Thursday, 30 October 2014

AA T-80

Many people know of the T-90 AA tank, a T-70 with AA machineguns that could reach a high elevation, but fewer know that there was also an attempt to make such a tank on the T-80 platform.

"Based on experiences of tanks fighting in cities and in mountains, GABTU requested that Artkom develop tank guns that can fire with elevation of up to 70 degrees. Therefore, tank guns based on the M-42 currently being tested should have depression to -6 degrees and elevation of up to 70 degrees. The recoil brake and return mechanism should be tested at maximum elevation.

Due to the high elevation, the recoil is allowed to be variable, and the recoil brake must be strengthened. An additional return mechanism mounted on top of the gun in the mantlet is allowed. In order to provide smooth braking, the recoil brake must be variable at various elevations.

If tank guns based on the M-42 are nearing completion and these changes will be difficult, it is necessary to begin designing new prototypes that satisfy the above requirements."

However, before testing a fancy new gun at high elevation, it's reasonable to try it with an old gun. Doing this revealed some problems.

"The T-80 tank design proposed by comrade Astrov, deputy chief engineer at the GAZ Molotov factory, is an interesting design, as it offers the possibility of shooting at enemy aircraft.

At the same time, the T-80 has a series of drawbacks, such as:
  1. The angle of elevation (65 degrees, 60 in the prototype) is not enough for quality AA fire, which requires an angle of elevation of at least 85 degrees.
  2. The rate of fire is 14-15 RPM, which is not enough for an AA gun.
  3. The sights are primitive and observation from the turret is limited, which is unacceptable for an AA gun.
  4. The recoil mechanisms do not operate in normal conditions, and a knocking is heard when the gun is returned at low elevations, requiring a new recoil brake and return mechanism combination.
The first three drawbacks severely limit the value of the T-80 as an AA platform and will turn up during proving grounds trials, if any take place. Raising the issue of adopting the tank after only 375 trial shots at the factory is premature.

It is necessary to at least partially resolve defect #4 and resolve defects #1-3 using the resources of TsAKB engineers at factory #92, the complete resolution of which requires a drastic redesign of the T-80 tank."

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

Leningrad Front, Fall 1941

I already posted about the variety of vehicles that fought on the Eastern Front way past their obsolescence, and here are some more that show up in a table listing available vehicles on the Leningrad Front for September 27th, 1941.

The first column of each unit lists vehicles that are fully repaired, the second lists vehicles that are subject to minor repairs. The last two columns tally up the vehicles for both categories among all units, and the bottom row totals up the total amount of vehicles for the unit (armoured cars in the numerator, tanks in the denominator). The units listed are as follows: 123rd Tank Brigade, 124th, Tank Brigade, 42nd Army, 55th Army, 23rd Army, 115th Infantry Division, 8th Army, 21st NKVD Division, and Front Reserves. The vehicles listed are KV, T-34, T-28, BT-7, BT-5, BT-2, T-50, T-26, flamethrower tanks (likely T-26 modifications), BA-10 and BA-20 armoured cars.


Given the proximity of Kirov factory, the amount of KV tanks available for combat is not surprising, and neither is the amount of T-34s being overshadowed by older vehicles, like the BT series and T-26es. Six entire T-50s defend the northern capital, but I don't know if the Kirov prototype is one of them, or is not listed due to being owned by the factory instead of a military unit.

The previous article also mentions the 124th Tank Brigade, but about 13 months later, allowing us to track some of the more interesting vehicles. For instance, right now it has zero BT-2s, but two of the Front's 19 BT-2s can be found among its ranks in a year. Only two of the 51 KV tanks remain, replaced with other obsolete vehicles that migrate among the Front's units.

