Thursday, 10 December 2015

Red Army Exercises, 1941

CAMD RF 28-1167-367

Here's an interesting little table, vehicles planned for use during Red Army exercises in 1941. The rows list the various exercises, as follows:

Kiev Special Military District: June 1941
Western Special Military District: October 1941
Baltic Special Military District: July 1941
Transbaikal Military District: August 1941
Far East Military District: August 1941
Siberian Military District: September 1941
Arkhangelsk Military District: August 1941

These are all boring, since if you look at the columns to the right, they don't use any tanks at all, only light cars, GAZ-AA trucks, and ZiS-5 trucks. The next two are a little more interesting:

Auto transport exercises in Kiev Special Military District: June 1941
Auto transport exercises in the Western Special Military District: July 1941

These exercises involve a lot more trucks and also 50 special vehicles of some kind. But we don't get the good stuff until:

Combined arms exercises in Kiev Special Military District: September 1941
Combined arms exercises in the Western Special Military District: September 1941

Now we're talking! Lots and lots of vehicle! The middle section is tanks, and it's fairly self explanatory (the last column is armoured cars), the section to the right is tractors (Comintern, Komsomolets, S-65, STZ-5). After that is another pair of interesting columns, "length of work per vehicle per day" (presumably in hours, with the hours for combat vehicles in the numerator and light vehicles in the denominator) and "average daily distance travelled per vehicle" (light cars in the numerator and trucks in the denominator).

It's interesting to note that despite a large number of old model tanks, only 50 T-34s are issued for exercises and only 60 KVs, showing how protective the Red Army was of its shiny new toys, even for such limited exercises. Sadly, the war cut these plans short, and the T-34 had to earn its combined arms experience in battle.

Wednesday, 9 December 2015

PTRS vs PTRD

"Evaluation of Degryaryev and Simonov anti-tank rifles based on the reviews of privates, Sergeants, and officers of anti-tank rifle units
  1. Simonov's rifle starts jamming after only a small amount of fouling in the chamber, after 10-15 shots. Degtyaryev's rifle is flawless in its action. I knocked out a tank near Skopishki at 300 meters (with a BS-32 bullet). - Sergeant Pazharduk, 665th Reg., 216 Div.
  2. The Degtyaryev anti-tank rifle has an insufficient rate of fire for fighting tanks, reloading takes too long. The rate of fire of Simonov's rifle is good, but heavy for attacking. Their weakness is that they are not used with the whole unit, but split up among companies and platoons, which removes the ability to fire in groups on tanks and other targets. BS-32 bullets have weak incendiary properties, BS-41 bullets are good. - Sergeant Pikalov, 346th. Div.
  3. The PTRD is an excellent weapon, works flawlessly. The PTRS jams often when there is any dirt in it or when the lubricant freezes. - Artillery Quartermaster, 1166th Reg., 346th Div. Jr. Military Technician Prikhodko
  4. The PTRD is flawless in battle, never has any jams that create difficulties on the battlefield. However, its weakness is that it has no magazine. The PTRS has a high rate of fire, and is convenient to carry, as it can be taken apart and put back together quickly. Its drawback is that it has many jams that cannot be fixed on the battlefield, the assembled rifle is heavy, the round casings burst often, and the chamber is fouled, which results in jams. 4 medium tanks were knocked out with anti-tank rifles from 300 meters (BS-41 bullet), and three armoured cars from 200 meters. - Artillery Quartermaster, 1168th Reg. 346th Div.
  5. The PTRS has sufficient rate of fire, and sufficient penetration for a light or medium tank. Its drawbacks include jamming in dusty conditions and case expansion, which makes reloading difficult.
    The PTRD is light and mobile, reliable in cold and dust. The penetration is sufficient. Drawbacks include a lot rate of fire. During fighting in Lithuania and Latvia 3 tanks were knocked out at a range of 250-300 meters with incendiary bullets. - Commander, 1st Company, 1168th Reg. 346th Div. Captain Gotozhkov
  6. The PTRD is superior to the PTRS, its penetration is good. With three aimed shots, an enemy machinegun was destroyed at 250 meters. Company commander, 346th Div. Sr. Lieutenant Deritz
  7. The anti-tank rifle is a good weapon for destroying enemy strongholds, armoured cars, and other weapons. - Sr. Sergeant Fedoseev
  8. The penetration of the anti-tank rifle at 100 meters is 45 mm. The rate of fire of the PTRS is 10-15 RPM, of the PTRD is 8-10 RPM. The rate of fire is good. The anti-tank rifle is very effective at destroying enemy machinegun nests. The anti-tank rifle likes cleanliness, good care, and constant lubrication. - Jr. Sergeant Kvichko
  9. Anti-tank rifle units prefer to be armed with PTRD rifles, as they are lighter and more reliable. Currently, AT rifles are rarely used against tanks, as our units are saturated with AT artillery. They are normally used to destroy cars, prime movers, and light armoured cars. - Artillery Quartermaster, 417th Div. Malinin
Conclusions
  1. In the second phase of the Patriotic War, when the Red Army went on the offensive on all fronts, our forces became saturated with AT artillery, improvement of armour on medium tanks and increased numbers of heavy tanks, the importance of anti-tank rifles as anti-tank weapons decreased drastically.
    The anti-tank rifle lost its power as an infantry anti-tank weapon. Artillery effectively fights tanks now. The anti-tank rifle, due to its high precision, is now used against open enemy concentrations, armoured cars, and APCs. This is natural, given the state of equipment of infantry at this time.
  2. Almost all anti-tank rifle units speak well of the PTRD: light to carry and flawless in battle. Some wish to increase its rate of fire, others mention that the rate of fire is the only good quality of the PTRS. There are no positive reviews of its reliability, only negative. After 10-15 shots, it starts jamming, and these jams are hard to fix, consume a lot of time, which is unacceptable in modern fast-paced battle.
    The PTRS is unusable in battle, and its subsequent production is pointless.
  3. Retain the PTRD in production, increase its rate of fire.
51st Army HQ Chief, Major-General Dashevskiy
Chief of the Artillery HQ, Colonel Shvedkov
September 28th, 1944"

