Wednesday, 16 December 2015

Green Elephant

This project, designed in 1942 by the Ural Heavy Machinery Factory could have been the heaviest Soviet SPG. In accordance with the saying "fight fire with fire", engineers proposed a well armed, well protected, but not very mobile "pillbox on tracks" to attack enemy fortifications, the U-19 SPG. What prevented this project from becoming a reality?

Bunker Buster Project

In early 1942, it was clear that the KV-3 wouldn't take off in Chelyabinsk. Even if the tank and its engine were still listed as active projects, they were all but forgotten. The plans to build the 212A SPG on the KV-3 chassis were dropped in April of 1942, but the idea of a heavy assault gun remained. This time, the KV-7 served as the foundation, as its casemate allowed the use of a 152 mm ML-20 gun-howitzer. The project to mount this gun in a KV-7, indexed U-18, began at UZTM under the supervision of L.I. Gorlitskiy.

However, the compromise of using the KV-1 chassis and an ML-20 gun was not entirely satisfactory. The KV-1 chassis was acceptable, but the ML-20 was notably inferior in its destructive power to the 152 mm Br-2 high power gun, which was considered the gold standard for bunker busters. As a last resort, the B-4 howitzer was considered acceptable, since both could be installed on the same mount. Unlike the Br-2, less than 40 of which were made, the B-4 was a fairly common artillery system.

At the start of 1942, two organizations were involved in the design of heavy SPGs. The Moscow Baumann Machinebuilding Institute was tasked by the NKV to work on bunker busters armed with either a 152 mm Br-2 gun (SU-Br-2) or 203 mm B-4 howitzer (SU-B-4). The second organization was factory #221, the producer of Br-2 guns and B-4 howitzers. In March of 1942, the factory design bureau finished proposals for the BR-33P and BR-33G SPGs. Both were based on components from the T-34 medium tank. Documentation showed that the BR-33P would be armed with a 152 mm Br-2 gun, and the BR-33G would be armed with a B-4 howitzer. After a review, it was decided that these vehicles would not be produced, as they did not match the requirements for bunker busters.

The Ural variant

In April of 1942, the task of creating a 203 mm assault gun was given to the UZTM design bureau. Judging by correspondence, this vehicle was ordered by J.Ya. Kotin, Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production at the time. It is interesting to note that, unlike the U-18, the U-19 was not present in reports. It is likely that the project had a low priority and was treated as a backup plan. Nevertheless, the U-19 was completed before the U-18. The overall description of the vehicle was finished in May, blueprints in June, and the project was sent to GAU and GABTU on August 12th, 1942, three weeks before the U-18. The backup plan was also thought out a lot more thoroughly than the main one.

The U-19 consisted of a 203 mm mod. 1931 howitzer (B-4) on the KV-1 chassis. The goal of this vehicle was the destruction of fortifications that were too tough for smaller guns. Like the KV-7, the KV-1 hull was altered: the turret platform was removed, the engine bulkhead was made removable, the fuel tanks and air intakes were altered. The oscillating part of the B-4 remained unchanged, in order to reduce the time required for conversion. The turret was replaced with a massive casemate, partially overlapping the engine compartment, which could cause difficulty when servicing the engine.

The thickness of the front plate was 75 mm, the sides were 60 mm thick, the rear 40 mm, and roof 30 mm. A large hatch was included in the rear for installing the howitzer, which had a smaller hatch in it for crew evacuation. According to the specifications, the roof was removable. Since the main purpose of the U-19 was the destruction of fortifications, the gun elevation was capped at 10 degrees. The horizontal traverse was minimal, only 4.3 degrees each way, same as on the B-4 howitzer.

The requirement to make minimal changes to the chassis while also providing a respectable level of protection resulted in an interesting product. According to calculations, the U-19 would weigh 66190 kg, which was even heavier than the 212A SPG. Since vehicles have a tendency to be heavier in metal than on paper, it was possible for the U-19 to be the heaviest Soviet assault SPG, surpassing even the fully armoured SU-14. Putting the B-4 howitzer in a closed casemate also required a height of 3510 mm, which was only 50 mm lower than the fully armoured SU-14. The creators of the U-19 understood that the large SPG was a perfect target for the enemy, which is why it was to be escorted by regular tanks on the battlefield.

A predictable outcome

The project led to predictable results. On September 9th, 1942, the chief engineer of UZTM, M.G. Umnyagin, received a letter written by the chief of the BTU, Engineer-Colonel Afonin.

"To your letter #3707/48s sent on August 24th, 1942, regarding the project "U-19 203 mm howitzer on the KV-1 chassis", I reply that:

  1. The mass of the U-19, equal to 66 tons, and the V-2K engine will not result in reliable movement at the required speeds. Furthermore, the transmission of the KV-1 is designed for a 40 ton vehicle, and cannot work reliably in a 66 ton vehicle.
  2. The SPG makes for a well noticeable target due to its large height (3.51 meters) and wide upper section (immobile turret). 
  3. The armour is weaker than that of the regular KV-1 tank, as a result of which, the crew will not be protected at close ranges.
  4. If the suspension is damaged, the gun will only work within a 9 degree arc, as the U-19 does not have a rotating turret.
  5. Due to the mass of the SPG, it will not be possible to tow damaged SPGs from the battlefield.
  6. The off-road performance of the SPG, judging by its effective horsepower (9 hp/ton) and ground pressure (0.98 kg/cm^2) will be poor.
From the above, I conclude that further development of the U-19 SPG is illogical."

This reaction from GABTU was well founded. On one hand, the mass of the SPG was similar to that of the 212A, on the other hand, the 212A was based on the KV-3, with a much more powerful engine. The project was also submitted at a bad time, since the lighter 42.5 ton version of the KV-1, indexed KV-1S, just entered production at ChKZ. A design that would weigh 1.5 times as much as the base vehicle was like a red rag shown to a bull. In these conditions, the chances of the U-19 reaching even the prototype stage was nil.