Tuesday, 28 October 2014

85 mm Gun Range

I talked about the doctrine of applying heavy guns of the IS-2 and ISU-152 from a long range (1500-2000 meters). What about lower caliber weapons, such as the 85 mm gun? The 5th Guards Tank Army has us covered, with its "Brief instructions several issues of using units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, arising due to partial reorganization of tanks and artillery in the army", dated May 21st, 1943, publied in Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War, vol. 15, doc. 4.
The contents of the document are as about as brief as the title, but all the way at the bottom lies the answer to this question.

"Additionally, corps commanders should be aware that a 85 mm gun battery from the 6th AA artillery division has been assigned to each corps to assist in fighting enemy tanks, specifically T-6 (Tiger), tasked with fighting the enemy at long range (1500-2000 meters). Remember that the 85 mm gun is capable of penetrating any German tank at 1500 meters and knocking it out at 2000 meters. The one exception to this is the T-6 when hit in the mantlet and front. When hit in the side, turret, suspension, the T-6 is knocked out from 2000 meters by 85 mm guns just like any other German tank."

Monday, 27 October 2014

IS-2 and ISU-152 Manual

Despite my best efforts, many people still believe that Soviet heavy guns were inaccurate and were incapable of engaging the enemy at long range. Here is another nail in that coffin with the "Directive of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the use of IS-2 and ISU-152 regiments in combat" published in Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War, vol. 2, doc. 7.

"The practice of use of heavy tanks and SPG regiments in combat shows that IS-122 and ISU-152 tanks are the most effective method of fighting enemy heavy tanks (Tiger and Panther) and SPGs (Ferdinand), as well as destroying enemy artillery and fortifications.

IS-122 and ISU-152 regiments are used to strengthen tank or mechanized corps, and in rare cases, infantry corps.

The use of IS-122 and ISU-152 regiments as a part of tank or mechanized units achieves significant results in combat, which is confirmed by the actions of these regiments on the 1st Ukrainian Front."

The specifics of the combat examples have little to do with the point of the document, and have extracted them into other articles. It is sufficient to say that IS-2 tanks that opened fire from 1500-2000 meters in several cases and ISU-152 SPGs that opened fire from 1400-1500 meters in the other achieved very palpable results. Continuing on, here is that the Council has determined that the correct application of these heavy vehicles entail:

"The combat use of IS-122 tank regiments and ISU-152 SPG regiments

The off-road performance, armour, mobility, and constant readiness to open fire allows SPGs to follow tank and infantry units and constantly support them with heavy fire.

The IS-122 and ISU-152 should open direct fire at ranges of up to 2000 meters. Most effective fire is from 1500 meters.

Tanks fire from short stops, from open, half-open, and if possible, concealed positions. Tanks and SPGs follow medium tanks or infantry from one position to another, combining fire and maneuver, not lagging behind the battle. If tanks or SPGs lag behind, their knowledge of the battlefield is reduced, and they cannot fire timely. The flanks of heavy tanks should be covered with medium tanks or infantry with artillery.

Additionally, each heavy tank or SPG should have a submachinegunner escort.

Competent use of terrain increases effectiveness, reduces losses, and aids in achieving surprise attacks at the enemy. The terrain shape, upper layer of soil, and off road performance have significant impacts on the mobility of heavy tanks and SPGs. Swamps, wide and deep rivers, wet plains are difficult obstacles, and must be scouted out in a timely nature.

Reconnaissance of the battlefield must commence as soon as orders are received and continue throughout the battle. The task of the scout is to discover the condition of terrain and roads, presence of bridges and their capacity, possibility of approaching the enemy while hidden, and priority objectives for tanks and SPGs to destroy.

Observation of the battlefield is of utmost importance. In the regiment, HQ officers observe the battle from Observation and Communications Points. Vehicle and unit commanders observe the battlefield from their vehicles, or personally on foot (or prone). The results of observation must be immediately communicated to the commander by radio or a messenger.

