Sunday, 15 December 2013

Factory #174 Experiments

"I report that in order to complete the request of Marshal Kulik on the production of SPGs, I received and transferred to the Chief Engineer of the factory, Military Engineer 1st class comrade Ginsburg, the following:
  1. 37 mm automatic AA gun model 1939 (ZiK-37) - 2
  2. 76 mm tank gun model 1927/32 (KT-28) - 1
  3. Blueprints for the ZiK-37 and KT-28.
  4. Dimensional samples of ammunition for the KT-28 gun and 57 mm ZiS-4 gun.
Additionally, ANIOP transferred one T-34 tank with a 57 mm ZiS-4 gun to factory #174.

I received requirements for a 76 mm SPG, a 57 mm AT SPG, and a 37 mm AA SPG. In order to complete the design, I still require the following:
  1. 76 mm AA gun model 1938 (4K)
  2. Blueprints of the 4K AA gun.
  3. Dimensional samples of ammunition for the 37 mm AA gun model 1939 (ZiK-37)
[Handwritten:] On the 3rd point, UVZA will send blueprints. On the 1st and 2nd point, UVZA knows nothing about that.

ANIOP gave us a T-34 without a TMFD telescopic sight for the ZiS-4 gun. 

Currently, the Chief Engineer has distributed tasks for design of SPGs to his subordinates, but the work is in the beginning stages. Meanwhile the due date for returning the T-34 (June 15th) has already passed. 

I ask to give an order to transfer the above items to the factory and extend the time for using the T-34 tank.

At the same time, I wish to know if there is a formal contract for the production of these SPGs, or if the factory agreed to fulfil Marshal Kulik's request without a contract.

Military representative UVNA GAU KA, Military engineer third class, Erofeev
June 15th, 1941"
CAMD RF 81-12104-112

Nothing too unusual in terms of SPG designs, but the T-34 with a 57 mm ZiS-4 is more interesting. It is unlikely that this is one of the 14 tanks identified in the article, therefore the amount of these vehicles increases to 15.

Saturday, 14 December 2013

SG-122

In late 1942, SU-122s and SU-76es entered production. However, as it often happens, not enough vehicles were produced to meet the army's needs. The need for a 76 mm SPG was solved with the SU-76I. In case of a medium SPG armed with a 122 mm howitzer, the military was luckier. Work on a StuG III with a 122 mm howitzer began earlier that year.

"To the chief of the repairs directorate of ABTU KA, brigade engineer Sosenkov
Copy to factory #592 director Pankratov

In accordance with the decision of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces comrade Fedorenko on the re-armament of captured StuGs with model 1938 122 mm howitzers at factory #592, I ask you to arrange for four repaired StuGs to be delivered to factory #592. In order for work to proceed without delay, the first StuG should be received by April 25th.

April 13th, 1942
Chairman of the technical council, E. Satel"

The vehicle was indexed Self-Propelled Howitzer SG-122 (StuG) (Samohodnaya Gaubitsa SG-122 (Artshturm)), more commonly called just SG-122 and sometimes SU-122/T-3. The crew consisted of a driver, a commander, two loaders, and a gunner. As with many pre-war Soviet indirect fire guns, the M-30 had vertical and horizontal traverse controls on opposite sides of the gun, forcing the commander to aim horizontally, and the gunner to aim vertically. One of the loaders also performed the job of a radio operator.

The vehicle was armed with a 122 mm model 1938 howitzer (M-30). Much like the SU-76I, the SG-122 was protected with up to 45 mm of armour. The majority of the vehicle's insides remained the same. The radio was moved from the left side to the right, into a special addition to the vehicle's hull. External gas tanks were added to increase the vehicle's operational range.

SG-122(A), first prototype.

SG-122(A), first prototype, cutaway, showing maximum gun elevation.

SG-122(A), first prototype, top view, cutaway.

After trials in September, the following deficiencies in the design were discovered:
  1. Insufficient off-road performance on soft terrain, and high pressure on front road wheels.
  2. High pressure on the commander, due to also performing the duties of a gunner.
  3. Insufficient operational range.
  4. Difficulty in using gun ports due the position of the ammo rack.
  5. Insufficient robustness of casemate armour plates.
  6. Rapid buildup of gases in the fighting compartment. 
Two new prototypes were built on the PzIII chassis to resolve these issues. The vehicle was lightened by using 35 mm armour plates instead of 45 mm, and was equipped with wider winter tracks. The commander and gunner switched places, with the commander now performing horizontal aiming. Front hatches were removed to increase protection. The commander was also given an improver periscope and panoramic sight. The gun ports were replaced with those of superior design from the SU-76I. Their size allowed not only the use of the Nagant revolver, but any small arms used by the Red Army. The rate of fire was increased (according to Svirin, to a very rapid 7-8 RPM) by adding a loading tray. Large and awkward gun shields were replaced with an improved mantlet, more capable of protecting the weapon from bullets and shrapnel. An exhaust fan directly above the gun helped vent gases after firing.  