The project was sent to the archives, and few mentions of it exist in other documents. This fact played a mean trick on the U-19: since the only information available on the project was "B-4 on the KV-1 chassis", it was confused with another vehicle. A series of publications, including encyclopaedias, show an illustration of the U-3, a 203 mm howitzer installed in a SU-152, which has no relation to the U-19 project. Even the developer was different: this project was designed by the factory #9 design bureau, led by F.F. Petrov.

Tuesday, 15 December 2015

Gently Used


"Factory #75
To: GABTU Chief, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko
CC: Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding, comrade Goreglyad
June 18th, 1941

In order to gather experience of use of diesel motors, which is necessary to perform further work on improving the quality of produced engines and increase of their warranty period, the factory needs to 
systematically observe the use of diesel engines as they are used.

We have materials on the use of engines in A-7M vehicles from factory inspector reports, but there is extremely little information on long term use of A-34 and KV engines, as these vehicles typically worked very few engine-hours.

The Kharkov armour academy has A-34 and KV tanks in its possession, which are used to teach students at the academy. We consider it necessary to organize systematic observation of the materiel (engines and their components). 

In order to acquire 150-200 engine-hours as rapidly as possible, I ask that the Kharkov armour school not be limited in terms of engine-hours with the aim of achieving at least 200 hours per engine over June-August.

Factory #75 accepts the responsibility of repairing 5 A-34 engines and 4 KV engines and restoration after exhaustion of their resource. 

Inform me of your decision.

Factory #75 director, Kochetkov."

CAMD RF 38-11355-138 p.150

Monday, 14 December 2015

PTR vs Panther

"Award Order
  1. Name: Oboldin, Saveliy Savelyevich
  2. Rank: Sergeant
  3. Position, unit: AT rifle crew commander, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Korsun, Order of the Red Banner Motorized Infantry Brigade, 18th Znamensk, Order of the Red Banner Tank Brigade, 3rd Ukrainian Front
    is nominated for the state award of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
  4. Year of birth: 1922
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: VLSKM member since July 1943
  7. Participation in the Civil War, subsequent actions in defense of the USSR, Patriotic War (where, when): October 15th, 1943 through November 1st, 1944: 2nd Ukrainian Front, 3rd Ukrainian Front since November 1944.
  8. Wounds or concussions in the Patriotic War: lightly wounded on January 10th, 1944
  9. In the Red Army since: September 1st, 1943
  10. Recruited by: Olkhov recruitment office, Kurgansk oblast
  11. Prior awards: none
Brief and specific description of heroism or achievements: Sergeant Oboldin walked the warpath with his battalion. During action to surround and liquidate the Budapest group and liquidate the German offensive north-west of Budapest, he served as an anti-tank rifle crew commander, demonstrated heroism, skill, and bravery.

In battles for Vertishacha (Hungary), on the night of December 22nd to 23rd, 1944, Sergeant Oboldin asked for permission to form a tank destroyer squad, and then took command of it. After discovering 8 enemy tanks at the north-western outskirts of the village, Sergeant Oboldin set objectives for every group member and headed to the lead tank. He stealthily approached the tank and threw an anti-tank grenade. The tank was destroyed. On the Sergeant's signal, the rest of the group threw grenades and opened suppressing fire from rifles and machineguns. These actions caused panic among the enemy. Tank crews located in houses ran out and were gunned down by Oboldin's group. Only a small number managed to get away. As a result of Sergeant Oboldin's swift action, 3 PzV tanks were knocked out and 4 captured intact. Sergeant Oboldin was instrumental in achieving this objective.

On January 3rd, 1945, in battle for the Baina settlement, with Private Azizov was wounded, Sergeant Obodin took has AT rifle and knocked out a PzV tank that was moving along the central road towards the church. After that, he also destroyed an enemy APC.

Seeing the support of the famous AT rifleman, the infantry rushed into an attack yelling "Ura!" and the village was taken.

The rifleman was seriously injured in this battle, but without leaving the battlefield he encouraged his soldiers to "Kill the bastards, destroy them completely!"

He is worthy of the state award of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

CAMD RF 33-793756-35

Sunday, 13 December 2015

World of Tanks Armoured Fantasy: Land Cruisers

Even before they reached the battlefield, tanks were called "land ships". This metaphor turned out to be infectious, and there were many projects during WWII that were similar to ships, both in size and in firepower. Yuri Pasholok named these types of projects "land cruisers". Let us look at two designs where even the term "superheavy" seems constricting.

Davletov's Land Cruiser

On April 13th, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense received a letter from the village of Gorniy Balykley, Stalingrad oblast. Its author was a student of the Azov-Chernomorkiy institute of mechanical engineering, G.A. Davletov. The envelope contained a description and a sketch of a combat vehicle that baffled the imagination. The author was inspired by an analysis of recent wars, from WWI to the Winter War. He took it upon himself to create a combat vehicle capable of penetrating a series of fortifications like the Mannerheim Line without losses.

The result was a 2.5 thousand ton tank with a 40 meter long hull (width was half of that distance). Davletov intended his vehicle for land, but also equipped it with two propellers to move on water. The giant would be propelled by a massive (and also nonexistant) 15,000 hp engine bank. The author expected his vehicle to achieve a speed of 40 kph on land and up to 13.5 knots on water (about 25 kph). The fuel would not be gasoline or even boiler oil, but raw oil.

The armament of this land cruiser was appropriate for its size. The 5 meter tall turret would hold three 500 mm mortars with a range of 30 kilometers, two long-range 150 mm guns with a range of 35 kilometers, and ten 75 mm guns. This was not enough, Davletov also wanted four AA guns and 20 mounted machineguns. The ammunition supply was also impressive, 100 rounds for each mortar. In addition, the enormous "deck" of the land cruiser would contain 16 fueled up tanks, ready to fight.

