T-70 Bug Report

"List of suggestions for the T-70 composed at the technical conference of the 85th Independent Tank Brigade

1. Engine Compartment
1. The tanks have a grille for airflow, which can regulate engine temperature. In combat, it is not known how to set it in advance, which leads to overheating or overcooling of the engine. Opening and closing the grille should be done from within the tank. It is necessary to make a control for this on the driver's panel.
2. The clutch disk splinting design is unreliable. Vibrations de-splint the bolts, and the engines jam. In order to tighten them, the engine must be removed, which is impossible in combat conditions. Tightening them though the access hatch is impossible, as it is too small. Redesign the splinting.
3. In combat conditions, the tanks are filled with all available unfiltered water. There is no opportunity to do it otherwise. The honeycomb radiator gets plugged and the engine begins to heat up. There is no way to clean this during battle, and the effect shows within 20-25 hours. A pipe radiator is necessary.
4. The carburettor does not allow for rapid enriching of the mixture when the engine is started, which leads to difficulty in starting. Use the MKZ-6 carburettor, it will ensure an easier start.
5. The lifter shaft knob is welded to the case in three points, and can fall off at the welding seams. Welding it back on required removing the engine, which cannot be done in battle conditions.
6. The engine cover is bolted on, and takes too much time to remove. It must be held on with clips.
7. Increase the steam chamber socket for intake, and increase the size of the exhaust valve.
8. Latest model tanks have the exhaust pipe and muffler on top of the engine compartment. The exhaust pipe heats up, and does not allow for transport of submachinegunners and makes the tank difficult to fuel up. Cover it with a casing.
9. Latest model tanks have weak side armour. Near Kudinovo, a 100 kg bomb fell 25-30 meters from a tank and punctured its side on the right, the engine casing was penetrated, three cylinders were knocked off, the fragment punched through the other side of the casing and was embedded in the ammunition rack. The tank completed its combat mission with one engine. 
2. Transmission compartment:
1. The hatch above the final drives is too small and does not allow for rapid servicing of the final drives and brakes. Increase the size of the hatch by 40-50 mm.
2. In battle, tanks carry submachinegunners on top. The tank's design should include handles or at least straps for them to hold onto, as many must be transported. For instance, in battle for Kudinovo, 20 submachinegunners rode on the tank. 
3. Fighting compartment:
1. Strengthen the turret turning mechanism carrier, as it easily snaps.
2. It is hard to observe using the periscope. The seat does not turn, and the turret is cramped, so you can only look forward. It is necessary to enable observation in the direction opposite of the gun.
3. The commander's seat is affixed to the turret and turns with it. If the turret is knocked off by a bomb, the commander is lifted with it, and dies. It is necessary to affix the seat to a rotating floor.
4. The microphone in the tank does not allow for reliable communication with the driver, as the speech is drowned out by noise. Replace the microphone with a throat microphone.
5. When the tank moves, it constantly "dips" down, making firing on the move difficult. It is necessary to equip the front wheels with shock absorbers.
6. The radio is powered by engine batteries. It has insufficient capacity and rapidly depletes. It is necessary to install a separate battery for the radio.
4. Suspension:
1. The tanks typically carry submachinegunners, up to 20. The clearance of the vehicle is low, and under such weight, decreases further. Increase the clearance of the tank.
2. The tow cable is short and cannot loop through both hooks of the tank being towed. Hooking it up to only one tank, the towed tank does not go straight. It is necessary to lengthen the cable, or better yet, add a second hook.
3. Driving over ice leads to tracks slipping. The tracks need spurs. 
5. Driver's compartment:
1. An observation device exists to observe with closed hatches. The field of view is small, and does not let the driver see to the left or right of the tank, which leads to having to open the hatch in battle. It is necessary to use a periscope with a range of 180-220 degrees.
2. The driver's seat back is at too low an angle, and the cushion is too high up. The driver is tilted backwards, which tires him out and negatively impacts the quality of driving and observation. The effect is the same for all body builds.
3. Driving in a straight line does not require the driver's hands, which means he can fire at infantry with a machinegun. It is necessary to equip the tank with a machinegun ball mount, increasing its firepower.
4. The hatches have high tolerances, and there is no liner, which leads to water leaking in during the fall. It is necessary to introduce a liner to prevent leaks.

