Finland's "Elephant Gun"

Many nations searched for effective anti-tank weapons in the interbellum years. One of the most popular countermeasures was the anti-tank rifle. These rifles ranging in caliber from 7.92 to 20 mm were issued to infantry units. Finland also followed this path as it nervously observed the development of armoured vehicles by its eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union.

Winter War Tank Experience

"Copy #1

4th Army Chief Command

Army Staff

#578/41 secret

1. General rules of using Russian tanks:
1. Russians support their offensives with tanks (50-100 per division, up to 200 or about 20 per battalion when attacking fortified regions).
2. Tanks advance in 2-3 echelons:
   
1. To penetrate and to reach objectives in the rear.
2. To suppress fire and break into the main line of defense.
3. Tanks always drove with closed hatches. Observation was done through periscopes. Hatches were opened only for self-defense if the crew was in danger.

Video: Did T-34 Prototypes See Battle?

It is often claimed that T-34 tank prototypes were tested in combat in the Winter War, and sometimes even in the Battle of Khalkin Gol. I explore whether or not this was possible and where the tanks were at the time of these conflicts in my latest video.

Tanks at the Mannerheim Line

"Technical Meeting Minutes

Factory #185
May 9th, 1940
Chairman: comrade Barykov

Report by comrade Koloyev about the anti-tank defenses in the Summa region on the Karelian Isthmus.

The Mannerheim Line was built with the forces of four large capitalist nations. The Karelian Isthmus is bounded on two side by Lake Ladoga and the Bay of Finland, or to be more exact the Vyborg Bay. The isthmus, like all of Finland, is scarred by lakes, rivers, heights, and becomes one large foothold covered by a system of anti-tank fortifications. Let us examine one small region of the front line near Summa.

Damage to a KV Tank in Karelia

I talked about damage to KV tanks in 1940, but this is an even earlier case: December 1939, the very first KV that was sent into battle. Here is what Finnish AT guns managed to do to it.

1. Dent, 70 by 50 mm, 10 mm deep.

2. 100 by 50 mm dent, 10 mm deep.

3. 70 mm by 50 mm dent, 10 mm deep.

4. 60 mm by 50 mm dent, 10 mm deep.

5. The cap was knocked off and the bearing damaged.

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 2

Part 1.

"Lelyushenko (Brigade Commander, 39th Tank Brigade): I will concentrate on issues that turned up in our experience, using the 39th Tank Brigade as an example. I think that it was a mistake to enter the battle against the White Finns with only two tank battalions. When we were leaving West Belarus, I had 5 battalions, so I ended up with 110 tanks instead of 350. Three battalions were designated as independent and assigned to infantry divisions. These battalions did not have means of repairing their vehicles or replenishing their ranks. The HQ and political department could only service half of the brigade. These tank battalions ended up with 7-8 tanks by December 15th, 1939, and very few men. They had no way to evacuate their tanks or repair them. Tank brigades have excellent mobile workshops for this, a small factory. If a tank is knocked out in the morning, it will be back in action by evening. I had only two battalions, plus later the 204th Flamethrower Battalion and 65th Ski Battalion, and ended the war with almost as many tanks as I had at the start. I repaired my own tanks, and those from other brigades. As a result, the brigade remained combat capable, ready to complete any mission.
What's new with tanks in this war? Before the war, commanders thought that tanks will be of little use in a real war, as the terrain will be 50% forests, 25% water, some percentage of swamps, and only about 10% of terrain will be suitable for tanks. Practice shows that tanks could be used in the Finnish theater, and not only could, but should, with the caveat that organization of cooperation with infantry needs to be theater specific. Infantry must follow tanks closely. When tanks moved slowly (I am talking about tanks with applique armour that were invulnerable to 37 mm guns), infantry walked confidently, holding onto them.
...
Another issue was new to me. Commanders thought that tanks should not be used at night, and they were used rarely in this way. Experience showed that tanks should be used at night, but how? They should not be used for long range attacks, but for short pushes with infantry to capture important defensive objects. This is how you achieve success. For example, we defeated the enemy with our infantry at the Ilvesk fortified region. Infantry feels our force and support. Tanks, with their guns and flamethrowers, repelled any attempt to counterattack our infantry.
Can tanks be used at night? They can and should be used, but should be combined with carefully organized infantry units and good reconnaissance.
The issue of assault and blocking groups. An assault group is composed of a company of infantry, a platoon of tanks, two anti-tank guns, and one sapper unit. Assault groups should be trained in attacking pillboxes on real terrain. The infantry, not just the sappers, needs to know how to calculate the necessary amount of explosives, attach them, and use them. I had three cases where all sappers were wounded and there was no one among the infantry that could destroy the fortifications. Everyone needs to learn the absolute minimum about explosives in peace time.
Returning to the issues of tank force organization. I think that a tank battalion attached to an infantry division is not enough. They must be removed to create tank regiments and brigades. Experience at the Finnish front shows that the tank battalions are not viable. These battalions don't have the means to evacuate and repair tanks. Replacement of manpower is complicated, as the battalion has no resources to draw the replacements from. Here is what I did in my tank brigade: form an unofficial training battalion. I gathered up 150 men from the supplies, communications, HQ reserve, and other companies. I trained them once in a while, preparing mechanics, drivers, motorists, tank commanders, gunners. This worked out well. I did not receive enough drivers, so I trained my own. They were taught the traditions of combat spirit, and I've never seen one that faltered in battle and turned back, they all raced forward to complete their mission. The 39th Tank Brigade completed all objectives that were given to it."

Seems that this idea of explosives training was not unique.

"Bychevskiy (Major, chief of engineers of the 13th Army): ... I agree that tankers and infantry need to be taught to deal with explosives. There is nothing difficult during explosives training in regular military academies. In practice, we saw that soldiers and commanders could master explosives quickly, and in the end could dismantle minefields on their own. A short training course right on the front lines (3-4 days) showed good results. We definitely need to introduce explosives training for infantry and tankers so they can deal with minefields on their own."

Lelyushenko was not alone in using tanks at night either.

"Mladentsev: (Colonel, commander of the 387th Infantry Regiment): ... On using tanks: tankers, your field manual says that tanks should not be used at night. I used them, and it worked well. Tanks move forward, infantry moves forward, they work together, and work together wonderfully. Infantry is morally supported, tankers are not afraid of the night, even if visibility is poor. Infantry and tanks penetrated enemy fortifications together, and destroyed his counterattacks. Tanks can and must fight at night. We need to practice cooperation of tanks and infantry in peace time."

"Frolov (Corps Commander, 14th Army): ... On tanks: the T-26 tank fully proved itself. The BT was not useful, I should have pulled them back to Petsalmo. Artillery must be replaced. We need a light mountain gun. New model 1936 guns [76 mm F-22] are good, but not useful here. The 122 mm howitzer showed itself well, but it needs a ChTZ tractor, no other tractor can pull it here."

Pavlov (Army Commander 2nd Class, Red Army ABTU Chief): ... Tanks assigned to divisions met a terrible fate, and would have in any war. Pardon my honesty, but everyone that claimed that these tanks will be used to teach cooperation was bluffing, there was no cooperation. More than 7000 tanks were scattered across infantry divisions, and they had no effect. They were helpless. A tank battalion in an infantry division, T-37 and T-26 tanks, is a limited organization. Weak T-37 tanks are incapable of traversing any mud. These battalions were ineffective. Correct me if I'm wrong, but they were mostly used to guard the divisional or regimental HQ.
Voice from the audience: Correct.
Pavlov: And this is more than 7000 tanks. These same battalions inside the brigades, they fought well and achieved more, since they were controlled by the brigade HQ. I have to say that not only HQ staff, but political workers looked after the control. Comrade Lelyushenko said: we're going to attack, political workers, go to the infantry units, make sure they will follow the tanks. This is how we achieved cooperation. It is not always possible to check the cooperation with independent battalions.
Where am I going with this? We need to restore tank brigades using tanks from infantry divisions. In the Kiev Military District, I have 4 brigades with 14 tanks. The tanks were transferred, the brigades fell apart. I will say it outright: if there is mobilization tomorrow, our brigades will not be ready. The tanks will have to be sent back from as far as the Leningrad district. We need to end this practice. As long as I am the commander of this type of armed forces, I will make sure that no more units are dismantled. If they need tanks, take the whole unit.
...
Regarding the T-37, it is a special type of vehicle, it must be moved to special battalions at the corps level so the commander can use T-37 tanks properly. As far as new types of tanks are concerned, I will make a note: commanders, don't flood the Commissariat and comrade Stalin with telegrams, let us solve the issues of organization in Moscow properly. I know how it is in practice, as soon as a new vehicle is available everyone starts saying that the old vehicles are no good. They say: give us T-34s and KVs, only they are compatible with our theater, no other tanks are compatible. I will tell you now that I will take measures to ensure that not a single telegram like this even receives an answer. We will determine what district gets how many tanks at the General Staff, wait your turn."

