The Doomed Victorious AA Tank

The T-90 AA tank developed by the Molotov GAZ factory that won the tender but never entered mass production.

The situation in Soviet tank production changed radically in the second half of 1942. The experience in 1941 and the first half of 1942 clearly indicated new priorities. It was clear that T-34 production had to increase, as this tank turned out to be the optimal combat vehicle. It had the necessary mobility, decent armour, and powerful armament. The T-34 was often the only tank that could move cross-country in later 1941 and early 1942. The KV-1 was too heavy and the T-60 was too weak. The T-70 light tank that appeared in early 1942 was better than the T-60, but Soviet leadership had no illusions about it. It was clear by the spring of 1942 that the T-70 would not be built at as many factories as the T-60 was. The situation was difficult in the summer, and a decision was made to even spin up T-34 production in Chelyabinsk at the cost of decreasing KV production. Additionally, a decision to build the T-34 in Sverdlovsk at the site of the former factory #37 was made. Only two factories remained for the T-70: the Molotov GAZ in Gorky and factory #38 in Kirov. They would also have been used for T-34 production, but they proved unsuitable.

Status of the work on AA tanks at the GAZ as of September 1942. AA tanks on the T-60 and T-70 chassis are mentioned. In reality, they only worked on the future T-90.

Front line experience in 1942 showed that the decision to change priorities was correct. The first use of the T-70 tank revealed that it had issues when it came to crew comfort and, most importantly, armour. This was not a surprise. The age of light tanks was coming to an end, and the Germans also ceased production of these vehicles in the summer of 1942. Soviet light tanks clinged on for longer, but it was clear that their time had come. This did not mean that light vehicles would disappear altogether. The chassis of light tanks was necessary for the creation of SPGs, which were not obsolete until the very end of the war. Self propelled guns with powerful armament than the tank they were based on were in demand at the front, which experience proved time and time again as the war went on. The development of Soviet self propelled artillery did not differ much from the path it took abroad, even considering that the first SPGs went into production in the summer-fall of 1941 (including SPAAGs).

The T-90 tank prototype, September 1942.

Tanks at Khalkhin-Gol

 "To the Chief of the RKKA ABTU
August 19th, 1939

Directorate of the People's Commissar, 1st Department
#755895ss

On orders of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Class comrade Kulik, I send you a copy of the act on the inspection of combat and training in the 1st Army Group for your inspection and execution of necessary measures.

Deputy Chief of the 1st Department, 
Major Bibikov

Act [to certify that] I conducted an inspection of the combat and training in the 1st Army Group fighting in the region of Khalkhin-Gol during the period of July 11th-24th, 1939

1. Permanent units

[...]

Armoured units:

The 7th, 8th, and 9th Armoured Brigades are essentially armoured cavalry, more suitable for guarding borders and internal security. They did not train to fight alongside infantry and don't know how to do this. These units played a big role in the initial stages, but took heavy losses. The arrival of poorly trained reinforcements weakened them, they need to train and re-equip.

Friend or Foe

Soviet armoured forces never established a uniform system of tactical markings, leaving individual commanders to create their own. When it came to friend or for markings, there was an even greater variety, as they were changed often. One example is this schedule used by the 9th Army in July of 1941.

Bombs vs Tanks

The eternal question of aircraft vs tanks came up during the recent stream with Valeriy Zamulin about the Battle of Kursk.

"I saw an analysis I think in August-September of 1943 of using HE bombs on enemy concentrations of armoured vehicles. They specified in brackets: tanks, APCs, accompanying wheeled vehicles. It clearly said that the effectiveness of HE bombs against enemy armoured groups was rather low. Causes:

1. The armoured groups are highly mobile. Consider this: you order the strike against tanks, point it out, the order goes through several HQs (army, front, airstrip) and by the time the airplanes  gather and arrive there is no one there. 
2. The Germans used concealment well, like smokescreens. It was also rare for significant armoured forces to be concentrated on a narrow section of the front. If the Germans came up with an armoured group it would immediately scatter and when bombed (according to our statistics) about 5% were hit. "

Perfidious Albion

"People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

10th Department

Outgoing #4490

Received: 18:00 September 20th, 1942

Sent: 19:20 September 20th, 1942

Top Secret, copies forbidden

Specialist number: 896

To: London, Soviet envoy

Special

Top priority

To Mayskiy. You acted like a coward in your conversation with Eden about the Aerocobras.