Technical Department Chief of the Tatishev Tank Camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Vasiliev"

CAMD RF 38-11355-1420

St Louis Car Company

I have already posted a report on the visit to the Chrysler factory that assembled Sherman tanks, but even smaller factories that produced less exciting tanks weren't skimmed over. Andrei Ulanov has a report on the St Louis Car Company, which produced LVT amphibious tanks.

"On June 21-22nd, we visited the St. Louis Car Company train factory, located on the outskirts of St. Louis in order to familiarize ourselves with American amphibious tanks. This factory made streetcars before the war, and, along with the streetcars, began producing amphibious tanks for the Navy and training airplanes for the Army. With the end of the war, the production of airplanes ceased, and the factory continued building amphibious tanks and streetcars.

This factory is a regular American assembly factory. It is small, and well equipped with tools required for assembly and production of some small parts. The factory employs about 900 workers, who work in two shifts. The factory makes 8 LVT-4 amphibious tanks daily. The company engineer that accompanied us claimed that in 1942, the factory made only two tanks per day, but gradually increased production due to increasing supply until they reached 8. If necessary, the factory can make 12 tanks per day."

Tank Quotas in 1931

"Minutes of the Revolutionary War Council meeting on changes to the tank program for 1931

May 8th, 1931

Present: comrades Voroshilov, Uborevich, Triandafilov, Martinovich, Halepskiy
Secretary: comrade Litunovskiy

1. T-27 Tankettes

Due to proficiency attained in mass T-27 manufacturing and discovery of excellent combat characteristics (mobility, off-road performance, possibility of using a 37 mm gun), the transition from the T-18 to the T-26, which shortens the requirements for small tanks by 65 vehicles, and a lack of selected medium tank, it is necessary to produce 200 additional tankettes in 1931. Accept comrade Martinovich's proposal to wait until the issues of producing T-26 tanks at the Bolshevik factory and hulls at the Podolsk factory are resolved before inquiring if factories can produce additional tankettes. MPS VSHKh should investigate this issue and report to the RVSS.

Consider comrade Martinovich's claim that VSNKh is preparing to gear up the Nizhniy Novgorod and 2nd automotive factories to produce no less than 15 thousand T-27 tankettes according to the government decision from February 20th, 1931.

2. T-26

T-26 orders are proceeding on time. Retain the previous order of 300 vehicles. Remind MPS VSNKh that, according to Bolshevik factory directors, the bottleneck of production is cast iron, and its reception is still not resolved. This threatens the timely delivery of T-26es.

3. T-18

Considering that the Motoviliha factory still hasn't mastered tank production, and the order for 75 T-18 tanks is delaying important artillery orders, cancel 65 T-18 tanks, leaving only the 10 tanks that have already been started. Send no more tank orders to Motoviliha.

4. Medium tank

1. T-24:
1. Retain the 1931 order for 80 T-24s with the corresponding amount of spare parts (mandatory).
2. Comrade Martinovich must immediately give HPZ this order and ensure that there is no extra produced, as we will not make any more of these vehicles.
2. TG:
1. Report to KO that the commission's decision on the TG medium tank cannot be realized in 1931, as the experimental prototype is still unfinished, and it is impossible to determine when it will be. As a result, there can be no standardized medium tank in 1931 for us to produce.
2. The Vickers 12-ton tank that we purchased must be meant for colonial forces (weak armour and armament), and does not measure up to our tank armament system.
3. Continue accelerated work on the TG experimental prototype. Take note of the schedule proposed by Leningrad region OGPU.
4. Ask permission to purchase the new 16-ton Vickers tank, of which we have been notified, which matches our requirements for armour, speed, and armament.
3. Christie tank:
1. Ask for permission to adopt the Christie tank into the mechanized forces as a high speed tank destroyer (BT).
2. Instruct comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy to calculate the maximum amount of BT tanks (existing type, with no changes) that can be produced this year at HPZ, considering that the T-24 order at that factory decreases by 220 units.
3. Simultaneously, instruct UMM to accelerate work on modernizing the Christie tank.