Via artem-mr.

Artillery Effectiveness

As mentioned in this article, even the most impressive artillery barrage doesn't amount to much when you're just dumping shells in the vague direction of the enemy. Every shot must be carefully aimed, and the aftermath analyzed in order to ensure effectiveness. Here are some of these analyses, from the Battle of Kursk. Notice the difference that effective scouting makes: if you know exactly where the target is, you can drop shells directly on top of it. If you don't know where the target is, you are forced to blanket the area in shells, drastically reducing effectiveness.


Target #364, east of the Parashino agricultural college. Shells fired: 80 76 mm, 20 122 mm. 
Shells that hit within 50 meters: 7 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Shells that hit within 75-100 meters: 6 76 mm, 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun damaged by shrapnel, crew members killed.

Target #422, 3 150 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 872nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 40 122 mm shells used.


Target #471 north of Senkovo. Shots fired: 39
Shells that hit within 50 meters: 33, 21 122 mm, 12 76 mm
Shells that hit within 50-100 meters: 6, 5 122 mm, 1 76 mm
Effectiveness: gun destroyed.

Target #485, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 872nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 54 122 mm shells used.


Target #541, south of Glazunovka. Shells fired: 75 122 mm, 40 152 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 2 122 mm, 6 152 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 5 122 mm, 10 152 mm
Effectiveness: one 150 mm gun damaged, crew members killed.

Target #514, south-west of the Prozorovskiy farmstead. Shells fired: 43
Hits within 50 meters: 39, 21 122 mm, 18 76 mm
Hits within 100 meters: 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: one gun with crew destroyed.


Target #622 west of the Parashino agricultural college. Shells fired: 80 76 mm, 20 122 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 10 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 5 76 mm, 2 122 mm
Effectiveness: 1 gun destroyed, 1 gun damaged by shrapnel.

Target #543: north-west of Kuznach. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 56 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 3 76 mm, 12 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 4 76 mm, 6 122 mm
Effectiveness: 1 gun destroyed, crew killed.


Target #665, 2 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 469th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 32nd Howitzer Artillery Brigade. 46 122 mm shells used.

Target #721, Kriviye Verkhi. Shells fired: 75 122 mm, 40 152 mm
Hits within 50 meters: 3 122 mm, 10 152 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 4 122 mm, 6 152 mm
Effectiveness: one gun damaged by shrapnel, two crews killed.


Target #752, north-east of Lodyrevo. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 11 76 mm, 9 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 6 76 mm, 4 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun and crew destroyed.

Target #784, north-east of Lodyrevo. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 7 76 mm, 9 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 8 76 mm, 1 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun damaged by shrapnel, direct hit on two dugouts with people.


Target #792, north-east of Sadoviy. Shells fired: 200 76 mm, 50 122 mm.
Hits within 50 meters: 20 76 mm, 3 122 mm
Hits within 75-100 meters: 2 76 mm, 2 122 mm.
Effectiveness: 1 gun  destroyed, 2 guns damaged by shrapnel, 3 crews killed.

Target #846, 3 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 3rd squadron,  753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 78 152 mm shells used.


Target #1022, 3 150 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 3/642 Corps Gun Artillery Regiment. 76 107 mm shells used.
Target #1024, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 2nd squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 64 152 mm shells used.


Target #1082, 3 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 1st squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 58 152 mm shells used.

Target #1142, 4 105 mm gun battery, suppressed on July 5th, 1943, during counterbattery fire by 2nd squadron, 753rd Gun Artillery Regiment. 56 152 mm shells used.


Target #3975, north-west of Senkovo
Number of hits: 34
Within 50 meters: 26, 4 152 mm, 22 122 mm
Within 50-100 meters: 8, 3 152 mm, 5 122 mm
Effectiveness: 2 guns knocked out by shrapnel, 2 dugouts destroyed

Target 4042, east of Sadovod
Number of hits: 22
Within 50 meters: 13 152 mm
Within 50-150 meters: 9 152 mm
Effectiveness: 2 vehicles destroyed, 2 guns damaged by shrapnel.

