Fine Vintage

 "May 23rd, 1945
#0859140

The Armoured and Mechanized Units of the Far East and Transbaikal Front possess 1600 functional old tanks: T-27, T-37/38, T-30/40/60, MK-2, MK-4, M3 light, M3 medium. There are also 1167 of these tanks at repair plants that require refurbishment.

Production of these tanks and spare parts for them is long finished. Spare parts for old imported tanks are not being delivered. 

Obsolete Tanks

 "#0858795
April 10th, 1945

I report that production for the T-27, T-30, T-37, T-38, T-40, and T-60 tanks has ceased. As of April 1st, 1945, there are 566 tanks of these types that require refurbishment but cannot be supplied with parts.

Imported Mk.II [Matilda], Mk.IV [Churchill], M3s [Medium Tank M3], and M3l [Light Tank M3] tanks are in the same state. As of April 1st, 1945, there are 315 tanks of this type that require refurbishment.

All of these vehicles are obsolete, as they have weak armament and insufficient armour. They cannot be used in battle and are only used in training units.

It would take a considerable expense to restore these tanks. Repair units are loaded with repairs of modern tanks, and it is not reasonable to distract them with repairs of obsolete vehicles.

I ask for you permission to use the aforementioned tanks until they require refurbishment, after which they will be written off and disassembled for parts. These parts will be used for light and medium repairs of tanks that are still being used.

Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forced, Colonel General of the Tank Forces, Korobkov."

TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.290 L.4
Printed in Glavnoye Bronetankovoye Upravleniye Lyudi, Sobytiya, Fakty v dokumentakh, 1944-1945 p.457

The Other Degtyaryev

The Red Army had two primary machine guns during the Great Patriotic War and the period preceding it: the light DP-27 and heavy Maxim. All Soviet armoured vehicles were equipped with a modified variant of the light machine gun. However, even these proven designs had their competitors. Given certain circumstances, they could have become widely used as well. One of them, the DS-39 heavy machine gun, even had a tank version produced and tested.

From Sky to Earth

The concept of an airborne tank appeared in the early 1930s. The creator of this concept was John Walter Christie, who presented a tank that was supposed to get to the battlefield over the air using a discarding airplane attachment. Thanks to a powerful engine and a linkage to the propeller, the tank would not need an aircraft to tow it. This tank, known as the Convertible Airborne Tank M1932, never took flight, but the idea made its way into several countries. Christie himself quickly understood that a carrier airplane is necessary after all. There were two further developments: a plane that could carry a tank either underneath or inside it, or a specialized glider. Both developments were explored in the USSR and abroad. The Germans and British got the furthest with gliders, and the USSR, Germany, and USA got to practical stages with the aircraft approach. This article will discuss the fate of Soviet airborne tanks.

Fuel Capacity

"Table of one full load of fuel per fighting vehicle."

Vehicle	Capacity in kg	Type of fuel	Notes
T-35	637	BK-70, B-70	Aux. tank 360 L
KV-1 and KV-2	834	RB-70 diesel
T-28	462	BK-70, B-70
BT-7M	619	RB-70 diesel
BT-7	547	BK-70, B-70, RB-70
BT-5	263	ditto
T-34	710/628	BK-70 diesel/B-70
T-26	204	RB-70
T-40	154	RB-70
T-50	255	RB-70
T-60	227	RB-70
T-70	321	RB-70
T-38	90	Automotive gasoline
T-37	90	Automotive gasoline
T-27	35	Automotive gasoline
BA-20 light	75	Automotive gasoline
BA-10 medium	88	Automotive gasoline
BA-11 heavy	115	Automotive gasoline
BA-64	68	Automotive gasoline
MK-3 Valentine	145	Gasoil “3”
MK-2	192	Gasoil “3”
American M3 medium	613	3 cubic cm of RD per 1 kg of B-70
American M3 light	146	2 cubic cm of RD per 1 kg of B-70 or B-74
Universal Carrier	45	B-74 2nd grade
Bren Carrier	68	B-74 2nd grade

Via Valeriy Lisyutin

Future of Soviet Tanks

"February 21st, 1938

To People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Voroshilov

...

Using existing tanks in the Red Army

1. Existing 862 T-18 tanks should be used as mobile anti-tank guns in fortified regions in the event that modernization results in satisfactory results. Modernization work is currently being performed. If the modernization is unsuccessful, the T-18s should be removed from service and melted down. There are no spare parts for the T-18, and they are not being produced.

