Sunday, 16 March 2014

Hasan Tank Combat


"Notes on known defects and deficiencies of our tanks and recommendations on their correction

T-26 vehicle
  1. The oil radiator can be reached by an enemy that can pierce it with a bayonet. It should be covered with rotating overlapping armour plates.
  2. Old tanks can't lock their driver's hatch. There were cases where the enemy could open it and kill the crew. We have many tanks like this.
  3. You can't use the fan, as it increases the possibility of the crew being harmed by bullets and lead splashes. Make the fan like on the BT tank.
  4. Gases collect at the top of the turret, which reflects on the crew's health. There were cases of CO poisoning. It is necessary to put a fan at the top of the turret next to the periscope.
  5. The air, due to gunpowder gases, high temperature, sweat, and other causes, is difficult to breathe. The tank should be equipped with chemically filtered breathing tubes.
  6. The suspension is not protected from the outside.
  7. The tank is hit frequently. The turret and hull armour should be streamlined.
  8. The turret attachment is insufficiently rigid. There were several cases of turrets falling off.
  9. Loss of tracks. The suspension cannot keep up with the mobility required from a tank. Sharp turns cause the track to slip off, and you cannot function without sharp turns on the battlefield.
  10. Many cases of rubber tires flying off the road wheels.
  11. There were cases when shells jammed hatches. In the event that the tank caught fire, the crews could not exit the tank, and burned up.
  12. It is hard to see out of the tank. Several old variants of tanks have no observation ports at all in the turret, and existing ones are insufficient for full observation.
  13. Tanks burn strongly due to gasoline, rubber bandages, and frequent painting due to holidays and inspections from important commanders. When painting tanks, remove the old layer, and do not paint over it.
  14. There is a dead zone where the enemy is immune to the tank's weapons. The enemy could climb on the tank, hit it with crowbars, loosen the gun, destroy instruments and devices, pour gasoline on it, and set it on fire. It is necessary to have high explosive rounds in all tanks. Provide pistol ports for the driver on the sides.
  15. The battery is placed in the tank poorly, and impedes observation and the use of pistol ports.
  16. The tank moves slowly through swamps and gets stuck frequently. 
  17. The driver sees the enemy in front of him, but cannot fire at him.
  18. The front plate of the tank is vulnerable. There were many tanks with frontal penetrations. The front of the tank must be sharp.
  19. Commanders' tanks are distinct from others. In battle, the enemy fires at those tanks first.
  20. It isn't possible to replace the 1st and 2nd cylinder sparkplugs on the move, as the frame is too close to them.
  21. The ventilation hatch can fit a grenade through it. There were cases where this happened.
  22. Shells penetrate armour frequently. The following armour is vulnerable: front horizontal, driver's hatch, hull and turret walls.
  23. There is nowhere to urinate during battle.
  24. There is nothing the crew can use to fight fires.
  25. Heat in the tank leads to high consumption of drinking water.
  26. There were cases where the enemy could freely place a grenade in the rear compartment.
  27. There is a periscope for observation, but it is inconvenient to use during battle.
BT vehicle
  1. The front part of the tank is hit with shells frequently.
  2. The tank has a hard time traversing swamps.
  3. The driver cannot fire.
  4. The hatches are circular, and you cannot use them to take cover when leaving the tank.
Otherwise, the vehicle has the same problems as the T-26.

Overall notes
  1. Drivers are unprepared to drive with hatches closed, observe from the turret, use terrain for cover, and approach the enemy stealthily.
  2. The brake signal must be on at all time when moving at night.
  3. Tanks should help each other in battle. If a tank loses a track, another tank must cover the crew. If samurai climb up on the tank, another must destroy them with the machinegun. Everyone must feel that his comrades will not abandon him in trouble. 
  4. Company command trucks should be armoured, as they have to follow the tank until the attack, and sometimes during the attack. When the vehicle breaks down, it should be towed to cover and repaired. The trucks should match the brand of trucks in the company. 
  5. When evacuating a tank, it is desirable to hook on the tank without leaving the engineering vehicle. Add a hatch next to the tow hook.
  6. Outline markings, especially white ones, make it easier for the enemy to aim at the tank.
  7. Move from wood fired field kitchens to gas kitchens, as it is difficult to find firewood.
  8. Practice evacuation of a damaged tank from the battlefield.
  9. In order to evacuate damaged tanks, have vehicles with Komintern tractor winches. The off-road performance of this vehicle must be better than the tank's.
  10. Wheeled vehicles should not supply tanks with ammunition, fuel, or other supplies. It is necessary to have tracked armoured transports, preferably short ones, so that they may move unnoticed. Fuel vehicles should have nozzles to fuel up five tanks simultaneously, and each must have a self-evacuation device.
  11. Add a hatch in the bottom of all tanks to gain access to components that require periodic lubrication.
Composed by participant in the Hasan lake battles, engineer Starkov
February 26th, 1939
One copy printed on March 15th, 1939"


Saturday, 15 March 2014

Cheating at Statistics 6: Broken Tigers, Broken Hearts

I usually wouldn't post a Hero of the Soviet Union award order (otherwise I would have no time to post anything else), but this one is special. Vladimir Zelmanovich Vaisser managed to score a Hero of the Soviet Union and an Order of the Patriotic War, First Class in one battle, so it deserves further investigation.