5. Heavy tank:

1. It is necessary to have at least a small number of heavy tanks in the RKKA.
2. UMM must discover information on heavy tanks in Italy, England, and, if possible, France, with the objective of buying such a tank, or at least blueprints.
3. Simultaneously, conduct independent work on such a tank.

6. On an engine factory for medium tanks

Ask the government to reverse its decision on February 20th, 1931, and allow construction of a factory for M-5 (Liberty) instead of the previously chosen M-6 (Hispano-Suiza).

UVVS chief Baranov must reserve 150 new M-5 engines from 1931 production and transfer them to comrade Halepskiy.

7. On armour

Report to the government that the task of cementing against armour piercing bullets is completed. The task of reducing the amount of ferrite alloys in the armour is also completed. Work on cementing steel against small caliber armour piercing shells continues. According to comrade Martinovich, a complete transfer to using cemented armour (Vibrak type) will happen in July 1931.

Keep in mind comrade Martinovich's statement that the required amount of firebrick to build 8 furnaces at the Izhor factory (for production of cemented armour) has been ordered on April 19th 1931 from abroad.

Comrades Martinovich and Halepskiy should ensure the fastest possible arrival of this order.

Chairman Voroshilov

Secretary Litunovskiy"

RGVA 4-14-414

IS, First Series

"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #104ss
Moscow
February 25th, 1943

On the construction of experimental IS tanks

To fulfil State Committee of Defense decree #2943ss, issued on February 24th, 1943, I order that:

1. The director of the Kirov factory, comrade Dlugach, director of factory #200, comrade Sherbakov, and chief engineer of the Kirov factory, comrade Kotin, produce two experimental IS tanks at the Kirov factory: one with the 122 mm gun (U-11), the other with a 76 mm gun (F-34), and provide them for proving grounds trials by March 10th, 1943.
2. The GOKO decree defines the following main characteristics of the IS tanks:
1. A maximum weight of 39.5 tons for the tank armed with the 122 mm U-11 gun, including ammunition, fuel, and crew.
2. A maximum weight of 38.5 tons for the tank armed with the 76 mm F-34 gun, including ammunition, fuel, and crew.
3. Armour:
1. Front: 120/100 mm (cast)
2. Side: 90 mm (rolled)
3. Top and floor: 20 mm 
4. Rear: 60 mm (sloped at 45 degrees)
5. Turret: 100 mm (sides)
4. Maximum speed: 55 kph.
5. Transmission: 8 speed gearbox, planetary turning mechanism, planetary final drives.
6. Engine: 600 hp V-2K
7. Ammunition:
1. No less than 30 shells for the IS tank with a 122 mm gun.
2. No less than 80 shells for the IS tank with a 76 mm gun.
8. Crew: 4
9. Machineguns:
1. With a 122 mm gun: 2 (coaxial and hull)
2. With a 76 mm gun: 3 (coaxial, turret rear, and hull)
10. Fuel capacity: 500 kg

..."

CAMD RF 38-11355-1485

Drink Responsibly

"9th Leningrad Partisan Brigade
Commander: Svetlov, commissar: Dmitriyev

December 29th, Peleshi sector, 4660, 9 km south of Slantsy: a group from the brigade destroyed an enemy tank with mines.
December 28th: Brigade scouts stole an accordion from drunken enemy officers in a restaurant in Narva."

Source

"In October of 1941, German soldiers looted a spirits warehouse left by the retreating Red Army. As a result, 95 men received methanol poisoning, of which 10 have died.