Far East Modernizations

"To the Chief of the GBTU TU

RE: #1142232

January 24th, 1944

1. Repair factory #105 developed blueprints and processes to rearm the T-37 and T-38 tanks to use the ShVAK gun. The mass of the tank increases by 100 kg as a result of rearmament. After being rearmed, the prototype was tested by firing on the move and by swimming. Trials show satisfactory results. Repair factory #105 is performing the rearmament. As of January 1st, 97 T-37/38 tanks have been rearmed with the ShVAK gun.

Far East Conversions

"To the Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

RE: your letter #822338 written on May 23rd, 1944

I report that:

1. As of June 1st, 1944, the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front have applied applique armour to 128 BT-7 tanks, 113 of which were converted in 1942-43 and 13 in 1944.
   Since no proper quality armour was available, applique armour is only installed at factories during refurbishing. Armour of written-off tanks was used. Contoured armour for turrets is not available.
2. As of June 1st, 1944, 130 T-37/T-38 tanks have been converted to ShVAK guns. Further work to re-arm T-37 and T-38 tanks ceased due to an absence of ShVAK guns.
3. Repair factories #405 and #77 are converting two-turreted T-26 tanks into single turreted. As of June 1st, 1944, 35 tanks have been converted.
4. The following is necessary to continue work on rearming and adding applique armour:
1. Contoured armour for BT-7 turrets.
2. ShVAK guns.
3. TMFP-1 sights.
4. Equipment to convert two-turreted T-26es to single turreted (turrets, turret platforms, turret rings, etc).
5. Rearmament and installation of applique armour is not being planned due to a lack of aforementioned armament and parts.
   All BT-7s refurbished by the repair factories are being equipped with applique armour.

Acting Assistant to the Chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Ryabov

Acting Chief of the UK ORT of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Sviridov"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2548 p. 175

Upgunned T-38 Trials

"Results of trials of a T-38 tank armed with a ShVAK gun from March 15th to 29th, 1944

T-38 tank #4216 armed with a ShVAK gun converted at factory #105 on January 13th 1944 was presented for trials. The engine ran for 2 hours since the last medium repairs.

After arming it with the ShVAK gun, the tank's weight increased by 400 kg. The tank was tested at 100% of combat weight with a crew of 2 men.

The route and trial conditions are described in the attached journal. 910 km were travelled during the trials (402 km on a highway, 508 km on a dirt road, off-road, and over obstacles). The engine worked for 48 hours and 40 minutes.

Metamorphoses of an Amphibian Scout

An unusual modification of the T-38 can be seen in the outdoor display of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This vehicle is distinct from its brothers: instead of one DT machinegun, its turret houses a 20 mm TNSh autocannon and a coaxial DT machinegun. Some Russian historians spread the myth that this tank was experimental. In reality, not only was this not an experimental tank, but these tanks had the chance to fight. This article will cover modifications of T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks.

T-37 and T-38 with ShVAK

"To OKB-15 director, comrade Shpitalniy

Kaganovich factory (Khabarovsk) plans to arm 400 T-37 and T-38 tanks with a ShVAK gun and a coaxial DT machinegun.

I ask you to take this project under your supervision and urgently send your representatives to the Kaganovich factory.

Consider that, due to the small amount of space in these vehicles, it might be necessary to replace the autocannon's belt feed with a magazine one.

GBTU TU Chief, Engineer-Colonel, Afonin

GBTU TU 4th Department Chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel, Nenarokov"

Trials and Tribulations

"...execution of complete trials was impossible for the following reasons:

1. NIPSVO does not have a T-38, for which comrade Polyubin's mount was built (feed system, ammunition racks, toolkit, etc).
2. The provided 7.62 mm modernized tank machinegun mod. 1940 was very worn out, the logbook and toolkit were missing. By the time the shortened trials program was completed, the machinegun was inoperative.
3. Comparison of the TP and TP-1 sight and subsequent choice of the superior model (as per your instruction) was impossible, since only the TP sight arrived."

Via Andrei Ulanov

T-37 and T-38 Applique Armour

"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, comrade Goreglyad
CC: factory #37 director

The question of adding applique armour to T-38 and T-37 tanks during their repair and turning them into land tanks has arisen.

I ask you to instruct factory #37 to develop blueprints for applique armour for the T-38 and T-37 with calculations of change in mass and other parameters.