Tanks and Air

"Orders to the 4th Tank Army #019

July 24th, 1943

The Army Commander orders that:

Friendly identification markings for aircraft consist of:

1. For cabins of trucks and turrets of tanks: a white triangle at the top, as large as possible.
2. Motorized rifle units mark the front line with white strips of fabric.
3. When our aircraft are seen, immediately fire green-red flares and a burst of tracers towards the enemy.

"Furniture Truck", "Whirlwind" and "Eastern Wind"

The Flakpanzer 38(t) SPAAG that was put into production in late 1943 was treated as only a temporary fix until a more effective SPAAG could be developed for tank units. German designers analyzed a number of possibilities and chose one. The production of the new vehicle began quickly, and in March of 1944 the German army received the first 3,7 cm Flak 43 auf Pz.Kpfw. IV (Sf), better known as Flakpanzer IV (3.7 cm Flak 43). These vehicles and their descendants were in high demand on the front lines due to the loss of air superiority.

From Sky to Earth

The concept of an airborne tank appeared in the early 1930s. The creator of this concept was John Walter Christie, who presented a tank that was supposed to get to the battlefield over the air using a discarding airplane attachment. Thanks to a powerful engine and a linkage to the propeller, the tank would not need an aircraft to tow it. This tank, known as the Convertible Airborne Tank M1932, never took flight, but the idea made its way into several countries. Christie himself quickly understood that a carrier airplane is necessary after all. There were two further developments: a plane that could carry a tank either underneath or inside it, or a specialized glider. Both developments were explored in the USSR and abroad. The Germans and British got the furthest with gliders, and the USSR, Germany, and USA got to practical stages with the aircraft approach. This article will discuss the fate of Soviet airborne tanks.

Suggestion for Stalin

"To the Chairman of the Committee of Defense, comrade I.V. Stalin

In June of 1941 the 23 mm aircraft gun designed by us passed trials in an airplane, showing good results firing both on the ground and in the air. In addition to the good performance, NKV experts remarked that the gun is 50-60% simpler to produce than the VYa gun that is currently in production. Half as much time, tools, plants, workers, etc. will be required to make our gun, which is important at this time to ensure defeat of fascism.

Gotta Go Fast

"To the Chief of the Rear and Supply Directorate of the General Staff, Major General comrade Yermolin

According to your order, I present to you the conclusions on the draft project of a tank glider developed by TsAGI engineers including comrade Yermonskiy.

The project proposes a 6 ton tank that can be towed behind an airplane as a glider. The tank accelerates on its tracks with the tank's engine power to at least 100 kph.

Night Fighters

"572 sorties were carried out this month. Of those, the machineguns were fired in 134 sorties. Firing was done from a height of 300-500 meters, from a distance of 700-1000 meters. Targets included columns of vehicles, strongholds, personnel, and enemy vehicles in settlements and on roads.

As a result of the assault, the following damage was done to the enemy, based on the crews' reports:

• Fires started: 1
• Strongholds suppressed: 3
• Vehicles destroyed: 1

Sturmoviks

"Actions of ground attack aircraft against enemy tanks

During the Patriotic War against German invaders, the destruction of enemy vehicles as well as enemy personnel increased in importance. At this stage of the war, the most important thing was to destroy enemy tanks and SPGs, which then slows down the enemy and prevents his ground forces from advancing.

In addition to ground based methods, ground attack aircraft increased in importance, as they could defeat enemy tanks with cannon fire or special bombs.

Bombs vs Artillery

A while ago I posted some data on the effectiveness of high explosive rounds. Recently, a similar infographic came up, but for bombs. I thought it would be interesting to compare the results of the two. The first sequence shows the size of the hole a bomb makes in the ground (the height and radius) and the second shows how far the shockwave travels. 

The smallest of the bunch is the 50 kg bomb, forming a 2.4 meter deep crater 2.2 meters in radius. This is comparable to the effect of a 152 mm HE shell, which creates a wider crater (2.5 meters in radius), but a shallower one (1.8 meters deep). The shockwave from such a bomb would travel for 12 meters. Unfortunately, no fragmentation effect is given for the bomb, nor an explosive effect for the shell, so it's hard to compare. We can compare the appreciable difference between the smallest bomb in the Soviet arsenal and the largest shell at the corps artillery level. 

