. Retain the previous order of 300 vehicles. Remind MPS VSNKh that, according to Bolshevik factory directors, the bottleneck of production is cast iron, and its reception is still not resolved. This threatens the timely delivery of T-26es.

3. T-18

Considering that the Motoviliha factory still hasn't mastered tank production, and the order for 75 T-18 tanks is delaying important artillery orders, cancel 65 T-18 tanks, leaving only the 10 tanks that have already been started. Send no more tank orders to Motoviliha.

4. Medium tank

1. T-24:
1. Retain the 1931 order for 80 T-24s with the corresponding amount of spare parts (mandatory).
2. Comrade Martinovich must immediately give HPZ this order and ensure that there is no extra produced, as we will not make any more of these vehicles.
2. TG:
1. Report to KO that the commission's decision on the TG medium tank cannot be realized in 1931, as the experimental prototype is still unfinished, and it is impossible to determine when it will be. As a result, there can be no standardized medium tank in 1931 for us to produce.
2. The Vickers 12-ton tank that we purchased must be meant for colonial forces (weak armour and armament), and does not measure up to our tank armament system.
3. Continue accelerated work on the TG experimental prototype. Take note of the schedule proposed by Leningrad region OGPU.
4. Ask permission to purchase the new 16-ton Vickers tank, of which we have been notified, which matches our requirements for armour, speed, and armament.
3. Christie tank:
1. Ask for permission to adopt the Christie tank into the mechanized forces as a high speed tank destroyer (BT).
2. Instruct comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy to calculate the maximum amount of BT tanks (existing type, with no changes) that can be produced this year at HPZ, considering that the T-24 order at that factory decreases by 220 units.
3. Simultaneously, instruct UMM to accelerate work on modernizing the Christie tank.

5. Heavy tank:

1. It is necessary to have at least a small number of heavy tanks in the RKKA.
2. UMM must discover information on heavy tanks in Italy, England, and, if possible, France, with the objective of buying such a tank, or at least blueprints.
3. Simultaneously, conduct independent work on such a tank.

6. On an engine factory for medium tanks

Ask the government to reverse its decision on February 20th, 1931, and allow construction of a factory for M-5 (Liberty) instead of the previously chosen M-6 (Hispano-Suiza).

UVVS chief Baranov must reserve 150 new M-5 engines from 1931 production and transfer them to comrade Halepskiy.

7. On armour

Report to the government that the task of cementing against armour piercing bullets is completed. The task of reducing the amount of ferrite alloys in the armour is also completed. Work on cementing steel against small caliber armour piercing shells continues. According to comrade Martinovich, a complete transfer to using cemented armour (Vibrak type) will happen in July 1931.

Keep in mind comrade Martinovich's statement that the required amount of firebrick to build 8 furnaces at the Izhor factory (for production of cemented armour) has been ordered on April 19th 1931 from abroad.

Comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy should ensure the fastest possible arrival of this order.

Chairman Voroshilov

Secretary Litunovskiy"

RGVA 4-14-414

1931 Tank Program

"Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) On the Tank program

February 20th, 1931

Building on the decree from November 30th, 1930 on the tank building program that specifies the requirements before 1932: 4,000 tankettes, 13,800 small tanks, and 2,000 medium tanks, the Politburo decrees:

1. Tankette

1. Approve the T-27 tankette with the Ford AA engine with the following characteristics:
1. Speed: 36-40 kph
2. Mass: 2 tons
3. Armour: 10-15 mm
4. Armament: 1 machinegun
5. Engine, watercooled, 40-45 hp
2. The tankette will be produced at automotive factory #2. The production will be mastered in 1931 by means of production of 400 tankettes. 
3. Considering that T-27 tankettes uses Ford truck components, in addition to armour and tracks, VSNKh is assigned the issue of creating a second manufacturing base for T-27 tankettes at the Nizhniy Novgorod automotive factory, assigning 20-25% of the factory's output to them.
4. VSNKh and NKVM must report in two months how many tankettes the factory can produce before spring of 1932.

2. Small tank

1. Approve the T-26 (Vickers) with the following characteristics:
1. Speed:
1. On roads: 35 kph
2. Off-road: 20-25 kph
2. Mass: 7.5 tons
3. Armour: 8-13 mm
4. Armament: one 37 mm gun and one machinegun or two machineguns
5. Engine: Armstrong-Sidley air cooled, 84-93 hp
2. In order to master production in 1931, produce 300 tanks of this type at the Bolshevik factory. Prepare for organization of production at Bolshevik and Stalingrad factories with their own engineering staff.
3. Bolshevik factory should be expected to produce 1,500 tanks per year and Stalingrad 12,000 tanks, with spare parts. The production base at Stalingrad must be ready by April 1st, 1932. The experimental plant must be ready by spring of 1932, which should produce 100 tanks per shift per year. In order to master production, the experimental plant must produce one batch of tanks in spring of 1932.