GABTU BTU Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, Korobkov
GABTU BTU Military Commissar, Regimental Commissar [illegible]"

Torsion Bar Trials

"Methodology of Torsion Bar Trials

The trials were split into stages:

• Motion trials of torsion bars.
• Lab tests of materials (static and spring fatigue).
• Lab static destruction tests of torsion bars (by twisting).
• Analysis of various layouts of torsion bar suspensions and issues connected with them.

Teletank Development

"To Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko

Report

I report to you on the current status of armoured telemechanics:

Various organizations (NII-10, NII-20, Red Army NIST) performed work regarding telemechanization of tanks since 1929 under the orders of Red Army US and ABTU. Experimental prototypes of Renault, T-18, T-24, T-37, T-26, T-28, T-20, T-38, and BT-7 teletanks were produced.

By 1935, the issues of automation of the suspension and chemical armament of the tank were resolved, and a commission selected the TOZ-26 T-26 teletank developed by NII-20 as the most suitable teletank out of three experimental T-26 teletanks. This prototype was accepted for mass production. In 1936-37, factory #192 produced 35 groups and another 30 groups in 1938-39, slightly modernized vehicles with the index TOZ-8. In total, 130 special tanks were built, 65 control tanks and 65 teletanks (65 groups).

Tanks in the East

"To the Chief of the 8th Main Directorate of the NKOP, Brigadier-Engineer comrade Sviridov

I send you these materials on trials of fighting and armoured vehicles BT-7A, T-38, FAI and trucks GAZ-AA, ZiS-5, ZiS-6 regarding their performance during border and internal maneuvers executed by the NKVD Internal Forces in 1937-1938.

Experience in using these vehicles in conditions of middle Asia revealed several design defects that must be corrected when building these vehicles.

I ask you to inform me of your decision.
Division commander Kovalev

RESULTS
Of trials of BT-7A, T-38, FAI armoured car, GAZ-AA, ZiS-5, and ZiS-6 trucks.

Trials were performed in the following conditions:

1. Total distance: 2500 km (without assistance, combined on tracks and wheels)
2. Terrain: various
1. Mountains with steep grades, mountain passes at an elevation of 2500 m to 4000 m, mostly off-road, up to 1000 km long.
2. Rocky bed of a mountain river, 200 km.
3. Off-road on a salt marsh, 250 km.
4. Dirt roads with up to 50 cm of loess dust, 100 km.
5. Loose sand, from flat sand roads to loose dunes with grades up to 40 degrees, up to 1000 km long.
3. Climate conditions:
1. Mountains with a normal temperature of +15, salt marshes with a temperature of +50, mostly through regions without water.
2. Sand-salt marsh terrain with air temperature ranging from +10-15 degrees to -15 degrees.
3. Mountain passes up to 4000 m high in winter conditions with snow banks with temperature ranging from -20 to -40.

The results of the trials showed the following behaviour of vehicles on various terrain:

1. BT-7A tank

Light gravel highway, average speed of 30 kph: Tanks worked normally. Since the tracks weren't broken in, locking pins were cut off and track pins fell out. 

Mountain terrain with passes from 2500 m to 4000 m high: The effectiveness of the fuel mixture decreased, had to be enriched. The result was excess use of fuel, black smoke from the muffler, engine overheating. The engine power decreased by 30-35%. Due to a large power reserve, a 30% decrease in performance did not have a noticeable effect on the vehicle's performance.

The performance of the BT-7A in these conditions showed that they can, without significant changes, especially without an altitude corrector for the carburettor, cross mountain passes over 4000 meters high.

On steep slopes, fuel could drain out of the carburettor, causing the engine to desynchronize. The water temperature reached 100-110 degrees and oil temperature 80 degrees in August.

Suspension: the track pin and horizontal spring plug have significant drift after 500 kilometers of use.

Marching on a mountain approach, flat road on salt marsh, and loess dust: On rocky terrain, the existing design of drive wheel and track links results in frequent jamming due to saturation of the tracks with mud and rocks.

It is possible to cross salt marshes at high speeds, but only without turning and over new places each time.

The BT-7A tank is completely unusable in loess dust conditions and is not protected against it. The lack of protection from dust of transmission components is noticeable. Initially, the complete saturation of tracks, bearings, and disks did not allow for changing gears. It is not possible to clean the main friction clutch in this design without removing the gearbox. In the last stages of moving across loess dust, the main friction clutch disks showed grit up to 2 mm in size, which disabled the clutch. Further use of tanks involved only using the final drives without disengaging the main clutch.

