The Wehrmacht's Unplanned Workhorse

How the Pz.Kpfw.IV became Germany's most numerous and longest serving tank.

There are many cases in worldwide tank building where not everything went according to plan. Even the legendary T-34 was supposed to leave the stage in 1941 in favour of the T-34M. Only the start of the war saved it from replacement. A similar thing happened to the Medium Tank M4. It was supposed to be replaced in 1943, but the replacements didn't turn out well. This happened to every long-serving tank, and the Germans were no exception.

The Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.C was the most common German medium tank at the start of the war.

Second Fiddle

Even though the German Pz.Kpfw.IV tank was originally created as a support vehicle (Begleitwagen) and fell short of its counterpart the Pz.Kpfw.III in many ways, it was still the heaviest tank in the German arsenal and mounted the largest caliber gun. Issues with Pz.Kpfw.III production also made it the most numerous German medium tank at the start of WWII. Despite its “secondary” designation, the Pz.Kpfw.IV did not evade the attention of the British. Intelligence agents and tankers alike strived to uncover its secrets.

A meeting in Africa

As with the Pz.Kpfw.III, the British only knew about the Pz.Kpfw.IV from rumours. There was little verified information, but one of the few things known for sure was that the tank was heavier than the Pz.Kpfw.III. Intelligence summaries referred to it as a medium tank, whereas the Pz.Kpfw.III was called a “medium-light tank”. Naturally, the British encountered the Pz.Kpfw.IV in France in 1940, but a sample could not be obtained for study due to the rapid defeat of the British Expeditionary Force. Even though there was no precise data about the armour or armament of the tank, an identification poster was still composed and distributed on December 16th, 1940.

A drawing of the Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.C composed according to intelligence data showing distinguishing features of the vehicle. The antenna deflector, fixed gun mantlet, pistol port in the single piece front plate, and driver’s observation slit were among the features unique to this variant of the tank.

DShK vs Pz.Kpfw.IV

"Results of firing the 12.7 mm DShK machine gun with the B-32 bullet against the German Pz.Kpfw.IV tank

Range	Hit location	Armour slope from vertical	Total angle (slope + shooting angle)	Armour thickness	Hits	Results
100 m	Right side of the turret	25 deg	70 deg	20 mm	5	15 mm deep impacts (1 on photo #63)
50		25	90	20	2	18 mm deep impacts (2 on photo #63)
100	Right side of the hull, engine compartment	0	70	20	3	Complete penetration
100	Turret rear	12	90	20	5	One complete penetration, 4 18 mm deep dents
100	Hull rear	0	70	20	2	Complete penetration
150		0	70	20	2	17 mm deep dents
150		0	90	20	2	18 mm deep dents

Pz.Kpfw.IV vs StuG

 "Top Secret

Inspector General of the Tank Forces
#046/44 Top Secret

June 26th, 1944

Copy 1 out of 5

Notes on the report to the Fuhrer

Replacement of Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks with L/48 and L/70 assault guns.

1) Tactical-technical data

The 75 mm L/48 gun with the model 1939 armour piercing shell can penetrate all known types of English, American, and Russian tanks from medium distances of 600-1200 meters (including the English Cromwell tank, see attachment #1).

45 mm gun vs Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.E

Photo #64: Penetration of the front hull, 50 mm thick, from a range of 50 meters (I).

Pz.Kpfw.IV Weak Spots

 "

Death to German occupants!

Weak spots of the German Pz.Kpfw.IV tank

F-34 vs Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.E

 "Results of firing on the German T-IV tank with the 76 mm model 1940 (F-34) gun on the T-34 tank

Photo 68. Penetration of the right side, 40 mm thick (20+20 mm) from 800 meters.

The Necessary Pair

Why the Panther couldn't replace the Pz.Kpfw.IV and why the Germans spent the whole war with two medium tanks.