The regiment commander commands his companies or batteries with radios, messengers, or rockets. Using other types of communication increases the reliability of command. In battle, orders to fire are usually given in cleartext, but the names of units and names and ranks of the commanders must be given in code. The regimental commander's first priority is to keep in contact with whoever his unit has been assigned to. In battle, he must be present within the ranks of the regiment, from where he may control his companies or batteries and, in a critical moment, inspire his men with personal courage.

1. Marches.

The regimental commander and his HQ provide seamless marching conditions by means of scouting out the route and locations nearby.

The movement speed on good roads is 20 kph. Average speed is no less than 15 kph (10 kph on mountainous terrain). Weather and specifics of the road lead to significant variance in speeds. When marching on mountains on serpentine roads with sharp turns, more time must be alotted, as stops to inspect the vehicles must be more frequent. The regiment marches company by company (battery by battery). One company (battery) follows another after a set length of time. When operating in operational depth without immediate contact with the enemy, the battery must be ready to deflect enemy counterattacks.

2. Offensive.

The IS tanks and ISU-152 SPGs have the same off-road performance and maneuverability as medium tanks. Because of this, they can accompany tanks and motorized infantry during offensives. The commander of the unit to which the regiment is assigned and the regimental commander organize the movement of the regiment, determine objectives and how they should be achieved, the location of the regiment in the order of battle, a joint communications system, and the methods of communication.

The regiment, as a rule, drives forward in the second echelon, 300-500 meters behind medium tanks or infantry. Its place is the location of the main strike, along a 1000-1500 meter wide front. The main purpose of the IS and ISU tanks is to destroy enemy tanks and SPGs, as well as deflect enemy counterattacks.

When attacking, close terrain with an uneven landscape and good ability to observe is favourable. Uneven landscapes protect the IS and ISU from enemy close combat measures.

When penetrating an enemy defensive line, IS and ISU tanks may be used in the first echelon to destroy fortifications.

Some of the tanks may be used in assault groups. For this, they are assigned to infantry regiments and are distributed among assault battalions. Tanks, operating carefully on their terrain, attack fortifications as a part of assault groups, opening fire at 1500 meters or closer.


3. Defense.

IS and ISU tanks are a powerful anti-tank defense method, and can serve as a mobile anti-tank reserve. Its place is in the direction the enemy is most likely to attack from. When defending, tanks should be placed in cooperation with anti-tank guns.

An IS-122 regiment or ISU-152 regiment is placed in an interleaved manner along a 2.5 km wide and 2 km deep front. When defending, terrain that is open while the tank itself is concealed is preferred.

The first line of defense is infantry, artillery, and medium tanks. Behind them, 500-600 meters away, are 2-3 companies of IS and ISU tanks. 800-1000 meters behind are the rest of the regiments's tanks, acting as a mobile reserve.

Crews ready 2-3 positions for their tank, one of which is the main one. They must be connected by hidden paths. All positions must be equipped with trenches that cover the hull of the tank or SPG, and carefully hidden. In order to fire precisely and effectively at enemy tanks, prepare firing cards.

It is reasonable to keep tanks hidden, and only move them out when the attack starts. If there is no time to make hidden paths, take up positions along routes that only reveal a portion of the turret. In both cases, each tank and SPG must carefully observe the battlefield. Always be ready to meet enemy tanks and repel them.

It is reasonable to let enemy tanks get as close as possible.

When firing at 1500 meters, the IS and ISU can destroy any enemy heavy tank. It is especially favourable when the enemy shows his side.

When deflecting the enemy's attacks, a useful method is to fight in pairs. One tank shoots, while the other watches enemy maneuvers, and assists the first tank.

The method of ambushes has proven itself. Ambushes are placed in likely directions of enemy attack, with the objective of letting enemy tanks close, then destroy them with sudden aimed fire.

Otherwise, follow the Armoured and Mechanized Forces manual parts 1 and 2.

The use of IS-122 tanks and ISU-152 SPGs in front of infantry and medium tanks or as immobile guns is forbidden.

Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant-General Novikov
Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Major-General Petrov"

In case someone thought that this long range use is specific to the 1st Ukrainian Front, a similar order is given by the Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army (Order #484120, published in vol. 15 doc. 9):

"Heavy tanks and SPGs open direct (generally) fire: at tanks from ranges up to 2 kilometers, at large targets (concentrations of enemies, artillery positions) from 3 kilometers.

Heavy tanks and SPGs fire from stationary positions (ambushes), from short stops, and on the move (at large targets)."

Sunday, 26 October 2014

Cheating at Statistics 9: Art Imitates Life

Continuing the theme of investigating the battles specified in "Directive of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the use of IS-2 and ISU-152 regiments in combat", here is another engagement, this time between Tigers of s.Pz.Abt 509 and Soviet IS-2s from 72nd GTTP and ISU-152s from 399 GTSAP.

Schneider's records of this battle favour the German side:

"19 April 1944: 18 Tigers support the attack on Isakow, but they erroneously attack to the south in the direction of Podwerbce. Belatedly, some tanks close in on Isakow, preventing enemy forces from escaping to the south. In conjunction with the 101. Jager-Division, which is attacking from the east, the enemy forces are totally destroyed by the Tigers."

When records of both sides are compared, I have often found that "totally destroyed" forces tend to not notice their total destruction at the hands of Tiger battalions, and continue pushing on. In those cases, the Tiger unit tends to clear out of the area of operations, usually with heavy losses. 

"20 April 1944: The battalion gathers in the area of Buczacz (3 of 29 Tigers operational) and is transported to Kolomea. It remains there as a field-army reserve and a training unit for Hungarian crews on the Tiger tank."

Thought so. Let's see how much "total destruction" 15 lost Tigers achieved. The Germans are attacking southwards from Buchach (the previously recorded location in the diary), so it's very possible that they took a slightly wrong heading and ended up in the neighbouring Podverbtsy. Unfortunately for them, heavy Soviet guns were waiting north of Gerasimov.

"The 72nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was assigned to the 11th Guards Tank Corps, and was tasked to fire from an ambush. in a second echelon, 1.5-2 km from the front line. It took up positions in houses north of Gerasimov.
...the enemy penetrated our defenses at Podvertse and Zhivachuv. IS-122 tanks opened fire from a distance of 1.5 kilometers. As a result, 6 tanks were knocked out and 3 burned, 6 of which were Tigers."

"399th GTSAP was assigned to 11th Guards Tank Corps, and by 7 am set up in the ranks of 27th Motorized Infantry Brigade, with the objective of not letting the enemy break through Navziska and Gerasimuv from Zhivachuv.
...after an artillery barrage, 7 enemy tanks attacked the motorized infantry. The batteries opened fire from 1400-1500 meters. First shots ignited several enemy tanks. The rest advanced and tried to hit from the flank, despite fire from the SPGs.  On the left flank, 10 enemy tanks started flanking the batteries. In order to liquidate the menace, a reserve battery was deployed, which knocked out three tanks with one volley. The rest of the tanks withdrew.

The regiment fought for 7 hours, deflecting tanks and infantry. As a result, the enemy attack failed, and they were stopped at the road between Zhivachuv and Navziska. Total enemy losses: 13 tanks (6 burned and 7 knocked out) and up to 100 soldiers and officers."


So we have 18 Tigers that attacked southwards. The Soviets claimed 6 Tigers knocked out in the initial attack, "several" knocked out by SPGs an hour later when 7 tanks attacked, and three more knocked out when 10 tanks attacked their flank.  This makes a total of 9 Tigers, and 4 other unidentified tanks (perhaps also Tigers, the diary doesn't mention cooperation with any other unit). The Germans go from 18 Tigers supporting the attack to 3 Tigers during their withdrawal the next day. A claim of 13 Tigers is entirely reasonable in this engagement, with two more Tigers that could have been knocked out by other means or bogged down somewhere.