Due to dust getting into the magneto, the tank could not be started. Other electric components were disabled due to dust, such as the starter, the generator, etc.

Engine: the loess dust gets in with air through the air filter, side pockets and cracks, gets into the engine, and forms and abrasive mass when mixing with the oil, resulting in fast wear of cylinders, rings, pins, floating pins, and bearings. As a result, the engine starts working unreliably. The oil system stopped working due to wear of the oil pump gears.

Note: two engines broke down over these trials due to tearing of the piston rods of the 1st and 2nd cylinder. The VVS M-17F manual describes this as a manufacturing defect.

Suspension: the final drive bearings wore down quickly.

Overall conclusions: 

The BT-7A tank is adequate for use in the mountains. The tank needs improvements for use in sandy or dusty conditions to protect the transmission, engine, and electric equipment from dust.

Engine group:

• Requires dust protection with a more powerful oil filter, better sealing of the carburettor and coil pipe housing.
• The fuel nozzles should be moved in order to avoid a chance of fire if gasoline leaks on the magneto contacts.
• The valve rocker leaks oil during use and cannot be repaired.
• The gear-based oil pump and its connector wear quickly.
• The nozzles cannot be regulated without removing the top armour plate.
• It is difficult to access the engine during use.

Transmission compartment:

• The main friction clutch must be protected by a special case (from the engine to the gearbox)
• There must be an intermediate connector between the main clutch and gearbox that allows for work on the clutch without removing the gearbox.
• Strengthen the bearings of the main friction clutch and improve access to them and the ratchet disk.
• Improve access to the oil nozzle of the final drive bearings.
• Cover the control pull rods with a special casing.
• Improve the gearbox link (springs break, locks pop out, other breakdowns).

Final drives:

• Install strengthened ball bearings.
• Redesign the drive wheel in order to strengthen the disk and rim.
• Change the tracks to use finer links.

Electric equipment:

• The lights turned off due to poor quality of lightbulb sockets.
• Up to 80% of ammeter and voltmeter breakdowns were due to poor quality of materials or assembly.
• Starters broke down due to poor quality of relay contacts.
• Bronze bearings of the launch magneto wore quickly.
• The generator plug connectors are unreliable and hard to reach.
• The electric equipment layout is complicated and hard to reach during repairs.
• The ignition button contact (made from a latten brass spring) is low quality and breaks quickly.
• Electric wiring close to the turret creates a fire hazard.

It is necessary to:

• Protect the magneto, generator, and starter from dust and moisture. The started magneto should be installed on ball bearings.
• Remove the plug connectors from the generator and lead the wires up to the control panel near the generator.
• Allow access to the starter relay without removing the starter.
• Note: a Bendix gear starter is desirable. In addition, the tank should have another way of starting the engine aside from the starter.
• Wiring inside the tank should be done in accordance with fire safety. Wires in the turret should be covered in pipes until they reach their contact.
• Small connectors should not have friction contacts, and should be connected with either bolts or solder.
• The battery should be moved to the rear of the tank, as during operation water, oil, and dust gets on it, and leaking electrolyte corrodes the radiator.

It is also difficult to remove the batteries for charging, and in the winter impossible to install the engine heater without it. It is also impossible to charge the batteries without removing them.

In the same conditions, other vehicles were tested:

1. T-38 tank: demonstrated excellent performance in all conditions, aside from:
1. Fast wear of final drive gears.
2. Insufficient engine power for the vehicle's weight, causing overheating, and low speed on land and water.
3. It is necessary to add air filters to the engine.
2. FAI armoured car: showed good results. It is necessary to add an air filter and improved radiator.
3. GAZ-AA: showed good performance and endurance. Needs an oil air filter and an improved radiator.
4. ZiS-5: performs poorly on sand. The reductor is very weak, mostly the gears and bearings of the main gear break. Needs a stronger radiator and a rigidly installed differential like on the GAZ truck.
5. ZiS-6 (three-axle): needs a more powerful engine. The existing engine can only provide a speed of 12 kph on the described terrain. The demultiplexor is very weak, the gears of the first gear break often. Needs a stronger radiator.