The German tank building school was among the best in WW2. One could say it finished in second place overall. For instance, the Panther was a very competitive medium tank. The T-34 and Medium Tank M4 had advantages over it in production qualities and modernization potential, but the Panther surpassed them in armour and firepower while maintaining decent mobility. This tank was supposed to become Germany's main tank. It became the most numerous tank in the Germany army by the second half of 1944. Three factories built this tank, putting out 350 units monthly at the peak of production in the summer of 1944. The Panther was also a key part of the future of German tank building. This tank was supposed to be the only medium tank remaining in production by the second half of 1945. It would even be developed further. The Panther Ausf.F with improved frontal protection was supposed to become the main variant.

Three German medium tanks in one shot, July 1943. The Pz.Kpfw.III was on its way out, the Pz.Kpfw.IV was here to stay, and the Panther that couldn't quite replace it.

There is a common misconception that once the Panther appeared on the scene production of other medium tanks either stopped or began to wind down, after which it quickly became Germany's main tank. In reality, peak production of the Panther coincided with peak production of Germany's other medium tank, the Pz.Kpfw.IV. The difference in production volumes was not so great, which is a feat considering that only one factory build Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks starting with the summer of 1944: Nibelungenwerke. Medium SPGs are incomparable, as only the StuG 40 and StuH 42 outnumbered the vehicles built on the Pz.Kpfw.IV chassis, even though it was considered outdated in early 1944. This seems like a paradox, but there were good reasons why the Pz.Kpfw.IV entered production in November of 1937 and stayed there so long and why production of two medium tanks continued throughout the entire war.

The Fight for Sight

Optics often come up in discussions that compare Soviet and German tanks. The famous "Zeiss optics" are often invoked by those who are not very well versed in the subject matter. The issue was not in Soviet sights. Plenty of them survived to this day, and any who wish can evaluate their quality on their own. German tanks were first and foremost superior in their observation devics. Their visibility was better than that of Soviet tanks, which was often a deciding factor in victory on the battlefield. However, the evolution of German observation devices is an interesting topic for discussion.

Panzerwaffe Between III and IV

German tank building during WW2 ended up in a situation where the similar Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks as well as SPGs and other vehicles on their chassis were built in parallel in large numbers. The tank chassis were similar in many of their characteristics. They were equipped with the same engines and transmissions of the same type. At the same the designs were incompatible in many ways. Let us try to figure out how the Germans arrived at two solutions instead of one and why multiple attempts to unite the two designs ended in failure.

How to Lose Everything and Learn Nothing

German tanks and SPGs of the second half of WW2 are often praised as "wonder weapons". Based on what is written about them, one can only come to the conclusion that Germany lost WW2 by accident. This is often said about the "big cats": the Tiger, Panther, and so on. Indeed, Germany's tank industry took a lead in 1943. Thanks to a sudden jump forward, one can argue that Germany had the best heavy and medium tanks. However, it was in the second half of 1943 that the Germans began to lose their grasp on the Eastern Front. A year later, German tank industry was no longer in the lead. The issues it faced were systematic, and despite an arguable second plate in the tank race, the Germans had no future when it came to either the tanks or their armament.

The Third Reich's Last Tanks

German tank building was in a difficult state towards the end of WW2. The issue wasn't just in factories damaged by bombers, loss of significant territories, and shortages of resources. The consequences of mistakes in planning and production as well as unscrupulous competition began to crop up. Let's take a look at how the new head of the Panzerkommission tried to bring order back to German tank building and what came of it.

In Defense of the Panzer IV

With the debut of the Panther in 1943 the Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV were threatened with cancellation. Their chassis would be used to make StuGs, a vehicle that could not be replaced with the Panther. However, Guderian himself wrote a treatise in defense of the humble Pz.Kpfw.IV.

"Notes for the Fuhrer's report (September 5th, 1943)

Pz.Kpfw.IV tank or assault gun?

