Friday, 10 October 2014

"USSR" Armour

"Description of an invention titled "Armour Type USSR"

The armour plate (1, 2) is covered in pits (3), that have a special shape. Inside each pit, there is a charge with a detonator (5). Most bullets that hit the armour will hit inside the pit, as any object will obey the laws of least resistance and ricochet off the walls into the depth of the pit. The pits will have a shape slightly smaller than the bullet, so when the bullet hits, it will plug the pit.

The bullet (4) will hit the detonator with its tip, which will detonate the charge. The resulting gas expansion will slow down the bullet and not let it penetrate the armour.

December 1st
Astrakhan

Bruskin."



Figure I shows the front view of Bruskin's armour plate, figure II shows the side view, of what happens when a shell hits the armour. Obviously this idea needs some work before implementation, but it's definitely ahead of its time. Work on reactive armour would not start for many years after this patent application was submitted.

Thursday, 9 October 2014

Panzerfaust, Russian Style

CAMD RF 233-2356-775 contains a laconic and rather interesting phrase in a paragraph describing the actions of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 598th Infantry Regiment. It seems that Captain Kolchanov found his 45 mm guns and 76 mm regimental guns unsatisfactory, and decided to stock up on some heavier firepower. The document reads: "Against enemy Panzerfaust operators, the battalion successfully used singular M-31 mortar rounds, which were carried up to the second or third floor of a building and fired at the enemy positioned across the street."

Thankfully, a little extra digging reveals more details about this tactic.

"Experience of direct fire by rocket artillery in the streets of Berlin

In street battles, when a solid front line is gone and enemy units are often found in individual houses and crossroads, the use of traditional artillery is impossible. Rocket artillery units used M-13, M-31 and captured 280 mm rounds to fire directly without launchers.

Considering the caliber and destructive force of M-31 rockets, their use was an effective measure against enemy concentrations.

Rockets were used to destroy all or parts of houses that contained enemy concentrations or impeded progress. The conditions of city fighting allowed for transport and installation of rockets 30-100 meters from enemy forces in a house window or wall breach. Aiming was performed with a primitive aiming device.

The effectiveness of M-31 rockets is achieved due to the following:
  1. At short distances (30-100 meters), it is possible to hit a small target such as a smokestack, church cupola, window, or breach in a wall. Due to the destructive power of the rocket, the target is completely destroyed.
  2. Using rockets to fire directly at the last minute allows our forces to eliminate the enemy or clear a path before the enemy has a chance to commit mobile reserves. The sudden and complete destruction has a great effect on enemy morale.
One advantage of rockets over traditional artillery is that moving large caliber artillery into a direct fire position is impossible, and indirect fire introduces the danger of hitting your own forces, whereas low caliber artillery does not achieve the desired effect. Another advantage is the possibility of using many rockets at once to destroy several targets. 

Massed use of M-31 rockets results in powerful and effective fire support for infantry units in cities. The use of this method is possible when:
  1. There are concealed paths towards to front lines.
  2. The target is 30-150 meters away.
  3. The placement of rockets is done secretly and silently.
  4. Cooperation with infantry is carefully and correctly carried out.
When preparing for fire support, assault teams encountered difficulties with transporting the rockets. Due to the presence of enemy soldiers with Panzerfausts and submachineguns in our rear, as well as fires, trucks carrying the rockets were forced to stop 900-1000 meters away from the front lines. The 130 kg rockets had to be carried the rest of the way by hand. In some cases, additional breaches had to be made in house walls. In places where the path of the rockets crossed the street under fire, the rocket was placed in a box, a rope was tied to the box, and thrown across the street. Soldiers would run across one by one and then pull the box across after them. In order to protect the rocket from bullets and shrapnel, the front part was covered with bricks. 

When the rocket was put into firing position 15-30 meters from the enemy, absolute silence and stealth was required. When any noise or movement was detected, the enemy would fire upon the position with Panzerfausts.

Horizontal aiming was performed with a primitive sight, consisting of one nail in the front of the mount and two nails in the rear. Vertical aiming was performed by stacking bricks and wooden beams under the rear of the mount. The mount was stabilized with wire in different directions. This held the mount in place during the process of firing, which improved accuracy. 