Military Engineer 3rd Grade, Babushkin

Lieutenant Sherbelev

Military Technician 2nd Grade, Kurochkin"

V. Lehn collection.

German Intel: Red Army Tanks

Naturally, before you invade a country, you need to be aware of what their army is like. This is a German intelligence bulletin listing the tanks that were known to be in the Red Army. Black rectangles mark especially vulnerable areas.

"BA Ford" armoured car

This is a BA-10 armoured car. The German document correctly identifies it as being armed with one 45 mm gun and two machineguns, although the hull MG is very much overexaggerated in the drawing. The armour is also listed correctly (6-10 mm). The speed is a little low (50 kph instead of 52). The mass is listed as 5-7 tons, which is also a bit high (actual mass was 5.1 tons). The vehicle is shown to be vulnerable to armour piercing bullets at 250 meters and 20 mm shells at 700 meters.

Amphibious Tank T-37

The T-37 is correctly named, but its armour is overestimated (10 mm instead of 8) and so is the speed (45 kph instead of 40), but the rest seems about right. The vulnerability of the vehicle is the same as the BA-10.

Amphibious tank T-38

The data on the T-38 is largely the same as on the T-37, except it's 100 kg lighter (it was actually heavier, at 3.3 tons). The armour is still listed as 10 mm, even though it's still thinner (9 mm). Vulnerability is, naturally, the same.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26A tank

This is the two-turreted T-26 mod. 1931 or 1932. The document can't decide, ascribing the tank an armament of one 37 mm gun and two machineguns, whereas in reality tanks with two turrets had either two machineguns or one 37 mm gun and one machinegun. The armour is listed as 14 mm, which is in between the mod. 1931's 13 mm and mod. 1932's 15 mm. The mass (8.55 tons) is more than either of the modifications (8 and 8.4 tons respectively). This tank is listed as invulnerable to armour piercing bullets, but still vulnerable to 20 mm shells at a range of 550 meters.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26B Tank

This is the most common T-26, T-26 mod. 1933. Armour is too thin (14 mm instead of 15 mm) and mass is a bit high (9.55 tons instead of 9.4). Vulnerability is the same as the above tank.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26B Flamethrower Tank

This is a KhT-130 chemical tank, the Red Army's most common flamethrower tank on the T-26 chassis. Data is the same as on the "T-26B".

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26C Tank

This is the last model of the T-26, T-26 mod. 1939. The mass is too low again (9.7 tons instead of 10.25), armour is still too thin at 14 mm. The armament is identified correctly. The vulnerability of the tank is the same as above.

BT (Christie tank)

Despite the Germans being aware that there are different kinds of BT tank, they are all rolled into the one BT entry. The mass is listed as 10.5 tons to 12 tons, and is a little off again, as the BT-2 weighed in at 11 tons and the BT-7 went up to 13.9 tons. Armour is listed as 6-16 mm; too thin for the BT-7, which went up to 22 mm. Armament is listed for all BT models, including the BT-7 with a 76 mm gun. The vehicle is vulnerable to 20 mm shells at 400 meters. 

T-28 Medium Tank

Here we have the classic T-28 with a KT-28 gun. Unlike with the T-26, there is only one T-28 model listed in the guide. The mass is a bit too high (28 tons vs. 25). Vulnerability is listed as 300 meters with the 20 mm gun, 700 meters with the Czech 37 mm gun, 450 meters with the German 37 mm gun, 1400 meters with the 50 mm tank gun, and 1500 meters with the 50 mm AT gun. The side is vulnerable at 500 meters to the 20 mm gun and at any range to any other gun.

T-35A Heavy Tank

The drawing might not look like it, but yes, this is the T-35. Armament is identified correctly, even though the drawing seems to be missing three turrets. Vulnerability is the same as in for the T-28.

T-35C Heavy Tank

The SMK (the only new Soviet tank the Germans seemed to be aware of) has been rolled into the T-35 family, which is not too absurd if you don't have very good intel. The drawing is of the early SMK with the T-35 suspension, but the tank already lost its third turret. This information is likely based on the SMK that was bogged down in Finland, as there was not much opportunity to examine the other two prototype heavy tanks.

The vulnerability of the tank is not too shabby either: impervious to bullets or 20 mm shells, vulnerable to 37 mm guns at 100 meters, and to 50 mm guns at 450 meters. The Germans bust out the heavy artillery here, noting that the tank is vulnerable at 500 meters to the 105 mm mod. 1918 cannon firing mod. 1939 shells.