SG-122, improved prototype, front view, cutaway.

They were tested at the Gorohovets proving grounds shortly after the SU-122 decree, on December 5th. The SU-35 (SU-122) participated in these trials as well. Based on trial results, orders for the SG-122 were cancelled. Only 21 of these vehicles were produced. It is unknown how many used PzIII hulls and how many used StuG hulls, but M. Svirin writes that 8 StuG hulls were used for conversion into SU-76Is and SG-122s.

Actual combat use was complicated by a lack of spare parts and the use of a captured radio, which operated on a different range of frequencies than Soviet ones. In February of 1943, all existing vehicles were transferred to training units.

One experimental vehicle was produced using the PzIV chassis, indexed SU-122/T-4.

Information and images retrieved from Battlefield.ru, Solyankin et al, Domestic Armoured Vehicles of the 20th Century, Volume 2, Exprint, 2005 and M. Svirin, SturmGeshuetz III Assault Gun, Zeughaus, 2007

Friday, 13 December 2013

Seasoned Veteran

CAMD RF 38-11355-745

"On April 6th, 1942, a commission consisting of GAU KA military acceptance representative military technician 2nd class Ivanov, REU GABTU KA military acceptance representative military technician 2nd class Petrov, and representative of the Stalingrad Tractor Factory repair plant #5 comrade Dzyuba, composed this act on the inspection of T-34 vehicle #513491, which arrived from the South-Western Front for repairs at STZ.
  1. L-11 gun #606: the rifling, chamber, and external unpainted parts are completely covered in rust. The breech stopper is missing. The instrument and parts kit is missing. The assembly needs cleaning. 
  2. The coaxial machinegun is functional, needs cleaning. The instrument and parts kit is missing.
  3. Various devices and the second machinegun are missing.
  4. 18 DT disk magazines are present, that need cleaning. 
  5. Documents on the armament are missing.
This concludes the current act.

Military technician 2nd grade Ivanov
Military technician 2nd grade Petrov
Dzyuba"

This T-34 certainly has seen some sights. The L-11 indicates that it's a model 1940, which ceased production in March of 1941, and were mostly lost in the first months of the war, or upgraded. To date, no T-34 model 1940s have been found.

Thursday, 12 December 2013

End of the SU-76

"Decree of the State Committee of Defense #3530ss, June 6 7, 1943
Moscow, Kremlin

On SU-76 SPGs

The State Committee of Defense decrees that SU-76 SPGs, designed by comrade Ginzburg of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production, and accepted by GOKO decree #2559 on December 2nd, 1942, turned out to be of unsatisfactory quality. Furthermore, the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) did not carry out trials with due diligence before accepting the SU-76 for production.

The modifications proposed by the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev), confirmed by GOKO decree #3184ss on April 14th, 1943, did not result in serious improvements and did not increase the quality of the SU-76 to satisfactory levels, which also suggests that the NKTP and GAU KA trials were executed poorly.

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
  1. Production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38 must cease immediately.
  2. The People's Commissar of Tank Production, comrade Zaltsmann, must be made aware of his mistakes regarding production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38.
    The designer of the SU-76 SPG, comrade Ginzburg, must be removed from work at the NKTP, and not allowed to participate in NKTP projects further. He is to be transferred to the NKO for assignment to less critical work in the Acting Army.
    The chief of GAU KA, comrade Yakovlev, must increase the amount of control and responsibility for all experimental work on armoured vehicles, paying special attention to members of trial commissions.
    The NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must find and punish guilty workers in the NKTP and GAU KA, which carelessly performed trials of the SU-76 SPG.
  3. The NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and factory #38 (comrade Yakovlev) must:
    1. Produce spare parts for the SU-76 SPG and T-70 tank according to attachment #1.
    2. Install, by July 15th, 1943, on all SU-76 SPGs in the armed forces, flexible couplings, additional friction clutches, reinforced idler carriers, and improved track spring stops.
      In order to complete these tasks, send factory #38 brigades into the field.
  4. The NKO (comrade Fedorenko) must, by June 30th, 1943, present the People's Commissar of Defense with his plan regarding continued use of SU-76 SPGs produced prior to June 1st, 1943, by factory #38.
  5. The Commander of the Armoured Vehicle and Tank Forces of the Red Army (comrade Fedorenko), along with the GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must complete trials of new 76 mm SPGs produced by factory #38. During trials, pay special attention to reliability of main assemblies.
  6. After the completion of trials, the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and NKO (comrade Fedorenko) must provide the GOKO with a conclusion on the possibility of accepting a new 76 mm SPG into service in the Red Army by July 5th.
Chairman of the State Committee of Defense.
I. Stalin."
RGASPI 644-2-178