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

German Ground Attackers

"Translated from German

Combat use of ground attack aircraft

March 1944

...

7. Anti-tank assault aircraft

1. Anti-tank assault aircraft squads are independent units. They can be attached to assault aircraft squadrons or united in the direction of the main attack to form a powerful anti-tank group.
2. Henschel 129 (single seater, two engine) and Junkers 87-G (with special equipment) are used as anti-tank assault aircraft. Both airplanes, due to their heavy weight and special weapons (Henschel 129: 30 mm cannon and two 7.9 mm machineguns, Ju-87-G: two 37 mm cannons) have low speed and are insufficiently maneuverable.
   They are very vulnerable to enemy fire, and the ability to use them is therefore limited.

...

Censorship

"Order # 9/113s of the Entrusted Agent of Safekeeping of Military Secrets in Print and Chief of the Literature and Publishing Directorate

February 3rd, 1943

Moscow

Introduce the following changes into order #57/1126/c published on November 6th, 1942:

A. Aircraft

I-5 with M-22 engine I-15 bis with M-25a engine I-16 with M-25, M-25a, M-25v, M-62, M-63 engines I-153 with M-62, M-63, and M-63tk engines	Can be openly published.
MIG-1 fighter LI-2 bomber IL-4 close and long range bomber TB heavy bomber	It is permitted to publish the name of the aircraft, usage memos, and silhouettes. Technical descriptions and instructions must be marked “for authorized use only”. Tactical flight characteristics must be marked “Secret”.

B. Armoured vehicles

T-26, T-27, T-28, T-34, T-35, T-37, T-38, T-40, T-60, T-70, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7M, KV-1, KV-2	Can only be mentioned and depicted in photographs in open print. Tactical-technical characteristics to be printed with “for authorized use only” mark.
American light tank M3, medium tank M3
Churchill, Tetrarch (Mk.VII)	Mention in open publications is prohibited.
Matilda (Mk.II), Valentine (Mk.III)	Allowed for open publication. Can be shown in photographs without revealing details, design of the fighting compartment, and control mechanisms.
Universal Carrier	Can only be mentioned and depicted in photographs in open print. Tactical-technical characteristics must be marked “for authorized use only”.
Aerosans NKL-16 mod. 1941, NKL-16 mod. 1943, NKL-26 combat aerosan	Can be openly published.

D. Chemistry

Explosive flamethrower (FOG) Portable flamethrower (ROKS-2)	Independent explosive flamethrower companies are armed with explosive flamethrowers. Any mention in open publication is forbidden. The explosive and portable flamethrowers can be published with the mark “for authorized use only”.
Ampulomet Individual incendiary items (bottles, TSch-360 thermite ball, thermite rounds, thermite charges)	Can be openly published.

Send this order to all regional publishers, and to the Central Military and Naval Censorship department.

Entrusted Agent of Safekeeping of Military Secrets in Print and Chief of the Literature and Publishing Directorate, N. Sadchikov"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

Sturmoviks

"Excerpt from an intelligence report from the 1st Belorussian Front on the enemy's impression of our aircraft

A captured memo issued by the 9th Army command begins with these words: "Enemy Sturmoviks can appear like lightning in a clear sky. They are exceptionally dangerous if you remain like a passive observer on the road, gazing at the machines exhaling fire. Only one rule exists in relation to ground attack aircraft: get off the road, get to cover." In early April, the 9th Army newspaper also published several slogans giving advice on what to do in case of ground attack aircraft raids. Flyers with this information are also posted in occupied cities."

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

Supply Drop

"Report on assistance to the uprising in Warsaw by elements of the 16th Air Army in September of 1944

On September 12th, 1944, based on the request from the Polish Committee of National Liberation, after the reception of representatives of the uprising that crossed to the eastern bank of the Vistula river, the Military Council of the 1st Baltic Front gave the following order to the commander of the 16th Air Army: to assist the uprising in Warsaw via delivery of weapons, ammunition, and supplies by air.