"T-34 tank commander Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser, while defending the Chepovichi station on December 19th, 1943, demonstrated bravery and heroism. In an ambush, he allowed enemy tanks to approach, then opened fire. With precise shots, he destroyed two enemy tanks. The enemy attempted to flank the ambush, but comrade Vaisser expertly predicted the enemy's movements and ordered to move to a previously readied position, from which he destroyed a Panther tank and up to a platoon of soldiers and officers. The enemy's attempt to capture the station failed.

Guards Junior Lieutenant Veisser destroyed 3 enemy tanks and up to 50 fascists. He is worthy of a government award: Order of the Patriotic War, First Class.

2nd Tank Battalion commander, Captain Korolev"

Next day, the Germans came back, and Vaisser was not as lucky.


"T-34 tank commander, Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser demonstrated the greatest courage, heroism, and bravery in defense of the Chepovichi station.

40 Tiger and Panther tanks from the SS division "Adolf Hitler", with infantry support, attempted to take the Chernovichi railroad station in order to continue an offensive at Kiev. Comrade Vaisser's company stood in the station's defense.

"Fight to the last breath, but do not give up the station - this was the brigade commander's order," said Vaisser to his crew, as they opened precise fire at the enemy. Two shells knocked out a Panther, but an enemy shell set the hero's tank on fire. Comrade Vaisser personally left his tank, put the fire out, and continued the uneven battle. Another tank and APC with infantry was destroyed. The enemy concentrated powerful fire on the Junior Lieutenant's tank, and it was hit and set on fire again. The driver and machinegunner/radio operator were heavily injured. Comrade Vaisser and his turret commander [loader] jumped out of the tank, put out the fire with snow and their coats, dragged the wounded out, tended to their wounds, and climbed into their tank once more. 

Comrade Vaisser's powerful tank was no longer able to move, but the gun was operational, and the heroic commander fought on. A Tiger and a Panther were knocked out, but the immobile tank was a target, and the enemy knew this. Powerful fire from enemy SPGs destroyed the tank and set it on fire, wounding the turret commander. Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser was killed and burned up with the tank. 

The heroic battle of the brave tanker comrade Vaisser inspired all tankers to bravely carry out their order. The enemy took heavy losses and was beaten back. The station was not given up. Two days later our units, having worn out the enemy, moved in for an attack, continuing their success in the Novograd-Volynskiy direction. Guard Junior Lieutenant Vaisser is worthy of the highest government award, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of the 111st Tank Novograd-Volynskiy tank brigade, Colonel Granovskiy"

Schneider confirms how devastating this attack was for the Germans.

"19 December 1943. Seven operational tanks start an attack at 0900 hours on Meleni. Afterwards they advance across the railroad line Kiev-Korosten in the direction of Baljarka. One T-34 and several anti-tank guns are knocked out, and one Tiger is knocked out. Total tanks: 23

20 December 1943: The railroad station of Tschepowitschi is captured, several enemy tanks are knocked out. Three Tigers operational with twenty in for repairs. SS-Hauptsturmfurer Kling is recommended for the Knight's Cross, but the recommendation is not approved."

Ugh, that German transliteration. Nevertheless, the Germans admit to 20 Tiger losses (of course they were recovered, so it doesn't count!) but claim that they took the station. Let's see who's right.

Tigers from the 13th Company of the 1st SS "Adolf Hitler"

Oh look, it's the Tigers we were looking for! Surrounded by Red Armymen. Oops. Looks like someone is stretching the definition of repairs again. Let's see what happens to these Tigers later.

"21 December 1943: An enemy attack on the railroad station is beaten back; several enemy tanks are knocked out. Two Tigers are operational.
...
24 December 1943: ..."Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" is pulled from the line and marches south. Seven disabled Tigers have to be blown up near Tschepowitschi."

Oh, there they are! Hmm, I thought you had recovered them. Perhaps the ones that had to blow them up were the Soviets. With their tank guns. Several days earlier. Incidentally, 7 Tigers is the total Soviet kill claim for December 20th. Lines up quite nicely, no?

Panther Ausf. A #316 from the 1st SS Tank Division, destroyed in early 1944 in the Ukraine

Panthers! Panthers not mentioned in the combat diary. I guess they couldn't be bothered. Good thing Vaisser's commanders were more thorough. Incidentally, not all German combat diaries are so dismissive of their lighter tanks. 2nd SS honestly admits that they had 4 Panthers and 6 PzIVs in the area supporting their 5 working Tigers, but similarly does not report their loss.

On to the claim that the Germans took the railroad station. Usually, the diaries are full of exact (if suspect) numbers of enemy tanks destroyed, but on December 20th and 21st, the Germans report the destruction of "several" enemy tanks. If they kept the battlefield, should they not have been able to count more precisely? Indeed, Schneider's diaries is the only place that I could find that mentions the Germans keeping the station. All other sources, including the Museum of Combat Glory of the 25th Tank Corps, claim differently.