Because of this, the Quartermaster of the 16th Army has ordered that all captured alcohol should be inspected at the army laboratory before consumption."

Trophy Battalion

In 1942, things were tough for the USSR in terms of tanks supplies. The following document illustrates the condition of many armoured units pretty well:

"To the Kalinin Front Military Council

The 29th Army includes the 143rd, 159th, and 129th Independent Tank Battalions. In reality, these units are not combat capable due to a lack of vehicles, and only exist in the army on paper. On February 16th, 1942, the condition of the aforementioned tank battalions was as follows:

Unit	Vehicle	Allotted	Claimed	Counted	Of those counted			Of those disabled
					Functional	Disabled	No contact	Medium repairs	Major repairs
143rd OTB	KV	5	4	4	-	2	2	2	-
	T-34	11	4	4	-	4	-	3	1
	T-60	20	2	2	-	1	1	1	-
	Total	36	10	10	-	7	3	6	1
159th OTB	KV	5	5	5	-	5	-	2	2
	T-34	11	6	6	-	5	1	3	-
	T-60	20	10	10	-	8	2	2	1
	Total	36	21	21	-	18	3	7	5
129th OTB	KV	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-34	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-60	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Captured medium	-	2	2	-	2	-	2	-
	Captured light	-	10	10	-	10	-	10	-
	Total	36	12	12	-	12	-	12	-
	Total	108	43	43	-	37	6	25	6

The table paints a grim picture. The entire Army has lost its armoured forces, with the 129th OTB losing all domestic vehicle permanently. 6 vehicles are missing, likely lost. The battalions have kept their records well, not a single unclaimed vehicle is present or claimed vehicle lost. 37 vehicles are disabled, with most needing medium repairs, and a few needing major repairs. Damage to an additional 6 vehicles has not yet been evaluated.

Category Reshuffling

I noticed that my "What May Have Been" page was getting out of hand, so I decided to shuffle the categories around a little bit. That page has been deprecated, and contents moved to the sections for their respective nations, which now have less poetic, albeit more descriptive, titles. In order to further ease searching, the Soviet page (by far the largest one) will be reorganized, additional categories introduced, and content will be sorted in a more intuitive manner. If you can't find something with the rather lacking search feature, check back in a few days, and it should be much easier to find what you're looking for.

World of Tanks History Section: KV-220

The heavy KV-1 tank that entered production in 1940 was protected with 75 mm of armour. At the time, this was one of the thickest plates in the world. However, the KV-1 had many drawbacks, and the military decided to develop a replacement in the summer of 1940.

Joseph Kotin's Heavyweight

The Kirov Factory in Leningrad and its subordinate design bureau headed by Joseph Kotin got to work. They had to develop and build two prototypes of a heavy tank by November of 1940. One was to be armed with a 76 mm F-34 gun (already in production), the other with an experimental F-30 85 mm gun developed by Grabin's design bureau.

The tank had 100 mm of armour, and was called KV-220. It is also mentioned in documents under the name T-220 and Object 220. The tank with the F-30 gun received a special enlarged turret. Depending on the source, the tank's mass reached 62 to 65 tons. The tank's designers had to lengthen the hull and add a more powerful engine.

The KV-220 began trials in January of 1941. During its first time on the proving grounds, it set an anti-record: its engine broke down on the second day. The vehicle returned to the factory. In 1941, most likely in spring, another KV-220 was built, but never participated in trials.

KV-220 to KV-3

At the same time, intelligence reported that Germany was developing a heavy 45 ton tank with thick armour and powerful armament. The Soviet military assigned the KV-3 project to Kirov factory, with even thicker armour and a 107 mm ZiS-6 gun. The gun was ready, but tank engineers were lagging behind, so the KV-220 was used as a test platform for the KV-3. It was equipped with an 850 hp engine, loaded to 70 tons, and returned to trials.