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 1

After the conclusion of the Winter War, it was clear that application of tank forces in the Red Army needs to be reviewed. Here are some excerpts from a meeting of VKP(b) bigwigs discussing the effectiveness of the tanks and suggesting changes to how they are used, from rkka.ru archives. I will also include some interesting parts that characterize the army as a whole.

"Semenov (Brigade Commissar, Military Commissar of the 50th Infantry Corps): ... We did not study Finland during peacetime enough, we did not study it properly. During wargames, we reached Vyborg in no time at all, with a break for lunch. The White Finn tactics are based on close combat, with an organized system of rifle and mortar fire, with light ski units. Our units turned out to not be ready to fight on skis, they were bound to roads, and their supply lines dragged 10 km behind. We were only saved due to a shortage of Finnish aircraft. For instance, the 123rd and 84th infantry divisions, 1st, 13th, 15th, 35th, and 20th tank brigades, and elements of the 90th Division were all stuck on one narrow road. Many people had to work for several days to untangle this traffic jam."

"Pshennikov (Brigade Commander, 142nd Infantry Division): ... Next issue, the use of tanks. When we were fighting in no man's land, despite my division advancing along a wide front, there was a lack of roads. I had a tank brigade that operated on a front of one regiment with only one road. What happened? The tank brigade clogged up the road and I had nothing to feed that regiment with. All carts had to be stopped and supplies carried to the regiment on foot. In future wars, tank units need their own roads. If there is no other road, don't reinforce the division with tanks, or maybe with just one battalion.
I also think that it is necessary to review tank division compositions, as T-37 and T-38 tanks did not show themselves well. Divisions need to have T-26 tanks. Even those have a drawback, their tracks slip off. That is their greatest weakness, and it must be resolved."

"Sinitsin (Regimental Commissar, Military Commissar of the Front Armoured Forces): Comrades, I consider it my duty to raise some issues on the use of armoured forces in Western Ukraine and against the White Finns. Comrades that spoke before me correctly brought up on the poor cooperation between tanks and infantry. I've been in tank forces for a while, but I have never seen proper cooperation between tanks and infantry in training. If we want to have proper cooperation between tanks and infantry, we need to include a tank brigade in each infantry corps and force the commander to train tanks and infantry together. This will have an effect.
I think that tank battalions with 15 T-26es and several T-38s worked poorly, since there was no repair bases for them, and the vague directions given by combined arms commanders, as a rule, resulted in their disablement. Spreading tanks out without proper orders does not achieve anything. Tank battalions should not be included in infantry divisions.
There is no tank master in the region, front, or army. ABTU is no more or less than an inspectorate. In this condition, we cannot prepare tank forces properly, as nobody is really responsible for training or control. I think that ABTU and tank force directorates should be organized like the VVS. This will increase responsibility for actions, create a centralized training center, and military councils and commanders will have someone to hold responsible for the state of tank forces. Some words on tankers: it is known how important tanks are in any battle, but we have problems with finding qualified crewmen. For instance, there is a regular captain in the Leningrad district who is in charge of assigning tank unit commanders. Where does he know them from? He doesn't, nobody studies these issues, and there is chaos going on with our crews. I think it is necessary to have training and assignments under control of the armoured forces chief. This will make things more reasonable.

The next issue is about the types of tanks. It is sad that a regular 37 mm shell penetrates our tanks, not to mention larger calibers. I think that we need to move to tanks armed with larger calibers and thicker armour due to enemy anti-tank artillery.
Stalin: Is 45 mm enough for T-26es?
Sinitsin: It is enough, but the KV is a new type of tank, and 45 mm is not enough.
Stalin: Is 75 mm enough?
Sinitsin: Yes, that is enough. We need to make more tanks like this and quickly. My next issue is discipline. We talk too much, but the state of affairs is poor. We need to stop talking and prepare our forces properly. I will give you an example. In the 13th Army, I saw a soldier that was lightly wounded in the arm, led to the rear by 3-4 men led by a political chief to take care of him, and then this group sticks around the rear instead of going back and fighting.
It is also necessary to improve training in military academies. We have young lieutenants that just finished the academy, and they don't know how to shoot their pistols. I must make a remark about political workers, there are many comrades with a very low level of military knowledge. We need to end this now and train our commanders and political workers better."

Continued in part 2.

NKVD on Tank Use in the Winter War. Part 3: Organization

Part 2.

"The control of armoured forces during the period of war had a separation between the commanders of the units and their technical possessions, formation, organization, supplies, and support from the rear. All of these elements were scattered around various departments and directorates. UABTB controlled the combat units, the Directorate of Military Technical Supplies (UVTS) controlled supplies and technical support, the 4th HQ Department was tasked with organization, OKNS did the delivery, the 5th and 6th departments controlled the rear, the 1st Department and OABTV controlled the operations, OABTV also dealt with training. There was no unified system of control and supply for armoured forces, and as a result, no one person had the responsibility for the entire armoured force.

The inventory of human resources among the soldiers and officers was done poorly. Armoured forces' rubrics cover a spectrum of specialities which are not differentiated, which resulted in BT specialists being sent to work on T-26, T-38 tanks, etc. There was a deficiency in the population of the junior commanders and privates as a result of this. Up to 50% of the reinforcements sent to the armoured forces consisted of poorly educated Red Armymen which did not satisfy the forces' requirements.

Inter-departmental confusion resulted in negative consequences. The chief of the North-Western Frotn UABTV and the chief of the 5th Department of the Front HQ, contrary to the UVTS, issued a proposal, approved by the Front council (#0043, February 24th, 1940). According to this proposal, medium repairs of all vehicles was to be conducted at army level evacuation bases, for which all army repair services were to be concentrated at these bases, and all supplies would be delivered there. In practice, this meant that tank units lost all of their evacuation and repair ability, their commanders lost the responsibility of medium repairs, and created large bases on the front, which is unacceptable from the points of view of security, air defense, and combat repair ability. This also meant the introduction of needless and difficult trips in the absence of sufficient transport, which would overload the roads and increase the length of time for repairing a vehicle. In the end, the result was an unavoidable failure to perform medium repairs and disarmament of all tank brigades in a very short term.

This decree was met with confusion by all army units, and was not followed.

The above dispersion of tactical, operational, organizational, and technical functions between various departments and directorates can be explained by the fact that the armoured forces are considered a partial and secondary component in the RKKA system. Currently, armoured forces, alongside aviation and artillery, are the most notable type of forces in the Red Army, both in number and importance, and is one of the decisive components of a battle or operation. Experience at Khalkin-Gol, Poland, and especially in Finland confirms this. Practice demands that the control and supply of armoured forces needs to be collected in the hands of one chief, RKKA ABTU, similar to the VVS directorate, as an HQ and a supply directorate. The district HQ should have an armoured force HQ, which has its own HQ, a supply department, an HR department, etc.

This way, a strong and precise system is created to control armoured forces, without any of the drawbacks of the current system.

Chief of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Leningrad Military District
Major of State Security, Sidnev"

Via slon-76.

NKVD on Tank Use in the Winter War. Part 2: Vehicles

Part 1.

"Experience showed that the weakest point of existing tanks is their armour. 954 tanks were lost during the period of activity on the North-Western Front, which is over 50% of all losses in battle. Armour of T-28 tanks, not to mention BT and T-26 tanks, is easily penetrated by 37 mm shells. New KV and SMK tanks with 75 mm armour showed themselves well, as they were impenetrable by even 76 mm shells.

Another weakness of existing tanks was their off-road performance. They could not traverse the deep snow, 2-2.5 meter wide anti-tank trenches, escarpments 2.5 meters tall, or stone tank traps. All of these obstacles were impassable or difficult to cross without preparations.

Our experience showed that no tank type used its technically permissible speed. During regular marches, tank speed ranged between 15 and 20 kph, on the battlefield, between 6-10 kph.

Therefore, the experience of war requires that we immediately review current tank designs. First, we need to produce armour screens that proved themselves well in battle for existing tanks to make them immune to 37-45 mm shells. According to specialists, our army needs the following types of tanks, based on the experience of the Finnish theater:

1. A tank for maneuver action with 25-30 mm of armour and a top speed of 35-50 kph.
2. An infantry tank for cooperation with infantry when penetrating field fortification, with 60-70 mm of armour that is immune to low caliber shells, with a top speed of 25-35 kph. An up-armoured T-28 or T-35 tank would work for this role. Such a tank would neutralize artillery up to 76 mm, forcing the enemy to use only medium calibers, which will require special measures to camouflage and hide on the battlefield due to their large size.
3. A breakthrough tank with armour up to 100 mm and a top speed of 25 kph. This tank needs to be even more powerful than the infantry tank to operate in fortified regions with mine fields, tank traps, wide trenches, and pillboxes. Its armour must resist 76 mm guns and armament must be able to destroy pillboxes (122-152 mm). The tank would weigh 40-60 tons and be able to cross 6 meter wide trenches. Its average speed can be 10-20 kph, and top speed 20-30 kph.
   Success in the use of KV and SMK tanks shows that our designers and factories are capable of giving us such a tank.