You should all know what happens next. The SU-15 and SU-16 take to the proving grounds in June, and the SU-15 goes on to become the SU-76M, the most successful light SPG used by any army of WWII.

Wednesday, 11 December 2013

SU-76 and SU-122 Production

This is quite a wide-reaching decree, dealing with three tanks: the rise of the SU-35 (SU-122) and SU-12 (SU-76), and the end of the T-70, as the SU-76 was replacing it as a cheap infantry support method. Also, it lists the large (very, very large) amount of steps and people involved in manufacturing a new tank.

"State Committee of Defense Decree #2559ss

December 2nd, 1942
Moscow, Kremlin

On the production of SPGs at the Uralmash factory and factory #38

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
  1. NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) must arrange for:
    1. Beginning of production of self propelled SU-35 guns on the T-34 chassis with 122 mm M-30 howitzers at the Uralmash factory. 
    2. Beginning of production of the SU-12 SPGs on the T-70 chassis with the 76 mm ZiS-3 gun, and removal the T-70 from production at factory #38 (city of Kirov).
  2. Establish the following production schedules for the T-34 and T-70 tanks, and SU-35 and SU-12 SPGs.
    1. Uralmash
      1. T-34
        1. December 1942: 100
        2. January 1943: 100
        3. February 1943: 110
        4. March 1943: 135
      2. SU-35
        1. December 1942: 25
        2. January 1943: 100
        3. February 1943: 100
        4. March 1943: 100
    2. Factory #38
      1. T-70
        1. December 1942: 200
        2. January 1st, 1943: remove the T-70 from production
      2. SU-12
        1. December 1942: 25
        2. January 1943: 150
        3. February 1943: 200
        4. March 1943: 300
  3. Establish the following schedules for production of tank hulls in December of 1942:
    1. Uralmash: T-34 hulls: 650
    2. Uralmash: SU-35 hulls: 35
    3. Factory #38: T-70 hulls: 120
  4. Allow the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and factory directors (comrade Muzrukov from Uralmash and comrade Yakovlev from factory #38) to arrange production of 125 SU-35s and 175 SU-12s based on prototype blueprints.
  5. GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must confirm the blueprints at the end of trials for mass production of the SPG.
  6. The People's Commissar of Medium Machinery (comrade Akopov) must ensure that factory #38 produces the following spread out evenly over 5-day periods:
    1. GAZ-202 engines with a shielded 12-volt electrical network and a gearbox for the SU-12 in the following amounts:
      1. December 1942: 120
      2. January 1943: 340
      3. February 1943: 460
      4. March 1943: 600
    2. Supply factory #38 with hot and cold stampings, cast gray and malleable iron in the amounts negotiated for the T-70, as well as cold stampings and malleable iron components for the new SU-12, from the Gorkiy factory.
    3. Produce for factory #38, and deliver evenly over month-long periods, the following, according to factory #38 and NKTP specifications.
      1. 200 devices
      2. 100 stamps for cold stamping
      3. 300 special cutting tools
  7. People's Commissariat of Armament (comrade Ustinov) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must ensure the supply of M-30 howitzers, ZiS-3 guns, and optics for them, completely suitable for mounting in an SPG, and matching the technical specifications of the Uralmash and #38 factories, in the following amounts:
    1. M-30
      1. Before December 15th, 1942: 25
      2. Before December 20th, 1942: 30
      3. January 1943: 100
      4. February 1943: 100
      5. March 1943: 100
    2. ZiS-3
      1. December 1942: 75
      2. January 1943: 175
      3. February 1943: 250
      4. March 1943: 300
  8. The People's Commissariat of Rubber Production (comrade Mitrohin) must provide rubber for road wheels and deliver it in accordance with goals set by the NKTP.
  9. The People's Commissariat of Electric Plants (comrade Shimerin) must set a daily limit for factory #38: 3500 kW for December 1942, and 4000 kW for the first quarter of 1943.
  10. The People's Commissariat of Tool Production (comrade Efremov) must produce 20 special assembly tools for factory #38 in the first quarter of 1943, for production of road wheels, balancers, winches, and torsion bars, billed to the NKTP.
  11. The People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals (comrade Tevrosyan) must provide armour plates for SPGs according to special instructions and dimensions given by Uralmash and factory #38, billed to the NKTP.
  12. The People's Commissariat of Heavy Machinery (comrade Kazakov) must provide 18000 cubic meters of oxygen to Uralmash per day.
  13. The Chief of Military Production in the USSR Council of Commissars (comrade Shapiro) must produce a proving grounds at factory #38 by February 1st, 1943 for SPGs.
  14. The Kirov regional committee must provide land for factory #38's proving grounds.
  15. The People's Commissariat of Finance (comrade Zverev) must issue 5 million roubles from the reserve funds of the USSR Council of Commissars for the preparations for production of SPGs in December of 1942 and first quarter of 1943.
  16. The Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Workforce in the USSR Council of Commissars (comrade Shvernik), the Kirov regional committee (comrade Ivolgin) and Kirov regional party committee (comrade Lukyanov) must:
    1. Mobilize 1000 women before February 1st, 1943, for factory #38 from the surrounding region.
    2. Issue 4000 square meters of living space to factory #38, obtained by increasing density.
  17. NKPS (comrade Hrulev) must issue a cargo train to factory #38 on the North-Pechorskiy line for the first quarter of 1943.
  18. Comrades Saburov, Malyshev and Zaltsmann, must, as soon as possible, present GOKO with a proposal for new production resources for the T-70 tank to replace factory #38, considering the availability of grounds of the Mytishi train factory (factory #592) and elements of factory #8.
  19. Consider points 3 and 4 of GOKO decree #2429ss from October 19th, 1942, to be superseded by the current decree, and order NKTP and NKSM to cease production of 45 mm and 37 mm SPGs. 
  20. Uralmash director and chief engineer, comrades Murzukov and Umnyagin, as well as director and chief engineer of factory #38, comrades Yakovlev and Terentyev must know that GOKO tasks them with a special responsibility of completing this decree on time.
  21. The control of fulfilment of this decree is given to comrade Petrosyants.
Chairman of the State Committee of Defense
I. Stalin."
RGASPI 644-2-113