The execution of this task was assigned to the 9th Guards Stalingrad-Rechitsa Order of Suvorov Night Bomber Division (Po-2). On September 13th, individual Il-2 aircraft under fighter cover flew over the blocks held by the uprising forces dropping banners with notes containing the schedule of the Po-2 flights and means of communication with the uprising forces. In addition, to establish reliable communication and control over the delivery of the cargo, paratroopers equipped with radios were dropped into uprising held regions, who reported on their landing and location, and subsequently maintained communication with the 1st Baltic Front HQ, reporting on the situation in Warsaw and the amount of supplies dropped from Po-2 bombers that ended up in the hands of the uprising.

The Po-2 bombers set out with cargo for the uprising on the first time on the night of September 14th, 1944. Between September 14th and October 1st, the Po-2 bombers made 2243 sorties and dropped the following cargo:

• 45 mm guns: 1
• 50 mm mortars: 156
• Anti-tank rifles: 505
• SMGs and rifles: 2667
• Grenades: 41,780
• Ammunition (various): over 30 million
• Medicine: 0.5 tons
• Supplies: 113 tons

as well as communications equipment (telephones, cable, etc).

The actions of Po-2 bombers were supported by fighters and ground attack aircraft, who suppressed the most active enemy AA emplacements during the day. 14 Po-2 night bombers were lost between September 14th and October 1st.

Composed based on materials summarizing the actions of the 16th Air Army for September of 1944.

Senior Assistant to the Chief of Operational Research of the 1st Belorussian Front Operational Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlovskiy"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

Night Witches

"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0099

October 8th, 1941

Moscow

Contents: on the formation of female aircraft regiments of the Red Army VVS

In order to utilize female pilots and technical ranks, I order that the following must be formed by December 1st, 1941:

1. 586th fighter regiment equipped with Yak-1 aircraft according to TO&E #015/174 located in Engels.
2. 587th bomber regiment armed with Su-2 aircraft according to TO&E #015/159. Form the regiment within the 10th reserve aircraft regiment in Kamenka.
3. 588th night air regiment with U-2 aircraft according to TO&E #015/186 located in Engels.
4. The commander of the Red Army VVS must equip the aforementioned regiments with aircraft and women personnel from the VVS,  Civilian Air Fleet, and OSOAVIAKhIM.
5. Retraining of personnel with their new materiel will be done at:
1. Pilots: at the formation sites of the air regiments.
2. Technicians: at the collection point of technical personnel in Moscow.
3. Navigators and staff: 2nd Post-Secondary Ivanovo Navigator Academy.
6. The Chief Intendant of the Red Army and Chiefs of the Central Directorates of the NKO are to arm the air regiments with all necessary equipment.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

I.Stalin."

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Controlled Impact

"Order to the Red Army Air Force #0194

September 23rd, 1944

Moscow

Commanders of the Air Armies report that fighter pilots still use one of the most complicated attacks, namely ramming, to this day. 

In many cases, ramming does not only destroy the enemy plane, but also leads to a loss of our airplane, and, often, the death of the pilot.

Aircraft Costs

"Prime cost of important products of the People's Commissariat of Aircraft Production

Item	Factory	Prime in thousands cost during			% change in May
		June 1941	1st quarter 1942	May 1942	Compared to June 1941	Compared to 1st quarter 1942
Aircraft
PE-2	#22	455.9	406.3	-	-	-
PE-2	#39	577.1	524.0	462.6	-19.8	-12.0
IL-4	#126	1148.0	479.0	409.4	-64.4	-14.5
IL-2	#18	308.5	214.5	208.0	-32.6	-3.0
PS-84	#84	569.1	574.3	531.0	-6.5	-7.5
LAGG-3	#21	265.5	154.3	118.9	-55.0	-23.9
YaK-1	#292	188.7	112.0	93.8	-50.5	-16.2
UT-2	#47	34.5	40.0	40.8	+9.0	+1.0
U-2	#387	29.6	26.9	23.2	-21.8	-14.0
Engines
M105R	#16	71.7	77.3	-	-	-
M82	#19	157.7	82.0	73.8	-53.2	-10.0
M62IR	#19	56.8	45.0	44.9	-21.0	-0.2
AM38	#24	60.5	87.0	54.1	-10.5	-37.8
M105P	#26	43.4	67.7	51.0	+9.0	-24.4
M88	#29	52.2	53.5	49.5	-5.2	-7.5
M11	#154	11.1	11.0	9.9	-11.0	-10.0

"

Via Yuri Pasholok.