Other defects in the design of vehicles include a poor radio design, which is large, non-portable, requires concentration for configuration work, and, mainly, cannot be used without turning away from the tank's weapons. As a result, commanders often forgot about their radio in situations where they needed to not only observe and control their unit, but fire from their tank.

The tank machinegun also performed poorly in battle. Disk magazines often jammed. Tanks require an improved machinegun."

Continued in part 3. 

NKVD on Tank Use in the Winter War. Part 1: Tactics

"April 5th, 1940

To the chief of the Special Department of the NKVD GUGB, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank, comrade Bochkov

Report on the deficiencies in units during the period of combat against White Finns (based on materials of special units).

Deficiencies of motorized units in combat

The specifics of the Finnish theater of war did not allow for the deployment of large independent tank units for powerful frontal or flanking attacks against the defending enemy. Tanks fought primarily in small groups with infantry, mainly along roads. Despite this, tanks played a significant role in the combat operations of the Red Army, especially on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main armoured forces were concentrated. During the war, a series of serious drawbacks was discovered among tank forces, which increased the difficulty of armoured warfare in the Finnish theater. The main drawbacks were lack of cooperation with infantry, artillery, and other types of forces, defects in the design of tanks, and deficiencies in the organization of armoured forces.

The specifics of the Finnish theater demanded that tanks must cooperate closely with other types of forces. However, in practice, tanks cooperated little. The cooperation with artillery and infantry was especially deficient.

The commanders of infantry units, regiments and battalions, did not always give clear objectives to the tank units that were assigned to them. Sometimes, commanders lacked significant knowledge of enemy defenses due to weak reconnaissance, and gave orders based not on specific targets designed to suppress specific enemy strongholds, but by lines on a map or landmarks. The path for tanks was often not specified, and was not supported with reconnaissance or infantry support.

In the 39th Light Tank Brigade, as a result of insufficient cooperation with infantry during combat on December 15th, 16th, and 17th, only 34 tanks returned out of 62 tanks that participated in combat. Of those, 5 were burned up by the enemy, 6 were stuck in an anti-tank trench, and the fate of the remaining 23 is unknown. 19 men from the crews died, 23 were wounded, and 32 disappeared. 5 of the dead were company commanders.

The operation started with no reconnaissance, tanks knew about only one trench, but not about the second one. The task of setting up a passage across the trench fell to the sapper battalion of the 49th infantry division and the brigade's sapper company, but the passages were made inattentively and the tanks had difficulty crossing. On December 15th, the 222nd Infantry Regiment that was supposed to support the tank attack at 12:00 was on a lunch break.

Tank units did not get their assignments in time, which made fulfilling orders impossible. On December 18th, 1939, at 12:00, the commander of the 768th Infantry Regiment Major Sokolov arrives at the preliminary positions of the 1st tank company of the 108th Independent Tank Brigade, and ordered Lieutenant Gaitsin on behalf of Brigade Commander Pestrevich: "You are now subordinate to the commander of the 554th infantry regiment. Attack now, as the main attack will start after the artillery barrage at 13:00". One hour remained until the attack, necessary to move into position. When the company arrived at new positions, the commander of the 554th regiment ordered "Attack immediately over there (waved his hand) or the regiment's attack will be late" instead of giving specific orders. When company commander Gaitsin asked for a more specific task, the commander replied "If you do not wish to attack, I will report you to the division commander." As a result, tanks attacked with no infantry. They drove up to the tank traps, found nothing, and drove back.

This situation with cooperation persisted not only in the first period of fighting, during assaults on a fortified region, but after, during the breakthrough and general offensive. Three battalions from the 13th Brigade accompanied by two regiments of the 84th Infantry Division penetrated from the Kamara station to the South-Western ourskirts of Pien-Pero, where they fortified for a defense for three days. Due to a lack of cooperation with neighbours, there was no connection to the rear (tank traps region between Kamara and Pien-Pero). The brigade commanders made no effort to establish cooperation and communication with their rear. Instead, an order was given by radio on February 22nd to attack Pero station without any directions on cooperation with neightbours, no communcation with the rear, and, most importantly, no communication with artillery of the 84th Infantry Division, which remained in the rear, cut off from the enemy. As a result of a lack of cooperation and reconnaissance, combat operations were carried out with great losses, and not always successfully, which is especially confirmed by experience in the February-March battles of the 20th Tank Brigade, which lost 68 tanks from enemy fire, 49 from mines, 3 in swamps, 3 to fire, and 6 were left on the battlefield in February. In total, 55 tanks were lost due to technical reasons.

On March 2nd, 1940, the 95th Independent Tank Battalion of the 20th Brigade was attached to the 201st regiment of the 84th division and tasked with capturing the railroad platform West of Wyborg near height 36,5 and Nameless (map 50000). When the order was given, Colonel Sinenko, HQ chief in the 20th Brigade, did not give an order for reconnaissance. The battalion performed its task without reconnaissance, infantry riding on top of tanks. As a result, the infantry was destroyed by flamethrower and machinegun fire on and around the tanks, while 3 tanks were destroyed by AT guns and 8 tankers were killed.

On March 5th, 1940, at 7:00, the HQ of the 20th Brigade received an order to capture heights 38 and Nameless, ending up at the bridge North-West of Yutnai. The HQ chief wrote an order for the 90th Independent Tank Battalion to attack in the first echelon, and the 95th battalion in the second echelon with elements of the 84th division. The division and brigade commanders did not think the offensive through, and the HQ chief did not check the preparedness of the battalions. As a result, it was only discovered during the offensive that the 90th battalion is not prepared for battle. The brigade commander ordered the 95th battalion, already prepared for a combat mission, to immediately perform the mission of the 90th battalion. The battalion commander was told that he would discover his objectives from the 344th Infantry Regiment. The 95th battalion was supposed to gather up in 10 minutes and go into battle without an objective. Only at the start of the battle did the battalion commander familiarize himself with the order of the 344th regiment, and did not manage to familiarize himself with the orders of the artillery commanders. The attack was planned for 12:00, an artillery barrage was fired, but nobody ended up attacking.

The brigade commanders did not concern themselves with issues of reconnaissance, electing to follow the very general, not always correct, and unconfirmed information of infantry reconnaissance, which was not always suitable for tank units. The 215th Reconnaissance Company, attached to the 20th Tank Brigade, was not used for its intended purpose during the war, and received no orders to discover the location of the enemy. In combat, the reconnaissance company did not perform reconnaissance, but was instead used as a means of communicating with neighbouring units, with the exception of 2-3 tanks observing the battlefield.

Other brigades were in similar shape. On March 12th, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Brigade received an order to support the success of the 613th Infantry Regiment, which was tasked with capturing Tammisuo. The battalion could not complete the task due to a lack of knowledge about enemy anti-tank defenses and their route. A part of the tanks got lost and stuck in traffic jams under enemy fire, a part hit a minefield and barricades, and also stopped under heavy fire. The battalion, without completing its objective, lost two men killed, three men wounded, and two tanks knocked out. The 1st Tank Brigade lost 13 tanks in total during the war due to not knowing combat routes and weakness of infantry and tank reconnaissance.

In several cases, infantry did not follow tanks, and did not fortify the areas they captured, leaving tanks to fight AT guns, mortars, and anti-tank riflemen groups alone. On December 17th, 1939, 20th Tank Brigade Commander Barzilov ordered the 95th Tank Battalion to capture Hotinen-Turta, assisted by the 768th regiment of the 138th Infantry Division. Just before the offensive, a message came in from the commander of the 138th Infantry Division HQ, Colonel Bashin, saying that there will be no artillery barrage, as the enemy is on the run, infantry is already in Hotinen and is attacking Turta. Due to this, it was proposed that the battalion goes further past the Summa fortifications, clear the path for the 10th Tank Corps to Wyborg, and follow them.

However, information about Hotinen was incorrect. When the 95th battalion approached the first line of tank traps, it was discovered that they were not destroyed, were followed by minefields, an anti-tank trench, and a second row of tank traps. There were no infantry units from the 138th Infantry Division. When the battalion approached the tank traps, they came under a hurricane of artillery and machinegun fire, and two vehicles were knocked out. The battalion entered battle, crossed the first row of tank traps, but was unable to cross the second due to an artillery barrage, and, without assistance from infantry or artillery of the 138th Infantry Division, were forced to retreat to initial positions.

