Replaceable Tires

"USSR NKTP
All-Union State Special Machine-building Trust
April 4th, 1935
#37-372-1232s
To the director of the Voroshilov factory, comrade Dufur
Copy: director of the Kirov factory, director of factory #185, RKKA ABTU

Despite the quite obvious necessity of switching to T-26 tanks with removable road wheel tires in 1935, the issue is still not resolved. The necessity of using removable tires is confirmed by both trials (in a 3000 km run, only two road wheels broke for reasons not connected to their tires) and the unsatisfactory robustness of the enlarged road wheels on that same vehicle, SU-5, and other vehicles on the T-26 chassis.

The claim that the production will be too costly is countered by the necessity to restore the old casting molds, which will be more expensive than making new casting molds for the simpler removable tires.

Finally, the cost of use will not increase if one considers the significant gain in reliability and decrease in rejections of manufactured components. The tire will be molded on a separate simple mold, as opposed to a complicated combination mold.

Considering the aforementioned points, I consider it necessary to immediately switch to removable tires for the T-26, for which:

1. The director of the Voroshilov factory, comrade Dufur, in cooperation with the Kirov factory, must develop a plan to produce production together with the aim of switching to production of removable tires in the fourth quarter of 1935.
2. The directory of factory #185 comrade Barykov must sign a contract with the Kirov factory to supply road wheels for the production of the SU-5 and other experimental vehicles on the T-26 chassis.

The full plan of shifting production to road wheels with removable tires and the cost of this transition should be given to me for approval no later than April 15th of 1935.

Director of the Special Machine-building Trust, Neimann"

V. Lehn Collection

Valentines for Victory

The plucky little Valentine tank was in the very first catalog of tanks offered to the Soviet Union by the British. The first Valentines went into battle in November of 1941, and despite orders ceasing due to the Valentine's obsolescence, Valentine tanks remained in the Red Army until the end of the war, not just fancy Mark XIs but regular old MkIII*s as well.

"To the commander of the 6th Guards Cavalry Grodno Division

Battle report #0113, HQ of the 198th Allenstein Tank Regiment, Rheinsberg, 10:30, April 30th, 1945. Map 100.000, dated 1935

1. The regiment, in cooperation with the 28th Cavalry Regiment, travelled 40 km with battles on April 29th, 1945, capturing the following settlements: Barsdorf, Blumenow, Zootzen, Tramzov, Buchholz, Burow, Menz, Rheinsberg.
2. The following damage was done to the enemy:
1. Destroyed:
1. 11 large caliber guns
2. 19 automatic guns
3. 1 SPG
4. 14 AA machineguns
5. 20 hand machineguns
6. 8 mortars
7. 9 APCs
8. 7 tractors
9. 123 cars
10. 23 motorcycles
11. 100 bicycles
12. 80 trailers
13. 134 soldiers and officers killed
2. 60 enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner
3. 725 Soviet prisoners of war were liberated
3. No materiel or personnel losses were taken on April 29th, 1945
4. The regiment has:
1. 5 T-34 tanks, 5 combat ready
2. 10 Valentine MkIX tanks, 8 combat ready
3. 3 Valentine MkIII tanks, 3 combat ready
4. 7 SU-100, 7 combat ready
5. 5 S-76, 5 combat ready
   Two MkIX tanks need medium repairs, and one SU-100 needs light repairs.
5. Supplies:
1. Fuel and lubricant
1. Gasoline: 0.5 refills
2. Gasoil: 1.3 refills
3. Aircraft lubricant: 1.3 refills
2. Ammunition:
1. 100 mm shells: 2 refills
2. 85 mm shells: 2 refills
3. 57 mm shells: 1.3 refills
4. 40 mm shells: 0.5 refills
5. BESA ammunition: 1.8 refills
6. Bren ammunition: 1.8 refills
7. DT ammunition: 1.8 refills
3. Food: 3 days
6. Communication with HQ is done through a communications officer."

CAMD RF 3895-135762-1

World of Tanks History Section: How Tanks Learned to Fight

European strategists planned on finishing up the war that erupted in August of 1914 in only a few weeks. Many young officers were afraid that they would not have time to prove their bravery on the battlefield. Sadly, both groups were mistaken. Not that much time elapsed before the war ended up in a positional dead end. All offensives ended up the same: hundreds, sometimes tens of meters of progress at a horrible cost in human lives.

Both sides of the conflict looked for a solution, inventing more and more new types of weapons until one September morning in 1916, the sound of tracks and tank engines filled the air.