Here is how the author proposed his vehicle be used: "Concentrate up to 100 land cruisers 250-300 km from the front line. These 100 cruisers would have 1800 tanks (200 amphibious). In addition, the ships could hold up to 4 infantry divisions with armament."

At nightfall, the armada would move out towards the front lines, and reach them by morning. A few hours before dawn, bombers would destroy enemy fortifications before they are hit with the wave of cruisers. After that, almost 2000 tanks would dismount and launch an attack. Davletov considered two hours to be enough to defeat the enemy's defenses. "The cruisers follow penetrations of the tanks, firing on remaining pockets of resistance, crushing them with their mass, widening the breach. Their aim is to join up with paratroops and aircraft to capture the enemy capital."

The author claimed that there was no force that could stop his cruisers. The 100 mm thick armour could only be penetrated by large caliber guns or a heavy bomb, but cooperation with other types of forces would mitigate that risk: aircraft would protect it from the air and infantry from the ground. However, the land cruisers could fight alone. For instance, to capture a well protected island. The ship would bombard it from 30-35 km away, and then move in to drop off 18 tanks and several hundred infantrymen. Davletov expected that his cruiser could fight with a whole squadron of enemy ships. In this case, the tanks on deck would be swapped for torpedo boats.

The author expected that his project would be considered an impossible fantasy, but he bet on the Soviet government wanting to turn fantasy into reality. He expected that a prototype could be ready soon, if work was split up between various departments: "Building of the hull could be delegated to shipbuilders, armament could be made by artillerymen, transmission and tracks by tankers, and the engine by power plant engineers", he wrote.

Even if the USSR risked such an ambitious project, there would not be enough time for it. War was coming.

Osokin's Tank Cruiser

Another "land cruiser" was proposed to GABTU in 1942. "Wishing to help my beloved Motherland in its struggle against the fascist hordes... I present for your attention my project of a new powerful vehicle for the Red Army: the tank cruiser" wrote Engineer-Colonel Osokin (initials unknown).

His proposal travelled a long way. First, military engineers thought it was interesting, up to the deputy commander of the Ural Military District, who promised to pull some strings in Moscow. The inventor never received any news from Moscow, and decided to write himself, with his commander's permission. Osokin was certain that his project would be a success, and that any delay was undesirable.

What did he propose to create? "The tank cruiser (TK) consists of a four-motor land fortress on tracks with powerful armour and armament." The TK consisted of a main hull on two tracks and two tracked vehicles to each side. They consisted of two suspensions connected with a single transmission and engine compartment. Each of these had its own fighting compartment. Unlike Davletov's vehicle, Osokin's cruiser did not float. Pontoons would be needed to cross water.

The central hull would be welded from different thicknesses of plates. Osokin separated it with bulkheads into several sections. The front contained the cockpit, which housed the driver and commander. Behind them, a compartment for the technician and a radio operator, which was connected to the gun compartment.

One of the most interesting features of Osokin's design was the armament. The main turret housed a duo of 152 mm guns. Behind it was a compartment for ammunition. Each secondary vehicle would have a T-34 turret with a 76 mm gun. The rear of the "tank cruiser" would have coaxial AA machineguns and an AA gun on a rotating mount.

Osokin listed the characteristics of his fearsome creation. The length of the TK's hull was 21.45 meters, width was 9.7 meters. The height was less than 4.3 meters. The 270 ton vehicle would be brought to life by 1500 hp M-40 engines. The armour thickness varied from 125 mm in the front to 50-100 on the sides, and 50-80 on the roof and floor. Armour was powerless against gas attacks, so Osokin equipped each compartment and of his tank with a tank of compressed air.

The tactical applications of the TK could be many: destruction of fortification lines, pockets of resistance, fighting artillery of all calibers, fighting enemy tanks, SPGs, and motorized infantry. The triumphant conclusion would be "accompanying the victorious Red Army in its march towards the capitals of the enemy, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Bucharest, and then westward, to liberate the peoples under the fascist yoke."

Sadly (or fortunately) both land cruisers were rejected by GABTU. They spent many years in archives and only became public knowledge fairly recently. As a result, their German equivalent, the Ratte, is much more widely known. Interestingly enough, Davletov foresaw its appearance: "The enemy will have no choice but to build his own land cruisers. During the first year of the war, he who has a sufficient amount of cruisers ready will be the undisputed ruler of the land." The author was wrong. The war was won not by a battle of inventors' fantasies, but by boring yet effective regular tanks.

Original article available here.

Saturday, 12 December 2015

World of Tanks History Section: Czechoslovakian Tanks

Before WWII, Czechoslovakia was one of the leading tank building countries in the world. It lost that status in 1939 after the German occupation, but their powerful industry kept working. Here, famous Marder and Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank destroyers were built, as well as hulls for the King Tigers. In providing for their army, Germany unwittingly set up the perfect conditions for Czechoslovakia to resume its position in the tank building world after its liberation.

In the fall of 1945, months after the war, the military and engineers of Czechoslovakia resumed their work, combining personal experience and technical solutions from both the German and Soviet tank design schools. Sadly, most of these designs were never produced for economic or political reasons.

Here is a brief overview of the most interesting Czechoslovakian tanks.

Kolohousenka KH.50

The first Czechoslovakian tank, designed by the combined efforts of Ringhoffer, Laurin & Klement and Breitfeld-Danek companies. The first two chassis built in 1923 were built based on solutions used in the German Hanomag WD-50PS tractor. The tank was equipped with a wheeled suspension, designed by German engineer Heinrich Folmer, which could be raised or lowered. The engine was also a German design. The tank was armed with a 37 mm cannon installed in a one-man turret.