It must be said that the KV-220 did not have exceptional reliability. Trials records mention difficulty in changing gears, and failing suspension components. Nevertheless, by the start of the Great Patriotic War, the tank traveled over 1900 kilometers.

The German invasion upset all tank design plans in the USSR. The KV-3 project was transferred to Chelyabinsk, but both KV-220s were left in Leningrad. In October of 1941, they were both equipped with standard KV-1 turrets with 76 mm guns. The tanks were sent to the 124th Tank Brigade.

Prototypes on the Front Lines

Brigade commander D. Osadchev recalls that one of these vehicles was lost in battle for a railroad bridge over the Tosna river in December of 1941. The tank was hit and lost its turret.

In 2013, Yuri Pasholok discovered documents in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense which stated that the other KV-220 remained in the 12th Independent Tank Training Regiment until at least 1944.

The original turret of the KV-220-1 prototype was removed and used on the Leningrad front as a pillbox until 1944.

Author: Vladimir Pinayev

Sources:
- M.N. Svirin, Tankovaya Mosch SSSR volume 2: V Tyazheluyu Poru, Moscow, Yauza, Eksmo, 2008
- Sovetskiye Bronirovanniye Mashiny compilation, Moscow, Eksprint, 2002
- M. Kolomiyets, Istoriya Tanka KV, Frontovaya Illustratsiya #5, 2001
- CAMD RF documents provided by Yuri Pasholok

Original article available here.

World of Tanks History Section: The Last Tank Battle of WWII

Shumshu island, in the northern group of the Kuril archipelago. Not the most pleasant place for living. Today, there is no permanent population on this island. But in the far off year 1945, it was completely different.

While Japan was a powerful force in the Pacific, it saw the Kurils as an important strategic base. Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta based his invasion of the Aleutian islands from there. The Kurils were also a base for preparing the Japanese invasion of Kamchatka.

In the second half of the war, the roles changed. Now it was the Americans that regularly staged raids at Japanese bases. Concerned about an American invasion, the Japanese began reinforcing the north Kurils. Among others, Shumshu received the 11th tank regiments from Manchuria. The Japanese Imperial Navy, having their own tank branch, transferred the 51st and 52nd coastal defense units to the island, armed with amphibious Ka-Mi tanks.

Kuril splinter

On August 9th, 1945, the Red Army's Manchurian Operation began. Lieutenant-General A. Kravchenko's Guards T-34s vapourized any Kwantung Army units in their path. On August 11th, battles raged on South Sakhalin. Kamchatka and Shumshu were quiet, but not for long.

Early morning on August 18th, a Soviet advance force from Kamchatka landed on Shumshu, and, having surprised the Japanese, moved 2 km inland without much resistance. The Kuril landing operation has begun.

Sadly, after the initial landing, the operation did not go as flawlessly. An hour after the landing, the first ships carrying infantry arrived. The Japanese regained their senses and opened fire. The situation was made more difficult by the overloaded ships that could not get close to shore. The boats meant for ferrying soldiers got lost in the mist, and did not arrive on time. Soldiers had to jump into the water and swim to shore. The water damaged their radios, and communication with ships was only regained by 11 am. Barely any artillery made it to shore. This was the cause of the largest amount of casualties, finally recorded as "Missing in Action".

The Japanese themselves did not realize what was happening and who was attacking them. Reports of thousands of American soldiers flew form the island to headquarters. Only after a few hours did the Japanese discover that they were being attacked by Soviets. A lack of awareness of the numbers and nationality of attackers did not prevent the Shumshu garrison commander from ordering his troops to push the invaders into the sea.

Japanese light tanks were the first to reach the landing. At about 3:30, Colonel Ikeda sent Captain Ito Isao's tank company to perform reconnaissance with 11 light Ha-Go tanks. By 1945, these vehicles were hopelessly outdated. However, since the majority of artillery was still on the ships, they presented a credible thread.