No wonder Kling didn't get his medal, I am surprised he was recommended for doing such a shoddy job. Here are the stylish tanks of the 25th "Broken Hearts" Tank Corps that pounded his face in.

"Broken heart" insignia, summer 1943.

"Broken heart" insignia, winter 1943-1944.

As you can see, a regular T-34, not even a T-34-85, is a deadly enemy for Tigers and Panthers.

Friday, 14 March 2014

T-50's Ancestor

All is fair in love and war, and that includes intellectual property. Parts of that one PzIII that was tested went to the Kirov factory, which made good use of them.

"To the Chief of the 3rd BTU Department, Military Engineer 1st grade, comrade Afonin

In response to your letter #144353s from January 21st, 1941, we respond that in design and production of the T-50 object, experience from the PzIII was used in the following components.

Position of the crew and armament in the turret.
As in the PzIII tank, the T-50's commander is positioned in the rear of the turret, behind the brass catcher. In order to provide circular vision, the turret had a special commander's cupola, 240 mm tall, equipped with 7 (8 in the initial batch) prismatic observation devices, covered with armour. The use of these devices instead of the triplex on the PzIII greatly improves the commander's safety.

As on the PzIII, the T-50's 45 mm gun has two coaxial machineguns. In order to reduce the size of the turret and increase the resistance of the front of the tank against shells, the T-50, unlike the PzIII, cannot aim these machineguns independently.

Additionally, the following components are installed with the PzIII as an example:
  1. Three-coloured light indicators leading from the commander to the driver.
  2. Indicator for gun moving past the sides of the tank.
  3. Mobile lightbulb with electromagnet.
  4. Individual fasteners in the ammunition racks and tools bin.
As for the transmission, despite its interesting design, neither its layout nor individual components were used on the T-50. The T-50's requirements list a rear drive wheel. As for the individual transmissions, they are of great interest. However, due to a limited amount of time allotted to design and construction of the T-50, the factory could not apply these components.

All engineers, testers, and researchers of the factory have familiarized themselves with the vehicle. A number of components, such as the spare gearbox, spare engine, and hydraulic shock absorber were disassembled and sketched. A number of components have been photographed.

Several engine parts were used in the design of a new engine at our factory.

Chief factory engineer, Zakosenko
Deputy chief designer, Ginzburg.
April 10th, 1941"

Thursday, 13 March 2014

Importance of Height

Ask yourself, what factors are most important in an anti-tank gun? Is it penetration? Rate of fire? Those are important, but if you want your gun to last for more than a few seconds after its first shot, you need to consider two more: mobility and concealablility. As the following photograph illustrates, the FlaK 36 may have had plenty of the former two characteristics, but its lack of the latter two made it a poor anti-tank weapon.


Reports from Guderian's 4th Tank Division confirm this conjecture:

"Combat with Russian tanks using 8.8 cm AA guns and 10 cm guns is insufficient. Both guns are clumsy compared to tanks, and are usually detected, targeted, and destroyed before they can reach their positions. In only one engagement between Orel and Mtsensk, two 8.8 cm guns and one 10 cm gun, all heavy guns available for defense, were detected and destroyed. These guns are as big as a barn door, and present a very large and easy target"
A. Ulanov, D. Shein, First T-34s, p. 161

Edit: I found a better picture, but it's marked with a reflection instead of a watermark. 

Wednesday, 12 March 2014

KV-3 in Evacuation

As the Germans drew closer to Leningrad in the summer of 1941, belongings of the Kirov factory began being evacuated to Chelyabinsk. One of those was a partially completed KV-3.


"Order #47 of the Kirov Factory, from June 30th, 1941
Based on the order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production, I order that:
  1. Department #1 chief must arrange the delivery of technical documentation regarding the object KV-3 and delivery of the prototype, parts, and instruments to ChTZ.
  2. The Chief Engineer of department #1, comrade Kotin, must send all Object 222 blueprints, copies, technical requirements, and calculations. Due date: July 3rd, 1941.
  3. Chiefs of Mh-1, Mh-2, Mh-3, Mh-4, Mh-6, and SB-2 must send all technical documentation on its production as of July 1st, and assemble a full description of the package, as well as devices, special instruments, parts, and assembled components in our possession. Due date: July 9th, 1941.
  4. KTO Chief comrade Rohlin, OSL Chief comrade Lepin, OTsL Chief comrade Arsenyev, and TsMK Chief comrade Kulichkin must send all technical documentation, technological processes, technical requirements, blueprints, stamps, models, and all thermally conditioned stamps, models, and parts. Due date: July 9th, 1941.
  5. Department #1 Chief Lantzberd and KTO Chief Rohlin must send the following comrades to ChTZ in order to enable the production of KV-3s.
    1. Chief technologist of Department #1, Kabardino
    2. Deputy chief engineer, Duhov
    3. Senior machinist, Pavlov
    4. PTB-1 senior engineer, Zilberg
    5. PTB-1 senior engineer, Mirkin
    6. OTK MH-2 chief, Salakin
    7. OTK MH-2 senior technologist, Sokolov
    8. MH-2 designer, Ilyin
    9. MH-4 senior technologist, Mayorov
    10. TB [text rubbed out] chief, Kalugin
    11. SB-2 senior master, Zhukovskiy
    12. SKB-2 designers, Merenkov, Schneidman, Burhanov, Shashmurin, Skvortsov, Petuh, and Sobolev
  6. SB-2 Chief (Abramov) and OP-2 Chief (Nosov) should take the KV-3 vehicle hull, put the V-2-SN engine in (take it off the 220 vehicle) and send it to ChTZ on July 7th. Send the system and optics to ChTZ, do not wait for the turret to arrive.
Factory director Zaltsmann"