And that's it, no T-34, no KV-1 or KV-2. Those tanks were indeed surprises for the German intelligence.

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 1

After the conclusion of the Winter War, it was clear that application of tank forces in the Red Army needs to be reviewed. Here are some excerpts from a meeting of VKP(b) bigwigs discussing the effectiveness of the tanks and suggesting changes to how they are used, from rkka.ru archives. I will also include some interesting parts that characterize the army as a whole.

"Semenov (Brigade Commissar, Military Commissar of the 50th Infantry Corps): ... We did not study Finland during peacetime enough, we did not study it properly. During wargames, we reached Vyborg in no time at all, with a break for lunch. The White Finn tactics are based on close combat, with an organized system of rifle and mortar fire, with light ski units. Our units turned out to not be ready to fight on skis, they were bound to roads, and their supply lines dragged 10 km behind. We were only saved due to a shortage of Finnish aircraft. For instance, the 123rd and 84th infantry divisions, 1st, 13th, 15th, 35th, and 20th tank brigades, and elements of the 90th Division were all stuck on one narrow road. Many people had to work for several days to untangle this traffic jam."

"Pshennikov (Brigade Commander, 142nd Infantry Division): ... Next issue, the use of tanks. When we were fighting in no man's land, despite my division advancing along a wide front, there was a lack of roads. I had a tank brigade that operated on a front of one regiment with only one road. What happened? The tank brigade clogged up the road and I had nothing to feed that regiment with. All carts had to be stopped and supplies carried to the regiment on foot. In future wars, tank units need their own roads. If there is no other road, don't reinforce the division with tanks, or maybe with just one battalion.
I also think that it is necessary to review tank division compositions, as T-37 and T-38 tanks did not show themselves well. Divisions need to have T-26 tanks. Even those have a drawback, their tracks slip off. That is their greatest weakness, and it must be resolved."

"Sinitsin (Regimental Commissar, Military Commissar of the Front Armoured Forces): Comrades, I consider it my duty to raise some issues on the use of armoured forces in Western Ukraine and against the White Finns. Comrades that spoke before me correctly brought up on the poor cooperation between tanks and infantry. I've been in tank forces for a while, but I have never seen proper cooperation between tanks and infantry in training. If we want to have proper cooperation between tanks and infantry, we need to include a tank brigade in each infantry corps and force the commander to train tanks and infantry together. This will have an effect.
I think that tank battalions with 15 T-26es and several T-38s worked poorly, since there was no repair bases for them, and the vague directions given by combined arms commanders, as a rule, resulted in their disablement. Spreading tanks out without proper orders does not achieve anything. Tank battalions should not be included in infantry divisions.
There is no tank master in the region, front, or army. ABTU is no more or less than an inspectorate. In this condition, we cannot prepare tank forces properly, as nobody is really responsible for training or control. I think that ABTU and tank force directorates should be organized like the VVS. This will increase responsibility for actions, create a centralized training center, and military councils and commanders will have someone to hold responsible for the state of tank forces. Some words on tankers: it is known how important tanks are in any battle, but we have problems with finding qualified crewmen. For instance, there is a regular captain in the Leningrad district who is in charge of assigning tank unit commanders. Where does he know them from? He doesn't, nobody studies these issues, and there is chaos going on with our crews. I think it is necessary to have training and assignments under control of the armoured forces chief. This will make things more reasonable.

The next issue is about the types of tanks. It is sad that a regular 37 mm shell penetrates our tanks, not to mention larger calibers. I think that we need to move to tanks armed with larger calibers and thicker armour due to enemy anti-tank artillery.
Stalin: Is 45 mm enough for T-26es?
Sinitsin: It is enough, but the KV is a new type of tank, and 45 mm is not enough.
Stalin: Is 75 mm enough?
Sinitsin: Yes, that is enough. We need to make more tanks like this and quickly. My next issue is discipline. We talk too much, but the state of affairs is poor. We need to stop talking and prepare our forces properly. I will give you an example. In the 13th Army, I saw a soldier that was lightly wounded in the arm, led to the rear by 3-4 men led by a political chief to take care of him, and then this group sticks around the rear instead of going back and fighting.
It is also necessary to improve training in military academies. We have young lieutenants that just finished the academy, and they don't know how to shoot their pistols. I must make a remark about political workers, there are many comrades with a very low level of military knowledge. We need to end this now and train our commanders and political workers better."