The German claims in this engagement remind me of a certain Star Trek episode. The first thing that came to mind was "You look, er, quite well for a man who's been... utterly destroyed, Mr. Spock."

Saturday, 25 October 2014

Heavy Tanks in Combat

On April 16th, 1944, heavy fighting raged on around Ternopol. Soviet forces encircled the city, and the Germans trapped in their fortress no longer wished to remain there. Here is a rare case where both sides committed their biggest tanks to the fighting.

The 53rd Guards Tank Brigade received the 11th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment, three companies of new IS-2 tanks, on the night of April 16th. That morning, a company was readied to defend the small town of Pochapintse.

The Germans committed their Tigers from s.Pz.Abt 507. These Tigers, as well as 9th SS "Hohenstaufen" and elements of SS Division Galizien (which appeared to have spent the previous day torching the village, according to Nieukarane zbrodnie SS-Galizien z lat 1943—1945). 

With the two forces less than seven kilometers apart (and a seven minutes' drive, according to Google, although neither the Tigers nor ISes would have managed it that fast), a confrontation is inevitable. Schneider says:

"16 April  1944: Relief attack continued with 12 operational Tigers in support. Several antitank positions  were  wiped out and Hill 363 was captured. Initial contact with the defenders of Tarnopol was established."



Hm, rather laconic. The Soviet record of the battle is much more in depth.

"At 10:30 on April 16t, 1944, the enemy attacks with a force of up to 25 tanks and two battalions of infantry, and at 16:00 with 40 tanks. At a high cost, the enemy managed to displace elements of the 53rd GTBr. 

Heavy tanks (one company), placed behind the medium tanks, opened intense fire at a range of 1500-2000 meters. As a result, 13 enemy tanks were destroyed, (3 Tigers and 10 Panthers). The crew of Guards Lieutenant comrade Vovk showed themselves well, knocking out four enemy tanks (one Tiger), as well as Guards Lieutenant Timokhin, knocking out three enemy tanks (one Tiger).

The enemy attack was repelled, and its tanks returned to initial positions."

It's interesting to note that despite the Panther's thicker armour, it is the Tigers that are considered a more prestigious prize. Now, how closely does the Soviet description matches the Germans' records. I cannot say for sure how many Panthers the Germans lost, but Wielhelm Tieke writes that 9th SS came in with 24 Panthers, which makes the claim of knocking out ten of them feasible. Counting knocked out Tigers, however, is a much easier feat.

"17 April  1944: The 2./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507 attacked north of Seredynki; it had eight  operational  tanks."

12 - 8 = 4, so that means the Soviet count was correct. Not only that, but the Germans managed to lose another Tiger elsewhere, or someone confused a Tiger for a Panther. The Soviet record that the Germans failed to displace them is also confirmed (despite some casual Googling turning up opinions that 9th SS somehow won the engagement), as they are attacking the same target from a different location the next day. It appears that this Hill 363 was of no help to them. 


Again, the Germans had no luck at all.

"18 April  1944: The relief attack bogged down and a withdrawal was  executed during the night. One company remained in support of the XXXXVIII. Panzer-Korps. Eight tanks reported operational; seven of them with  the 1./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507."

Eight tanks remain in the German battalion. You may have noticed that I have omitted mention of the 1st company until now. The thing is, Brody is quite a ways away from where the fighting was taking place, so it would have had no effect on this engagement.


The Germans attacking Pochapintse have failed, losing 11 Tigers and at least 10 Panthers against the defending IS-2 company. 

Friday, 24 October 2014

Anti-tank Posters

I've already shown some Soviet anti-tank posters, but here are some more. These are pre-war, and contain a little more information about the tank aside from where to shoot it.