The 91st battalion of the same brigade suffered a similar fate. It also ran into anti-tank obstacles and was forced to retreat, as elements of the 255th and 272nd infantry regiments lagged 1-2 km behind the tanks and did not go for an attack.

These problems with cooperation happened in later battles as well. On March 7th, 1940, at 16:00, the reconnaissance battalion of the 1st brigade received an order to take the roads in the Kongas region on March 8th, in cooperation with the 331st and 335th Infantry Regiments of the 100th division. The chief of the 1st unit of the division was supposed to direct this operation, but when the representative of the battalion arrived at the divisional HQ, he could not find him. The remaining commanders knew nothing of the offensive. Representatives that attempted to make contact with the individual battalions of the 331st regiment barely found them, as not all battalion commanders knew the exact location of their units.

Nobody in the 335th regiment knew anything about the offensive when contact was made at 01:00 (the order arrived at 02:00). Naturally, the regiments had no success when carrying out the operation, as they acted in an unsynchronized manner and did not advance simultaneously. The 331st regiment started retreating from the railroad and asked the regiment to provide artillery fire at the tank traps, not informing the reconnaissance company commander, whose tanks was currently at the tank traps. As a result, the reconnaissance company and the attached infantry from the 167th Motorized Infantry Battalion took casualties from their own artillery (up to 50 men killed and injured).

Cooperation between artillery and tanks was not always at the required standard. Communication between artillery and tanks, as a rule, was absent. Artillery mainly provided tanks with a passage through only the first row of anti-tank obstacles. In depth, the tanks were left to fend for themselves and received no support from artillery.

Regimental artillery was often late in reaching positions for direct fire support, or was used to fire indirectly. AT guns of advancing infantry were almost never used. Artillery largely shot at areas, and tanks could rarely summon quick fire from divisional artillery to destroy enemy AT guns.

The lack of cooperation between moto-mechanized forces and other kinds of forces, especially artillery and infantry, led to failures to achieve objectives and excessive losses. Frequently this resulted in shelling of our own forces. The above leads to the conclusions that the issue of cooperation was not given its deserved attention during peacetime. This was especially noticeable when attacking enemy fortifications, when it became necessary to hold training exercises between operations to teach various kinds of forces how to cooperate in battle. Unfortunately, these exercises had little effect, as they were very hurriedly prepared."

Continued in part 2.

World of Tanks History Section: SU-152, Soviet Beast-Killer

During the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, the Red Army hit a powerful defensive line in Karelia, the Mannerheim Line. Soviet soldiers were greeted with an unpleasant surprise: concrete pillboxes that could onl be destroyed with large caliber artillery.

Delivering a heavy and clumsy gun to a battlefield is not an easy task. The best solution is a gun that can drive into battle by itself. Soviet commanders remembered that work on self propelled artillery has been slowly coming along since 1931. The topic was dusted off. Two factories, Kirov and #185, got to work. By Spring of 1940, experimental vehicles have been designed: SU-14-2, T-100Y (SU-100Y), and KV-2, which may be called a tank, but was more of an assault gun with a turret. The SU-100Y did not make it in time for the war, but work on bunker busters continued. When the Great Patriotic War began, the design center was moved from Leningrad to Sverdlovsk.

From three barrels to one

The basis for the SU-100Y was the T-100 heavy tank, which lost out to the KV and did not enter production. This also put a cross over the SU-100Y. All heavy SPGs had to use the KV chassis.

In November of 1941, the Chelyabinsk Kirov Factory (ChKZ) designed the KV-7 assault tank, a vehicle with an immobile casemate carrying three guns. The project was curious, but its combat usefulness was doubtful. In fall of 1942, the Red Army GAU ordered ChKZ to develop a large caliber SPG, placing the ML-20 152 mm gun in the KV-7 hull. The project was headed by Lev Sergeevich Troyanov, the most experienced Soviet designer of SPGs.

Troyanov decided to install the casemate on a KV-1S heavy tank chassis. The wooden model and project documentation were ready at the end of 1942. In early January of 1943, the project was scheduled for a demonstration to the client. By this point, it was indexed KV-14. Two projects were demonstrated. First was designed by the factory #9 design bureau chief Fedor Fedorovich Petrov. The project was more complete, but needed many modifications of the KV-7 hull and the gun. Working blueprints for Troyanov's project were only partially complete, but his project required significantly less modifications to mass produced tanks and guns.

Stopping power

On the day after the demonstration, Joseph Stalin signed an order of the State Committee of Defense to build a prototype of the new SPG by January 31st, in less than a month. Kirov factory not only managed to deal with such a harsh quota, but finish a week early.

Trials of the new SPG were conducted from February 1st to February 5th. The KV-14 drove to the proving grounds at Chebarkul. This was a difficult trial: the SPG drove through a snowed-over highway in temperatures of -42 degrees. Water got in the engine, it kept stalling. The SPG travelled the 85 km from Chelyabinsk to Chebarkul in 13 hours.

After 234 shots, no defects were discovered in the gun or mount. The gun could not achieve the requested 3-4 RPM, but the result of 2.8 RPM was also not bad. No defects were found in the engine or transmission. There were design flaws that needed work, but by February 9th, the KV-14 was adopted into the Red Army.

And so, the USSR received an SPG with no equal anywhere in the world. It had a powerful gun, the armour of a heavy tank, and what was no less important for a fighting machine, a compact size. What's most important is that the Red Army received a universal SPG, capable of dealing with any combat mission. From the end of April of 1943, the vehicle was indexed SU-152.

The Beast-Slayer's debut was at the Battle of Kursk, in which 24 vehicles of this type took part. The small numbers did not make a large impact on the flow of events, but it turned out that, of all Soviet vehicles of the time, only a shot from this SPG could guarantee the destruction of any German vehicle of the time. It was not necessary for a 152 mm shell to penetrate enemy armour. Hero of the Soviet Union Major Sankovskiy demonstrated the combat potential of the SU-152: his vehicle destroyed 10 tanks in one battle.

The SU-152's effectiveness is also highlighted by the fact that it remained in service with Soviet tank forces until 1958.

Yuri Pasholok's book "SU-152 and other SPGs on the KV chassis" was referenced when writing this article.

Original article available here.

Tank Stakeouts

The story of the single KV of Raseiniai that stopped Kampfgruppe Raus is well known. However similar incidents occurred occasionally, even if they didn't become as widely known as Raseiniai.

"24 HOURS IN A SIEGED TANK

Today, another Republican tank crew was saved, out of the three that were stuck in fascist territory near Saragosse. The miracle did not happen by itself, it happened as a result of boundless heroism of the soldiers, their stubbornness and belief in their abilities.

The brave trio just got to the front lines of government officials. We honour them, scratched up and singed. They slowly tell their story, exhausted, but happy.

The tank was immobilized with several shells. It was surrounded by fascists. The crew shot back for twelve hours, but, after showering the tank with grenades, the fascists closed in. The crew locked themselves in, and decided to not give up alive. The fascists climbed up on the tank and called to the crew. The crew did not answer. 

The Italians and rebels decided to open the tank. They climbed all over it with mallets and crowbars. The tank was closed up like a safe. The bolts held. 

After several hours, the fascists were tired, and decided to have dinner right on the tank. After dinner, they took a nap. One of the crewmembers moved. The rebels heard him, rolled off the tank, and renewed their attack. 

They started throwing incendiary grenades at the bottom of the tank. Rubber started burning. "We sat still, silently, and smoked," tells the commander. "It was around 19 hours into the siege."

The fire burned for a while, and went out. It did not get to the gas tanks. The crew could hear the rebels' conversation. It was decided that they would not leave until the tankers' corpses were dragged from the tank.

The attack resumed once again. There was nothing left to hope for. The crew decided to commit suicide if the enemy gets inside. 

Suddenly, a shell exploded nearby. Then, another, a third, and yells of the wounded. Republican artillery, and other Republican tanks, established the location of the tank, and provided it with covering fire. 

The shooting stopped. The fascists ran off and hid. The decisive moment has come. This was the last chance for rescue.

The commander managed to turn the cannon and make three shots. After that, he took off the lock, and ordered the turret commander to run. The fascists opened fire. He dove behind a bump. The commander returned fire with his machine gun and ordered the driver to evacuate. He himself went last.

The rebels covered them with a rain of bullets. The trio lay close to the ground, until the fascists got tired of shooting. Another sprint, and then another, and another. Exactly 24 hours since the start of their resistance has passed.