Thanks to the wheeled suspension, the KH.50 was superior to its contemporaries in terms of range and speed. At the same time, this design was very complicated. Two improved KH.60 and one KH.70 designs were also produced. Engineers managed to improve the vehicle, but it was still very heavy, and very complex.

Work on the Kolohousenka family ended in 1929. The two KH.60 tanks were sold to the USSR, the KH.70 to Italy. The new owners studied these prototypes and came to the same conclusions: this design has no potential for further improvements.

LT vz. 35

Based on requirements from the Czechoslovakian army, Skoda designed the S-IIa cavalry tank in 1935. It surpassed is competitor, the P-II-a from CKD, and was adopted under the index LT vz. 35 (light tank model 1935).

At the moment of its creation, the LT vz. 35 was one of the best tanks in its class. The suspension provided smooth travel and the 37 mm vz. 34 cannon could defeat most tanks of the era. The front armour, 25 mm thick, protected the tank from high caliber machineguns, one of the main AT methods of the 1930s.

The contract for production of new tanks was divided evenly between Skoda and CKD. 298 LT vz. 35 tanks were built for the Czechoslovakian army. Foreign militaries also noticed this impressive novelty. Romania bought 126 tanks and used them under the index R-2. Bulgaria bought 10 improved tanks under the index T-11. After occupation, the German army adopted the LT vz. 35 under the index PzKpfw 35(t). They were used until the end of 1941.

LT vz. 38

In late 1937, the Czechoslovakian army announced a competition for a new light tank to replace the LT vz. 35. CKD entered their TNH-S tank, an improved version of an export tank designed for Iran. In July of 1938, after trials and numerous improvements, the tank was adopted under the index LT vz. 38 (light tank model 1938). The tank was quickly put into production, but only about 10 were finished before the German occupation.

The LT vz. 38 was the best pre-war Czechoslovakian tank, and the best light tank in the world at the start of WWII. Designed by Aleksei Surin, it combined good maneuverability and powerful armament. A good modernization reserve allowed the front armour to be increased to 50 mm without a loss of speed. The excellent design ensured that production continued even after German control. 1414 vehicles of this type were made. Hungary and Romania also used this tank. Sweden bought a license for the LT vz. 38 and produced it under the index Strv M/41.

In 1941, the LT vz. 38, already under the German flag and index, ran into Soviet KV-1 and T-34 tanks, against which it had little chance in battle. To be fair, in comparison to new Soviet tanks, almost all German vehicles appeared obsolete.

ST vz. 39

Work on medium tanks in Czechoslovakia began in 1931. At first, a combined drive vehicle was designed, but in 1934, it was discarded in favour of an all-tracked design. In 1934, the Czechoslovakian army announced a competition for a new medium tank. Tatra and Skoda submitted their designs.

The first CKD medium tank, indexed V-8-He, was built in December of 1937. The vehicle, designed by a group under the direction of Aleksei Surin, was a combination of solutions used in the LT vz. 34 tank and another prototype, the SP-II-b. It used a similar suspension, and the hull and turret were further evolutions of those used on the light tank. The first prototype had a dummy turret, but by 1938, a new prototype was ready, with a proper turret and a 47 mm Skoda A-9 gun. Thanks to the 250 hp V-shaped Praha NR engine, the tank could accelerate to a speed of over 40 kph, and the 32 mm of front armour reliably protected from high caliber machineguns and autocannons. The result was a modern tank, comparable with German and Soviet vehicles of the era.

In September of 1938, the tank was adopted into the army under the index ST vz. 39, but production did not start before the German occupation. Unlike the LT vz. 38, the medium tank was of no interest to the Germans, so it was not put into production.

Skoda T-24

In late 1941, under the initiative of the German Skoda director, Wilhelm Foss, a project was started to design a new medium tank for the German army. The new tank had little in common with medium tanks designed by Skoda earlier. The Soviet T-34 that had such an effect on the Germans was picked as a baseline.

Information on how work progressed on this new tank is contradictory. Two opinions exist: one that the tank began its life under the index T-24, and was later renamed T-25. The second states that both tanks were designed in parallel. Almost no information remains on the T-24 tank. There is only one blueprint, dated May 1942, which presumably depicts the T-24.

Like German engineers, the Skoda design bureau only borrowed the layout with sloped armour from the T-34, the rest was their own work. The tank had a torsion bar suspension, six road wheels per side, and a 380 hp engine. The T-24 project was shut down in September of 1942, with work focusing on the more promising T-25 tank. No effort was made to produce this tank in metal.

Skoda T-25

The T-25 medium tank was the pinnacle of Czechoslovakian tank design. The draft was proposed in May 1942, and the final design was ready by October.

The tank was seriously influenced by the Soviet T-34, but ultimately, only the layout with sloped armour was copied. The suspension consisted of six road wheels per side, on torsion bars. The T-25 would have a 500 hp 12-cylinder Skoda engine, letting the 23 ton tank accelerate to 60 kph. The armour was up to 50 mm thick. The armament was very original: a 75 mm Skoda A18 gun with a revolver type loading mechanism. The drum held 5 shots.

Due to the more promising Panther tank designed by MAN, the T-25 was cancelled in late 1942.

Konštrukta T-34/100

In 1949, Czechoslovakia obtained a license to produce the T-34-85 medium tank from the USSR. The first tanks left the assembly line of the CKD factory in Sokolovo on September 1st, 1951. Starting in 1953, production moved to Martin (Slovakia). 2736 tanks were built.