Despite arriving reports, the assault gun has practically no advantages over the Pz.Kpfw.IV tank, as the assault gun:

In the Panther's Shadow

The theory that Germany should have kept producing the Pz.Kpfw.IV instead of the Panther is common among amateur historians. However, the peak of Pz.Kpfw.IV production coincided with Panther production. Nobody was going to reduce production volumes, at least in 1943. The Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H and Ausf.J became the most numerous German tanks of the second half of WWII, and the Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.J became its most numerous tank overall. It was outnumbered only by the StuG 40 Ausf.G, 8500 of which were built. Late production Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks were a litmus test for what was wrong with German tank production in the last years of WWII.

Snow "Shoes"

The tank was born on the battlefields of WWI where it had to combat not only enemy fortifications, but also mud. Tanks were often lost not from enemy fire, but from being stuck on cross country terrain. Engineers and the military first started thinking about how to improve mobility of their vehicles. Further improvements focused on improving mobility in general, but advanced methods of driving on soft terrain did not progress past experiments. Engineers returned to the issue of improving off-road mobility in WWII. In addition to mud, tanks got a new enemy: snow. This issue was most prevalent on the Soviet-German front where there was more snow than anywhere else for obvious reasons.

Extra Protection

The tendency to increase armour protection was one of the most notable features of the German tank building school. No nation in the world increased protection without a radical change to the chassis. For instance, the Pz.Kpfw.III more than tripled the thickness of its front armour compared to its initial form. The Pz.Kpfw.IV set a record, quadrupling the thickness of the front hull compared to that of the B.W. This wasn't it, as the Germans still worked on improving protection of tanks that were already build. This article will cover those methods.

Warspot Article: Second Fiddle

The Pz.Kpfw.IV became the workhorse of the German army, serving from the first day of the war to its last. However, one could hardly have predicted this in 1941. The British developed quite a negative opinion of this vehicle through trials and inspections of captured samples. Read why in my latest article on Warspot.net.

Book Review: Panzer IV

 

As a military history writer, it is hard to strike a balance between the two sides of a tank's history. Many opt to focus exclusively on the technical specifications of a tank, judging its effectiveness and evaluating its legacy via a measure of kilograms or centimeters divorced entirely from any kind of context. Others lean towards the description of military operations only and gloss over any technical aspects of the tanks involved or how well they were suited for the tasks they carried out. Publications that attempt to cover both aspects often result in abrupt switches from one to the other without any meaningful link between the two. The simply named Panzer IV by Thomas Anderson stands in contrast to these works, masterfully weaving together the combat experience of the Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and the technical changes introduced into the design in response to lessons learned in battle.

The Real Panzer '46

There is a certain group of people who are dead certain that if the Germans got lucky and held on for at least a year then they would get a second chance. The only reaction to this opinion can be a smile. These day-dreamers should understand the state of German industry and what their opponents were doing in the same fields in order to realize the potential Germany had in late 1945 and early 1946.

One of the fan favourites among the "second chance" theorists are the military vehicle projects. Allegedly, if they had the time, these could be built. The reason for this hope is that information about German military projects became available several decades earlier than Allied ones. The first information (or rather, digests) became available towards the mid-60s. This was typically not original German documents, but Allied intelligence reports, which contained a ton of mistakes. The same can be seen in Soviet reports. The first documents to be declassified were ones related to aircraft. Aviation developed at a breakneck pace, and various napkinwaffe were only interesting in the years immediately following the war. The situation with tanks was much more complicated. There were fewer of them and little information remains regarding prospective projects.

The E-50/E-75 was one of those projects. It is mentioned often, frequently as a wonder weapon that would have composed a new generation of German tanks if it was ever put into production. Yuri Pasholok wrote about it before, but it's time to revisit the topic without rose tinted glasses.

The Best StuG

The StuG III and StuG 40 were the most numerous armoured vehicles in the German army during WWII. Together with the StuH 42 assault howitzer, 11,300 such vehicles were built. The front lines needed more of these assault guns, and so Germany began to develop these vehicles on other chassis. The fighting in 1942-43 made it clear that the Marder tank destroyers needed to be replaced. The Wehrmacht wanted something lower and better protected. This began the development of the main character of today's article, the Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyer. The sum total of its characteristics made this vehicle the best German medium SPG of the war.