Since the exhaust jet was hot and highly pressurized, all doors and windows behind the rocket were opened, and all flammable objects removed. In order to prevent accidents, the detonator was placed in the basement or a distant room. Wires were run on the floor along the walls, and held with heavy objects every 1-2 meters. 

The firing position was camouflaged during setup by field-expedient means, and was removed several seconds before opening fire."

And of course, pictures!

Firing an M-31 rocket directly,


Firing an M-31 rocket upwards.

Firing an M-31 rocket downwards.

Wednesday, 8 October 2014

SU-85 Adoption

"Factory #9 project: SU-85 SPG

According to GOKO decree #3187ss issued on April 15th, 1943, and #3289ss, issued on May 5th, 1943, and orders of the People's Commissar of Tank Production and People's Commissar of Armament #233ss/260ss, issued on May 8th, 1943, Uralmash factory, factory #9, TsAKB, Kirov factory, and factory #8 were instructed to design and produce an 85 mm SPG.

TsAKB (comrade Grabin) was instructed to design the gun, factory #9 was instructed to build it, and Uralmash was instructed to build the hull and suspension.

During this project, the following guns were proposed for installation on the T-34 chassis:
  1. TsAKB: 85 mm S-18 gun.
  2. Uralmash: 85 mm S-18-1 gun, the TsAKB design with minor changes (welded mount).
  3. Factory #9, personal initiative: 85 mm D-5S-85 gun.
  4. Factory #9, personal initiative: 122 mm D-5S-122 howitzer, which has many parts in common with the D-5S-85.
In the end of July of 1943, the aforementioned SPGs were produced by factory #9 and Uralmash. 

The D-5S-85 gun has the ballistics, barrel, and chamber of the model 1939 85 mm AA gun. The barrel is a monobloc type, the breech is vertically sliding, semi-automatic. The firing mechanism is of the striker type. 

The recoil mechanism is positioned above the barrel. The recoil brake and return mechanism are independent mechanisms, positioned in one plane above the barrel. The brake is hydraulic, oil-filled, the return mechanism is hydro-pneumatic. 

The mount is cast, clip type. The mount houses a rail on which the gun slides after recoiling. 

The gun is balanced without additional weight due to increased size of the barrel and breech.

The elevation mechanism is of the sectored type, the turning mechanism is of the screw type.

The oscillating part of the gun is held in a special frame, which can turn with the gun vertically and horizontally. The frame and mount with recoil mechanisms are covered by a spherical armour cover, hanging off the mount.

According to order #079 issued on July 12th, 1943 by the People's Commissar of Tank Production and Commander of Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Red Army, a commission led by Lieutenant-General of Artillery, comrade V.E. Taranovich tested the following vehicles from July 25th to August 6th, 1943:
  • SU-85-I with the 85 mm S-18-1 gun (TsAKB project with Uralmash modifications)
  • SU-85-II with the D-5S-85 gun (factory #9 project)
  • SU-85-IV with the 85 mm S-18 gun (TsAKB project)
  • SU-122-III with the 122 mm D-5S-122 howitzer (factory #9 project)
The commission made the following conclusions following trials:
  1. All four vehicles passed mobility trials, but not gunnery trials.
  2. Considering that rapid adoption of an 85 mm gun by the Red Army is necessary, the commission considers the 85 mm SPG armed with the D-5S-85 gun designed by factory #9 and using the armoured self propelled chassis with a casemate that flares out above the entire width of the tracks.
  3. Factory #9 must make the necessary changes in the blueprints of the 85 mm D-5S-85 gun to correct defects of the gun and its mechanisms, established by the commission during trials and outlined in the "conclusions" section of the report."


Tuesday, 7 October 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Operation Typhoon

In September of 1941, it was clear that both Soviet pre-war ideals of victory with little bloodshed and German plans of swiftly crushing the Red Army burned up in the flames of summer battles. The Germans wasted precious time in the battle for Smolensk and by turning Guderian's tank group south, to Kiev. But it was still warm, and the illusion that the tempo of Operation Barbarossa could be revived still inhabited German headquarters. All they had to do was put some strength into a finishing blow.

Before Typhoon

The Germans did not cut corners. Three of four tank groups participated in the offensive on Moscow, codenamed "Typhoon". Before the offensive, Hitler's speech was read to German units, telling them, in part, of the beginning of the last and greatest decisive battle of 1941.

Unlike a lot of Hitler's promises, these one turned out true. However, this battle was not decisive in the way he expected.