After the T-34-85, Czechoslovakia obtained a license for the SU-100 tank destroyer, armed with the powerful D-10S 100 mm gun. An idea was born to equip the T-34 with a gun of the same caliber. Konštrukta Trenčín started work on this project, then the Vojenský Technický Ústav (Military Technical Institute, or VTU). The project started in 1953, and by April of next year, the VTU proposed a T-34-85 with a redesigned turret. The front was lengthened to accept a 100 mm gun. The gun could be mounted in two slightly different ways.

The redesign was of little interest to the military, especially since production of the T-54 began in Martin in 1957.

TVP VTU Koncept

On October 17th, 1945, the General Staff of the Czechoslovakian army approved the requirements for a new medium tank. The project was named Tank Všeobecného Použití (TVP), or Main Battle Tank. The VTU stepped forward as the developer, with the T-34-85 as its inspiration, namely the slopes of the armour, its thickness, the armament, and mass.

The draft was proposed on March 2nd, 1946. Little of the T-34-85 remained in the project aside from sloped armour. The front of the tank had a machinegun and a flamethrower. The suspension was also homebrewed: leaf springs similar to those on the LT vz. 38 and German-designed tracks. Nothing specific was mentioned about the engine, aside from the requirements of a diesel engine that would produce 20 hp/ton. The turret used German designs. The armament would be the 88 mm L/56 gun.

During discussions, the military wished to improve the armament. The German 88 mm L/71 gun and 105 mm AA gun were proposed as options. The tank did not move past the draft stage, as the project was passed onto Skoda, who used it as a basis for their T-40 tank.

Škoda T 50

The Skoda T-40 became a stepping stone for further development of the universal TVP tank. Due to constantly growing appetites of the military, the vehicle had to be changed repeatedly until it was no longer recognizable. Only the dimensions and six road wheels per side remained. This stage of the project was called T-50, or just TVP.

Little is known about this design. Czech historians propose that it was influenced by the Soviet IS-3 heavy tank. The light Skoda T-17 tank serves as circumstantial evidence. Its turret was reminiscent of the IS-3, and its hull had the same pike nose. The TVP was supposed to be an enlarged T-17 according to some historians, but precise information on what was happening with the project during this period is lacking.

Information regarding armament is also brief. It is only known that, starting in 1949, the R 11 AA gun or the 100 mm A 20 gun were considered, with tank versions of both in development.

Škoda TVP T 50/51

The TVP obtained its final look on February 18th, 1950. On that day, Skoda and CKD, who were working on the project in parallel, presented their draft proposal. The CKD variant had the factory index TNHtA, but effectively these were the same tank, since the blueprints show almost no differences. The only difference is in the design of the transmission and engines.

Serious changes were made since the last stage of the project. The pike was discarded, and the front of the hull was closer to the AMX M4. The suspension was also redesigned. The turret was made anew, and received the ZK 477 AA machinegun. An X-shaped 1000 hp engine was proposed. The armament remained unchanged: either the R 11 or A 20.

Work did not progress past a 1:10 scale model. The license for the Soviet T-34-85 spelled the end of the project. The TVP was cancelled in March of 1950.

Original article available here.

Superheavy Paper Tank Destoyers

Fantasies regarding WWII era armour in the areas of technical capabilities and application in combat, both of tanks that existed and those that never made it off paper (or were never even planned at all), are very widespread. A popular category of these fantasies concerns tank destroyers on the chassis of German superheavy tanks. Do any of them actually have a basis in reality?

The Atlantis of German tank design: E-100 Krokodil


The E-100 and Maus superheavy tanks are some of the most worshipped idols among German armour. The fact that the development of both was stopped by a personal order from Hitler in July of 1944 does not stop many from believing that both monsters could make it to mass production. In reality, the fate of the Maus was sealed when the Allies bombed Krupp's factories and there was nowhere left to produce the tank. The E-100 was never fully assembled and never moved under its own power, nor was a contractor determined for its production.

Jagdpanzer E-100 Krokodil with a 173 mm K18 gun. This layout and even the gun have no connection to reality.


Tank destroyers on the chassis of the E-100 and Maus tanks are another topic. Information on these vehicles is quite incomplete which gives fertile soil to wild fantasies. One of the most hyped up examples at present is the imaginary E-100 Krokodil.

Thanks to French artist Hubert Cance who drew this tank destroyer in two variants (149 and 173 mm guns) for the 22nd issue of Batailles & Blindes magazine published in November of 2007, the mythical project took shape. It went as far as the creation of scale models by very serious plastic model companies based on the artist's projections. The fact that the vehicle would break down every 10 kilometers from the strain on the front road wheels clearly did not occur to him.

Superheavy guns for superheavy tank destroyers


Meanwhile, tank destroyers on the E-100 and Maus chassis were indeed planned, but information on them is scarce. Nevertheless, even scraps of archive data allow us to lift the veil off the heaviest and most armoured tank destroyer in the world.


In late March of 1944, the Krupp design bureau developed two guns: the 15 cm StuK L/63 and 17 cm StuK L/53. According to calculations, both could penetrate 200 mm of armour at 4 kilometers. It is not known who the intended target for these monsters was, but both guns appear in Guderian's report detailing potential developments on April 7th, 1944.

The designation of both guns dictated that they were meant for SPGs. These guns could potentially be installed on relatively light Panther or Tiger based vehicles, but in reality only one carrier was built, the 17 cm Kanone 72 (Sfl) Geschuetzwagen Tiger otherwise known as Grille 17. The choice of chassis for gigantic anti-tank guns remained open.

Data from a blueprint of the 17 cm StuK L/53 dated March 23rd, 1944

Sturmgeschutz Maus


Around the same time that Krupp proposed projects for superheavy guns, activity around the superheavy Maus tank resumed, simultaneously with its rival, the E-100, the 140 ton superheavy tank from Adlerwerke. In practice, Adler proposed a redesign of the 1942 Tiger-Maus project, developed by Krupp and cancelled in favour of the Maus. Even the turret used in the blueprint is the Maus turret from January 1st, 1943, also proposed for the Tiger-Maus. This blueprint has notes on two guns, 15 cm and 17 cm. In order to not breed any illusions, let me state that this does not mean anyone had plans to install these guns in this tank.