Monday, 7 December 2015

Cheating at Statistics 12: Overclaim at Oboyan

In a previous article, we saw some SS Tigers make quite a kill claim.

"12 July 1943: Fierce Soviet tank attacks from the direction of Jamki, Prochorovka and Petrovka (on both sides of Kalinin) are pushed back. The II./SS-Panzer-Regiment "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" and the Tiger company knock out 163 enemy tanks. One Tiger is knocked out; nine Tigers undergo repair.
Total tanks: 12."

Since the words "SS", "Tiger" and "kill claim" immediately set off a siren, let's take a look at how the 1st Tank Army, the unit defending Oboyan direction, handled such a crushing blow.

"According to orders from the Front Commander, the 1st Tank Army regrouped, starting on the afternoon of July 11th and ending on the night of July 12th.

The 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps concentrated at 2nd Novoselovka with the goals of advancing towards Shepelevka and Luhanino.

The 10th Tank Corps, transferring its defenses to the 204th Infantry Division, took up positions along the western outskirts of Novenkoye with the goal of advancing towards Berezovka and Syrtsevo.

The 6th Tank Corps remained in place to allow for the 5th Guards Stalingrad and 10th Tank Corps to deploy, as well as to prevent penetration of the enemy in the north-west direction.

The 204th and 309th Infantry Divisions, 3rd Mechanized Corps, and 31st Tank Corps remained in place to prevent the enemy from penetrating to the north, and to begin advancing with the 5th and 10th Tank Corps in the event that the enemy retreats south.

At 9:00 on July 12th, the army began its offensive."
Tank Front

What we have here is a very common picture: the attack of the famed and fawned over Tiger fails, and the battlefield is in Soviet hands. Many kill claims (unverifiable, as the Germans cannot inspect the battlefield after) are made, and tanks lost in the attack are registered as "undergoing repairs", while still on Soviet territory. By July 15th, as the company is going though a "planned retreat" south, these tanks are already forgotten.

Let's look at the two attacking tank units that would have faced off with the SS tanks on July 12th, namely the 10th Tank Corps and 5th Guards Tank Corps.


10th Tank Corps:
"As a result of battles from July 12th to July 14th, our corps destroyed:
  • Tanks: 123
  • Soldiers and officers: up to 2500
  • Vehicles: 132
  • Guns: 19
  • Aircraft: 5
Our losses for this period:
  • Killed: 175
  • Wounded: 144
  • Tanks burned up or knocked out: 23"
I don't have the documents for the 5th Guards Tank Corps, but it's not particularly difficult to estimate the likelihood that the German kill claims are correct. The Corps was formed from three tank brigades and one motorized infantry brigade. Based on the time of the formation of the tank brigades, they would have followed cadre #010/270: 53 tanks (32 T-34s, 21 T-70s). The motorized infantry was armed only with armoured cars and unarmoured vehicles. Assuming that all 23 of the 10th TC's tanks were knocked out on July 12th, that still leaves 140 tanks unaccounted for compared to the 153 available tanks in the 5th Guards TC, assuming they started the battle at full capacity. Since the Battle of Kursk started a while ago, they almost certainly didn't. The neighbouring 2nd Tank Corps was down to 85 tanks

 Since the advance of the unit continued until July 15th after which it was reassigned to the 6th Guards Army and fought further, one can safely assume that they had a lot more than 13 tanks left over after the battle on July 12th, especially as documents of the Voronezh Front do not mention any particular difficulty faced by the 5th Guards at this time. As usual, impressive SS kill claims turn out to be nothing but fiction.

Sunday, 6 December 2015

World of Tanks Armoured Fantasy: The Universal Fighting Machine

Military Engineer A.I. Pavlov never considered himself a cocky man. In his letter submitted along with his project in 1943, he wrote "Perfection of form, quality, and technical capability was never achieved by the first designer." His invention had a grandiose purpose: a vehicle that could perform a wide variety of tasks and, in his opinion, replace a large amount of land vehicles.

Compartment by compartment

"The UVM-1 is shaped like a train, which allows it to cross wide trenches, up to 9 meters", Pavlov wrote. The hull of the vehicle consisted of seven cars, connected by hollow armoured segments. There were hatches inside the segments that allowed crewmen to walk between them. The joints were flexible enough to allow the UVM-1 to traverse very bumpy terrain. In order to save on the vehicle's resources, it could be disassembled and transported by rail in pieces.

Each car had a separate role. The front one contained the driver and commander, and it controlled the UVM-1 during marches. "The front and top of the cabin is armoured, the other faces are watertight, and can submerge into water up to the wheel axles", Pavlov explained.

Cars 2 and 6 had cylindrical turrets. Their roofs consisted of two semi-disks, which could slide to the side. These cars would contain high caliber machineguns. Additionally, each one would contain 500 kg of explosives, which could be thrown out of a separate hatch. Both cars were staffed by two crewmen. Cars 3 and 5 had artillery turrets. These cars also contained 2.5 tons of oil and fuel.

