Light Tank Destroyer

 "Approved by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel General of Artillery, Voronov
October 17th, 1942

Tactical-technical requirements for a 45 mm anti-tank SPG

1. Purpose of the SPG

The 45 mm anti-tank SPG is designed as a weapon for tank destroyer artillery regiments and anti-tank batteries in moto-mechanized units to combat enemy tanks and infantry.

2. Requirements for the SPG

The SPG uses the traversing part of the 45 mm model 1942 "M-42" anti-tank gun. The SPG must satisfy the following requirements:

1. Muzzle velocity of 870 m/s when firing the 1.4 kg armour piercing shell.
2. Ability to use armour piercing, high explosive, and subcaliber ammunition.
3. The practical rate of fire in direct fire mode is no less than 15 RPM.
4. The elevation angle is no less than +15 degrees.
5. The depression angle is no less than -5 degrees.
6. The traverse is at least 30 degrees(15 degrees per side).
7. The rate of elevation and traverse is at least 1.5 degrees per turn of the flywheel.
8. The bore axis height is no more than 1600 mm.
9. The gun uses the AZP sight.
10. The SPG is serviced by three crewmen (including the driver). The fighting compartment contains folding chairs for two men.
11. During travel, the gun can be rigidly fixed in the horizontal and vertical plane.
12. The gun mount must allow for comfortable loading at all elevation and traverse angles.
13. The SPG can carry two PPSh SMGs.
14. The ammunition capacity is 90 rounds for the 45 mm gun and 1000 rounds for the submachine guns. The ammunition stowage must be reliable and safeguard the ammunition during travel. It must be easy to extract the ammunition from the racks to load.

Deliveries

 "Table of arrivals of tanks at the front lines in 1941, by type

Type	Domestic				British			American		Total
Month	KV	T-34	T-60	T-70	Mk.II	Mk.III	Mk.IV	M3 S	M3 L
Total 1941										20,740
Jan	126	206	348	-	-	16	-	-	-	696
Feb	165	420	260	-	-	-	-	-	-	845
Mar	105	338	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	527
Apr	320	702	576	-	134	144	-	14	32	1922
May	350	1003	898	-	255	171	-	30	16	2723
Jun	199	698	657	103	-	74	-	144	222	2091
Jul	299	1177	746	371	86	44	-	66	91	2880
Aug	178	1378	250	583	10	63	-	35	98	2595
Sep	45	598	-	439	-	72	-	54	43	1251
Oct	160	1100	75	640	-	10	-	24	5	2024
Nov	215	1312	-	838	85	163	-	187	61	2861
Dec	239	1678	48	1026	-	-	42	23	16	3072
Total 1942	Total domestic:  20,957				Total foreign: 2530					23,487

"

Via Alexey Isayev

This data is interesting on its own, but it's also interesting to compare to deliveries of foreign tanks. The first Matilda and Valentine tanks began arriving during the Battle for Moscow and were thrown into battle with little preparation. As you can see in the above table, once the situation stabilized a little bit it took some time before new units with British tanks could be properly outfitted. Large deployments of Matildas and Valentines only take place in April, four months after deliveries began.

A similar picture can be seen with American tanks. The first shipments arrived in January of 1942 and we start seeing a small number of these tanks on the battlefield in April-May, 4-5 months later. Once the pipeline was set up, it was not as hard to deploy new tanks. A bump shipments that came in May hits the front lines in June. A lot of tanks were tied up in delivery by the end of the year: 3875 foreign tanks were delivered to the USSR in 1941-1942, but only 2530 were actually fielded before the end of 1942.

You can see the same pattern with Soviet tanks. Evacuation of factory #183, the USSR's largest producer of the T-34 tank, began in September of 1941. The factory began to set up in the Urals in December-January, and by May of 1941 you see a spike in deliveries of T-34 tanks. Similarly, production of the T-70 was authorized in March of 1942 and we see these tanks begin to arrive on the front lines in July. 

Za Rodinu!

With the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to tell what intelligence is valid and what is not. However, in the moment, even mostly correct information takes on a very strange form.

This is one such example. 

American Review

 "Materials from the USA War Department describing Soviet T-70, T-34, KV-1, and KV-2 tanks

To the Chief of Staff of the Armoured and Motorized Forces, Major General of the Tank Forces comrade Salminov

I present to you materials received from the USA War Department describing Soviet T-70, T-34, KV-1, and KV-2 tanks.

This material was composed by the training department of the US Army Air Force to familiarize American personnel with identifying foreign tanks.