Ultimately, neither vehicle went on to become very successful. The SU-76 ceased production in 1943 due to poor reliability, replaced by the SU-76M. The SU-122 was replaced with the SU-85 in 1943 as well. As for the T-70, no additional production resources were found, and its production also ceased in 1943. 

Tuesday, 10 December 2013

SU-76I

I briefly mentioned various Soviet re-arming projects in the past, so let's take a closer look at a successful one, the SU-76I. As was the tradition at the time, the 76 index stands for the caliber of the gun. The I stands for Inostrannaya (foreign). The vehicle was also referred to as SU-76 (S-1) after its gun assembly index, or Sturmgeschütz 76 in German intelligence documents.

"Mass production model of a SU-76I SPG on the chassis of a captured PzIII, designed by factory #37"
CAMD RF 38-11369-1

The Red Army experienced a need for light SPGs armed with 76 mm guns as early as Fall of 1941, but that need was not met until December of 1942, when production of the SU-76 SPG began. Sadly, production was dragging slowly, and the vehicle ultimately ended up a bust. The need for a light SPG didn't go anywhere. In order to meet the army's needs, factory #37 converted PzIIIs and StuGs to use an F-34 76 mm gun in a fixed casemate.

"According to GOKO decree #2758 from January 18th, 1943, factory #37 and TsAKB NKV designed and built an experimental prototype of a SU-76I SPG on the chassis of a captured StuG SPG and PzIII tank, using a stock 76 mm F-34 tank gun.

In March of 1943, the vehicle was tested at the Sofrino proving grounds over 280 kilometers of travel and 434 rounds.