Car 4 of the "Universal Fighting Machine" would be the largest. Here is where Pavlov proposed putting two diesel engines with an electric generator and 11 tons of fuel. This car would be armed with two flamethrowers and 7.62 mm machineguns with a large range. Four crewmen would man this car. "The ceiling contains a cooling system and air circulation system", Pavlov added.

Finally, car 7 was similar to the first, but was equipped with additional armour and a minesweeper. On a march, the UVM-1 would drive with the first car forward. In battle, it would turn around and face the enemy with car 7.

Buoyant Wheels

The creator came up with a special suspension for his design. "The project has a brand new innovation in the field of movement... a buoyant wheel system." Each car was equipped with a pair of large diameter wheels, car 4 had four of them.

The wheels were essentially hollow metallic drums. They had external rubber tires, and the covers resembled cones pointing outside. The inner disk was made from a 5 mm steel sheet and had a brake pad. Two rows of spokes covered the inside of the wheels. Pavlov relied on these spokes to propel the tank in water, envisioning his UVM to be a paddleboat.

Each wheel was supposed to be waterproof on the inside, and for a good reason, as it contained an electric motor. The axles would be made of hollow tubes that would carry electricity to them.

Aside from the design of the UVM-1, Pavlov wrote in detail about its tactical characteristics. While being 25 meters long, it would only be 3 meters wide and tall. The inventor estimated the mass of his vehicle to be 100 tons, half of which would be used by armour. The crew, in total, would weigh 1.5 tons. There would be enough fuel on board for 4000 km of driving, or three days. The estimated speed of his tank was 100 kph on a highway, 20 kph on water.

"Over hunchbacked mounds and river crossings..."

Unlike other projects, Pavlov also included a combat plan for his UVM-1. Pavlov didn't sweat the small stuff and envisioned a grandiose plan of crushing the defenses of eastern German regions and Berlin with a corps of his vehicles. The offensive would start near Vyazma, in the swamps, where the enemy would not expect an attack.

Towards the end of the day, the attack would begin. "Splitting into 3 columns of 33 vehicles, the tanks would drive westward, and each column separate into 11 groups of 3 vehicles each at dawn," the author planned. The main objective was speed, and the tanks would engage the enemy only when necessary. The inventor encouraged stealth and "disguise as the German", although it was unclear which German vehicle the tanks could be mistaken for. The march would continue until the vehicles reached their initial positions at the city of Poznan. They were expected to cover 1000 km within one day, prepare overnight, and attack right before dawn.

From Poznan to Berlin, the universal fighting vehicles would destroy enemy infrastructure, airports, and power lines. "Going around Berlin, thoroughly destroy its surroundings. After that, head for the center, crush, shoot, explode, and most importantly burn, not allowing to put out the fire, destroy everything." Having finished off the capital of the Reich, the vehicles would head to other German cities. This operation would be supported by aircraft, which would deliver fuel and evacuate the wounded.

Before daydreaming about crushing the invaders, the vehicle had to be put into production. The inventor understood this and listed a series of undertakings that would achieve the fastest possible production of 100 vehicles. One month would be enough to compose working blueprints and assemble a prototype. The cars would be produced at three factories and sent to Moscow, as well as the wheels, armament, electrical equipment, etc. Two factories in Moscow would assemble the vehicles, and in another month, the People's Commissariat of Defense would have 100 powerful tanks.

Pavlov promised his creation a bright future and many modifications. He considered that the UVM-1 would lead to victory for Communism on the whole planet. "These vehicles could reach La Manche and cross it, no matter the resistance. With sufficiently daring application of these tanks, we could turn the history of the world around incredibly quickly." When the last war would come to an end, the UVMs could ferry cargo to the Arctic or to starving African countries, through the ice and empty desert.

Sadly, no response to Pavlov's proposal was retained in the archives, but it's not too hard to imagine what it would be. This project combined many proposals that have been made since the first World War, with the same drawbacks. The "Universal Fighting Machine" remained on paper. One must respect the imagination of the author, if he did not surpass the realm of science fiction for his time (and even ours!) then he surely reached it.

Original article available here.

World of Tanks History Section: The Road of Life

An IV drip for a heavily wounded soldier cannot instantly heal him or protect him from bullets and shells, all it can do is keep him from dying. This is the role that the "road of life" played for Leningrad during the siege. During the difficult winter of 1941-1942, this road over the ice of Lake Ladoga saved the city from inevitable demise. There was no alternative for Leningrad.

The Germans had no intention of feeding the starving citizens of the city, and the loss of Leningrad would mean an almost guaranteed defeat for the USSR.

Ladoga: Threat and Hope

Everything began in August of 1941 when the Germans cut off the last railroad that connected Leningrad with the rest of the country. Soviet command decided to evacuate civilians through the lake, known for its powerful storms. In order to travel safely, ships carrying people had to take the Old Ladoga and New Ladoga channels. However, on September 8th, 1941, the Germans captured Shlisselburg. The land blockade was complete, and it was no longer possible to use water channels that entered the Neva near Shlisselburg.