Tuesday, 11 March 2014

Kubinka

The Kubinka tank museum is home to not only a large number of rare (and sometimes unique) exhibits, but a large amount of them are fully equipped and in working order. This has been the goal of the museum since its inception. Here are the conclusions of a commission regarding some unique exhibits from April 1st, 1941.

"T-100 #810.
Condition:
  1. The vehicle is completely unprepared for storage. All transmission, motor, turret, and electric components are covered in rust.
  2. The vehicle is stored on pallets. Tracks and rims of road wheels are covered in rust.
Commission conclusions: perform technical inspection #3 and keep in the museum.

T-100Y #1352
Condition:
  1. Fighting compartment, gun, engine, and transmission parts are covered in rust.
  2.  The vehicle is not stored on pallets, and is not prepared for long term storage.
Commission conclusions: perform technical inspection #3 and transfer to the Artillery Directorate.

T-29
Condition:
  1. The rubber tires on five road wheels have come off.
  2. Most track links are damaged.
  3. The left front frame is missing the roller nut.
  4. The vehicle arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.
Commission conclusions: keep in the museum.

T-46
Condition:
  1. The turret is not fully equipped. There are no ball mounts in the turret, protective cups for the PT-1, right turret hatch, gun port caps, gun mantlet, frame, or periscope glass.
  2. The crew seats and electric turret motor are missing.
  3. The vehicle arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.
Commission conclusions: re-equip the vehicle and keep in the museum.

T-111
Condition: 
  1. The vehicle is fully equipped, arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.
Commission conclusions: keep in the museum.

SU-14 #23547
Condition:
  1. Currently being repaired at the workshop, needs repairs for both side friction clutches, main friction clutch, and technical inspection #3. It is being prepared for trials.
Commission conclusions: return to Artillery Directorate upon completion of trials.

Ricardo #15200
Condition:
  1. The right half-turret is in pieces, has been removed from its place and kept in the bay.
  2. The gun is missing, and the gun carrier on the left is missing.
  3. The artillery crew seats are missing.
  4. The leather from seats and cushions in the driver's compartment is missing.
  5. Both magnetos and all sparkplugs are missing, wires are torn throughout the vehicle.
  6. The track has frozen into the ice, the vehicle is rusted inside and outside, and not painted.
Commission conclusions: re-equip the vehicle, correct defects, and keep in the museum.

Vickers 12-ton
Condition:
  1. 4 sockets and ball mounts are missing from the fighting compartment.
  2. The gun and mantlet are missing.
  3. The lever cap for the engine grille is missing.
  4. The vehicle was not placed on a pallet, the tracks have frozen into the ice. Oil is pooling under the engine.
  5. The vehicle is clean and in a satisfactory condition.
Commission conclusion: re-equip the vehicle and keep in the museum."

The "Ricardo" vehicle mentioned is a British MkV, one of the initial exhibits at the museum. The sparkplugs from that tank were stolen in early 2000s and sold to a Western collector. Such a shame they weren't originals.

Here's the story of another exhibit. See if you can guess what it was.

"To the deputy chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces HQ, Guards Major-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Markov

On the issue of: obtaining a transport for the transportation of the SU-380 to the NIBT proving grounds.

One 380 mm self-propelled howitzer on the Tiger-H hull was discovered at Kirchmeiser's factory (Germany). The deputy chief of the Armoured and Motorized Group of the Soviet Occupation Force in Germany, Guards Engineer-Colonel comrade Karpenko responded to the inquiry from the GBTU chief, stating that the SU-380 will be sent to the NIBT proving grounds after receiving transport.

Since it is imperative that the SPG be delivered to the proving grounds urgently, I ask for you to order the allotment of one railroad platform for the transport of the SU-380 to the NIBT proving grounds (Kubinka railroad station, West railroad).

USA BTU KA Chief, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Forces, Demyanenko"
CAMD RF 38-11369-709

The SPG in question, is, of course, the Sturmtiger. 