The experimental prototype passed trials, and was recommended for service in the Red Army. The SU-76I SPG was accepted into the Red Army by GOKO decree #2758ss from January 18th, 1943."
CAMD RF 38-11369-1

The SU-76I was a continuation of the SG-122 design, along with some improvements, like sloped armour. Originally, the project called for a ZiS-3 gun (which was later installed on the SU-76), but the only way to provide proper mantlet protection was to use an F-34 in a special frame (indexed S-1). Armour reached 50 mm in the front. The SPG kept its 300 hp Maybach engine. Due to the fact that vehicles of different makes and models served as a base for the SU-76I, various SPGs of this type can look slightly different. It is not known exactly how many of these vehicles were made from StuGs and how many were made from PzIIIs. According to M. Svirin, the total amount of SU-76I and SG-122 vehicles built with captured StuG hulls only equalled eight.

An interesting point: the decree that accepted the SU-76I into service pre-dates its trials by a month and a half. The Red Army must have really needed those SPGs. 611 SU-76I vehicles were built (compared to 550 of the original SU-76 production run).

By the end of 1943, there were almost no SU-76Is left in the army, and in the beginning of 1944, the last of them were transferred to training units. To this day, two SU-76Is remain: an authentic one at Sarny, Ukraine, and one with a restored casemate at the Poklonnaya Gora museum in Moscow. LiveJournal user starcom68 took very many photos of the former one.

Sunday, 8 December 2013

German Anti-tank Tactics

It is important to know how your enemy fights. Observations are fine, but capturing an enemy document with their descriptions is even better. Let's take a look at one such document, instructing German soldiers how to fight Soviet tanks, dated September 17th, 1941, stored under CAMD RF 38-11355-895:

"In order to fight enemy armoured vehicles (tanks, armoured cars), units must follow these rules of combat:

A: Reconnaissance

Send scout units far ahead and out of open flanks, to observe, track, and listen. The goal is to prevent sudden appearances of enemy tanks. Report the appearance of tanks with rockets or signals.

B: Combat readiness

When tanks are spotted, an order to ready for battle is given.
Junior commanders, on their own initiative, can get into a ready position from a march or from a camp. Run to your ordered positions. A trench should be prepared and camouflaged for the commander, so he can control his unit (or gun crew). Each group (machine gun or gun crew) needs to form a defensive point with 360 degree defenses.
Distances to various parts of the terrain are established. Open fire only upon the orders of a unit commander (battery commander).
Armour piercing rounds should be located close to the gun. It is necessary to have:
  • For the 98 rifle: 10 AP bullets SmK |H| 
  • For the 34 machine gun: 100 AP bullets SmK |H| in two drums or in belts
  • For the 37 mm light AT gun: 20 AP PzGr 40 shells
  • For the 50-mm medium AT gun: 32 AP PzGr 40 shells
  • For light infantry guns: 24 "38" grenades
  • For the 18 light field howitzer: 10 105 mm AP grenades
  • 105 mm gun 18: 10 105 mm AP shell
Have close combat weapons ready. Stick grenades, egg-shaped grenades, smoke grenades, grenade bundles, etc.

C: Combat tactics

When tanks appear, stop all movement. 
Aim at the tank ahead of time. 
By shooting sharp-tipped sS bullets, force the tanks to close their hatches.
Open fire from the following distances:
  • From 1500 meters, with the 105 mm 18 gun, with 10.5 cm AP shells (red).
  • From 1500 meters, with the 105 mm light field howitzer 18: 10.5 cm AP grenade.
  • From 1500 meters, with the MG 34 firing heavy sS bullets, to suppress accompanying infantry.
  • From 1000 meters, with the medium 50 mm AT gun, firing AP shells.
  • From 800 meters, with the MG 34, firing AP bullets mixed with tracers to knock out optics.
  • From 600 meters, with the light 37 mm AT gun, firing AP shells.
  • From 600 meters, with the light infantry gun 18, firing 7.5 cm 38 grenades.
  • From 500 meters, with the heavy AT rifle 41.
  • From 400 meters, with the 98 rifle, firing heavy sS bullets.
  • From 300 meters, with the light 37 mm AT gun, firing PzGr 40.
  • From 200 meters, with the light AT rifle 38 and 39.
  • From 150 meters, with the MG 34 and 98 rifle, firing SmK |H| bullets.
  • From 9 meters, with hand grenades, grenade bundles, gasoline bottles.
Aim at weak points: suspension, turret ring. Do not aim at the front of the tank, as it is the thickest. Fire at the sides and rear of the tank. Aim for concentrated crossfire. Do not only shoot at tanks right in front of you, but tanks to the left and right of them. When shooting with the heavy 150 mm howitzer, aiming at the suspension should yield satisfactory results.