An American CIOS report sheds light on this note. It states that German engineers did consider the E-100 as a potential platform for 149 mm and 173 mm guns. It also states that the results of their calculations were disappointing: these guns could be squeezed in, but the turret would have to become immobile. The aforementioned turret design was not even considered.

In April of 1944, Krupp started work on a new simplified turret, known as the Maus II turret. The E-100 version had its mass reduced to 35 tons by reducing the thickness of side armour to 80 mm. The 128 mm KwK L/55 would be the main gun on both turrets, with a secondary 75 mm KwK L/24. A rangefinder was also added to both turrets, with the axis of rotation of this pairing directly next to it. It's interesting how a more powerful gun was supposed to fit into such a tight space.

Sketch of an E-100 heavy tank with a 149 or 173 mm gun specified. This sketch became the foundation for many fantasies.

Initially, the E-100 was not a serious option for a superheavy tank destroyer. Its design was not even finished, but the Maus was already undergoing trials, and was a suitable vehicle. Correspondence mentions a draft of an assault gun on the Maus chassis that were delivered to Krupp and Porsche on May 9th, 1944, but sadly, the blueprints did not survive to this day. The 15 cm StuK L/63 was chosen as the main weapon. It was also suggested that a 30 mm automatic AA gun should be added to the top of the Sturmgeschutz Maus, but the idea was rejected on the assumption that the vehicle would be accompanied by SPAAG vehicles.

Sturmgeschutz E-100


The lifetime of the Maus assault gun was not long. While work was being done, it was discovered that the height of the vehicle would exceed the railroad limit. Even if the AA turret was removed, the problem remained. As a result, the Maus project fell apart, and the E-100, whose chassis was much lower, came into play. By the way, the unsolvable problem faced by Krupp and Porsche engineers directly indicates that any fantasies with a Jagdpanther-like fighting compartment are completely unfounded.

Blueprint for a 15 cm StuK L/68 mount in an SPG on the E-100 chassis.


On May 29th, 1944, Krupp requested permission for the development of draft documentation for a 1:5 scale model of 149 mm and 173 mm guns on the E-100 chassis. As with the Maus, the 149 mm gun received higher priority. The gun was redesigned, and its length reached 68 calibers. The blueprint for the 15 cm StuK L/68 on the Sturmgeschutz E-100 was ready on July 4th, 1944. The design of the gun was very similar to that of the 12.8 cm KwK L/55, meant for the Maus and E-100. The guns had an identical recoil mechanism, among other components. As for the vehicle itself, no blueprints remain. However, the slope of the front armour plate on the gun mount blueprint dispel any possibility of a front fighting compartment, same as with the Maus.


Data from the blueprint for a 15 cm StuK L/68 mount in an SPG on the E-100 chassis dated July 4th, 1944

The CIOS report casts a light on this project as well. According to the report, it became obvious that the tank will not meet requirements before the project was done. This fact did not stop the creators, and the tank was partially assembled. In parallel with trying to revive the E-100 as a tank, work continued to convert it to a tank destroyer. The tank would receive a fixed casemate instead of a turret. According to CIOS data, engineers also altered the tank's layout. The transmission, as well as the drive wheels, were moved from the front to the rear. Sadly, no blueprints of the StuG E-100 remain, but based on the conversions, it was likely that it would end up looking like the Ferdinand.

According to available documentation, the StuG E-100 1:5 scale model was finished and shown to Guderian. However, the project was doomed. On July 10th, Hitler ordered the cancellation of all superheavy tanks and SPGs on their chassis. This did not stop Krupp from continuing to work on assembling the E-100 half-legally and, in parallel, preparing 6 hulls and turrets for the Maus, but there was no possibility of further projects. The superheavy tank destroyer died without seeing the light of day.

Thursday, 10 December 2015

Red Army Exercises, 1941

CAMD RF 28-1167-367

Here's an interesting little table, vehicles planned for use during Red Army exercises in 1941. The rows list the various exercises, as follows:

Kiev Special Military District: June 1941
Western Special Military District: October 1941
Baltic Special Military District: July 1941
Transbaikal Military District: August 1941
Far East Military District: August 1941
Siberian Military District: September 1941
Arkhangelsk Military District: August 1941

These are all boring, since if you look at the columns to the right, they don't use any tanks at all, only light cars, GAZ-AA trucks, and ZiS-5 trucks. The next two are a little more interesting:

Auto transport exercises in Kiev Special Military District: June 1941
Auto transport exercises in the Western Special Military District: July 1941

These exercises involve a lot more trucks and also 50 special vehicles of some kind. But we don't get the good stuff until:

Combined arms exercises in Kiev Special Military District: September 1941
Combined arms exercises in the Western Special Military District: September 1941

Now we're talking! Lots and lots of vehicle! The middle section is tanks, and it's fairly self explanatory (the last column is armoured cars), the section to the right is tractors (Comintern, Komsomolets, S-65, STZ-5). After that is another pair of interesting columns, "length of work per vehicle per day" (presumably in hours, with the hours for combat vehicles in the numerator and light vehicles in the denominator) and "average daily distance travelled per vehicle" (light cars in the numerator and trucks in the denominator).

It's interesting to note that despite a large number of old model tanks, only 50 T-34s are issued for exercises and only 60 KVs, showing how protective the Red Army was of its shiny new toys, even for such limited exercises. Sadly, the war cut these plans short, and the T-34 had to earn its combined arms experience in battle.