First, we have a "light tank type 2", which is quite clearly a PzI Ausf. B. The dimensions of the tank and maximum armour thickness are almost correct, the weight is a bit off, but the top speed (50 kph) is completely ridiculous. The tank is credited with the ability to break a 25 cm thick tree, climb a vertical obstacle 60 cm tall, a grade of 40 degrees, a body of water 80 cm deep, and a 1.6 meter long trench, all of which are nicely represented graphically at the bottom of the image. Similar graphics show that the battalion cannon can penetrate it at a range of 1200 meters, and a machinegun can do so at a range of 800 meters. Despite the picture showing a Maxim gun, the fine print reads "with a high caliber machinegun".


Then we have a "light tank type 2 B", which is a PzII. The mass, size, and speed data is much better, than for the PzI, only the weight is a little higher than it should be. All other information is communicated in the same manner.


Now we get to an interesting one, a "medium tank type 3 B", which is an early PzIII (looks more like an Ausf. D than an Ausf. B), one that still had 8 wheels and leaf springs. Very few of these tanks were produced. Intelligence is doing its job!

Thursday, 23 October 2014

2-pounder HE

Many lamentations have been recorded about the lack of explosive shells for British 2-pounder guns. One solution I've seen involved jury-rigging smoke launchers to fire mortar shells. Another is a little more reasonable.

"A program of trials of 40 mm English high explosive fragmentation tracer AA shells in tank guns
  1. Goal of trials: to establish the possibility of using 40 mm AA shells in a tank gun. Before trials, the following work is done:
    1. The 40 mm shell is disassembled.
    2. The possibility of firmly loading an AA high explosive fragmentation shell into a tank shell casing is tested. The firmness of the load is tested by loading the shell into a tank gun.
    3. The tank gun rifling and shell driving band are measured in order to discover the necessary forcing of the band for satisfactory loading of the shell (not having the driving band prematurely stick into the rifling).
    4. The maximum pressure the shell can bear is calculated by examining mechanical characteristics of the shell and its size.
  2. Supplies for trials:
    1. System: 40 mm English tank gun.
    2. Shell: 40 mm English AA high explosive shell.
    3. Casing: from the 40 mm tank gun.
    4. Propellant: propellant from the English AA shell and domestic propellant with ballistic characteristics close to English 40 mm shell propellant.
  3. Trial process:
    1. Discovery of the propellant load to achieve V0=790 m/s and pressure less than the maximum acceptable pressure calculated in point 4.
      Note: according to information possessed by Artkom, the maximum acceptable pressure for the 40 mm AA high explosive fragmentation tracer shell is 3000 kg/cm^2. This information needs to be confirmed.
    2. Discovery of the propellant load to achieve V0=790 m/s using domestic propellant following points 1 and 3. Propellant will be tested on inert shells. If it is not possible to disarm the shells, testing will be done on shells that are incompletely armed with an inert detonator.
      If it is not possible to achieve a velocity of 790 m/s without surpassing acceptable pressure, trials will continue with the maximum velocity attainable at this pressure.
    3. Further trials will be carried out according to typical testing procedure applicable to HE shells (aside from point 1), using the propellant load established in these trials. Increased pressure is considered 1.1 times the current working pressure.
The trial report should include data for the formation of ballistic tables. The report should also include English markings on the 40 mm shells."