The position of the Red Army before the offensive was not enviable. The pre-war mechanized corps with their hundreds and thousands of tanks were lost, sacrificed in the first months of the war to stop the German advance. There was not enough vehicles to restore them, nor were there enough competent commanders and staff officers capable of directing such units. Nevertheless, tanks played a pivotal role in the battle for Moscow.

Drang nach Moskau

At dawn on September 30th, Guderian's 2nd tank group moved out. On October 2nd it was joined by Hermann Hoth's 3rd tank group and Erich Hoepner's 4th, tasked with destroying Soviet West and Reserve Fronts.

The Red Army was not the only one suffering from equipment shortages. The Panzerwaffe was not what it used to be on June 22nd. For instance, Hoepner's tank regiments from the 6th and 7th tank divisions had to be consolidated into one tank brigade.

More than 300 tanks attacked in two echelons on a 2 km front. The density of German guns was equally impressive, 100 cannons per kilometer. The sky was filled with dive bombers from Wolfram von Richtofen's 8th air corps.

Soviet infantry only learned to withstand attacks of such magnitude two years later, at Kursk. In the fall of 1941, German tanks cleaved through the defenses of ragged Soviet infantry like a sword through plywood. The only hope was on Soviet tanks.

Counterattacks: Kholm, Mtsensk, Maloyaroslavets

Lieutenant-General I.V. Boldin's operative group was formed from reserve units of the Western Front. It was composed of three tank brigades, and one each of infantry, cavalry, and motorized divisions. Overall, the unit had over 200 tanks, but they were largely outdated T-26 and BT tanks. Deployment lagged behind. When Hoth's tanks reached the shores of the Dniepr on October 4th, only the 128th Tank Brigade was ready to oppose them.

The Germans remembered this battle for a long time. Hermann Hoth wrote in his memoirs that the stubborn Russians fought to the death to stop the advance of German tanks. According to German data, they knocked out 28 Soviet tanks at a cost of 26 of their own, a ratio rarely seen in German documents in 1941. Sadly, Boldin's counterattack only held back one wedge that was driving through the Soviet front.

Guderian's 2nd tank group achieved a much more dangerous penetration. Having covered 200 km over several days, the 4th tank division reached Orel by October 3rd. At the time, the city was considered deep in the rear; even the streetcars were still running. There were no serious defenses between Orel and Moscow. Dmitriy Lelyushenko's 1st Guards Infantry Corps was hurriedly formed to plug the gap, but it was still in the process of moving out to the front.

A single battalion of soldiers from the 201 Airborne Brigade landed on the Orel airport, already under enemy fire. The paratroopers gave their lives to delay German tanks for another day.

On the evening of October 4th, the advance guard of Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade reached the outskirts of Orel. Soon the Germans realized that the time of easy and rapid marches was over. The 35 km from Orel to Mtsensk took an entire week to cover. For these battles, Katukov's brigade became the 1st Guards. Many of its soldiers received medals, six of Katukov's men received the Order of Lenin, one of the highest Soviet honours. Among them were future tank aces D. Lavrinenko and A. Burda.

Guderian's subordinates from the 4th tank division clenched their teeth and wrote reports on "absolute dominance" of new Soviet tanks. The value of these battles is highlighted by the fact that in November of 1941, a commission including Ferdinand Porsche and future Tiger designer Erwin Aders was sent to examine the tanks between Orel and Mtsensk.

While Guderian's division was wasting time and tanks in their mad dash to Moscow, their comrades were closing their jaws around the Bryansk, West, and Reserve Fronts. However, the Germans lacked the strength to both maintain a solid encirclement and continue their offensive. The attempt to achieve both anyway ended poorly.

Firstly, many encircled units managed to break out. Secondly, the few tank and mechanized units allocated to advance to Moscow did so along main roadways. As a result, Soviet high command, lacking the strength to restore a solid front line, could concentrate on building anti-tank defenses in most obvious directions. The main components of these defenses were tank brigades and anti-tank guns. For instance, the 17th Tank Brigade was a key part of defending Maloyaroslavks. Here is what the German 57th motorized corps wrote:

"The Russians are sitting in nearly every village on both sides of the road, sometimes in small numbers, sometimes large, and fiercely defend...The enemy is fortifying the front lines today...His advantage: tanks that fight in formation, and fight fiercely and skilfully."