As a result, the ships of the Ladoga navy were forced to travel directly through the lake. The trip between New Ladoga in the east and Osinovets on the west was short, only 60 kilometers, but very dangerous due to storms, rivalling the sea in their ferocity. To make things worse, there was no time to build lighthouses or mark the fairway.

Nevertheless, the first barges arrived at Osinovets on September 12th, 1941. September 17th, 1941, saw one of the biggest catastrophes in the history of lake and river travel. Towed barge #725 and the tugboat Orel was caught in a storm. Various sources estimated it to be carrying 1200-1500 people. Of those, the tugboat could save just over 200.

There was no alternative to the lake. In September 1941, the situation with supplies for Leningrad steadily worsened. The city needed 1100 tons of flour alone every day. The lake managed to supply half of that during the first blockade fall. Aircraft could only deliver 100 tons per day.

Ships and planes that delivered the necessities to the city didn't return with only civilians, but also soldiers to transfer east. About 20,000 men transferred during the German offensive on Tikhvin and Volkhovstroy in October helped prevent the enemy from taking those cities.

However, Tikhvin fell on November 9th, 1941, and supplies that were shipped there for Leningrad by rail stopped. This put the city's supply situation in danger, and it appeared to be on the brink of death.

Laying the Road of Life

By this time, the Soviets were already working on a project of a supply route over the ice of the lake. There was some experience in making such roads, and the most notable experience was only a year ago, during the war with Finland, a Red Army march over the ice of Vyborg bay. By the time Tikhvin fell, the first plans for the road already existed and work was underway.

The shallower north portion of Lake Ladoga froze faster. The Red Army needed to wait for this moment and perform reconnaissance. This happened on November 15-18th. A small column of 7 cars tried to make it across from the east shore, but unsuccessfully. The same thing happened to the second column. On November 18th, a recon group from the 88th Bridgebuilding Battalion, after spending 24 hours on the ice, managed to discover a route from Osinovets on the Leningrad side of the lake to Kobon village on the west side. The ice road went from an idea to a fact. Over the first few days, it could only support horse drawn sleds, later, cars.

On November 21st, 350 horsedrawn sleds arrives in Osinovets with the first 63 tons of flour for Leningrad. A thin strand stretched from Leningrad to the outside world, without which it would not survive the blockade. Officially, it was called "Military Automotive Road #102" (VAD-102), under the jurisdiction of Major-General of the Intendant Service, Afanasiy Mitrofanovich Shilov.

VAD-102 in Work and in Battle

Each kilogram of goods delivered over the road came at a cost of effort and life. Cars broke through the ice and sank, they were destroyed by German aircraft, the road itself had to be moved because the ice buckled under the pressure. A special schedule had to be established in order for the ice to not be overloaded. All possible efforts ensured that by January 1942, the Road of Life could deliver the minimum daily requirement of flour.

The return trips continued evacuating civilians and moving soldiers, and not just infantry. In February of 1942, the 124th Tank Brigade crossed the ice of the lake, dozens of heavy KV tanks. In order to ensure their safety, their turrets were taken off and towed separately on sleds.

The Germans were dissatisfied with the presence of this road right under their noses. The Luftwaffe started bombing it the moment it was built, and fighters hunted Soviet transport planes. When trucks started moving over the ice, they were fired on by artillery. The Germans were even preparing the 8th Tank Division to drive over the ice in order to break the supply line, but this plan was foiled due to a general offensive by the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts in January of 1942.

Soviet forces protected the Road of Life from the air and the ground. Here, a pilot from the 4th Guards Fighter Regiment, Leonid Georgievich Belousov repeated Aleksey Maresyev's heroic act. Both of his legs were frosbitten, gangrene set in, and they had to be amputated. Nevertheless, the pilot returned to battle in 1944. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union 13 years later.

In the summer and fall of 1942, the enemy transferred Italian torpedo boats and armed Siebel ferries. In October, the Germans attempted an offensive operation on the Suho island. The Soviet garrison fought off the attack with the help of the Lagoda navy.

Leningrad was ready for a second blockade winter. Supply lines over the lake worked flawlessly, and this work allowed for several major offensives by the Leningrad Front. Several other projects for moving supplies over ice materialized by the winter of 1942-43. There was even one as risky as building a trolleybus line over the lake, but it was declined. Instead, a railroad would be built, but the idea was not implemented in time.

On January 18th, 1943, Soviet forces penetrated the blockade. Even though the Road of Life continued its work until March, there was a new main supply artery, the Road of Victory, a railroad built in a record setting 17 days.

Original article available here.