Be calm. Let the enemy approach. Suddenly open fire as late as possible. The heavier the tank, the later you must fire in order to successfully penetrate. Save AP shells. 

D: Close combat

Blind the enemy crews with smoke grenades. Let the tank approach to 9 meters, then throw a grenade, grenade bundle, or gasoline bottle, and hide. If a tank stops, climb on it, and cover its vision ports. Kill tank crews that leave the tank. 

E: If the enemy breaks through

Defend the position at any cost. Tanks that break through can be destroyed by direct fire artillery or rear forces. Keep fighting approaching tanks and accompanying infantry. Open fire from all weapons. Even if you cannot penetrate, you will have a demoralizing effect on the crew.

Artillery fights tanks with all available guns. Artillery must be positioned far from forests, to be able to fire in all directions at tanks that broke through. Ready at least one AT battery per regiment, and give them more AP shells. Forward observers must be located in regions inaccessible by tanks. Have reliable connections to forward observers, in case they spot tanks.

Rear forces must fight tanks that broke through. This must be prepared in the same way as AA defenses. Supply forces and other non-combat units must be well camouflaged and positioned in regions inaccessible by tanks.

F: Short conclusions

A brave soldier can destroy any tank forces with his weapon, and other supporting weapons. He must aim carefully to penetrate armour. An indomitable will to destroy a tank is a guarantee that a unit will have no fear  when tanks arrive. The unit will always stand before tanks. Will always triumphs over machines."

This is the 1941 or earlier edition, aimed at general tank warfare. Note the abundance of APCR shells, which radically decreased after 1941. Aside from some minor scares, German APCR wasn't really an issue in 1942. Here is another one stored under CAMD RF 204-113-48, specifically about Soviet tanks.

"Translation from German. Captured on 9/1/43.

Summation of Experience of Tank Battles in the East.

1. Soviet tanks

Is it difficult to destroy the following tanks: medium T-34 (26 tons), heavy KV-1 (44 tons), KV-1 (reinforced), KV-1 mod. 1942 (120 mm of armour), KV-2 (52 tons). Light T-26 and BT tanks are of an obsolete design. T-40 and T-60 tanks have light armour.

Resistance of Russian tanks to AT guns is caused not only by armour thickness, but by its angle. The T-34 has high off-road ability. Special measures must be taken when fighting it, especially measures that use terrain impassable by tanks.

The main weakness of the Russians is poor visibility. This must be exploited in order to suddenly open fire from close ranges with AT guns.

2. Significance of tank reconnaissance. (Order 469/2A)

Reconnaissance is the first step in combat with all enemy tanks. In order to destroy a tank with powerful armour, the range, aim point, shell type, all depend on the tank (see order 489/3A "table for shooting a tank").

3. Tactics of Russian tanks

Russians have two main ways of using tanks:
1. Tanks are used as armoured guns (especially on flat ground). The tanks open fire from 1500 meters.
Countermeasures: it is pointless to open fire from light and medium AT guns, the StuG, the PzIII, or the PzIV (with the 75 L/43 gun). At this distance, tanks can only be destroyed by the 88 mm AA gun, artillery guns, heavy AT guns (AT gun model 1941 and 7.62 cm caliber guns, from a distance of no more than 1300 meters).

Infantry, and accompanying heavy weapons, when fired upon, must remain in the trenches, hide themselves, and cease all movement.

2. Tank attack (infantry attack support)
a) Due to insufficient radio equipment, attacking tanks follow the example of the leading tank.
Countermeasures: destroy leading tanks first.
German infantry lets Russian tanks move unimpeded.
b) Infantry escorts follow the tanks closely.
Countermeasures: separate the infantry from the tanks by opening suppressing fire.
c) Tank attacks are performed by moving up line by line.
Countermeasures: try to use cover, constantly change positions of AT guns, and attempt to deflect the tank attack in close combat."