They stand here now, drinking and smoking. They are giving precise directions to other soldiers in an armoured tractor that will recover their tank. 

Mihail Koltsov, Pravda, October 19, 1937."

A similar incident occurred during the Winter War, but with a much more valuable tank. While the Republicans didn't exactly have a surplus of T-26es, the tank in question was completely unique. During the Winter War, it was not yet decided which of the three new heavy tanks, the KV, T-100, or SMK, was the best. All three prototypes were sent into battle.

"The SMK tank was leading the column, and took a lot of fire. One of the shots jammed the main turret, and silenced the gun. The tank made it to the road. At the Kameri-Wyborg fork, the driver must have missed the stack of crates, and drove on to it. An explosion roared, and covered the area in thick brown smoke. The tank stopped. After the smoke cleared, Lieutenant Petin got out to investigate. The SMK stood next to a massive crater. The explosion destroyed the track and idler, and damaged transmission bolts. The electrical system was damaged, the bottom of the tank was bent. Even though there was a 40 degree frost, the snow surrounding the tank has melted. 

The driver, V. I. Ignatiev, was stunned by the explosion, and temporarily lost consciousness. The crew did not leave the tank. The T-100 and KV approached, and stopped nearby. The T-100 crew was made of volunteer testers. One of them, E. I. Roshin, wrote: "Our vehicles approached the damaged SMK, and covered it with our armour. The T-100 was in the front and to the right, the KV was in front and to the left, forming a triangular fortress. We stood like this for several hours, trying to repair the tracks of the SMK. We were dressed well, in new coats, boots, wool helmets, gloves. We could endure the bitter cold, but the damage was too heavy. The road wheels were damaged, as well as the tracks, and we could not get the heavy vehicle to move."

...

Lieutenant Toropov's engineering team tried to tow the tank using a 25-ton T-28 tank. They worked at night, under enemy fire, but could not tow the massive tank, firmly lodged in the crater. The damaged track and idler made it necessary to leave it in no man's land.

The Finns tried to tow away the SMK, but our artillery protected the tank. Finnish scouts managed to crawl up to it and steal a hatch cover. Kotin, when retelling this story, mentioned a curious fact. The factory producing armour for the SMK was behind schedule. The Kirov factory, unwilling to wait, produced their own hatch cover, using leftover low-carbon steel. The Finns stole this cover from the SMK, and, when it made its way to German labs, they decided that all Soviet tanks are made from "raw" steel.

...

The heavy tank remained in the crater until the end of the war. It was eventually moved with the combined forces of six T-28 tanks."

- Konstruktor Boyevih Mashin, Popov at al, Lenizdat, 1988.

A rare photograph of the SMK exists, taken by the Finns, in the process of attempting to tow it. 

Next situation is somewhat more Raseiniai-like, with a happier ending. Lieutenant Semyen Fillipovich Shmakov, company commander in the 500 independent tank battalion, received an Order of Lenin for his heroism. From his award order:

"On August 27th, 1942, at 8:00, along with the 994th infantry regiment of the 186th infantry division, on his KV-8 tank, he attacked the village of Voronovo. Escorting his company though the heavily fortified enemy lines of defense, he destroyed enemy pillboxes, and fortifications with fire from his tracks, and enemy forces with his gun and machine guns. He twice attempted to cross the river Navia. The second attempt was successful, but he was struck by heavy artillery and mortar fire, as a result of which his tank lost an idler and tore a track. The tank stopped on enemy occupied territory. From August 27th, 1942 at 9:00 to present time, Lieutenant Shmakov and his crew, without leaving the tank, courageously defended it for 198 hours while under constant artillery and mortar fire. While the tank was being sieged, it destroyed 11 pillboxes, 6 cannons, 3 machine gun nests, and up to 100 German soldiers and officers. Shmakov, despite his exceptionally difficult situation, provided care and encouragement for his crew, and was an example of courage and determination. In order to obtain water for his crew, he manually bored a hole through the radiator, allowing him to gather 1.5 canteens. He has currently managed to repair the track. As soon as he manages to lock it back on, the tank will be able to return on its own.

Commander of the 500th Independent Tank Battalion, Captain Torgilin 

Military Commissar of the 500th Independent Tank Battalion, Company Commissar Antonov"

World of Tanks History Section: Object 212

The history of domestic SPGs began in September of 1931. During work on a "self propelled corps triplex", SU-7 and SU-14 SPGs were developed. SU-7 was designed to use a 152 mm gun, 203 mm howitzer, and a 305 mm mortar. The SU-14 was designed to use a 107 mm gun, 152 mm gun, and a 203 mm howitzer. After the arrests of N.N. Magdeisev (designer of the B-4 howitzer) and then P.I. Syachintov, who was in charge of the SU-14 project on August 7th, 1938, the "small triplex" was cancelled.

High powered SPGs came up again in late 1939. While storming the Mannerheim Line, the Red Army needed an SPG with a high caliber gun and at least light anti-shell armour. In the middle of December of 1939, the Kirov factory and factory #185 design bureaus received an order from the Military Council of the North-West Front to develop engineering tanks with anti-shell armour. Factory #185 started two projects at once. Work began on an SPG based on the T-100. Additionally, it was decided to equip the SU-14 with armour. You would assume that the already made SPG was the faster solution, but no, work only competed on March 20th, a week after the end of the Winter War. The creation of an SPG on the T-100 chassis was not fast either, resulting in a vehicle named T-100Y, armed with a 130 mm B-13 naval gun.

The Kirov factory took a different route. In January of 1940, a prototype of the KV heavy tank (serial number U-0) arrived from the front. According to orders from the Military Council of the North-West Front, the first 4 tanks, including U-0, were to be equipped with 152 mm howitzers to defeat pillboxes. An enlarged turret was rapidly developed as a result. Work on the enlarged turret was done by SKB-3, headed by N.V. Kurin. Initially, the 152 mm model 1909/30 howitzer was planned, indexed L-21. In metal, the assault KV was equipped with a shortened M-10 (indexed MT-1). By February 10th, the new U-0 passed gunnery trials, and by February 17th, U-0 and U-1 were sent back to the front. "KV with large turret" tanks first saw battle on February 22nd. By March 3rd, there were 4 tanks of this type on the front lines.

Due to the results of the Winter War, it was decided that the "bunker buster" theme would be continued. During the spring and summer of 1940, the Kirov factory and factory #185 continued designing heavy SPGs on the T-100 and SMK chassis. However, the final fate of these vehicles was decided by the end of June. Based on the results of trials, it was clear that neither tank will be mass produced, since the KV was more protected and weighed less. The "KV with a large turret" was an adequate interim solution for the bunker buster problem.

As mentioned above, the "KV with a large turret" was a temporary answer to the need for a heavy assault SPG. Kurin's tank was a hypertrophied support tank like the artillery BT-7 (frequently called BT-7A, but that index belongs to another tank). The vehicle on the KV chassis (indexed KV-2 in 1941) had the advantage of parts commonality with its base vehicle. However, it had many drawbacks. The chassis allowed for a limited power gun, while the military demanded that the Br-2 gun be used. Due to the limited size of the turret, loading the M-10T was no easy task. The presence of a rotating turret did not mean that the tank could shoot from any angle.

After the SMK and T-100 projects died, efforts were concentrated on the creation of a heavy tank that was a modernized KV. On July 17th, 1940, the Committee of Defense of the Council of People's Commissars issued decree #198ss on the creation of new vehicles on the KV chassis. According to the decree, the Kirov factory was to develop the following:

• Two experimental KV tanks (T-220) with 100 mm armour. One was to be armed with the F-30 85 mm gun, the other with the F-32 76 mm gun.
• Two experimental KV tanks with 90 mm armour. One was to be armed with the F-32 76 mm gun, the other with the F-30 85 mm gun.
• One experimental SPG with a Br-2 152 mm gun. 

The KV with 90 mm of armour received the factory index "150" (GABTU correspondence used the index T-150). It differed from its base vehicle in its 76 mm F-32 gun and a commander's cupola. It was planned that this tank, under the index "KV-3" will replace the KV-1.

The "220" tank was more distinct from the KV-1. The tank had a longer hull; the amount of road wheels increased to 7 on each side. The T-220 had a new turret, which housed the 85 mm F-30 gun. The tank used an 850 hp V-2F (V-10) engine. It was completed on December 5th, 1940.

The technical requirements for the 152 mm SPG were finalized by the end of August of 1940.

The SPG that the Kirov factory was tasked with received the index of "212". The chief engineer for this project was T.N. Golburt. The 212 was reminiscent of the SU-14-1, especially when it came to the layout of the fighting compartment. The chassis was a reworked T-220 suspension, with an engine in the middle and drive wheels at the front. The front also housed the driver's compartment. The fighting compartment was in a large casemate at the rear of the hull. On one hand, this design increased the size of the SPG. On the other, it increased crew comfort. The rear position of the casemate also reduced the distance that the Br-2 stuck out past the vehicle's hull.