A good defense is the key to success

At Ilyinskoye, near Maloyaroslavets, the Germans saw first hand what a well organized defensive line looks like. At about 1:00 pm, 15 German tanks moved out of Cherkassovo, accompanied by an infantry company. The soldiers were riding on the tanks, as well as APCs and motorcycles. The tanks were in two groups, the first one composed of 8 vehicles, the second one of 7.

At Sergeevka, the infantry was "swept" off with machinegun fire. The tanks tried to reach Ilyinskoye, but two were knocked out. The German infantry deployed to fight without seeing the enemy. Tanks from the second group pulled up. The offensive continued, but in a disorganized fashion. A portion of the tanks rushed forward, some were stuck on the road. One drove into a ditch. Soviet machinegun fire pinned down infantry. This attack resulted in numerous photos of a burned out tank column and a small cemetery near the road.

By the end of October it was clear that the "rapid dash" to Moscow failed. Instead of a march across highways, the Germans paid a heavy price for every kilometer they drove eastward.

Now the results of the battle depended on who had that last battalion in reserve.

Article author: Andrei Ulanov.

Andrei Ulanov is an historian and an author of books and articles on the Great Patriotic War. His most prominent works are "Order in Tank Forces" and "First T-34s" (co-authored with Dmitriy Shein). Currently, he is working on books on AT measures of Soviet infantry and combat use of T-34 tanks in 1942.

Sources:
  • CAMD RF documents.
  • NARA documents.
  • H. Hoth, Tank Operations
  • L.N. Lopukhoskiy, Vyazemskaya katastrofa 41 goda
  • Defense of Moscow: 17th Tank Brigade, http://konkurs.senat.org/notabene/17TBR.html
  • Fragment from "Geschichte des Panzer-Grenadier-Regiments 73", http://www.eco-kovcheg.ru/ilinskie_rubezhi-04.html.
Original article available here. 

Sunday, 5 October 2014

Penetration Equations

When designing a new gun, it is hard to know how much armour its shells will penetrate without building it. Similarly, if all you know is how thick enemy armour is but do not have a sample to shoot at, you will not know if you can penetrate it with your existing guns, or if need to develop new ones. These two problems predate tank warfare, and arose when the first armoured warships hit the seas. An equation was created by Commandant Jacob de Marre to estimate the thickness of armour a shell will penetrate, given the penetration data of another shell. WWII Ballistics - Armor and Gunnery defines the equation as follows.


Naturally, the equation is only an estimate (the book then goes on to present many cases where the equation doesn't work and requires modification of exponents). It works best when a similar shell is chosen, so try to find a reference shell of a similar caliber and type from the same manufacturer.

Another way to estimate penetration is the Krupp formula, also designed during the era of battleships. This formula is defined as follows:


Where B is the thickness of armour penetrated in decimeters, V is the velocity of the shell on impact, P is the mass of the projectile, and D is the projectile caliber. K is a resistance constant, which represents the quality of the armour and the capacity of the shell to penetrate it. When in doubt, use the value of 2400, which was the value for standard quality armour used in Soviet calculations.

However, since doing math by hand is for grade schoolers, I would like to introduce a handy utility: a Javascript penetration calculator. You can use both formulas to get a quick estimate of how much armour a shell should penetrate.

For example, if I plug in the data for a Soviet 45 mm model 1937 anti-tank gun (45 mm caliber, 1.43 kg mass, 760 m/s muzzle velocity) into the Krupp calculator, I get a result of 56 mm. Soviet penetration tables give the gun 57 mm of penetration, so that's a pretty good estimate! Now, to estimate the penetration of a model 1942 gun that uses the same shell, all I have to do is copy the values to the reference section and up the estimate's velocity to 870 m/s, which gives me a result of 68 with the penetration in Soviet tables being 69 mm. Again, only one millimeter off! Krupp's estimate for the 45 mm mod. 1942 gun is 65 mm, which isn't too bad.

Another example, with the D-25 gun. Plugging in the values (122 mm shell, 25 kg mass, 800 m/s) gives 151 mm of penetration, which is a bit lower than the Soviet value of 165 mm. When I copy over the data to calculate the penetration of the BL-9 gun (muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s), I get 227 mm, which is close to the value in the penetration table (230 mm). However, Krupp's estimate only gives 189 mm, which is quite far off. 