The next section of the document is fairly self-evident (shoot at flat armour when possible, use APCR on highly armoured targets, use guns with weak penetration at point blank ranges, shoot at the sides, etc). A section on infantry repeats the previous orders: when tanks get close, conceal yourself in cracks and trenches, do not open fire. It also mentions some infantry AT devices:
  • Rifle grenade model 1940: penetrates 60 mm of armour at a distance of 50-100 meters.
  • 250 gram smoke grenade, used to block off the tank crew's vision.
  • AT mine, attached by a magnet or a hook, capable of penetrating 140 mm of armour.
That document predates the Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek, so let's see how effective those were. A Soviet document on battle damage to tanks, stored under CAMD RF 233-2309-162, states: "Since the beginning of the operation, a very large amount (hundreds of thousands) of anti-tank grenades "Faust" (large and small) and "Ofenrohr" was discovered. Their application is negligible, barely 3% of all knocked out tanks fell to them. This is explained by the weak morale of the German infantry, shocked by our rapid advances. They run when our tanks are within 200-300 meters (the range of "Faust" is 40-50 meters)."

"Faust", of course, is a nickname for the Panzerfaust, and "Ofenrohr" refers to the Panzerschreck. Seems that the "indomitable will to destroy a tank" from 1941 has been broken by 1944. 

Rare T-70

Here's a pretty standard photo of some tanks being shipped by railroad.


But wait, what is this? Zoom, enhance!


It's a T-70. But no ordinary T-70! It's a very rare T-70 with a cast turret. Only three such turrets were made. The turret was discovered to be inferior to the welded one, and no one had the resources to develop (or even produce) a better version. 

The tank was originally to be manufactured with a cast turret designed by Dedkov, but it was replaced with a welded one before the tank entered production.

Saturday, 7 December 2013

World of Tanks History Section: Type 89

In 1927, the Osaka Rikugun Zoheisho arsenal began construction of the "#2 light tank" (Type 87). After trials, the Japanese decided that the tank needs more armour and firepower. The design was completed in 1929, and resulted in the medium tank #2589, or "Type 89 I-Go".

The Type 89 had a classic layout: driver's compartment in the front, fighting compartment in the center, engine in the rear of the vehicle. The hull of the I-Go was riveted, and, at least on initial vehicles, was a re-built Vickers MkC hull, also tested by the Japanese at the time. The turret, also riveted, was equipped with a 47 mm, and later 57 mm, gun. The turret was turned manually. The I-Go also had two machine guns, one in the front of the hull, and one in the back of the turret.

The Type 89 had a Daimler gasoline engine. Later vehicles used a domestic Mitsubishi engine. The tank could accelerate to 27 kph, and had a range of 160 km.

The first I-Go tank was built in 1931. The main producer of the tank was the arsenal in the city of Nagoya.

Soon after entering production, the Type 89 received a turret upgrade, with a commander's cupola and rear bay for the machinegun. This variant is known as Type 89A.

In 1935, after experience in Manchuria, the tank was modernized. The tracks were replaced with sturdier ones, with smaller track links, the front hull plate was improved, the observation devices were better protected. The commander's cupola grew in size, and the gun mantlet changed shape. This vehicle was indexed "Type 84B Otsu". The Otsu was mainly produced by Mitsubishi. Type 89A and Type 89B tanks were used by the Army and special landing groups of the Imperial Navy. Production continued until 1937, when they were replaced by the Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank.

Original article here.

Friday, 6 December 2013

World of Tanks History Section: Soviet-Japanese War

1. Introduction

In February of 1945, at the Yalta conference, the USSR promised to declare war on Japan three months after the defeat of Hitler's Germany. In exchange for this aid, the Soviet Union would gain Sahalin and the Kuril islands, lost in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

At that moment, Japan and USSR had a neutrality pact, signed in 1941, lasting 5 years. In April of 1945, the Soviet Union declared a one-sided annulment of the pact, citing Japan's alliance with Germany and military action against allies of the USSR. “In this situation, a neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has become meaningless, and there is no point in prolonging it,” claimed the Soviets. The sudden annulment of the pact sent the Japanese government into a panic, and for a good reason. The war situation was becoming critical. Allied forces dealt a series of crushing blows in the Pacific theater. Japanese cities and industrial centers were constantly bombed. No reasonable person remained in the Japanese government that believed in victory. The only remaining choice was to tire out the Americans until acceptable conditions for surrender can be negotiated.

America understood that a victory over Japan would not be easy. A handy example would be the battles for Okinawa. Japan had 77 000 soldiers on the island. America sent 470 000 against them. The island was taken, but America lost 50 000 soldiers. The Minister of Defence estimated that a final victory over Japan without the involvement of the Soviet Union would cost one million killed and wounded.