2 million roubles were issued to this project. 100,000 went into the development of the technical project, 25,000 to the design of a model, 300,000 on blueprints, 75,000 on blueprint edits, 1.1 million on the production of a prototype, 100,000 on trials, and then 300,000 on repairs. The cost of the armament was not included in this sum.

The first prototype was due on December 1st, 1940, but serious corrections had to be made due to faults found during the design process. According to a GABTU report on experimental works, some components for the 212 were produced by January of 1941. Also, the technical project was completed, and sent to the Izhor factory for the production of a hull. By then, 1.5 million roubles have been spent. Work was going slowly due to higher priority of the T-150 and T-220, as well as other problems.

The hull for the new SPG was received only on March 5th, 1941. According to reports, assembly was stalled due to a lack of ready components. By the spring of 1941, the 212 project was dropping in priority at the Kirov factory. The factory received an urgent order for a heavy tank that inherited the T-150's index of "KV-3". The project, indexed "223", was developed on the T-220 chassis, with a front plate thickened to 120 mm and a new turret for the 107 mm ZiS-6 gun. The mass was estimated at 68 tons. The design of this vehicle began after learning of a new German heavy tank. Due to this load, work on the 212 stalled starting in the second half of March of 1941. April and May reports on experimental work state "No changes" in the row titled "self-propelled gun on the KV chassis". 

After Germany's attack on the USSR, designs were reconsidered. Work on some designs was accelerated. Others, either in the initial stages or not compatible with the realities of modern war, were cancelled. According to the most common version of this story, this was the fate of the 212, but it did not happen quite this way.

According to order #253ss of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Production, the KV-3 was transferred from the Kirov factory to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory (ChTZ). Engineers, technologists, and materials were sent to Chelyabinsk. One KV-3 made it to the front, another, without a turret or components, was sent to Chelyabinsk. In February of 1942, this KV-3 was assigned to the experimental OP-2 plant. As for the 212, until the start of August of 1941, it was still at the Kirov plant. Only then was it transferred to the Ural Factory of Heavy Machine Building (UZTM in Sverdlovsk, modern Ekaterinburg). 

Meanwhile tank production had no time for the KV-3, nor a bunker buster on its chassis. The Kirov factory was evacuated to Chelyabinsk and renamed Kirov Factory in Chelyabinsk (ChKZ), and the Izhor factory that made KV armour was sent to Sverdlovsk. UZTM was renamed to Izhor factory, and only got its name back on January 4th, 1942. UZTM was also loaded with Ordzhonikidze factory #37 and Kalinin factory #8 setting on up its territory. Factory #75, which was producing the V-5 engine was moved to Chelyabinsk, and began working on the much more necessary V-2. The situation with 152 mm guns was no better. The last Br-2 was produced by Barricade factory #221 (Stalingrad, modern Volgograd) in 1940.

Bunker busters fell out of priority, but not for long. In November of 1941, work restarted on many prototypes referred to in the SNK report "On self-propelled artillery" from May 27th, 1941. Nearly all of these projects remained in the requirements stage until 1942, there was not even a possibility of a design. Most factories tasked with designing the SPG were either busy with setting up manufacturing in the buildings where they were evacuated to in the summer and fall, or loaded with more urgent requests. Nevertheless, the list of experimental works for 1942 once again included the KV-3, scheduled for completion on May 1st, 1942. The same was true for a "two-stroke 1200 hp diesel engine" (due on October 1st, 1942), "charging the V-2 engine to 1200 hp" (due on July 1st, 1942). In March of 1942, the topic of "152 mm SPG on the KV-3 chassis (bunker buster)" resurfaces. The KV was indicated as its chassis, and the oscillating part of the Br-2 its armament. Factory #100 was listed as responsible for the chassis. Factory #8 was responsible for the gun. 1.5 million roubles was issued for this project. A prototype was expected by July 1st, 1942. However, the KV-3 was dead and buried in spring of 1942, and different vehicles were considered candidates for a bunker buster chassis.

Read more about the Object 212 and other SPGs on the KV heavy tank chassis in the book "SU-152 and other KV-based SPGs", published by Tactical Press.

Article author: Y. Pasholok.

Original article available here. 

World of Tanks: Today in History: Karelian Offensive

The Soviet-Finnish War began on November 30th, 1939. The cause of the conflict was a territorial disagreement between the USSR and Finland, which could not be solved by diplomatic means.

The first stage of fighting proceeded poorly for the Red Army, mostly due to serious underestimation of the Finnish army's fighting ability, and due to the harsh terrain on which the Red Army had to fight. Many mistakes were made during planning, cooperation, and supply of advancing units.

On December 21st, the Soviet advance on Karelia completely halted. The Red Army fortified for a defense, collecting forces for a new offensive. During the relative quiet on the front, the Red Army analyzed its mistakes, reformed its units, and developed combat plans.

In December of 1939, during a breakthrough of the Hottinen fortified region, the famous KV-1 heavy tank saw its first combat trials.

The Red Army's offensive resumed on February 1st, 1940, with the forces of the recently created North-Western Front, commanded by S.K. Timoshenko. Infantry and tanks were supported by large amounts of artillery. Up to 12000 shells were launched towards Finnish positions daily.

The Red Army's general offensive began on the morning of February 11th, 1940, after a three hour artillery barrage. In three days, the Mannerheim line was penetrated, and tanks flowed into the breech. On February 17-23rd, the Finnish forces retreated to secondary defensive lines to preserve the front. Towards the end of February, the Red Army reached the rear of the Finnish positions, around Wyborg.

On March 13th, a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland. This is the day that is considered the end of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939-1940.

Original article available here.

KV and T-100 in Battle

"Work of heavy tanks in the active army from February 22nd to March 13th of this year [1940]

Schedule of active participation in battle of KV #0, KV #1U, KV #2U, KV #3U, and T-100 heavy tanks.

CAMD RF 38-11355-6

Data on damage and technical breakdowns of tanks over the combat period.

T-100

Impacts by 20, 37, and 47 mm guns:

1. Right side: 6
2. 45 mm gun mantlet: 1
3. Large turret bay: 3
4. Left track: 2
5. Left idler: 1

Additionally, shrapnel knocked off the head of the periscope on the small turret and dented the armoured cup over it.

Damage and technical problems:

1. Starter and dynamo gear breakage.
2. Main friction clutch pin breakage (x2).
3. Main friction clutch pin breakage and tearing of the power control cup lug.
4. 7 track links broke on rocks and mines.
5. 5 track pins broke (overhardened).
6. Right exhaust pipe was destroyed.
7. The nut stopper of the right drive wheel broke, as a result the nut was loosened and the wheel fell off.
8. Loosened road wheel retention nuts.

KV #0

Impacts:

1. Front plate joint: 1
2. Upper front plate: 3
3. Lower front plate: 2
4. Rear: 2
5. Right side: 3
6. Left side: 1
7. Right idler hub: 1
8. Upper idler: 1
9. Road wheel hub: 1

Damage and technical problems:

1. Road wheel retention nuts burst: first right wheel and third left wheel.
2. Road wheel hub nuts burst: 3rd right and 2nd left.
3. Road wheels destroyed by mines: 1st right and 1st left.
4. 1st right winch destroyed by mine.
5. 3rd left shock absorber torn off by mine.
6. Right idler hub destroyed by shell.
7. 2nd right shock absorber torn off by mine.
8. 2nd idler on the right destroyed by shell.
9. 8 track links destroyed by mines.
10. Two cases of fuel pump socket breaking.
11. Pipe from the fuel pump to the filter broke.
12. Oil meter broke. 

KV #1U tank

No impacts from AP shells, but there are scratches from a large caliber shell detonation.

Damage and technical problems:

1. Three cases of fuel pump socket breaking.
2. Engine piston rod broke.
3. 11 track links destroyed by mines.
4. 6th torsion bar on the right broke.

KV #2U tank

1 hit from a 37 mm shell in the front plate joint.

Damage and technical problems:

1. 1 left road wheel destroyed by mines.
2. 3 track links destroyed by mines.
3. Left fuel tank is leaking.
4. 5 cases of fuel pump socket breaking.