As you can see, using the DeMarre equation is likely to give you much better numbers, but Krupp can also serve as a ballpark estimate when you have nothing to compare with.

Deception

The Russian term "maskirovka" is largely translated as "camouflage". This is not entirely correct, as the term covers a broad spectrum of techniques meant not only to deceive the enemy into thinking you don't have forces in areas where you do, but that you do have forces in areas that you don't.

"To the Reserve Front HQ Chief

I report that your order to create tank models that imitate high concentrations of tanks has been carried out as of August 28th, 1941, in the following regions:
  1. Znamenka, Zhelaniye, Dobroye (all locations 40 km south of Vyazma)
  2. Zimnitsa, Siniki, Krasnikobo (all locatiosn 15 km east of Spass-Demyansk)
In total, 28 tank models have been built, which is approximately three tank battalions. Tank models were built to imitate the shape of medium tanks, and are difficult to distinguish from actual tanks at a range of 100-200 meters when properly positioned inside a forest.

Work was carried out by 30 sappers directed by a camouflage engineer and a representative of the 1st ABTU department, Major Belikov. The request to use local civilians without special permission from the regional council was denied due to the start of the harvest. 

Further placements of fake tanks were limited by aircraft bases, landing strips, and airports, which do not allow any kind of military unit or rear base quartering within 10-12 km. 

The lateness in returning from construction can be explained by difficulty of movement due to mud after the rains. All personnel participating in the operation have returned as of 11:00 on August 25th, 1941.

Attachment: diagram of placement of tank models.

ABTU Reserve Front Chief, Brigade Commander Podshivalov"


The fake tanks are represented by the diamonds on the map, with a red line pointing in the direction they are facing. Since detecting any kind of tank in a forest is hard, the engineers made it a little easier for the Germans by also imitating tank tracks on the ground, indicated by dashed red lines. How effective was this tactic? Let's look at how the Germans saw it.

"With the increased speed of our advance, we began a series of rapid tank attacks. On October 4th, front units of Kampfgruppe Koelitz (2nd Vienna Tank Division) penetrated the front lines at Desna and stopped at a crossroads. They were so consumed by deciphering their illegible maps that they were pushed back by a "sudden Russian tank counterattack", which rapidly solved their navigation problems. At 300 meters to the right, three Russian tanks were spotted. They were fired upon, sadly without results. It was decided that a more powerful shell should be used, and even though it hit its target, the tank remained. The Ober-Lieutenant, wishing to finish things, up decided to circle around the tank's rear in a motorcycle. Soon his subordinates were shocked to discover that the officer, standing upright, was laughing. He shook the "tank", and the entire thing fell down."
- Robert J. Kershaw. War without garlands: Barbarossa 1941/42

Saturday, 4 October 2014

Lend-Lease Impressions: M4A2 Sherman

I've posted a less than favourable initial impression of the M4A4 Sherman, which was confirmed in subsequent trials, but what about the M4A2, the tank that left the best impression on Soviet tankers of the ones supplied by Lend Lease?

"Note on the M4A2 tank

Positive qualities:

  1. The transmission, turning mechanisms, and suspension are reliable, and need minimal effort to maintain them.
  2. The double differential turning mechanism and brake is simple to maintain and reliable, making the tank easy to control.
  3. The two-stroke CMC diesel is economical (works on heavy fuel) and less fire-prone.
  4. The armament and amount of ammunition carried on the tank surpasses the tanks of the enemy and the T-34S.


    M4-A2 PzIII mod. 1940 PzIII mod. 1942 PzIV T-34S
    ~75 mm gun 1 - - 1 1
    50 mm gun - - 1 - -
    37 mm gun - 1 - - -
    12.7 mm MG 1 - - - -
    ~7.62 mm MG 2 2 2 1 2
    SMG 1 1 - - 1
    Shells 97 125 87 80 77
    MG rounds 9150 4050 Unknown 2700 3900
     
  5. Internal dimensions allow the crew to work freely, especially the gunner.
  6. The observation devices are simple, protected from rifle fire, and provide satisfactory visibility for the crew.
  7. The rubberized track has a long lifespan.
Main drawbacks:
  1. The turbocharged two-stroke CMC model 6046 series 71 diesel has M series injectors, which are not well designed, and burn (during acceptance testing in Gorkiy, over 30 hours of work, 5 of 12 injectors burned. On other tanks, the cylinders were scorched for the same reason).
  2. A lack of revolution regulators on the CMC diesels make it difficult to synchronize them.
  3. The hatches on the turret roof are cramped, and make exiting and entering the tank difficult.
Conclusions:
  1. The M4-A2 is a superior design compared to the M3 Medium, has good speed and powerful armament, which is conveniently located in a turret.
  2. The two-stroke CMC diesels are superior to gasoline engines as they save high quality gasoline and are less prone to fire in combat.
  3. If a better diesel engine than the CMC is used, the tank will be reliable."