A declaration of war was handed to the Japanese ambassador at 17:00, on August 8th, 1945. It declared that combat will start the next day. Considering time zone differences, this left the Japanese effectively one hour before the Red Army marched into battle.

2. Resistance

The Soviet strategy included three stages: the Manchurian, South-Sahalin, and Kuril. The first stage was the largest and most important, and it deserves a detailed description.

The Kwantung army, led by General Otsudzo Yamada, opposed the USSR in Manchuria. It contained about one million soldiers, over 6000 artillery and mortars, about 1500 planes and over 1000 tanks.

The Red Army started the operation with a pretty significant numerical advantage: 1.6 times as many soldiers, 5 times as many tanks, 10 times as many artillery pieces, more than 3 times as many planes. The advantage was not only quantitative; the Red Army's machinery was significantly more modern and powerful than that of the enemy.

The Japanese understood long ago that a war with the Soviet Union is unavoidable. For this reason, they created numerous fortification regions. Let us examine one of these: the Hailar region, which was to counter the advance of the left flank of the Trans-Baikal Front. Reinforcements were built up for 10 years. In August of 1945, it consisted of 116 bunkers, connected with concrete trenches, and a large amount of defensive engineering structures. This region was held by a division of soldiers.

It took several days to drive the enemy out of this region. This does not seem like a long time, it's not like the troops were stuck for months. However, in this time, other sections of the Trans-Baikal front moved forward as much as 150 kilometers. By the standards of that war, the delay was significant. Even after the main forces of the Hailar region surrendered, separate groups of Japanese continued to fight, showing fanatical bravery. Soviet reports constantly mention soldiers that chained themselves to their machine guns in order to prevent retreat.

Among the Red Army's successful operations, one must pay special attention to the 350 kilometer march of the 6th Guards Army through the Gobi desert and Hingan Mountains. The peaks of Hingan seemed an impenetrable barrier for tanks. Soviet tanks traveled on a road as high as 2000 meters above sea level, on slopes as steep as 50 degrees, forcing the tanks to zig-zag. Conditions were further complicated by nonstop rain, impassable mud, rushing mountain rivers. Regardless, Soviet tanks moved forward. By August 11th, they passed through the mountains and found themselves deep in the rear of the Kwantung army, on the Central Manchurian Plains. The army was lacking fuel and armament, and had to be supplied by air. 900 tons of tank fuel alone was supplied. As the result of this incomparable feat, the Red Army managed to capture 200 000 prisoners, and a large amount of guns and armour.

The First Far-East Front of the RKKA was met with brutal resistance from soldiers entrenched on hills designated “Sharp” and “Camel”, which were included in the Hotou fortified region. The approaches to those hills were swamps, scarred with small rivers and streams. The slopes were covered in trenches and barbed wire. The Japanese carved hardpoints into the mountain granite. Bunkers were covered in concrete up to 1.5 meters thick.

Defenders of “Sharp” rejected all offers for a surrender. The Japanese commander beheaded the local villager used as a translator. The Japanese were always unwilling to negotiate with the Red Army. When Soviet soldiers breached the fortifications, they discovered no remaining people, only corpses. Among them were not only men, but women, armed with grenades and daggers.

In the battle for the Mudandzyan city, the Japanese actively used suicide bombers. They threw themselves on Soviet tanks and soldiers with grenades strapped to them. On one section of the front, 200 of these “living mines” lay down in front of advancing tanks. Suicide attacks only initially had results. Red Army soldiers quickly learned to remain vigilant, and the attacker was usually shot before he could get in range and harm infantry or tanks.

3. Finale

On August 15th, Emperor Hirohito addressed his country by radio, informing the population that Japan accepts the conditions of the Potsdam conference and surrenders. The Emperor called his people to display courage, patience, and unite their strength to build a new future.

Three days later, on August 18th, 1945, at 13:00 local time, a radio message was issued from the Kwantung army general staff to its soldiers, which informed them that the decision to surrender was made, as continued resistance was futile. Over the next few days, forward detachments of the Kwantung army with no radio link were informed by messengers.

Most soldiers accepted surrender without any objections. Furthermore, in the city of Chanchun, where Soviet forces were insufficient, the Japanese themselves guarded military installations. Even so, a small number of fanatical soldiers and officers continued to resist, refusing to accept a “cowardly” order to cease fire. Their war only ended when they died.

On September 2nd, 1945, the act of unconditional surrender of Japan was signed aboard the American battleship Missouri. This date marks the official end of the Second World War.

Original article available here.