Sunday, 9 March 2014

Soviet Stabilizers



Present:
NTK chair, comrade Ozerov
5th Section chair, comrade Keller
Engineer, comrade Norenberg
From NTK AU, comrade Saks
Meeting chair: Ozerov
Secretary: Keller

On the topic of: engineer Norenberg's proposal of a servo-gyroscopic device for tank gun stabilization

Conclusions:
  1. First, build an (experimental) stabilizer for the 37 mm gun, as well as stabilize the turret horizontally with a servo-gyroscopic device.
    In the vertical plane, stabilize the gun relative to the turret, without correcting oscillations parallel to the firing axis, such as tilting. The device must allow the gunner to move the gun with his own force, without lag from the stabilization equipment. 
  2. Engineer Norenberg must provide overall draft blueprints by March 1st, 1930.
  3. Ask NTK AU and NTK UMM to develop preliminary Technical Specifications.
  4. 5th Section of the NTK UMM should familiarize engineer Norenberg with the nature of tank oscillations.
  5. Propose to engineer Norenberg to provide an overall diagram and dimensional blueprints of the gun stabilizer devices.
Signatures."

Look at that, bi-planar stabilization, in 1930! Sadly, I have not seen anything on more stabilizers for the MS-1, but this is far from the last time gun stabilizers appear in Soviet documents.

The idea of a turret stabilizer appears once more in 1939, for the BT-7, in a list of experimental developments at factory #185. In that same year, a stabilizer is proposed for the T-28's gun. Stabilizers were also proposed for the IS tank (and were actually built for the IS-5, although I am unsure about others). 

More stabilizers are mentioned in CAMD RF 38-11369-1.

"3. Work on stabilizing tank weapons.

In tank combat, aside from shooting from a stationary position, a tank must fire on the move. The conditions of firing on the move had to be as close as possible to the conditions of firing while stationary, from the point of view of accuracy, rate of fire, and convenience of loading. 

In order to solve this task, SKB NKSP, according to GOKO decree #3826 from July 28th, 1943, began designing and manufacturing experimental gun stabilizers for medium tanks in July of 1943, according to technical-tactical requirements from USA GBTU.

The design of domestic stabilizers took into account the experience with American gun stabilizers. However, domestic stabilizers work on a completely different principle, as they are based on the idea of forceful stabilization. This provides our stabilizers with higher precision than American indicator stabilizers.

The following gun systems were equipped with stabilizers: 76 mm American gun on the M4-A4 tank, 76 mm F-34 gun on the T-34, and the 85 mm S-53 gun on the T-34-85. The  latter designs corrected the deficiencies of the former.

Currently, according to GOKO degre #6896s from November 7th, 1944, a trial run of 5 T-34 tanks with STP-S-53 stabilizers are being prepared for trials."

While I haven't read anything about the Soviet Sherman stabilizer, the stabilizers for the T-34 (STP-34) and T-34-85 (STP-S-53) are more widely known. I do not have a photograph or a description of the STP-34, but I do have them for the STP-S-53. Since they were designed and built at the same time, it is likely they operated on the same principles.

STP-S-53 stabilizer in a T-34-85 tank
1. Hydraulic cylinder 2. Oil tank 3. Hydraulic pump 4. Electric motor 5. Damping gyroscope 6. Force gyroscope 7. Vertical aiming flywheel 8. Stabilizer switch 9. Hydraulics switch 10. GKZ-T modulator

Solyankin et al describe this device in their book "Domestic Armoured Vehicles, 20th century, volume 2". Skipping over the technical minutiae, let's go straight to the conclusions: "Trials showed good results. Conditions of firing on the move were close to conditions of firing from a stationary position. The stabilizer eased the task of vertical aiming, and the automatic firing mechanism reduced the shell's lag time, further decreasing vertical dispersion."

Up-Armoured BTs in the Far East

In a previous article, I briefly mentioned a BT-7 with additional armour. Not many details were available at the time, but Yuri Pasholok found some.

"Results of trials of the BT-7 tank with armour screens, over the period of March 18-28, 1944

The trials were performed on a BT-7 #0189-2 from the 203rd Tank Brigade with screens, radio, and a small link track. The tank's engine worked for 28 hours and 27 minutes since the last major repairs.

The armour screens made the tank heavier by 1.5 tons. The tank was tested with 100% of its combat loadout and 3 crewmen. The route and conditions of trials are listed in the trials journal, which is attached.

The trials were performed over 843 km (380 km on a highway, 463 on a dirt road, off-road, and on obstacles). The engine worked for 33 hours and 10 minutes.

As a result of trials, it was discovered that:
  1. There is enough fuel in the main tanks to travel 322 km without refueling.
  2. Due to the increased weight of the tank, it moves after 500-600 revolutions of the engine at first gear (earlier, 400 revolutions). On dirt roads of unsatisfactory quality, the front of the tank shakes significantly in the vertical plane, which makes controlling the tank difficult and limits the speed of movement. It is possible to move at 8-12 kph in first or second gear in the medium usage mode.
  3. After two hours of nonstop motion and a total 120 km march over 5 hours with two stops (for inspection), the temperature of the engine and transmission components is normal.
  4. At a speed of under 30 kph, engine RPM of less than 1650, and the unit mass of KB-70 gasoline at 0.765, and external temperature of -10 degrees, an average of 33.8 kg of gasoline is used in an hour.
    Lubrication of parts was performed using the standard table of lubrication for a BT-7 tank, and provides normal operation of all tank components.
  5. The increased weight does not affect the turret turning mechanism significantly. At a tilt of 25 degrees, the mechanism still allows for normal rates of turning, and allows for firing on the move.
  6. The increased weight does not impede the ability of the BT to overcome obstacles.
  7. An external inspection and inspection of the disassembled transmission and suspension components revealed that they were completely functional. (See the post-trials technical inspection act).
Conclusions:
  1. Trials of the BT-7 tank with additional armour screens shows that the BT-7's combat and technical characteristics are not harmed. A screened BT-7 is a viable vehicle, and usable in combat in the Far East theater.
  2. Due to the tank's increased weight, it is necessary to increase the norm of gasoline consumption from 28 kg per hour to 30 kg per hour."