Friday, 3 October 2014

Flak vs KV

The following is a part of a debriefing of a KV-1 radio operator of the 86th Independent Tank Battalion of the 55th Army on the Leningrad Front, whose unit came under fire from the then unidentified high caliber guns.

"On September 18th, 1941, our crew, composed of the tank commander and company commander Lieutenant P.P. Ivanov, gun commander Senior Sergeant E.E. Ivanov, mechanic-driver Senior Sergeant B. Minevich, loader Sergeant A. Zibin...moved out from Kupchino to complete our mission in the direction of Moskovskaya Slavyanka-Pushkin, for cooperation with the 2nd battalion of the 142nd Infantry Regiment.

At 17:00-18:00, a messenger came from the HQ to the commander, with orders to enter the battle, and our four tanks (one from the 84th OTB) drove on the highway to Novaya village. In the middle of the highway, we turned left and drove into a village, I don't know what it was called. From the western part of the village, 200-250 meters away, a high caliber gun opened fire on us, likely larger than 76 mm. We were hit 3-4 times (this was likely a whole battery, judging by how fast they fired). The 4th or 5th shot hit the driver's viewport, and knocked it through, cracked the driver's head open, and the shell ignited, first a red fire, then a bright white. I started opening the hatch, the tank commander was crawling towards me. I barely managed to open the hatch (the turret was turned to the left), and jumped out of the 20-25 cm opening, into a roadsided ditch. Smoke and vapour was coming out of our vehicle."

Iam-Krasnoyarsk, the mastermind behind the largest collection of KV photographs I am aware of, has a photo of these KV tanks.


The writing on the side of the right KV isn't a patriotic slogan, commonly seen on tanks of that era, but German writing, claiming the kill for Heeres Flak Abt. 280.

Thursday, 2 October 2014

Pigeons at War

The use of pigeons for communication is nothing new.


However, what if you didn't have much space for holding pigeons? You had to get creative.


Pigeons can also be used for another, more creative purpose.


"In some cases, pigeons were released 1500-2000 meters from us. They circled around the vicinity and hovered above our column when spotted, marking us for artillery and mortar fire (see p. 27). At the same time, small groups of Japanese suicide bombers moved out in front of us with prepared explosives or mines to destroy our tanks and SPGs."

Wednesday, 1 October 2014

T-34 Tractors

Seeing as how the Voroshilovets tractor was obsolete and there were lots of T-34s around, factory #183 designed a perfectly logical vehicle: a T-34 based artillery tractor.


The tractor was needed to tow heavy artillery, but it could handle much heftier weights.



And now for an amusing episode from the vehicle's development process.

"On the issue of testing AT-45 tractors at factory #75

According to GOKO decree #5122ss from February 6th, factory #75 produced an experimental batch of AT-45 tractors (six instead of ten, as the factory was missing four engines). Factory #75 director Barykov is using the vehicles in an improper manner. Instead of performing trials, he is using them for various factory tasks, ie transport of various goods, using only the tractor without a trailer. This use is deemed acceptable by the factory as a method of combining trials and useful transport work.

This kind of use makes it impossible to observe their work from the point of view of military acceptance testing and give an evaluation of reliability when working in conditions of the Red Army, as the schedule of use is erratic and does not correspond to any trials schedule. 

Factory #75 intends to continue using these vehicles, and with this in mind, the director intentionally delays the signing of an agreement with Artkom."

The newly rebuilding factory was also tasked with the higher priority T-44, and it could not manage two new vehicles, so the AT-45 died an early death. Yuri Pasholok writes that seven were eventually built.

Here's another photograph of the tractor, including another rare vehicle.


It's towing a T-34 recovery vehicle! You don't see one of those every day. Here's another picture.