KV #3U tank

Impacts from shells:

1. Upper front plate: 1
2. Lower front plate: 1
3. Right side: 4
4. Rear: 1
5. Turret: 1
6. Limiter: 1
7. Road wheels: 2
8. Tracks: 1

Damage and technical problems:

1. 4th road wheel on the right destroyed by mine.
2. 4th shock absorber on the right destroyed by mine.
3. Power control disk of the left side friction clutch jammed.
4. Left friction clutch power control cup retention nuts burst.
5. Left friction clutch ball bearing broke.
6. 3 cases of fuel pump socket breaking.
7. As a result of HE shell explosion, the gearbox retention frame was bent.
8. Due to the same explosion, the gearbox case burst.
9. Turret jammed with a shell.
10. A fan loosened due to poor cone calibration. 

All shell impacts made dents 10-40 mm deep. No shell impact affected crew performance in any way.

Composed based on reports from Captain Kolotushkin, commander of the heavy tank group.

Senior engineer of the 8th ABTU department, Military Engineer 3rd Grade, P. Voroshilov

June 28th, 1940"

So what happened to these tanks? You hear people go on about "poor reliability" this and "fifty thousand tanks lost in the first day" that, but the majority of these first batch of vehicles survived, at least until their modernization. CAMD RF 38-11355-321 tracks incoming and outgoing tanks from the Kirov factory as of August 1st , 1941, and contains almost the entire initial batch. KV-2 tanks U-1 and U-2, and KV-1 tanks U-5 through U-18 (missing U-7) all arrived from the Kiev Military District for modernization and were sent off to various destinations after the procedure was performed. KV-1 U-5 was the luckiest, as it mentioned in documents as late as spring of 1944.

World of Tanks History Section: T-100 Variants

In 1938-1939, Soviet engineers worked on a new heavy tank with anti-shell armour. The vehicle was going to replace the menacing looking, but not all that dangerous, T-35. Three projects competed, and the KV won. The T-100 and SMK remained prototypes, albeit ones in metal.

The T-100 was built at factory #185 in Leningrad. It was a 58 ton vehicle with two guns: 76 and 45 mm. In December of 1939, the Military Council of the North-West Front ordered an engineering vehicle to be built on its chassis. The factory began working on this project, but soon after, ABTU demanded that an assault tank be built on the T-100 chassis, with a 152 mm gun, designed to combat enemy fortifications. Work on the engineering tank ceased. Factory director N. Barykov obtained permission to use the 130 mm B-13 naval gun instead of a 152 mm gun.

The new vehicle received the index T-100-X. Instead of a rotating turret like on the T-100, the T-100-X had an immobile wedge-shaped casemate. The hull was to be built at the Izhor factory, and the suspension at factory #185.

In order to speed up construction, the casemate was simplified. This was the shape that it took in March of 1940. Along with a new casemate, the vehicle received a new name: T-100-Y. This SPG is also known as SU-100-Y. The original intention was that the SPG would be trialled in combat against the Finns, but the war already ended. Nevertheless, the vehicle was sent to Karelia to shoot at bunkers. The gun performed well, but the military did not like the large size and heavy weight of the SPG, and so it remained a prototype. Sources say that it fought with the experimental SU-14 and SU-14-1 SPGs in defense of Moscow in winter of 1941, providing indirect fire support against the Germans.

In January of 1940, another project on the T-100 chassis started. Army Commander 1st grade G. Kulik ordered the tank to be equipped with a 152 mm M-10 howitzer in a rotating turret. This project was indexed T-100-Z. The turret was ready by March of 1940, but it was never installed on the T-100. That project ended when the KV-1 and KV-2 were accepted for service.

Original article available here.

Soviet Infantry Protection

Popular history treats Soviet infantry as expendables that overwhelm quality with quantity, but examination of actual historical evidence suggests otherwise. Attempts to lengthen the life of the regular soldier (or, in this case, policeman) predate the USSR, beginning with the Russian Empire. "A catalogue of armour invented by Lieutenant-Colonel Chemerzin" describes his inventions, dating back to 1905:

"The armours vary in mass, the lightest are 1.5 pounds, the heaviest are 8 pounds. They are unnoticeable under clothing. Anti-rifle bullet plates weigh 8 pounds. The plates cover the heart, lungs, stomach, sides, as well as the spine and back over the heart and lungs. Each plate is tested for impenetrability in front of the customer."

A little more on trials:

"In the presence of HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, on June 11th, 1905, in the city of Orienbaum, a company of machine gunners performed tests. 8 machine guns fired at a plate made from an alloy created by Lieutenant-Colonel Chemerzin, from a distance of 300 paces. It was hit 36 times. The plates were not penetrated, and did not crack. All non-permanent personnel of the infantry school were present."

The Moscow Capital Police, who ordered the armour in the first place, tested it at 15 paces, from unspecified arms. The performance proved exemplary: "[the armour plates] are impenetrable, and do not produce fragments. The first batch is satisfactory."

The St. Petersburg Capital Police report was more thorough: "The results of the trials were as follows: after firing at the front and back plates, one that weighed 4 pounds and 75 zolotniks [a zolotnik is 4.26 grams] and the other 5 pounds 18 zolotniks, composed of steel and wrapped in thin silk fabric, with a Browning bullet, the bullet penetrates the silk, and makes a dent in the plate, but does not penetrate it, and remains in between the silk and steel. No fragments of the bullet fly out."

The Ust-Izhor training proving grounds achieved positive results when testing the plates with "3 line rifles of the infantry type, from 200, 150, 100, 50, and 8 paces."

The archive file further mentions 4791 sets of body armour, 340 shields, and 200 helmets made of this alloy sent to the Warsaw fortress over the period of 3 months.

The invention made a mark on media. The "Rus" newspaper (#69, 1907) wrote: "I saw a miracle yesterday. A young man, thirty years of age, in a military uniform, stood still in a room. A Browning was pointed at him from half a pace, a frightening Browning, aimed right for the chest, for the heart. The young man waited, smiling. A shot struck, the bullet bounced off.
"See," said the military man. "I barely felt anything.""

"Novoye Vremya" wrote on February 28th, 1908: "The invincible armour and new breastplates are wonderful inventions of our century, and surpass the knight's armour of the past. The scale layers remain the same, but the alloy is different. It is the inventor's secret. A. A. Chemerzin only explained the main idea behind his discovery. A. A. Chemerzin is a Lieutenant-Colonel of engineering forces. He finished a degree in mathematics, then an engineering school. He taught mathematics, while studying chemistry, and a series of experiments led him to exploration of nickel-chromed steel. The alloy was created under high temperature and pressure. Precious metals like platinum, silver, iridium, vanadium, and many others were added to the mix. This led to a very ductile and strong metal, that is 3.5 times tougher than steel. As a result, at three paces, the Mauser bullet could not penetrate a half-millimeter plate. Armour and breastplates were made that were impenetrable for revolver and rifle bullets, which deformed without giving off fragments. The danger of concussions and ricochets was solved.
The armour is expensive, but life is costs more. Putting on the 5 pound armour that covers the front and back, I did not consider it heavy. It is entirely unnoticeable underneath a suit. 7000 breastplates, helmets, and shields were sent to the army in the Far East, but sadly, too late..."

Indeed, the invention did not come cheap. 1500-1900 rubles would buy you a standard set of armour. 5000-8000 could buy you a custom-made set, tailored to your body. Chemerzin also offered the armouring of a carriage (20,000 rubles) and a car's engine compartment (15,000).

In 1916, Chemerzin's armour was tested for pilots. While it performed admirably, a cheaper armour was chosen, manufactured at the Petrograd mechanical and metalworking factories.

I don't have anything about the interbellum period, but the question of protecting infantry was explored during the Winter War.

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"In 1939, NKV NII-13 manufactured trial batches of steel SN-39 (150 units) breastplates and SNSh-39 (100 units ) breastplate-shields, which were then tested in combat (on Karelia). 

As is stated in our previous report for 1940 (report T-06-77), the breastplate received good reviews from the commanders of the 7th army, but the issue of increasing the strength of the armour in order to ensure bullet protection in close combat was raised. 

To resolve this issue, we have created a new (thickened) breastplate, SN-40A. According to the orders from GAU KA, a decision was made to mass produce the SN-40A, with the following goals in mind:

1. Manufacture 100-150 SN-40A breastplates, providing protection from model 1908 bullets fired from a rifle or machine gun from 150 meters at 0 degrees and from any distance at 30 degrees.
2. Manufacture the breastplates in three sizes. Previously, breastplates were produces in one size (small).
3. Explore the requirements for production of the breastplates and develop blueprints for equipment to mass produce the breastplates.
4. Conduct proving ground and battlefield trials to determine if the breastplates can be accepted by the Red Army.

The aforementioned mass production of the SN-40A is the topic of this report."

SN stands for Stalnoy Nagrudnik (steel breastplate). 

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"The manufacturing of the SN-40A was done at the "Industria" factory in Lysva. The breastplates were produced in 3 sizes, and in two thicknesses and weights. The blueprints of the the breastplate are shown in figure 2."