Saturday, 8 March 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Fall of Berlin

In the middle of April of 1945, Germany was between a rock and a hard place. The Allies were in the west, and the unstoppable Red Army rolled in from the east. Germany lost massive amounts of people, most of its natural resources, the country's industry suffered heavily, important agricultural regions were lost. The Third Reich was in agony, but even in this condition, the German army remained a dangerous foe. Even though all hope for victory was long lost, the battle-weary soldiers fought for every last scrap of land.

The Germans' resistance was only partially explained through devotion to the Fuhrer's ideology. A far bigger reason was the expectation that the government will manage to make peace with the Allies, and make a bargain for favourable terms of surrender.

Hitler and his officials knew that the western nations were afraid that the USSR would hold great influence in Europe after the end of the war. And they were right. President Roosevelt, when writing policy on co-operation with the USSR, wrote "The United States must get Berlin. The Soviets can have lands to the east". The British Prime Minister Churchill was in agreement with Roosevelt, and also held the opinion that Allied forces should enter Berlin first. The capture of Berlin would have been a serious ideological victory for the Allies.

The Soviet government understood the current political situation. Berlin must be taken as soon as possible. The date of the offensive was set for April 16th.

Massive forces were readied for the offensive operation. Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, Rokossovskiy's 2nd Belorussian Front, Konev's 1st Ukraininan Front. Ships of the Red Banner Navy Baltic Fleet and Dniepr Navy provided fire support. Approximately 7500 airplanes were ready for takeoff.

The German defensive was conducted by army groups "Vistula" and "Center". Air support was provided by the 4th and 6th air fleets, as well as the "Reich" air fleet. Hitler's defenders numbered over one million soldiers, 1500 tanks and SPGs, 3300 airplanes. The Germans also had an ace up their sleeve in the form of a heavily echeloned line of defense. Fortified regions on the Oder and Neisse rivers were up to 40 km deep. Berlin itself was turned into a fortress. Nearly every building was fortified, streets were barricaded, minefields and individual mines were scattered everywhere. A Berlin barricade was not just garbage piled across a road. It was a special structure made of wood and dirt up to 4 meters thick. The barricade could be collapsed by detonating special charges, completely blocking passage for tanks. 600 AA guns looked up at the sky. General Reymann was responsible for Berlin's defense until April 24th, when Hitler replaced him with Helmuth Weidling.

The main strike at Berlin was carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front. Its forces were concentrated in a foothold at the city of Kostrzyn. The German capital was only 60-70 km from there. In front of the foothold lay Seelow Heights, where the Germans established a powerful line of defense. In order to complete his task, Zhukov's forces had to break that line.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was to attack south of Berlin, and no later than 12 days into the operation, reach the river Beelitz-Wittenberg, and head to Dresden by the Elbe river. A variant of the plan would have the Front strike at Berlin from the south, if it was necessary.

The 2nd Belorussian Front was ordered to cross the Oder, destroy the Shtett group and cut the West Pomeranian group off from Berlin. The Front also had to cover the shore of the Baltic from Vistula to Altdamm.

On April 14th, Zhukov's forces began combat scouting from the Kostrzyn foothold. They managed to displace the 20th motorized division. Hitler was so enraged by this retreat that he ordered all of its men to be stripped of medals until they reclaim the lost territory. The Germans did not have time for this. The Soviet offensive was only 2 days away.

The Front put in significant effort the keep the attack a secret, but this was not 100% possible, simply due to the sheer amount of soldiers. Additionally, the Germans captured a Soviet prisoner, that revealed the day of the offensive. Knowing that an offensive would start with an artillery barrage, the Germans moved most of their forces to the second line of defense.

Nearly 9000 guns and mortars opened fire in the early morning of April 16th. The density of fire was about 270 guns per kilometer of front. In minutes, the first line of defense turned to dirt. The barrage lasted half an hour. At the same time, night bombers from the 4th and 16th air armies bombed enemy headquarters, artillery positions, and deep defensive lines. Infantry divisions followed, along with Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army.

134 AA floodlights were brought to Seelow Heights to blind the Germans. Unfortunately, they did not have the desired effect; the light beams were stopped by dust and smoke in the air. Many commanders had to order the lights turned off on their section, and then turned on again, which caused confusion. Nevertheless, Soviet forces pushed forward. When the second line of defense was reached, the resistance increased drastically. Fierce battles broke out on the entire length of the front. The Red Army did not achieve overwhelming success that day. The German defenses were only penetrated by April 19th. Seelow Heights were captured, and the possibility of advancing to Berlin arose. On April 20th, long range artillery of the 3rd Shock Army opened fire on the German capital. On the next day, elements of the 1st Belorussian Front were already at the outskirts of Berlin.