Perfect Theory and Flawed Practice

The British military theorist Ernest Swinton and French Jean-Baptiste Etienne proved the need for tanks on the battlefield and described in detail how they should be used. They wrote that tanks should be used suddenly, in large numbers, and only on appropriate terrain. Here, Swinton immediately made the note that there is often a gap between theory and practice.

That was exactly what happened in first tank battles. The army, exhausted by battles at the Somme, needed hope for a victory. Not in a year or two, but now. There was no time to save up tanks, train crews, and practise cooperation with infantry. Any delay could mean loss of initiative to the Germans. This is why instead of armoured armadas, only 32 tanks went into battle on September 15th, 1916. Five got stuck in mud or craters, and nine had their engines break down, but the rest reached their battlefield.

Of course, the first tank attack shocked the Germans. However, the miserly amount of tanks failed to influence the entire front, and the Germans quickly regained their courage and no longer fled from the "devils" that appeared on the battlefield. They fought against tanks, and with some success. Grandiose claims of overwhelming success in Entente press had little in common with the truth.

Swinton's cautions were confirmed in the first battle, and the situation repeated itself with some regularity. Tanks attacked through a pock-marked landscape, got stuck in it without the aid of engineers, and were destroyed by enemy fire. Infantry followed tanks clumsily, German machineguns mowed down anyone who was visible between the tanks, and many soldiers died from fragments of shells that exploded on the tanks' armour. Tanks without infantry were easy prey for the enemy. Tanks were supposed to be a wonder weapon, but resulted in little more than disappointment and criticism.

Infantry's Low Priority Escort

Despite all that, tanks were seen as a useful invention. By the end of the war in 1918, armoured forces began to take shape. Due to technical limitations, their vehicles could not perform any tasks independently. Tanks worked tightly with infantry, and there were rigid rules about how it was done.

A tank attack was to start at dawn, so drivers could see. Excess noise was to be avoided. Tanks travelled in groups of three: while the front tank suppressed the enemy, the other two cut a path through the wire for infantry. Each tank had no more than a platoon of infantry (25-30 men) accompanying it. Tanks made very narrow openings in barbed wire, so too many soldiers would create a crowd that was vulnerable to enemy fire.

Infantry split up into three groups. The first group destroyed the enemies in trenches with the aid of tanks. The third group marked openings on the wire and guarded them from enemy counterattacks. The last group assisted the first two and other attacking infantry.

The most important thing for infantry was to not lose contact with tanks. Armoured vehicles could cover it, force the enemy to withdraw, or just distract advancing enemies. When attacking a village or a forest, some tanks would attempt to get into the enemy flank or rear. Maneuvers were concealed with a smoke screen. Some tanks were left behind to protect flanks.

If there was a delay, the tanks were supposed to take cover. After that, tank commanders and gunners were to leave the tank, meet up with infantry commanders, and discuss further action.

Definitive Success: Battle of Hamel

A classic example of a competent tank attack was the battle at Hamel on July 4th, 1918. Before its start, cooperation between tanks and infantry was drilled thoroughly. In order to "befriend" the soldiers and these fairly esoteric vehicles, a proper name was painted on each one. This simplified communications and improved morale. During training, tanks crossed real trenches and barbed wire. Soldiers not only rode on and in tanks, but were given a chance to drive them.

The Entente carefully examined enemy positions. Aircraft were constantly flying over the front lines. In the morning, the artillery and machineguns started firing suddenly. The Germans didn't know if it would be an offensive or just another day of a positional war.

When the real attack started, the noise of tank engines were drowned out by aircraft. This trick was used several times, such as when attacking Amiens in August of 1918 or by the Red Army during Operation Bagration in 1944.

60 new MkV tanks participated in the offensive. Vehicles followed the creeping artillery barrage closely. Every 3-4 minutes, the barrage shifted forward by 100 meters. Tanks proved very helpful when fighting machinegunners. As a result, the Entente captured about 1500 prisoners and many weapons, including brand new anti-tank rifles.

Support in battle was also carefully practised. Each tank carried two crates of ammunition, magazines for Lewis guns, and drinking water. They were in turn supported by tanks converted to armoured carriers. Four of these vehicles delivered over 20 tons of supplies only half an hour after enemy positions were captured: ammunition, grenades, water, barbed wire, and stakes. For the first time in history, aircraft didn't just perform reconnaissance from the air, but dropped supplies for infantry with parachutes.

The commander of the operation, Australian General John Monash, later wrote: "everything was decided within 93 minutes".