Wednesday, 22 October 2014

Experimental SPG Work, January 1944

"To the member of the State Committee of Defense, comrade L.P. Beria

On the letter from the People's Commissar of Tank Production, I report:
  1. GAU supports the NKTP's request to cease producing the 130 mm gun, indicated in the GOKO degree issued on December 27th, 1943.
    GAU does not take part in the arguments between NKTP and TsAKB on the possibility of installing a 130 mm gun into the SPG on the IS chassis, knowing that if the organizations are willing to make concessions, a decision that satisfies both sides can always be reached.
    GAU considers it necessary to cancel the 130 mm SPG, as it requires a more reasonable and mass produceable artillery system for tanks and SPGs, which is possible to build in 1944.
  2. Our current SPGs with 122 mm and 152 mm guns model 1937/43, with ballistics of corps level guns A-19 and ML-20 are powerful weapons against German heavy tanks and SPGs, but it is necessary to further increase the firepower of these weapons.
    These requirements are confirmed by developments of the arms race on the battlefield and possible technical progress by our enemy.
    Considering this scenario, OKB-172 has designed a high power 122 mm SPG gun according to GAU specifications, indexed OBM-50. The technical project has been reviewed and approved by Artkom on December 18th, 1943. An experimental prototype has been ordered, and should be completed by factory #172 in February. The production of the 122 mm OBM-50 gun is confirmed by GOKO decree #4851ss issued on December 27th, 1943. In order to perform factory and proving grounds trials of the 122 mm high power gun, we need you to order the People's Commissariat of Ammunition to produce new tube nitroglycerine propellant.
    GAU considers this gun equivalent in power to the 130 mm gun proposed by comrade Grabin, but the 122 mm high power gun has many advantages over the 130 mm gun.
  3. The 152 mm OBM-43 gun is a completely different class of weapon than comrade Grabin's 130 mm gun, and can't be compared.
    The OBM-43 has been built according to GAU specifications as a towed gun. It is possible to install it in an IS SPG using the oscillating part and mount from the 152 mm model 1937/43 SPG gun (SU-152), which was ordered by comrade Malyshev and carried out by factory #100 and OKB-172 engineers.
    This 152 mm gun is not fully developed and is only an intermediate step, and its trials are of little interest. GAU does not oppose the transfer of the 152 mm OBM-43 gun from the NKV to factory #100 for mounting in an IS SPG to carry out trials at the Gorohovets proving grounds with assistance from the GBTU in order to test several design solutions and use cases.
  4. The installation of a special 152 mm SPG gun with the ballistics of the OBM-43 in an SPG has been foreseen by GAU. The project for such a gun, indexed OBM-53 has been reviewed and approved by Artkom on December 18th, 1943, at the same time as the OBM-50 project.
    No prototype is being produced, as the NKV has not issued the appropriate orders to factory #172. I ask you to order the People's Commissar of Armament, comrade Ustinov, to produce an experimental OBM-53 152 mm SPG gun by February 25th.
    GAU considers the 152 mm OBM-53 gun to be a very powerful weapon, and, due to design specifics and high power, it cannot be a mass produced tank escort weapon. It must be built in limited numbers to achieve objectives set by the Supreme Command.
  5. GAU supports the NKTP proposal to test a 100 mm gun designed by factory #9. At the same time, GAU considers it necessary to test the 100 mm gun designed by TsAKB.
  6. Along with the 100 mm gun, GAU considers it necessary to test an 85 mm gun with the muzzle velocity of 1000-1100 m/s.
    This gun has nearly the same firepower and penetration as the 100 mm gun, but the weight and size give it an advantage over the 100 mm gun, both of the gun and the shell.
    Additionally, the production of an 85 mm gun and ammunition for it would not pose any difficulty, as the design of the new gun and its shells is an organic progression from the existing items produced at NKV and NKB factories. Savings in metal (approximately 30% for the gun and 40% for its shells) are also a benefit.
  7. When installing powerful guns with barrels from 5600 mm (85 and 100 mm guns) to 7000-7500 mm (122 and 152 mm guns) in length, the barrel will exceed the front of the SPG by at least 3500 and up to 5000 mm (with the 152 mm gun). Because of this, when moving off-road, it will hit objects and terrain, which will cause damage to the gun and knock it out during battlefield maneuvers.