3. Medium tank

1. Approve the powerful TG tank as the main medium tank with the following characteristics (preliminary):
1. Speed:
1. Maximum: 40 kph
2. Average: 25 kph
2. Mass: 20 tons
3. Armour: 30/20/15
4. Armament:
1. 76 mm gun
2. 37 mm gun
3. 4-5 machineguns
5. Engine: 240 hp, air cooled
2. Propose acceleration of the tank building program to OGPU and NKVM, consider it the most important task in producing experimental tanks in 1931.
3. In order to master production, produce 50-75 tanks in 1931.
4. Considering the combat potential of this vehicle, be ready to produce 2000 tanks of this type by spring 1932.
5. The main manufacturing base will be at the Kharkov Locomotive Factory, in cooperation with the Stalingrad on the hull, engine, and steel casting.
   VSNKh is tasked with investigating if a second manufacturing base can be set up in the Urals.
6. After 80 T-24 tanks are produced, remove it from production and redirect the available resources to produce TG tanks.

4. Considering the possibility of a second manufacturing base for the TG tank in the Urals, cease production of small tanks at MMZ after existing components have been used.

5. Considering satisfactory results when producing T-27 tankettes with Ford AA components and preliminary successes at armouring and arming Kommunar and Caterpillar tractors to create infantry support tanks, consider it necessary to create a second echelon of infantry support tanks on automotive and tractor bases, for which NKVM and VSNKh must report in six months on the types, amount, and locations of production in 1932 and 1933.

6. On engines: supply tank factories with the following engines:

1. T-27 tankette: Ford AA engine from the Nizhniy Novgorod automotive factory
2. Small T-26 tank: Armstrong-Sidley engine from the Bolshevik and Stalingrad Tractor factories
3. For medium tanks: NKVM should accelerate investigations of medium tank engines and decide on a type in 1-2 months. Due to a lack of factories capable of producing powerful medium tank engines, NKVM should accelerate the construction of a factory that can produce sufficient engines for medium tanks by spring of 1932. Initially, aim the production at M-6 and Grotte engines. VSNKh, NKVM, and OGPU should design powerful diesel engines with 240-300 hp in 1931.

7. On armour

1. The consumption of armour by the current program is 50,000 tons of processed armour. The existing base (Izhor and Bolshevik factories) can provide 6,000 tons. 
2. VSNKh should organize a new manufacturing base at Stalingrad that can provide 46,000 tons of processed armour starting in spring of 1932.
3. Considering the necessity of increasing numbers of powerful medium tanks and tankettes, as well as production of second echelon infantry tanks on truck and tractor chassis, VSNKh should propose changes to the armour consumption.
4. The currently produced armour is inadequate compared to Vickers armour, despite the presence of twice as many coloured metals and ferrite alloys in our armour. NKVM and VSNKh should finish current investigations on increasing armour quality to Vickers levels and decreasing the amount of imported ferrite alloys in two months.

8. On small steel casting

In order to complete the tank program, 55,000 tons of small steel casts are required, with the Bolshevik factory's capacity of 4,000 tons. VSNKh should build a manufacturing base at the Stalingrad tractor factory capable of producing the missing amount."

RGASPI 17-162-9

World of Tanks: Today in History: Grotte Tank

On June 27th, 1931, the USSR started trials of an experimental medium tank designed by the German engineer Eduard Grotte.

E. Grotte was the head of a group of engineers from Germany that arrived in the USSR in March of 1930. The group was tasked with the development of a 20-ton tank armed with a 76 mm gun and a 37 mm gun, as well as machineguns. A special design bureau was created at the Bolshevik factory for this project, composed of the Germans and young Soviet engineers.

The result was the two-turreted medium TG-1 tank (Tank Grotte). For its time, the vehicle was very novel. It was the first domestic vehicle to have a fully welded turret and hull. The armour was sloped. The gearbox allowed same speed for moving forward and backward. The tank was controlled not with levers, but with a joystick, like a plane. Due to the pneumatic power steering, the driver's job was easier. The suspension was composed of five road wheels per side, 4 return rollers, an idler, and a rear drive wheel, and had a three layer shock absorber system for smooth driving.

The TG-1 has the most powerful tank gun for its time, the A-19 76.2 mm gun designed by Pavel Syachintov. A 37 mm PS-1 gun and five machineguns were used as auxiliary weapons. The armament was placed in three layers to ensure massed five in all directions.

With all its advantages, the Grotte tank never made it to production. All the novelties put into the design led to an unpalatable cost of production, and Soviet industry in the 1930s could not produce components of needed quality. As a result, the tank was unreliable.

Grotte left the USSR in 1933.

Thanks to the TG-1 project, valuable experience was gained, which was later used when designing domestic tanks. The famous Soviet tank engineer Nikolai Vsevolodovich Barykov started his career under Grotte's leadership.

Original article available here.