And so, within two years, tanks made their journey from questionable novelties to a fully fledged type of forces. Here, the evolution of offensive tank tactics stopped. Europe was tired of war. Although there were many conflicts between 1918 and 1939, they were mostly local. Experience gained from them was limited and specialized. When a new large war started, tank tactics had to be learned anew from almost nothing.

Original article available here.

Author: Evgeniy Belash

Evgeniy Belash is a historian, an author of books and articles on the First and Second World Wars. His best known work is "Myths of the First World War". He is the author of a book "Tanks of the Interbellum" on the participation of armoured vehicles in military conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s.

Sources:

• Fletcher David. Tanks and Trenches: first hand accounts of tank warfare in the First World War. History Press, 2009. P. 116–120.
• Infantry and tank co-operation and training. War department, 1918.
• List, Single, Major. The battle of Booby's Bluffs. United States Infantry Association, 1922.
• Monash, John. The Australian victories in France in 1918. London Hutchinson, 1920. P. 48–60.
• Mitchell F. Tanks at War. History of development of tanks in the 1914-1918 World War. Moscow. Gosvoyenizdat, 1935

Rebarrelling

German tanks weren't the only things to be converted to be compatible with Soviet supplies. A plan to use German artillery was in place as well.

"To: TsAKB Chief, Lieutenant-General of Technical Forces, comrade V.G. Grabin
Copy: Artkom chair, Lieutenant-General of Artillery, comrade V.I. Hohlov

On the issue of converting captured guns

I reply to letter #109s sent on November 16th, 1943, to report that your proposed ideas and analysis of conversion of German heavy artillery deserves the attention of NKV and GAU KA. According to this analysis, I propose the following conversion projects:

1. 211 mm mod. 1918 heavy mortar to the ballistics of a 203 mm B-4 howitzer.
2. 150 mm mod. 1918 and mod. 1939 guns to the ballistics of a 152 mm Br-2 gun.
3. 150 mm mod. 1918 howitzers to the reduced ballistics (first charge) of the 152 mm ML-20 gun-howitzer and 122 mm A-19.

Report on acceptable timeframes for TsAKB as soon as you receive this message.

Chair of the NKV Technical Council, Satel."

CAMD RF 81-12038-237

Swedish Intel

Today's article is brought to you by Something Awful forums poster TheFluff who works with Swedish archive documents. He dug up a rather interesting instruction to the Swedish army attache in Moscow, which reveals that the Swedes had a rather high opinion of Soviet armour:

"Armored fighting vehicle development in the Soviet Union

Briefing for the army attache in Moscow, 1962-09-03, 13:00-13:50.

(Handwritten: head of the vehicle department, head of the intelligence section [both of the army ordnance administration] and Sundin [engineer at the intelligence section at the time])

1. The Russians started committing a great deal of resources to the AFV sector as early as in the 1920's. It is a very telling fact that during the 1931-1939 period, when other great powers held trials with maybe 5-10 different tank types and took 3-4 types to series production, the Russians trialed 32 different tank designs, both foreign and domestic, and took 10 different types to significant series production runs. The Russian tanks have heavily influenced the tank and anti-tank technology of other countries ever since the late summer of 1941, when the Russians surprised the Germans with the T-34 tank. For a long time - since 1944 - our best reference manuals on armored fighting vehicle technology have been Russian works. 
2. Our current knowledge regarding Russian AFV's is documented on a number of datasheets, which are kept at the army attache office. The general characteristics of these vehicles will be shown on the following slides:
1. T-34-85, IS-3 (both 1945)
2. T-54, T-10, PT-76, ASU-57 (four different chassis types)
3. APC (8 wheels) 
4. SU-100 - T-54 chassis
5. ZSU-57-2 - T-54 chassis
6. ISU-152 - T-10 (IS-3) chassis 
7. "SU400"- T-10 (IS-3) chassis 
8. BTR-50 - PT-76 chassis
9. "SU-85/62" - PT-76 chassis
10. Rocket launcher vehicle - PT-76 chassis
11. Artillery tractor - ASU-57 chassis
3. Regarding new AFV's, the following intelligence is of primary interest:
1. Photos or drawings
2. Designation 
3. Type of armament and armament characteristics (gun bore, guided missiles, any electronics, turret or fixed casemate) (Handwritten note next to point 3) Card with this text provided to the army attache. The attache said he would request that a tank expert be sent over to be present at parades and other such events in the future.")
4. Weight (chassis class, number of road wheels)
5. Amphibious capability or lack of such capability
6. Presence of external armor screens or such things (on heavier tanks and other well armored vehicles)
7. Night fighting equipment"