Friday, 4 December 2015

Odd Hundred Out

The German E-series tanks (Entwicklung, "project") are especially renowned among German vehicle enthusiasts. The most famous of those is the heaviest of the proposals, the E-100. Alongside the Maus, this tank is often called a wonder weapon which would give the Third Reich a way to change the tide of war. In reality, the abilities of the tank are grossly overestimated. Additionally, the "canonical" history of its creation is omissions and mistakes. Even the external view of the tank, composed by Walther Spielberger, is not the same as what would have been in reality.

Tiger-Maus

In June of 1942, Porsche proposed its superheavy Maus tank. The draft was drastically different from what would eventually end up in metal. Outside, the tank was reminiscent of a larger Lowe, developed by Krupp. The initial design weighed 120 tons and had a 149 mm gun, 37 calibers in length. In June, on Hitler's orders, the armour was thickened, and a secondary turret with a 75 mm gun was added. It was decided that the proposed tank, already at 140 tons, would have to be redesigned. Effectively, it was going to be a whole new tank, with little of the original Tiger-Maus.

Porsche's brainchild had to be altered, but this change of course sealed the fate of Krupp's design. The Lowe, a project in development since 1941, was cancelled in July of 1942. However, Krupp did not lose everything: they were still developing the turret and gun, and the hull production was going to start in Hessen anyway. The company still had hope that they could have their revenge and regain lost profits.

The new round of competition between Krupp and Porsche started on September 11th, 1942. At a meeting between representatives of the 6th Weapons Department and Krupp representatives, the Maus turret was discussed. Lieutenant Colonel Fritz Holzhauer was worried about the many completely new components in Porsche's tank, including the engine. Lieutenant Colonel Felfert, responsible for Krupp's tank building branch, took full advantage of this fear. An alternative to Porsche's design was proposed, a tank that would weigh 150 tons and use as many components from the Tiger as possible. Holzhauer supported the idea and proposed that it be reviewed in a month.

This was not the first time that Krupp made such a move. Six years before these events, Krupp, initially chosen as the producer of a turret for the BW medium tank (future PzIV) managed to get permission to produce two prototypes of an entire tank, and as a result beat out the Rheinmetall design. And now, under the excuse of simplification, Krupp was about to make a tank out of a turret. It is worth noting that the "Tiger" here is the Tiger II. This is clearly indicated by the mass of the "donor" vehicle in question: 65 tons.

By mid-November, the alternative superheavy tank was ready. Unofficially, it was named "Tiger-Maus", but in NARA documents, it's called Krupp-Maus. Unlike Porsche, Krupp's engineers did not cover up the suspension with the hull. A unique solution allowed making the tank both wider than the railroad gauge and narrow enough to fit on a train. Like the Tiger and Tiger II, the tank had special transport tracks. Additionally, the sides were protected by armour plates, which could be removed for transport. The equipment to mount and demount the plates was attached to the turret. There were two versions of this project: blueprint W1671 proposed moving the turret back. This is about the same time as when Porsche's turret was moved (blueprint K3385, November 14th, 1942).

Krupp's revenge did not work out from the beginning. Calculations showed that for a 150 ton Tiger-Maus, even an engine turbo-charged to 1000 hp would not give it a maximum speed over 20 kph. With a stock Maybach 230, the result was even more sad: an effective hp/ton of 4.51. To compare, the British Infantry Tank MkI had an effective power of 5.98 hp/ton, and could go no faster than 13 kph. A similar speed was predicted for the Tiger-Maus with Tiger II components. To summarize, the commission (which, by the way, included Ferdinand Porsche) saw more drawbacks than advantages in Krupp's proposal.

A feverish search for a new engine began. Engines that were planned for the Maus worked, but they were not in mass production, and took away the major feature of the Tiger-Maus, the speed at which it could be put into production. Similar issues arose with the transmission and other components. The problem was compounded by the fact that the tank's mass grew month after month, reaching 170 tons in November.

On November 30th, 1942, a draft of the 170 ton Tiger-Maus was made (blueprint W1674). The mass of the chassis was 122 tons, 82 of which were for the hull. The proposed engine was the MB.507, the same as on the Maus. The removable side armour concept remained. The road wheels were planned to be 650 mm in diameter, less than on the Tiger II.

The result of the project review on December 1st, 1942, led by a key figure of the 6th Weapons Department, Heinrich Kniepkamp, was not promising. This Tiger-Maus was simply unnecessary, as it could not be rapidly put into production. With a mass of 170 tons, one could forget about using the engine, turning mechanism, transmission, or any other elements of the Tiger II. Only the reduction of mass by reducing side armour thickness was met with approval.

One week later, on December 7th, Krupp proposed a new version of the project (blueprint W1677). The mass of the Tiger-Maus dropped to 130 tons, the wheels were increased to the same 800 mm diameter as on the Tiger II. According to calculations, the top speed of the tank would be 23 kph, but considering the effective power of 5.4 hp/ton, this was overly optimistic. At the same time, an alternative variant (W1681) was prepared with a rear turret.

The commission that reviewed the project on December 8th immediately rejected the rear turret. The main variant was met with approval, as it reused many Tiger II components. The tank's suspension was to be torsion bar based, and a prototype was expected for fall of 1943.