The landing was covered from sea by a patrol boat. The main factor in deflecting the Japanese counterattack was the heroism of the Kamchatka marines. Shumshu award orders are peppered with the phrase "threw himself under the enemy tank with grenades". Having lost six or seven vehicles, the Japanese succeeded in pushing the marines to the eastern slope of height 171 (Severnaya mountain on modern maps). There, the Soviet soldiers began hurriedly fortifying, partially reusing captured Japanese positions.

Subsequent descriptions of events from the Japanese and Soviet sides differ, sometimes significantly. The Japanese write that a second tank company arrived to help the first, but this was not enough. As a result, the Japanese lost many tanks, with Colonel Ikeda himself dying in that battle.

The Soviet version of events records that, having received word of approaching reserves, the second echelon commander, Colonel Artyushin, moved out the majority of his AT units (AT rifles, grenadiers, and the few 45 mm guns that made it to shore) to meet the enemy. At about 14:00 local time, the Japanese attacked with 18 tanks. Nearly all of them were left in the trenches, having been knocked out by AT rifle fire. Only one tank managed to escape.

Colonel Ikeda's Bushido

The only thing on which both sides agree is the description of Colonel Ikeda in his last battle. Japanese sources write that the commander of the 11th tank regiment headed the attack, sticking out of his tank with a banner in hand. This is how he was remembered.

For his devotion to samurai ideals, the Colonel was given an appropriate death. He was not struck down by the bullet of a common infantryman, but by the hand of the commander of the Soviet advance guard, Major Shutov.

"The tanks formed up and thundered towards us. On one of them, banner in hand, was a Japanese officer. We prepared to deflect the counterattack. I could see the grimace on the officer's face. I press on the submachinegun's trigger. The officer falls, the banner falls with him. A moment later, his tank stops."
- Memoirs of Major Shutov. "Record of Heroic Day" collection. South-Sakhalinsk, 1969

The Japanese could not push the Soviets into the sea, the landed force dug in too deep. In total, the Japanese report losses of 21 tanks that day, and 96 crewmen. The remaining 30 tanks of the 11th regiment were concentrated west of height 171, and were ready for an attack. However, the order never came. On August 19th, the Shumshu garrison surrendered. WWII ended here.

Major P.I. Shutov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional completion of combat tasks, bravery, and heroism.

Colonel Ikeda, the commander of the 11th tank regiment, was posthumously made a Japanese national hero. The 11th tank battalion of the Japanese Self-Defense Force, based on Hokkaido, displays his regiment's insignia on its tanks. Colonel Ikeda's Shinhoto Chi-Ha stands on Shumshu to this day.

Article author: Andrei Ulanov.

Andrei Ulanov is an historian and an author of books and articles on the Great Patriotic War. His most prominent works are "Order in Tank Forces" and "First T-34s" (co-authored with Dmitriy Shein). Currently, he is working on books on AT measures of Soviet infantry and combat use of T-34 tanks in 1942.

Sources:
Documents of the 2nd Far East Front and Kamchatka Defensive Region, provided by Yuri Pasholok.
Photographs from Yuri Pasholok's personal archive.
"Record of Heroic Day" memoir collection. South-Sakhalinsk, 1969

Original article available here.

German Superguns

We've seen Soviet superguns, but can Germany beat them in impracticality? Of course it can!

Let's start with a pretty reasonable one.

A gun from your biggest mass produced heavy tank in a medium tank turret? Easy. Let's kick it up a notch.

Players of World of Tanks will already be familiar with this cannon. A seven meter long barrel isn't that unreasonable, considering that the King Tiger already had a 6.25 meter gun. You can do better, Germany.

Yeah, now that's what I'm talking about! This was one of the proposed guns for the Typ 205 tank. 

This isn't really a gun for a tank anymore, but with a barrel that's nearly 11.5 meters long, it's as big as one. Read more about it here. 

The very same gun mentioned in this document. Originally a railroad gun, it was given a chance at increased mobility when the E-100 project didn't go quite so well.

Scans by Yuri Pasholok.