The 1st Ukrainian Front had more success. The river Neisse was crossed on the first day. The offensive pushed 13 kilometers into German lines across a 26 kilometer front. Two days later, the German 4th tank army as displaced to the third line of defense. The Berlin group was in danger of being encircled from the south. The Germans sent in reserves to try and turn the tide of battle, but had no success. On the morning of April 18th, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies crossed the river Spree, and captured footholds south and north of Spremberg. The offensive was supported from the air by the 9th Guards Fighter Division, commanded by the famous Soviet fighter ace A. Pokryshkin.

The 2nd Belorussian Front was preparing to cross the Oder. On April 18-19th, the crossing was performed, and cut off elements of General von Manteuffel's 3rd Tank Army from Berlin.

On April 25th, Soviet forces closed a ring around Berlin. The last assault was coming. By modern estimates, 120 000 soldiers remained in Berlin, not counting Volkssturm militia. Approximately 3000 guns and 250 tanks accompanied them. The tanks were not only mobile fighting units. Many were inoperable, and were placed in strategic parts of the city, acting as bunkers. The city was separated into 9 defensive sectors. The closer to the center, the tougher the defenses.

April 25th is the official date of the start of the offensive, but battles raged on as soon as Soviet forces first approached Berlin, on April 21st. Assault squad tactics were frequently used. An assault squad consisted of a battalion or company of infantry, reinforced with tanks, SPGs, mortars, sappers, and sometimes even flamethrowers. These groups ate through the enemy defenses, slowly, house by house. When necessary, they would split up into smaller units.

Soviet aircraft delivered three massive strikes to objects in Berlin on April 25th and the night of April 26th. 2000 aircraft participated in the offensive. Six Soviet armies took Berlin from its desperate defenders, block by block. The 9th rifle corps of the 5th Shock Army distinguished themselves by taking 80 blocks in one day. The successes of the other units were not as stunning.

On April 27th, Soviet units fought at Spandau, on the northern borders of Tiergarten and Prentzlauberg. The 9th rifle corps reached Treptov. On the south side of Berlin, the 8th Guards Army and 1st Guards Tank Army reached the Landwehr-canal and crossed it. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was finishing off the 18th motorized division in Grünewald. The situation for Germans became more and more dire. They did not have enough water, the constant stress exhausted soldiers and militiamen, the amount of wounded grew day by day. Himmler's SS executed not only deserters, but civilians caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. These actions sometimes led to resistance from the Wehrmacht. General Mummert, commander of the Muncheberg tank division, ordered the SS to leave his positions, threatening them with execution.

German high command still spread rumours of a possible separate peace with the Western Allies. Few believed in it by this point. On April 30th, Soviet forces began storming the Reichstag, and that evening, the first of the assault flags of the 150th rifle division flew like a red fire on one of the columns. As battles progressed, flags appeared on the first floors. At night, two groups of soldiers managed to raise flags on the roof. The most well known flag was raised at 3 am above the cupola of the Reichstag by Junior Sergeant Meliton Kantaria, Sergeant Mihail Egorov, and Lieutenant Aleksey Berest. This was the only flag that remained after German artillery fired on the Reichstag.

On April 30th, Hitler committed suicide in his bunker at Wilhelmstrasse. One of history's most brutal dictators was rolled up in a carpet and burned in the garden of the Reich Chancellery. General Krebs, the head of the land forces, began negotiations with the Soviets that evening. A call was made to Stalin. He confirmed that the surrender must be unconditional. The Germans refused, and at 18:00 on May 1st, the attack on Berlin resumed. During one night, the defenses of the city were fragmented into several small remnants.

On May 2nd, General Weidling ordered the surrender of his 56 tank corps. He then signed an order to the rest of the garrison to put down their weapons and surrender. The order only reached most German units by the middle of the day. Over 100 000 men surrendered that evening. Berlin fell. The end of the Great Patriotic War was only a week away.

Original article available here.

Friday, 7 March 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Liberation of Kharkov

The Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation, codenamed "War Chief Rumyantsev", began on August 3rd, 1943. The operation was performed with the forces of the Voronezh Front (N. Vatutin) and Steppe Front (I. Konev). The operational plan placed the main strike to the west of Kharkov using the mobile flanks of the front. After the forces break through, 57th army of the South-Western Front would start its advance to meet it. The attack was asymmetric, with a strong right flank and comparatively weak left. The tank armies were to move quickly, up to 40 km per day. High command needed them to cut off reinforcements the Germans could bring in from the Donbas.

Soviet forces numbered 980 000 soldiers, over 2400 tanks and SPGs, over 12 000 cannons and mortars, 1300 aircraft. The Germans had 300 000 soldiers, 306 functional tanks and SPGs, and about 1000 aircraft. The main German line of defense was up to 8 km deep, composed of pillboxes linked together by full sized trenches. The second line was 2-3 km away from the first, and was equally well equipped. The rear line went through Bogoduhov, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan', and Zhuravlevka. Two powerful defensive rings surrounded Kharkov.