Kniepkamp and Krupp's joy was not meant to last. On December 15th, Holzhauer decided to keep only one Maus after consultation with the OKH. Hitler himself decided that Porsche's tank was more promising, and the Tiger-Maus was forgotten, only to later return under a different name.

Aryan Rebranding

In early March of 1944, Adlerwerke company from Frankfurt auf Main submitted blueprint 021A38300 for a super-heavy tank called E-100. This project would be the heaviest tank of the E-series, the idea of which was proposed by Kniepkamp in April of 1943 (in other sources, the E-100 project was started in June of 1943). The concept was for a series of vehicles with external suspension elements. The Adlerwerke team, headed by Karl Jenschke, would only work for the suspension, not only of the E-100, but of the E-75 and E-50. This is worth noting, as Adlerwerke is often credited with the E-50, E-75, and E-100 entirely, which is not correct.

According to the blueprints, the 140 ton tank would be armed with a 149 mm gun and a 75 mm gun. Two types of engines were proposed: one was a 700 hp Maybach 230, with a transmission and turning mechanism borrowed from the Tiger II. The estimated top speed was 23 kph. The second variant would have a new 1200 hp Maybach engine. Nothing specific was said about its transmission or turning mechanism. The top speed of 40 kph, at 8.57 hp/ton, was also very optimistic. The tank's main feature was the already familiar removable side armour and transport tracks to reduce width.

A maximum speed of 23 kph, removable armour, engine, transmission, and turning mechanism from the Tiger II? This seems very familiar. No, there was no mistake, this is almost an identical copy of the Tiger-Maus with a suspension from Adlerwerke. Instead of a torsion bar suspension, springs were proposed, and new 900 mm road wheels. The blueprint's authors did not even design a new turret: the Maus had an identical one on blueprint K3387, dated January 1st, 1943. The turret lasted for two weeks, after which it was replaced with a nearly year-old design: a 15 cm L/37 gun, one that was rejected in March of 1943.

Kniepkamp did not try very hard conceal the fact that his "new" tank was a year-old project pulled out of the dusty closet. Initially, he tried to convince Holzhauer that this was a new tank developed by a new company. In reality, Krupp was behind this project, and the Tiger-Maus was resurrected due to the restart of the Maus program. Kniepkamp's logic was sound: the E-100 was a simpler and lighter superheavy tank.

The tank would certainly not have received the same turret as in blueprint 021A38300. The 149 mm gun was rejected in March of 1943, and the turret itself changed significantly since then. In March of 1944, Krupp started work on a new turret, known as Maus II. The curved front was removed, the turret became easier to produce, and the guns (128 mm KwK L/55 and 75 mm KwK L/36) were placed on top of each other. Another important addition was a rangefinder. The E-100 was supposed to receive the same turret, but with a reduced mass to 35 tons. This was achieved by reducing the thickness of the side armour to 80 mm.

Despite Kniepkamp and Krupp's enthusiasm, the E-100 was not seen as a magic solution to all problems. By spring of 1944, an experimental Maus prototype was driving around Boeblingen, and work on the second prototype already started. All components for Porsche's tank were more or less finalized. The idea of rapidly building a competitive tank based on Tiger II components became impossible. The difference in mass between 140 and 189 tons was not that much, as in either case, specialized train platforms would have to be used. Finally, the armour of the Maus, especially on the sides, was greater than that of its competitor. There was little necessity in the E-100.

All that E-100 lobbyists managed was to receive permission to build one prototype with a dummy turret. This permission was given based on the potential use of the E-100 as a tank destroyer with either a 15 cm StuK L/63 or 17 cm StuK L/53 gun. It's evident that the first proposal was to install these guns in a rotating turret, but that trick would not fly. The Maus was not suitable as a chassis, as its hull was too tall. As a result, it was approved as a chassis for the StuG E-100. This was the purpose for which the chassis was being built, but Kniepkamp and Krupp retained hope that they could still push their tank through to replace the Maus.

On July 10th, 1944, Hitler gave an order to stop work on all superheavy tanks and SPGs. The orders were followed, partially. Changes were still made to the Maus, to the point of replacing the gasoline engine with a diesel one. These changes only stopped when both prototypes were moved to Kummersdorf, where Porsche could no longer tinker with his "children". The situation with the E-100 was even more comical: while Porsche was secretly tuning his creation, its competitor was still secretly being assembled.

The site of assembly was a Henschel proving ground in Haustenbeck, not far from Paderborn. This choice was not a coincidence: the project used Tiger II components, so Henschel was an interested party. Due to the critical situation on the front and overloaded production, assembly went slowly. By January 1945, the hull and engine compartment were mostly ready. The suspension was also partially assembled, but since Adlerwerke could only spare three men, and the springs were lost in the mail, it was not ready. Judging by the state of the tank after the war, the springs were never found.

In May of 1945, the unfinished chassis fell into the hands of the Allies. The Americans limited themselves to examining the vehicles at Haustenbeck. The British had other plans. By the time the E-100 was captured, it was partially disassembled by Germans. It seems that the British managed to find the missing springs, since in the summer of 1945, the suspension was completed and the tank was pulled out of its garage.