Continued in part 2.

Blockade Repairs

This listing of repair work works well to illustrate two things that I have mentioned in the past and one I have not. The first that I have mentioned is that the Leningrad Front was an odd mishmash of strange and obsolete vehicles, which you can see from mentions of BT-2s and machinegun-only BT-5s. The other is that it's a massive pain to keep track of how many vehicles were actually produced, as you can clearly see that it's not only the repair factories that are taking in damaged vehicles to restore them.

The thing I haven't mentioned yet is that Soviet factory nomenclature is incredibly annoying. This document lists all factories by their proper names, so you have both "Kirov factory" and "factory named after Kirov" (factory #185) mentioned on the same page. In order to prevent confusion, I refer to the latter by its number.

"Decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front #001311
Active Army
October 30th, 1942

Content: On the repairs of tanks, tank engines, and tractors at Leningrad factories

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decrees that:

1. The director of the Kirov factory, comrade Dlugach, must perform major repairs of 10 tank engines for factory #371 and 6 engines for Leningrad Front ABTU before December 1st, 1942.
2. The director of factory #371, comrade Kozharinov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Perform major and medium repairs on 10 KV-1 tanks.
2. Assemble upper and lower turret rings for BT and T-26 tanks in the following amounts:
1. For the Leningrad Front ABTU repair factory: 20 units.
2. For factory #185: 10 units.
3. Perform thermal conditioning and polishing of KV gearboxes for the Leningrad Front ABTU in the following amounts:
1. Item #12-355: 50 units.
2. Item #12-322: 50 units.
3. Item #12-266: 30 units.
4. Item #12-167: 30 units.
3. The director of factory #185, comrade Muromets must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major and medium repairs on BT-5 tanks (5 units).
4. The director of Yegorov factory, comrade Kolesnikov, must provide major repairs for 10 T-37 and T-38 tanks by December 1st, 1942.
5. Repair factory #4 chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Smirnov, must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Produce 10 new tanks.
2. Provide major repairs for T-26 and T-60 tanks (5 items).
3. Provide major repairs for T-26 engines (5 items) and gearboxes (10 items).
4. Provide major repairs for 30 STZ tractors.
6. Repair factory #27 chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Hoprov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major repairs on 3 medium tanks (3 units).
3. Perform major repairs on tank engines (5 units).

Coal, lubricant, fuel, electricity, and repair inventory is being distributed among factories.

Leningrad Front Commander, Lieutenant Govorov

Military Council Member, Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), A. Zhdanov

Military Council Member, N. Solovyev

Military Council Member, T. Shtykov"

V. Lehn Collection

Soviet Tanks in the Far East

Here are the tanks the Red Army had available in the Far East for war with Japan as of August 5th, 1945. As you can see, some of these tanks have been there for quite a while, as they are downright antiques. As per Soviet tradition, tanks that require light repairs (repairs that can be completed by the strength of the tank unit) are included in the "functional" column.

Vehicle	In possession	Functional	Med. Repairs	Maj. Repairs	Irreparable
T-34	1899	1794	32	70	3
M4-A2	250	250	-	-	-
BT-7	1030	797	41	179	13
T-26	1461	1272	33	122	34
KV	77	47	5	23	2
Valentine	81	78	3	-	-
T-60/70	46	14	-	28	4
BT-5	190	101	-	23	66
T-38	325	304	20	1	-
Tankettes	52	52	-	-	-
IS	19	6	1	12	-
T-27	56	56	-	-	-
T-37	52	52	-	-	-
M3 light	1	-	1	-	-
M3 medium	1	-	1	-	-
Various	5	5	-	-	-
Total tanks	5548	4841	137	455	125
ISU-152	197	188	1	8	-
ISU-122	1	1	-	-	-
SU-100	262	261	1	-	-
SU-76	952	944	9	-	-
SU-152	11	-	-	11	-
SU-85	6	1	-	5	-
SU-122	6	2	-	3	1
Total SPGs	1422	1393	11	28	1
Total	6980	6234	148	483	126

The small number of IS tanks available casts doubt on the assertion that IS-3 tanks were present in the theater.

Source: Russian Archives: Soviet-Japanese War of 1945: history of a military-political struggle between two nations. Documents and materials. Volume 2, table 18. Moscow, Terra, 1997, page 339.