    In January of this year, the commander of artillery of the 3rd Ukrainian Front sent a report to GAU, regarding the SU-85 SPG. In this SPG, the barrel exceeds the length of the SPG hull by about 2300 mm. The report says that when going over obstacles, there were cases of sand getting into the barrel, and strong enough hits against the ground that the normally reliable sliding shaft of the elevation mechanism bends, and the SPG cannot be used. The possibility of this happening with high power SPGs is much greater.
    Measures suggested by the NKTP (pushing the barrel back by 800 mm, 10 degrees of gun elevation) help only on the march, but not in combat, where damage is being done to these guns.
    Based on the above, GAU considers it necessary to, in parallel with the design of new powerful guns, to design new SPGs with rear fighting compartments (like the SU-76).
    This will preserve the high combat maneuverability of SPGs and allow the increase of their front armour.
  8. The armament of a self propelled gun must not only be examined from the point of view of increasing the firepower of tank units, but from the point of view of increasing the firepower of infantry units, maneuverability and firepower of special tank destroyer units, and creation of special weapons for the Supreme Command Reserve.
    GAU considers it necessary to have the following weapons in self propelled artillery:
    1. Infantry support SPGs
      1. 76 mm ZiS-3 gun (F-34) on a light SPG chassis made from T-70 components.
      2. 122 mm D-5 howitzer or 152 mm D-15 howitzer on a medium SPG chassis made from T-34 components.
    2. Tank escort SPGs
      1. 85 mm D-5 gun (with AA gun ballistics) on a medium SPG chassis made from T-34 components, already in production.
      2. 85 mm high power gun or 100 mm gun on a medium SPG chassis made from T-34 components, planned for production in 1944.
      3. 122 mm D-25 gun or 122 mm A-19S gun or 152 mm mod. 1937/43 gun, already in production, installed on a chassis made from IS tank components.
      4. High power 122 mm OBM-50 gun on an SPG chassis made from IS tank parts, planned for production in 1944.
    3. Supreme Command reserve SPGs
      1. 152 mm OBM-53 gun installed on an SPG chassis made from IS tank parts, planned for production in 1944.
      2. 203 mm howitzer on a half-covered chassis made from IS tank parts.
    4. Tank artillery
      1. Medium tanks:
        1. 85 mm D-5 gun (AA gun ballistics) or 85 mm high power gun.
      2. Heavy tanks:
        1. 122 mm D-25 gun.
        2. 100 mm gun or 85 mm high power gun.
  9. GAU considers existing artillery systems in tanks and SPGs incomplete. The correlation between quality and quantity of SPGs still needs refinement. Attempts to correct this balance, as experience shows, appear as individual and sometimes poorly thought out proposals from many design organizations. The demands of the front and capabilities of production are not considered.
    When these individual projects are built, antagonistic relationships form between organizations. This can cause unrefined prototypes to be pushed into production prematurely or the opposite, a delay before introducing this weapon into the Red Army.
    In order to bring order to the design of tank and SPG armament, GAU deems it necessary to hold a meeting of representatives of the General Staff, GBTU, GAU, NKV, NKTP, NKB, and design organizations in order to refine tank and SPG artillery systems.
Red Army GAU Chief, Colonel-General of Artillery, Yakovlev
January 24th, 1944"

Tuesday, 21 October 2014

T-40 Cost

Many times have I read the opinion "the USSR was a totalitarian state, Comrade Stalin could wave his hand and make anything cost as little as he wanted!" Those people may have learned their history from this comic book, but for the rest of us, here is a fragment of reality:

"Record of disagreement between GABTU and factory #37 on the topic of supplying T-40 tanks in 1941

Customer version:
  1. T-40 tank: regular, with individual parts and instruments kit and armament, 81,000 roubles.
  2. T-40 with radio: 71-TK-3 with a battery or 10-R with parts and instruments kit and armament: 86,000 roubles.
February 26th, 1941

Supplier version:
  1. T-40 tank: regular, with individual parts and instruments kit and armament, 135,000 roubles.
  2. T-40 with radio: 71-TK-3 with a battery or 10-R with parts and instruments kit and armament: 135,000 roubles:
    1. Cost of a 71-TK-3 radio station: 2850 roubles
    2. Production, installation, and testing of the radio station: 2000 roubles
      The cost of installing, testing, or producing a radio is not included in the 135,000 roubles.
March 3rd, 1941"