Wednesday, 9 December 2015

PTRS vs PTRD

"Evaluation of Degryaryev and Simonov anti-tank rifles based on the reviews of privates, Sergeants, and officers of anti-tank rifle units
  1. Simonov's rifle starts jamming after only a small amount of fouling in the chamber, after 10-15 shots. Degtyaryev's rifle is flawless in its action. I knocked out a tank near Skopishki at 300 meters (with a BS-32 bullet). - Sergeant Pazharduk, 665th Reg., 216 Div.
  2. The Degtyaryev anti-tank rifle has an insufficient rate of fire for fighting tanks, reloading takes too long. The rate of fire of Simonov's rifle is good, but heavy for attacking. Their weakness is that they are not used with the whole unit, but split up among companies and platoons, which removes the ability to fire in groups on tanks and other targets. BS-32 bullets have weak incendiary properties, BS-41 bullets are good. - Sergeant Pikalov, 346th. Div.
  3. The PTRD is an excellent weapon, works flawlessly. The PTRS jams often when there is any dirt in it or when the lubricant freezes. - Artillery Quartermaster, 1166th Reg., 346th Div. Jr. Military Technician Prikhodko
  4. The PTRD is flawless in battle, never has any jams that create difficulties on the battlefield. However, its weakness is that it has no magazine. The PTRS has a high rate of fire, and is convenient to carry, as it can be taken apart and put back together quickly. Its drawback is that it has many jams that cannot be fixed on the battlefield, the assembled rifle is heavy, the round casings burst often, and the chamber is fouled, which results in jams. 4 medium tanks were knocked out with anti-tank rifles from 300 meters (BS-41 bullet), and three armoured cars from 200 meters. - Artillery Quartermaster, 1168th Reg. 346th Div.
  5. The PTRS has sufficient rate of fire, and sufficient penetration for a light or medium tank. Its drawbacks include jamming in dusty conditions and case expansion, which makes reloading difficult.
    The PTRD is light and mobile, reliable in cold and dust. The penetration is sufficient. Drawbacks include a lot rate of fire. During fighting in Lithuania and Latvia 3 tanks were knocked out at a range of 250-300 meters with incendiary bullets. - Commander, 1st Company, 1168th Reg. 346th Div. Captain Gotozhkov
  6. The PTRD is superior to the PTRS, its penetration is good. With three aimed shots, an enemy machinegun was destroyed at 250 meters. Company commander, 346th Div. Sr. Lieutenant Deritz
  7. The anti-tank rifle is a good weapon for destroying enemy strongholds, armoured cars, and other weapons. - Sr. Sergeant Fedoseev
  8. The penetration of the anti-tank rifle at 100 meters is 45 mm. The rate of fire of the PTRS is 10-15 RPM, of the PTRD is 8-10 RPM. The rate of fire is good. The anti-tank rifle is very effective at destroying enemy machinegun nests. The anti-tank rifle likes cleanliness, good care, and constant lubrication. - Jr. Sergeant Kvichko
  9. Anti-tank rifle units prefer to be armed with PTRD rifles, as they are lighter and more reliable. Currently, AT rifles are rarely used against tanks, as our units are saturated with AT artillery. They are normally used to destroy cars, prime movers, and light armoured cars. - Artillery Quartermaster, 417th Div. Malinin
Conclusions
  1. In the second phase of the Patriotic War, when the Red Army went on the offensive on all fronts, our forces became saturated with AT artillery, improvement of armour on medium tanks and increased numbers of heavy tanks, the importance of anti-tank rifles as anti-tank weapons decreased drastically.
    The anti-tank rifle lost its power as an infantry anti-tank weapon. Artillery effectively fights tanks now. The anti-tank rifle, due to its high precision, is now used against open enemy concentrations, armoured cars, and APCs. This is natural, given the state of equipment of infantry at this time.
  2. Almost all anti-tank rifle units speak well of the PTRD: light to carry and flawless in battle. Some wish to increase its rate of fire, others mention that the rate of fire is the only good quality of the PTRS. There are no positive reviews of its reliability, only negative. After 10-15 shots, it starts jamming, and these jams are hard to fix, consume a lot of time, which is unacceptable in modern fast-paced battle.
    The PTRS is unusable in battle, and its subsequent production is pointless.
  3. Retain the PTRD in production, increase its rate of fire.
51st Army HQ Chief, Major-General Dashevskiy
Chief of the Artillery HQ, Colonel Shvedkov
September 28th, 1944"

Via artem-mr.

Artillery Effectiveness

As mentioned in this article, even the most impressive artillery barrage doesn't amount to much when you're just dumping shells in the vague direction of the enemy. Every shot must be carefully aimed, and the aftermath analyzed in order to ensure effectiveness. Here are some of these analyses, from the Battle of Kursk. Notice the difference that effective scouting makes: if you know exactly where the target is, you can drop shells directly on top of it. If you don't know where the target is, you are forced to blanket the area in shells, drastically reducing effectiveness.


Target #364, east of the Parashino agricultural college. Shells fired: 80 76 mm, 20 122 mm. 
Shells that hit within 50 meters: 7 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Shells that hit within 75-100 meters: 6 76 mm, 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun damaged by shrapnel, crew members killed.

Target #422, 3 150 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 872nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 40 122 mm shells used.


Target #471 north of Senkovo. Shots fired: 39
Shells that hit within 50 meters: 33, 21 122 mm, 12 76 mm
Shells that hit within 50-100 meters: 6, 5 122 mm, 1 76 mm
Effectiveness: gun destroyed.

Target #485, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 872nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 54 122 mm shells used.


Target #541, south of Glazunovka. Shells fired: 75 122 mm, 40 152 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 2 122 mm, 6 152 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 5 122 mm, 10 152 mm
Effectiveness: one 150 mm gun damaged, crew members killed.