Chemical T-46

"August 19th, 1935
To: Director of the S.M. Kirov Experimental Machinebuilding Factory

When the T-46 flamethrower was examined, the following conclusions were made:

1. The 50 L fuel tank (40 L usable volume) can make 10-12 shots at a range of 25 meters and 5-6 at a range of 40 meters. It is easy to work with this device.
   However, the volume is insufficient, and needs to be increased to 100 L.
2. The flamethrower equipment cannot be used to emit smokescreens.
3. If ABTU accepts this flamethrower, the following changes must be made:
1. Replace the flexible hose with a metal pipe, turning will be enabled with a ball joint.
2. Replace the hose nozzle with a more modern type, like on BT and T-37 tanks.
3. Add a pressure meter to measure the pressure inside the fuel mixture tank.
4. The pressure meter and reductor should be placed on a panel in the front of the turret. Use the M-34 reductor.
5. In order to hold the fuel mixture tank, weld a ring of iron with openings for bolts to the bottom.
4. It must be noted that the conversion of the T-46 to a chemical tank is more difficult than the conversion of the T-26. The chemical T-26 has a 400 L tank. If possible, the T-46 needs to have equipment of equivalent power.
5. A place for a 80-100 L smoke mixture tank is desirable.

Chief of the Chemical Department of NIHI RKKA

Minkov"

V. Lehn collection

Armata Przeciwpancerna wz. 36

"Photo #1 (negative #06652). System in combat position.

Photo #2 (negative #06654). System in combat position from the rear left. δ marks the position of the travel locking bar.

Based on trials of the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish anti-tank gun over 384 shots and 200 kilometers performed in February-March 1941, ANIOP makes the following conclusions:

1. The 37 mm mod. 1936 captured Polish gun is one of the newest types of armament in modern foreign armies.
1. Mass in combat position: 408 kg.
2. Muzzle velocity 790 m/s.
3. Gas pressure: 2700 kg/cm^2.
4. Shell mass: 0.700 kg.
5. Precision: same as the domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 gun.
6. Rate of fire: same as the domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 gun.
7. Horizontal traverse: 50 degrees.
8. Length in combat position: 2826 mm.
2. The domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 anti-tank gun on automobile wheels with porous rubber tires is a significantly more powerful AT measure than the Polish 37 mm mod. 1936 gun, while having similar characteristics otherwise. Mass in combat position is similar.
   Coefficient of metal use:
   45 mm mod. 1932 gun: 94.7
   37 mm mod. 1936 gun (Polish, captured): 55.2
3. The domestic 37 mm mod. 1930 gun is less satisfactory according to modern tactical-technical requirements than the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish gun.
4. The penetration of the Polish 37 mm gun is significantly less than that of the 45 mm gun. The latter can penetrate 40 mm of modern armour (K=2550) at an angle of 30 degrees at up to 400 meters, and at normal up to 800 meters. Under these conditions, the robustness of shells is acceptable (see ANIOP report #001326 from February 28th, 1941).
   The 37 mm Polish AP shell is less robust than our type 129 AP shell, which performed satisfactorily against 16 and 20 mm armour plates. Our shell penetrated these plates intact, while the Polish shells fragment.
   In terms of penetration, both 37 mm shells (domestic and Polish) are insufficiently powerful, and can only be used against light tanks with armour on the order of 20 mm.
   Tactical ranges for both shells are comparable, as the ballistics of the two systems are very close.
5. The design of the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish gun and its mechanism is of interest to our designers and manufacturers (shield, lever trigger, recoil brake cylinder, recoil lubricant, powder charge)."

CAMD RF 81-12038-132

Heavy Triplex

"Tactical-Technical Requirements for a 254 mm gun, 305 mm howitzer, and 400 mm mortar on a T-35 chassis

Main requirements:

Item	254 mm gun	305 mm howitzer	400 mm mortar
Range (km)	*	21	13
Combat mass (tons)	55-60	55-60	55-60
Travel mass (tons)	55-60	55-60	55-60
Shell mass (kg)	200-240	340	640
Vertical traverse arc (degrees)	55	65	70
Horizontal traverse arc (degrees)	10	10	10
Rate of fire (RPM)	1	1/2	1/3
Time to deploy from travel to combat mode and back (minutes	5	5	5

*Muzzle velocity and range depend on final choice of shell

Requirements:

• Stress on suspension elements must be evenly distributed.
• The system must be stable in motion when tilted at least 20 degrees.
• The system must be able to traverse a 35 degree grade.
• The ground pressure must be 0.6-0.7 kg/cm^2.
• The maximum speed should be 20 kph.
• The system must have enough fuel to run for 6 hours.
• The system must be able to cross a 4.5 meter wide trench.
• The system must be able to ford a 1-1,1 meter deep water hazard.
• The height of the tow hook must be 1 meter.
• Access to the engine and control mechanisms must be convenient.
• The SPG should fit within the dimensions of a railroad car.
• The chamber should accept existing 10 inch and 12 inch land and naval artillery shells."

