Tank Archives Turns Six

Hello, dear readers! Another year of running this blog went by. And what a year it was. I finally got past the medium of text, appearing in not one, but two podcasts by Military History Visualized: one on kill claims back in May, and one more recently on Soviet impressions on the Pz.Kpfw.I tank. In case you missed them the first time around, I'm embedding the videos under the break.

Twitter has taken off pretty well. I'm well over the 1000 follower milestone, sitting at 1322 at the time of writing. The main blog is also doing well, right up against 4 million total views. Seems that my audience demographics have stabilized: USA at a distant first, followed by the UK, Germany, Russia, Canada, Poland, France, Finland, Australia, and Spain.

HE vs Tanks

"Due to a shortage of armour piercing shells presently experienced by artillery units, the practice of firing other types of ammunition out of 76.2 mm divisional guns is common.

1. Armour piercing shot. Penetrates the armour of German tanks from any direction. Insufficient beyond armour effect. Fire and destruction of the tank are only caused if the engine, fuel tank, or ammunition is hit.
2. Steel cased HE grenade. Can be used in combat against light (in some cases medium) tanks. Aimed at the sides during oblique movement or the turret ring, it destroys or tears off side armour in addition to jamming the turret and destroying mechanisms inside the turret, including optical sights and observation devices. In a number of cases the turret stopped traversing. When howitzers are used, light tank turrets were torn off.

Man Hours

"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production #117-Ms

January 16th, 1942

Lately, many directors and chief engineers do not dedicate necessary attention to the issues of improving technologies, introducing new progressive technological processes, increasing amounts of instruments, etc, as a result of which time expenditure at various factories is unbearably high, which causes extra demand in tools and manpower.

For example:

1. The T-60 tank takes 2500 hours to produce at factory #37, but 4700 hours at factory #264, 1.9 times greater.
2. A V-2 diesel engine takes 2700 hours to produce at factory #76, 1800 hours at the Kirov factory, but at factory #75 the same diesel engine is produced in 600 hours.
3. The Krasnoye Sormovo factory takes 2500-3000 hours more to make a T-34 tank than factory #183 took in its time and the Stalingrad factory does now.

It is clear that, instead of carefully and systematically working to reduce costs of producing vehicles, instead of getting technologies and use of tools in order, instead of training workers, many directors and chief engineers take the path of least resistance and complete plans only by increasing the number of tools and workers. The People's Commissariat cannot and will not support this kind of extravagance.

I order that:

1. Chiefs of the production and planning departments must provide me with the standards for time consumption to produce KV, T-34, T-60 tanks, hulls for them, and the V-2 diesel engine, taking the leading factories as a baseline.
2. After standards are established, calculate the requirements for equipment and workforce.
3. The technical department (comrades Ginzburg and Rybkin) must transfer the experience of leading factories in lowering the labour requirements to factories that are falling behind.
4. Directors and chief engineers of tank, hull, and diesel factories must:
1. Within ten days re-evaluate the excessive time consumption and develop specific measures of improving production technologies with the goal of reducing time consumption.
2. Force existing technical, technological, and labour calculation departments to work properly. Warn the leaders of these departments that their work will be evaluated based on the reduction in times it takes to produce each vehicle, and not by the number of requests for new equipment or new workers.

Again, I'm warning directors and chief engineers of factories that, in time of war, we need to maintain strictest economy of tools and labour force. Directors who consider their duty to complete the plan "at any cost" must be told off. The plan must be carried out with minimal costs, not "at any cost".

People's Commissar of Tank Production, V. Malyshev"

RGAE 8752-4-82 pp.1-2

Canadian Shermans Inside and Out

By the time the M4A2E8 entered production, the Americans had no intention of using these tanks in their own army. While WWII continued, these tanks were supplied to the USSR. Afterwards, the remaining tanks were sold to Canada for a pittance, and formed the backbone of domestic tank forces for many years. As a result, there are plenty of M4A2E8 tanks still kicking around in Canada, many of them still running. The LeBreton Gallery in the Canadian War Museum has two: one of them slightly worse for wear than the other.

This is the one that works...