Attachment: the aforementioned on 5 pages
For your eyes only

Chief of the 2nd Directorate of Red Army Main Intelligence Directorate, Major General Khlopov
October 15th, 1943

Armoured Confusion: Mid-war

The history of Soviet wartime armoured vehicles bore several misconceptions. There are many reasons for this. A number of myths came from a lack of information. Sometimes historians' own guesses that had little to do with reality were interpreted as fact. Unfortunately, the authors of some myths are still considered experts to this day and these exercises in fiction are still cited as fact. Initially the author planned on two articles dedicated to misconceptions about the Great Patriotic War, but there were too many misconceptions for 1942-1943, and so the second article won't be the last.

Tank Comfort

Vadim Elistratov is a renowned restorer of armoured vehicles, with experience of bringing WWII era tanks back to life with their original components. Since he doesn't just rebuild the tanks but also drives them, he gave his impressions on how various nations' armoured vehicles compare to one another in a recent interview with Tactic Media.

Tank Brigade Experience

"To Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Lieutenant General Fedorenko

Experience in battle, especially the experience of the [91st Tank] Brigade between August 21st and 29th, 1942, shows that the KV tank lost its advantage over the T-34 in protection, as the same caliber of gun can penetrate both the KV and T-34. The KV has a significantly different weight and dimensions than the T-34, is less maneuverable, and is thus inferior to the T-34.

Soviet Tank Observation

From "Observation from Modern Tanks"

Engineer-Major L.S. Tolokonnikov

Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti (Tank Industry Herald) 1944 #10

"Presently, tanks use simple observation devices

1. Observation slits with protective glass and without.
2. Mirror observation devices (periscopes).
3. Commander's cupolas with observation slits or periscopes.
4. Observation ports.

Optical (aside from sights) and mechanical observation devices are completely absent. until a new type of tank observation device is discovered, further improvement of observation from tanks, protection of the observer, and convenience of observation can only be increased by improving the design of existing devices, increasing their quality, positioning them more rationally, and improving their attachment inside the tank.

This article will examine only a portion of the issue, that is the position, amount, and observation angle of modern tanks, domestic, captured, and allied (25 in all).

Mongolian Regiment

All aid provided by foreign governments to the USSR is usually lumped under the term Lend Lease, but this is inaccurate. A significant amount of aid came from other sources, such as Mongolia. One of the contributions was money to build the "For Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column consisting of 32 T-34 and 21 T-70 tanks. These tanks went to the 112th Order of the Red Banner Tank Brigade.

Tanks Review

"Exchange of experience in using tank weapons in the Patriotic War

The use of tanks in battle, especially in the winter offensive of 1943, showed several peculiarities of using tanks in battle, their advantages and disadvantages.

1. Typical distances for firing from a T-34 tank from standstill in defense or ambush is 1000 meters. When firing on the move or from short stops during offensive action the distance is the same.
   The practical rate of fire of the 45 mm gun is 3-4 RPM. For the DT it is one disk (63 rounds) per minute. From the 76 mm gun it is 16-17 RPM. In a cohesive crew the radio operator can help hand ammunition into the turret without being distracted from his work.
   

Comrade Sherman

"Award Order

1. Name: Sherman, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich
2. Rank: Jr. Lieutenant
3. Position and unit: T-70 tank commander, 2nd tank battalion, 120th Orsha Independent Tank Brigade.
   Is nominated for the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class (posthumously).
4. Year of birth: 1924
5. Nationality: Jewish
6. Party affiliation: none
7. Participation in the Civil War, subsequent combat in defense of the USSR: Patriotic War, Western Front, as of August 13th, 1943
8. Wounds or contusions in the Patriotic War: did not have any
9. In the Red Army since: March 6th, 1942
10. Recruited by: Samarkand recruitment office
11. Prior awards: none

Monstrous Regiment

Even as late as 1944, Red Army tank units were far from being populated entirely by T-34s. Sometimes colourful mixes like these went into battle, and their owners had to put up with a gently used fleet.

"By July 15th, 1944, the regiment was equipped with the following:

• 16 T-70 tanks
• 10 Matilda tanks
• 1 M4A2 tank
• 4 BA-64
• 2 motorcycles
• Automobiles:
• Trucks: 34
• Special: 8
• Cars: 2

At this time:

1. T-70 tanks each ran for 110-120 hours, and their technical condition was satisfactory to perform a forced march.
2. Matilda tanks, received from refurbishment on June 27th, 1944, had only 45-55 running hours remaining. Their technical condition was unsatisfactory for a combat vehicle. Matilda tanks required another round of factory repair due to worn out components and assemblies. Due to significant wear on all parts and components of the tank, they could not be restored by the regiment's resources.
3. The M4A2 tank was technically functional and ready for upcoming battles.
4. The Harley and Indian motorcycles were received from refurbishment and were in unsatisfactory condition.
5. Automobiles: half made up of foreign makes. 85% were received to fill up the regiment and brigade back in April of 1942, only 15% were received in the summer of 1943."

Via Andrei Ulanov.