Trials of the SN-40A were performed in the fall of 1941. The results were unsatisfactory. At 5.2 mm (one batch was 4.2 mm), the breastplates were too heavy. Even the air force did not want to use them. One would not immediately expect a heavy breastplate to matter in an airplane, but it does. "Uniform of the Russian Air Force 1935-1955" writes "The medical corps frequently equipped pilots with army type steel helmets. For example, in 1943, elements of the 4th Air Army made it mandatory for Il-2 and Pe-2 gunners to wear "a metallic helmet and special breast shields". However, in practice, when breaking away from a steep dive, the rear gunner was subjected to unacceptable forces, which lowered his capacity of defending the plane from enemy fighters." However, the specific breastplate in question was almost certainly not the SN-40A, but its successor, the SN-42.

The SN-42 was developed in the spring of 1942 and tested in August of the same year by airborne troops. It was composed of 36 SGN type steel, and was 2 mm thick. 500 units were manufactured, and sent to be tested in the army.

Overall view of the breastplate

Breastplate used as a shield

Breastplate used as a shield while prone

The results were as follows:

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"In 1942, according to the orders from the GAU of the Red Army, the Scientific-Investigative Institute #13 of the USSR NKV, developed a steel breastplate 3.3 kg in mass, 2 mm thick, that protects the main organs of the human body against German submachineguns at all distances, and rifles and machineguns at 300 meters. 

According to GOKO order #2160ss from August 8th, 1942, the steel breastplates were sent to the army, and received positive reviews. The reviews mention the following:

1. The steel breastplates provide reliable protection from German submachineguns, as well as fragments of mines and hand grenades.
2. The maneuverability of soldiers with breastplates is almost unimpaired.
3. Aside from providing protection for the soldier, the breastplate also increases the soldier's morale when performing his duties.

The technical documentation on the steel breastplate was accepted by the GAU of the Red Army on August 7th, 1942, after which the breastplate was mass produced at factory #700 (city of Lysva). At this time, 85,000 breastplates have been produced, distributed as follows:

1. South-Western Front: 5,000
2. Stalingrad Front: 3,000
3. Leningrad Front: 1,000
4. Volhov Front: 1,000
5. Don Front: 5,000

70,000 units remain at the warehouse. "

The benefits of the SN-42 breastplate are outlined in more detail in a letter from the deputy commander of the artillery of the 68th Army to the head of the GAU KA, Major-General Hohlov.

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"In November of 1942, the 57th army received 5000 steel breastplates to test. After the army established the reliability of the breastplates by shooting them from 100 meters with rifles, they issued a small amount (500 units) on a trial basis.
The breastplates were met with distrust, but commanders requested the breastplates in maximum available numbers after testing them in battle. All breastplates available in the warehouses were given out. In battles for Stalingrad, they were exhaustively tested.
Comments by unit commanders and soldiers say that the breastplate, in addition to the steel helmet, is a good and reliable method of protection from bayonets, bullets, and shrapnel.
It is also necessary to point out the morale value of the breastplate. Soldiers equipped with the breastplates that have experienced their reliability go into battle calmly and assuredly.
The artillery supply units are constantly receiving orders for additional breastplates. All these factors combined lead me to believe that the breastplates live up to expectations and are a worthwhile investment.
Please issue 15000 units to the 68th army."

Popular history dictates that only specially formed assault groups were equipped with SN-42 breastplates, but you may already be suspecting that it was not so. The breastplates were not meant for any one kind of soldier, as their instruction memorandum reveals:

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"A memo on the use of SN-42 steel breastplates

1. The steel breastplate safeguards the chest and stomach of the soldier in combat from 1) bullets of a German submachinegun at any distance 2) bullets of rifles and machineguns at 300 meters 3) fragments of mines and grenades.
2. The steel breastplate, thanks to its construction, does not stifle the soldier's movement while walking, running, or crawling.
3. The breastplate weighs 3.3 kg. To maintain the soldier's endurance and maneuverability, the soldier must be lightened at the cost of his backpack load.
4. The breastplate can be used by:
1. scouts, out on a mission.
2. sappers, while out scouting, making breaches in barbed wire, defusing explosives under enemy fire, etc.
3. infantry teams during scouting by combat.
4. submachinegunners, sneaking through the enemy lines, riding as tank infantry, and laying in ambush.
5. assault teams, attacking a pillbox.
6. soldiers fighting in city streets.
7. communications personnel, checking and fixing telephone lines under enemy fire.
8. any other situation where the commander deems that the breastplates can be usefully applied.
5. The breastplate can be used in 3 ways.
1. The breastplate is attached using straps and covers the chest and stomach during movement.
2. When crawling, the breastplate can be used as a shield.
3. When removed, the breastplate can be used to cover other parts of the body (right side, left side, head).
6. The breastplate consists of:
1. a hull, with the upper and lower plates.
2. soft lining, attached to the hull with a snap pin.
3. belts for attaching the breastplate: one on the waist and two on the shoulder
7. The breastplates are made in three sizes. The breastplate is 2 mm thick.

The breastplates are handed out by the Front Commanders, and are to be used by those armies where they can be usefully applied. Army and Front Commanders should send their feedback on using the breastplates and suggestions to the General Staff of the Red Army, and send a copy to the GAU of the Red Army.

November 11th, 1942"

At the same time as the SN-42, the SShN-42 (steel shield-breastplate) was developed. 

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The SShN-42 was thicker than the SN-42, at 4.9 mm. Only 25 SShN-42s were produced. The design passed trials, but their subsequent fate is unknown. Is is probable that they joined their regular breastplate cousins in the 5th Army for testing. 

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In 1942, NII-48 developed its own batch of a spin on breastplates: bulletproof vests. The armour was composed of four plates: two in the front, and two in the back. The vest tied in the front with two bows, like a lifejacket. 

From minutes #215 section 40 of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, on August 30th, 1942 (TsDOOSO 4-18-15): 

"On the manufacturing of a trial batch of personal methods of protection for riflemen and machinegunners

The Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approves of the initiative of the NII-48 in developing a design of personal armour protection and its mass production, and decrees that:

1. The director of the Uralmash factory comrade Muzrukov and director of NII-48 comrade Zavyalov must ensure the production of 200 units of personal armour and 50 units for personal armour for Maxim machinegunners by September 20th, 1942.
2. The VIZ director, comrade Radkevich, must provide to the Uralmash factory 3 tons of rolled 30 HGS steel for production of trial personal armour sets.
3. NII-48 director comrade Zavyalov is urged to manufacture a trial batch of armour sets and send them to the Red Army for practical tests. In the event that the tests pass and the armour is accepted for mass production, send the proposal to the Regional Committee.
4.  The General Secretary of the Sverdlovsk All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks must provide all necessary resources to factories in order to produce the personal amour sets for riflemen and machinegunners.

Regional committee secretary Andrianov"

500 vests were produced in total. They all were sent to the 5th Army, but did not saw very limited combat. It did, however, see enough that the Germans captured one unit.

"The picture was attached to a message from an intelligence officer in the headquarters of the German 35th Panzer division, informing the command of the 9th Army Corps that the enemy is using new defensive gear on October 2nd, 1942 called an "armoured vest", drawn based on an inspection of the unit captured during a battle."

The picture on the right is also of interest to us.

"Another picture from an intelligence officer in the 35th Panzer division, composed based on the statements of POWs from the 1158th regiment, which revealed that the regiment assault group used this second model of defensive gear on October 2nd, 1942, obtained with the purpose of evaluating its usefulness in battle. Based on the sketch, it was probably a prototype of the SN-42."

Based on reports from the front lines, NII-48 gave their bulleproof vest another try.

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The change is pretty self-evident: two more plates were added to the front to protect more of the soldier's body. 

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Here is another breastplate design, this one is a little different. Instead of one lower plate, there are three. The upper plate is composed of two pieces. The back also has a full shirt, not just straps. Its index was PZ-ZiF-20. As its name suggests, it was produced at the Frunze factory (#7). It did not perform as well as the SN-42, but was produced in large numbers anyway, as the army needed all the breastplates it could get. These breastplates were first issued in 1943. 

While the SN-42 was, no doubt, the best Soviet breastplate of the war, work did not stop with it. The financial plan for the second quarter of 1945 of the 6th Department of the Tank Directorate of GBTU KA (CAMD RF 38-11355-2756) mentions the following: 

"An experimental batch of bulletproof vests is being manufactured by the NKTP and NKLP factories. The vests are a new type of protection for Red Army soldiers. The contract is still being processed. The approximate cost is 500,000 rubles."

It is hard to judge how much 500,000 rubles is worth in today's money, but it is no small cost. For example, in 1941, developing the SPG-212 (more commonly known as Object 212) cost only 100,000 rubles.