Romanian Czech with a Russian Accent

The Romanian tank fleet was largely composed of Skoda Š-II-aR tanks (an export version of the LT vz. 35), accepted into service as the R-2. 126 units were purchased in 1938-1939. Fighting on the Eastern Front served as a cold shower for the Romanians. For instance, the 1st Tank Division lost 81 R-2s by the end of 1942. It was clear that these tanks could no longer be used in their initial form. The surviving 40 tanks were pulled out into the reserve.

Savin's AA Turrets

"Order of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production #26s

Chelyabinsk

January 15th, 1942

1. To director of factory #174, comrade Katsnelson: immediately stop the work comrade Savin is performing on the T-50 SPAAG.
   Designers from Savin's group are to be moved to factory #183 immediately to perform this work on the T-34 tank. All existing materials and technical documentation is to be immediately sent to factory #183.
2. To director of factory #183, comrade Maksarev: include Savin's group of designers into the factory's staff. Ensure that comrade Savin's group can complete its work in the following times:
1. Complete the project and working blueprints by March 15th, 1942.
2. Produce a prototype by May 1st, 1942.
3. Begin trials on June 1st, 1942.
3. To deputy chief of the NKTP technical department, comrade Ginzburg: transfer materials in possession of the NKTP on work performed by Savin's group to factory #183.

Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, Kotin."

RGAE 8752-4-9 p.103

F-34 Installation

"Technical Meeting Minutes

Held on September 8th, 1940, at the State Order of Lenin Comintern Factory #183

Present:

• Factory #183 Chief Engineer, Makhonin
• Factory #183 Deputy Chief Designer, A.A. Morozov
• Factory #92 Senior Engineer-Designer, P.F. Muravyev
• Factory #92 Technician-Designer, B.G. Lasman
• Factory #183 Senior Engineer, Maloshtanov
• ABTU Military Representative, Military Engineer 3rd Class, Baikov

Topic: comrade P.F. Muravyev's presentation regarding the possibility of installing the 76.2 mm F-34 tank gun in the T-34 turret and the conversion of the T-34 turret made necessary by the requirement that the F-32 and F-34 be made interchangeable.

Factory #183 Experimental Work

"To the Chief of the 4th Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, comrade Afonin

December 1st, 1940

Summary of experimental work at factory #183 in November of 1940

Trials of A-7M tank #0314-2 with surrogate parts:

1. Iron casing of the distributor shaft rather than aluminium alloy.
2. Horizontal spring rods.
3. Electrical wiring without liners.
4. Fuel tanks coated with zinc by schooping rather than tinning.
5. Gearbox with an iron casing. This gearbox was removed after 353 km after large cracks developing in the casing.
6. Final drive components.
7. Idler components and other small parts.

In addition, the following were installed:

1. Unified main clutch.
2. Unified oscillating levers of the turning wheels and other small parts.

The vehicle has travelled for 1488 km by December 1st, 1940, trials will continue in December.

Can Poland Into Tanks?

Having broken away from its collapsing "big brother", Poland recalled its once serious military and political ambitions. In certain people's minds, Poland would rise to the status of a regional superpower at the very least, which meant it needed an army to match. Polish engineers began working on a new generation of airplanes, helicopters, AA systems. Plenty of attention was directed at armoured vehicles as well.

QA

"Attachment to order #113-Mss

Approved by GKO decree #1148ss issued on January 14th, 1942

Requirements for quality assurance at tank factories

1. Quality assurance is performed by the military representative of the GABTU.
2. A tank can be considered accepted after firing the cannon and machineguns, test drive, correction of discovered defects and complete installation of equipment.
3. The quality assurance process consists of:
1. A 5 km drive for every T-34 and KV tank and 10 km drive for every tenth T-60 tank, chosen by the military representative.
2. Firing the cannon on every tenth T-34 and KV tank and on every T-60 tank. Coaxial machineguns are fired on every tank.
   In addition, the military representative can control the quality of individual components and assemblies, as well as the quality of assembly of the tank.
4. The military representative is permitted to accept tanks without clocks, voltmeters, ammeters (replaced with an indicator light), speedometers, aerothermometers (except one), turret fans (in winter time), turret traverse motors for the T-34, intercom (replaced with signal lights), spare containers, and radios in the event that there is a temporary absence of these parts at the tank factory."

RGAE 8752-4-8 p.169