An artillery barrage began on August 3rd at 5:00 am, and lasted for 3 hours. Aviation struck the enemy alongside with artillery. Soviet infantry moved out before the artillery fell silent, and progressed behind the barrage. During the first day, 12 km of German defenses were penetrated. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army made it even further, 20 km deep. The Steppe Front was bogged down in heavy trench fighting, and only progressed 7-8 km. They were behind schedule on the first day of the operation.

On the second day, the offensive continued, but the progress was still slower than high command preferred. On August 4th, the 5th Guards Army encountered the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. They only had 6 functional Tigers, but even they were a tough opponent on the defensive. As a result, the 5th Guards Army progressed only 10 km that day.

Belgorod was liberated on August 5th, Tomarovka on the 6th. The offensive gained momentum, but was still too slow. This was caused by the Germans' fierce resistance, activity of their aviation, and command errors made by the RKKA. For example, it was unnecessary to sent a whole corps from the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of Belgorod, as it was already surrounded by the 53rd army and 1st Mechanized Corps. Due to the delays, the Soviet forces had a higher chance of meeting reinforcements from the Donbas. Three SS divisions (Das Reich, Totenkopf, and Wiking) were on the way, as well as the 3rd Tank Division.

Rotmistrov's guardsmen met the 3rd Tank division at Zolochev on August 6th. On August 9th, the enemy was knocked out of Zolochev, and the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred to the reserve of the Steppe Front.

Meanwhile, Katukov's 1st Tank Army punched a hole in the German lines long enough to circle the enemy forces from the west. Elements of Katukov's forces were suppressing the Germans at Borisovka, surrounding them by August 6th. This was an organized German defensive point, and the resistance was fierce. Some of the encircled enemies broke through towards Graivoron on August 7th. After the resistance at Borisovka was eliminated, the commander of the German 19th Tank Division, Schmidt, was found among the corpses.

On August 7th, Grossdeutschland arrived at Akhtyrka. It became the core of the planned German counterattack. Divisions pulled from the quieter section of the front arrived at Kharkov.

On August 7th, elements of the 1st Tank Army took Bogoduhov. On the next day, several kilometers from the Kharkov-Poltava railroad, they encountered the newly arrived Das Reich SS division. The resistance was heavy enough for the Soviets to go on the defensive on several sections of the front. Two brigades from the 6th Tank Corps moved forward around the main combat region.

On the night of August 11th, the 1st Tank Army made an attempt to cut through the railroad, which was the main line of communications between Kharkov and Poltava. At first, the Soviets were nearing success, taking the Kovyagi station. Tanks moved on, but the German counterattack started during the second half of the day, and surrounded several Soviet tanks at Levandalovka station. Elements of the Totenkopf division attacked Sharovka and Murafa.

The 5th Guards Tank Army once again arrived on the battlefield on August 12th. It intercepted the German counterattack just in time. On August 12-13, heavy fighting broke out around Bogoduhov. On August 14th, the Germans delivered a strike at Vysokopolye. Soviet forces retreated, and on August 16th the Kharkov-Poltava railroad was once again in the hands of the enemy.

Akhtyrka became the new center of attention, with the 7th Motorized Division, 10th Motorized Division, and Grossdeutschland division concentrated there on August 18th. Only the 166th Infantry Division of the 27th Army, stretched out over 170 kilometers of front lines, was available to fight the Germans on a 25 kilometer front. Its positions came under heavy bombings, and were overrun. During the day, the Germans penetrated a section of the front 7 km wide and 24 km deep. The 4th and 5th Tank Corps and 71st and 241th Infantry Divisions were in danger of encirclement. These units immediately deployed on the flank of the German advance. Additional forces were pulled up to avoid a catastrophe. The 7th and 8th Guards Infantry Divisions deployed on the German flanks, protecting the rear of the Voronezh Front. Most of the 1st Guards Tank Army was moved to Akhtyrka. The 29th Tank Corps from the 5th Guards Tank Army was sent. Heavy and lengthy fighting began.

The aforementioned battles were fought by elements of the Voronezh Front. Eastward, in the Steppe Front's offensive sector, Soviet forces penetrated the outer defensive ring and approached the city's defenses. Battles were fought until August 17th.

On August 18th, the 57th army of the South-Western Front resumed their offensive, circling the city from the south. On August 20th, two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army were transferred south of Polevoy. The third remained at Bogoduhov.

On August 21st, the 5th Guards Tank Army began an offensive towards Korotych. Due to difficulties in crossing the Uda river, Soviet forces moved forward only one kilometer that day. On August 22nd, battles at Korotych broke out. Due to a tank-heavy German counteroffensive, the Soviet advance stalled and was partially encircled.

However, the German counterattack did not change the situation. On August 22nd, the Germans made the decision to leave Kharkov. Das Reich was tasked with holding the Soviet forces back to allow for the rest of the army to retreat. This was insufficient. Soviet high command tasked the 69th and 7th Guards Armies to take the city at night. By noon on August 23rd, Kharkov was completely freed from German occupants.

Original article available here.