Target #514, south-west of the Prozorovskiy farmstead. Shells fired: 43
Hits within 50 meters: 39, 21 122 mm, 18 76 mm
Hits within 100 meters: 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: one gun with crew destroyed.


Target #622 west of the Parashino agricultural college. Shells fired: 80 76 mm, 20 122 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 10 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 5 76 mm, 2 122 mm
Effectiveness: 1 gun destroyed, 1 gun damaged by shrapnel.

Target #543: north-west of Kuznach. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 56 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 3 76 mm, 12 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 4 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Effectiveness: 1 gun destroyed, crew killed.


Target #665, 2 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 469th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 46 122 mm shells used.

Target #721, Kriviye Verkhi. Shells fired: 75 122 mm, 40 152 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 3 122 mm, 10 152 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 4 122 mm, 6 152 mm
Effectiveness: one gun damaged by shrapnel, two crews killed.


Target #752, north-east of Lodyrevo. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 11 76 mm, 9 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 6 76 mm, 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun and crew destroyed.

Target #784, north-east of Lodyrevo. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 7 76 mm, 9 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 8 76 mm, 1 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun damaged by shrapnel, direct hit on two dugouts with people.


Target #792, north-east of Sadoviy. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 20 76 mm, 3 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 2 76 mm, 2 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun  destroyed, 2 guns damaged by shrapnel, 3 crews killed.

Target #846, 3 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 3rd squadron,  753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 78 152 mm shells used.


Target #1022, 3 150 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 3/642 Corps Gun Artillery Regiment. 76 107 mm shells used.
Target #1024, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 2nd squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 64 152 mm shells used.


Target #1082, 3 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 1st squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 58 152 mm shells used.

Target #1142, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 2nd squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 56 152 mm shells used.


Target #3975, north-west of Senkovo
Number of hits: 34
Within 50 meters: 26, 4 152 mm, 22 122 mm
Within 50-100 meters: 8, 3 152 mm, 5 122 mm
Effectiveness: 2 guns knocked out by shrapnel, 2 dugouts destroyed

Target 4042, east of Sadovod
Number of hits: 22
Within 50 meters: 13 152 mm
Within 50-150 meters: 9 152 mm
Effectiveness: 2 vehicles destroyed, 2 guns damaged by shrapnel.

Monday, 7 December 2015

Cheating at Statistics 12: Overclaim at Oboyan

In a previous article, we saw some SS Tigers make quite a kill claim.

"12 July 1943: Fierce Soviet tank attacks from the direction of Jamki, Prochorovka and Petrovka (on both sides of Kalinin) are pushed back. The II./SS-Panzer-Regiment "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" and the Tiger company knock out 163 enemy tanks. One Tiger is knocked out; nine Tigers undergo repair.
Total tanks: 12."

Since the words "SS", "Tiger" and "kill claim" immediately set off a siren, let's take a look at how the 1st Tank Army, the unit defending Oboyan direction, handled such a crushing blow.

"According to orders from the Front Commander, the 1st Tank Army regrouped, starting on the afternoon of July 11th and ending on the night of July 12th.

The 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps concentrated at 2nd Novoselovka with the goals of advancing towards Shepelevka and Luhanino.

The 10th Tank Corps, transferring its defenses to the 204th Infantry Division, took up positions along the western outskirts of Novenkoye with the goal of advancing towards Berezovka and Syrtsevo.

The 6th Tank Corps remained in place to allow for the 5th Guards Stalingrad and 10th Tank Corps to deploy, as well as to prevent penetration of the enemy in the north-west direction.

The 204th and 309th Infantry Divisions, 3rd Mechanized Corps, and 31st Tank Corps remained in place to prevent the enemy from penetrating to the north, and to begin advancing with the 5th and 10th Tank Corps in the event that the enemy retreats south.

At 9:00 on July 12th, the army began its offensive."
Tank Front

What we have here is a very common picture: the attack of the famed and fawned over Tiger fails, and the battlefield is in Soviet hands. Many kill claims (unverifiable, as the Germans cannot inspect the battlefield after) are made, and tanks lost in the attack are registered as "undergoing repairs", while still on Soviet territory. By July 15th, as the company is going though a "planned retreat" south, these tanks are already forgotten.

Let's look at the two attacking tank units that would have faced off with the SS tanks on July 12th, namely the 10th Tank Corps and 5th Guards Tank Corps.


10th Tank Corps:
"As a result of battles from July 12th to July 14th, our corps destroyed:
  • Tanks: 123
  • Soldiers and officers: up to 2500
  • Vehicles: 132
  • Guns: 19
  • Aircraft: 5
Our losses for this period:
  • Killed: 175
  • Wounded: 144
  • Tanks burned up or knocked out: 23"
I don't have the documents for the 5th Guards Tank Corps, but it's not particularly difficult to estimate the likelihood that the German kill claims are correct. The Corps was formed from three tank brigades and one motorized infantry brigade. Based on the time of the formation of the tank brigades, they would have followed cadre #010/270: 53 tanks (32 T-34s, 21 T-70s). The motorized infantry was armed only with armoured cars and unarmoured vehicles. Assuming that all 23 of the 10th TC's tanks were knocked out on July 12th, that still leaves 140 tanks unaccounted for compared to the 153 available tanks in the 5th Guards TC, assuming they started the battle at full capacity. Since the Battle of Kursk started a while ago, they almost certainly didn't. The neighbouring 2nd Tank Corps was down to 85 tanks

 Since the advance of the unit continued until July 15th after which it was reassigned to the 6th Guards Army and fought further, one can safely assume that they had a lot more than 13 tanks left over after the battle on July 12th, especially as documents of the Voronezh Front do not mention any particular difficulty faced by the 5th Guards at this time. As usual, impressive SS kill claims turn out to be nothing but fiction.