V. Lehn Collection

Shell Quality

_tezka posted an interesting document, tests of the F-34's shells for robustness. The test was set up as follows: a 60 mm thick armoured plate was placed upright as normal, but it had three 2 mm plates (referred to as walls in the document) set up behind it. After being fired, the shell was measured to determine how deformed it was. Here are the results:

"Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 76-76 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and two walls. Dimensions: 110-130-140 mm. 

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 70-65 mm. The shell is in front of the plate. Dimensions: 100-130-120 mm.

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 80-80 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and three walls. Dimensions: 120-135-150 mm.

The shell was stuck in the armour.

Penetration, less than a caliber. Entrance diameter: 70-70 mm, Exit diameter: 70-70 mm. The shell is in front of the plate. Dimensions: 145-160-150 mm.

Dent. Diameter: 60-60 mm. Depth: 3-5 mm. The shell was not found.

Dent. Diameter: 75-75 mm. Depth: 8-10 mm. The rear side of the plate has a bump. The shell is in front of the plate. Diameter: 135-155-145 mm.

Penetration, less than a caliber. Entrance diameter: 75-78 mm. Exit diameter: 70-80 mm. The shell was not found.

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 110-80 mm. Exit diameter: 130-100 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and three walls. Dimensions: 120-150-125 mm."

The quality of the shell seems decent. Most penetrations are the size of one caliber or larger, and the shell does not shatter after penetrating the armour or bouncing off.

Blockade Repairs

This listing of repair work works well to illustrate two things that I have mentioned in the past and one I have not. The first that I have mentioned is that the Leningrad Front was an odd mishmash of strange and obsolete vehicles, which you can see from mentions of BT-2s and machinegun-only BT-5s. The other is that it's a massive pain to keep track of how many vehicles were actually produced, as you can clearly see that it's not only the repair factories that are taking in damaged vehicles to restore them.

The thing I haven't mentioned yet is that Soviet factory nomenclature is incredibly annoying. This document lists all factories by their proper names, so you have both "Kirov factory" and "factory named after Kirov" (factory #185) mentioned on the same page. In order to prevent confusion, I refer to the latter by its number.

"Decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front #001311
Active Army
October 30th, 1942

Content: On the repairs of tanks, tank engines, and tractors at Leningrad factories

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decrees that:

1. The director of the Kirov factory, comrade Dlugach, must perform major repairs of 10 tank engines for factory #371 and 6 engines for Leningrad Front ABTU before December 1st, 1942.
2. The director of factory #371, comrade Kozharinov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Perform major and medium repairs on 10 KV-1 tanks.
2. Assemble upper and lower turret rings for BT and T-26 tanks in the following amounts:
1. For the Leningrad Front ABTU repair factory: 20 units.
2. For factory #185: 10 units.
3. Perform thermal conditioning and polishing of KV gearboxes for the Leningrad Front ABTU in the following amounts:
1. Item #12-355: 50 units.
2. Item #12-322: 50 units.
3. Item #12-266: 30 units.
4. Item #12-167: 30 units.
3. The director of factory #185, comrade Muromets must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major and medium repairs on BT-5 tanks (5 units).
4. The director of Yegorov factory, comrade Kolesnikov, must provide major repairs for 10 T-37 and T-38 tanks by December 1st, 1942.
5. Repair factory #4 chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Smirnov, must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Produce 10 new tanks.
2. Provide major repairs for T-26 and T-60 tanks (5 items).
3. Provide major repairs for T-26 engines (5 items) and gearboxes (10 items).
4. Provide major repairs for 30 STZ tractors.
6. Repair factory #27 chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Hoprov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major repairs on 3 medium tanks (3 units).
3. Perform major repairs on tank engines (5 units).

Coal, lubricant, fuel, electricity, and repair inventory is being distributed among factories.

Leningrad Front Commander, Lieutenant Govorov

Military Council Member, Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), A. Zhdanov

Military Council Member, N. Solovyev

Military Council Member, T. Shtykov"

V. Lehn Collection