All available E-100 parts were loaded on a superheavy trailer, and the tank began its journey towards the home islands, along with many other vehicles from the test site. Tracks were not installed on the vehicle until it reached England. There are rumours that the tank underwent trials, but they are unwarranted. The tank remained at the Bovington school until the 1950s when it was sold for scrap metal, along with most vehicles that arrived from Haustenbeck.

You may note that this story differs from the "canonial" one. Turns out, the perfect wonder-weapon was a rejected design that lobbyists tried to push through a second time. It had no advantages over the Maus. The E-100, as with the whole E-series, is one big question mark. As of March 1945, not a single E-series tank was listed in a production proposal, which speaks volumes.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

Thursday, 3 December 2015

Maria Oktyabrskaya

"Award Order
  1. Name: Oktyabrskaya, Maria Vasilyevna
  2. Rank: Guards Sergeant
  3. Position, unit: mechanic-driver, 26th Guards Yelnensk Tank Brigade, 2nd Guards Tank Corps
    is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
  4. Year of birth: 1905
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: none
  7. Participation in the Civil War, subsequent actions in defense of the USSR, and Patriotic War: in the Patriotic War since October 1943
  8. Wounds or concussions in the Patriotic War: heavily wounded on January 17th, 1944. Died from wounds.
  9. In the Red Army since: 1943
  10. Recruited by: Tomsk recruitment office
  11. Prior awards: Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Class
Brief and specific description of heroism: After receiving notice of her husband's death in battle with the German invaders, comrade Oktyabrskaya gathered her personal savings and donated them towards the construction of a tank, asking comrade Stalin to name it "Fighting Girlfriend". This request was granted. She arrived at the tank brigade, serving as the tank's driver.

Comrade Oktyabrskaya, as a patriot of the Motherland, avenged her husband's death as expected of a heroic Soviet woman. Despite the difficulty in battle for male mechanic-drivers, comrade Oktyabrskaya treated her vehicle with love, regardless of the situation.

In battle on November 20th, 1943, near Novoye Selo, comrade Oktyabrskaya was the first to burst through enemy defenses, crushing one AT gun and up to 30 enemy soldiers with her tracks. In this battle, comrade Oktyabrskaya's tank was knocked out and she was wounded. Despite the wound, she remained with the tank, and was besieged for three days under constant artillery fire. Despite this, she repaired the tank and returned to her unit.

In the same tank, on January 17th, 1944, near the Krynki farm, comrade Oktyabrskaya participated in an attack to capture this settlement. Her tracks crushed two AT guns with their crews, but the tank was knocked out by enemy artillery. Comrade Oktyabrskaya displayed heroism by repairing the tank under thick shell and mortar fire, but was heavily wounded, sent to the hospital, where she died of her wounds. For her fearlessness, patriotism, and heroism in battle, comrade Oktyabrskaya is worthy of the posthumous award of the highest order: the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

CAMD RF 33-793756-35

Wednesday, 2 December 2015

Anti-Tiger Gunner

"Award Order
  1. Name: Parkhomenko, Nikolai Kirillovich
  2. Rank: Guards Junior Sergeant
  3. Position, unit: Gun commander, 124th Guards Artillery Regiment, 52nd Guards Order of Lenin Infantry Division
    is nominated for the Order of Lenin and title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
  4. Year of birth: 1919
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member
  7. Participation in the Civil War and subsequent combat action in defense of the USSR (where, when): In the Patriotic War since June 22nd, 1941
  8. Wounds or concussions in the Patriotic War: none
  9. In the Red Army since: 1940
  10. Recruited by: Maryin recruitment office, Krasnodar region
  11. Prior awards: Order of the Red Star on December 24th, 1942, "For Courage" medal on June 15th, 1943
Brief and specific description of heroism: In the period of fierce battles to liquidate the German summer offensive at Belgorod, under constant bombings and artillery fire, comrade Parkhomenko destroyed 2 tanks, 2 mortars, and up to 60 enemy soldiers and officers just on July 5th, 1943.

In battle at Kartashevka, Kursk oblast, on July 12th, comrade Parkhomenko fought off attacks of enemy tanks and infantry while being bombed constantly, destroying two tanks, 3 trucks with cargo, and up to 70 enemy soldiers and officers.

When 8 enemy tanks penetrated the battery's defenses, comrade Parhomenko moved his gun to an open position and destroyed 3 tanks at 500 meters, including 2 Tigers. The rest of the tanks turned and fled, and the battery's position was restored.

When our forces exhausted and crippled the enemy attack and started their counterattack, comrade Parkhomenko and his gun never lagged behind the infantry and were always ready to provide direct supporting fire.

In battle on August 3rd, 1943, when our forces penetrated an enemy line of defense near the Novocherkassk farmstead, comrade Parkhomenko destroyed 2 AT guns, 4 MG nests, and up to 30 enemy soldiers and officers with direct fire.

In battle for Tomarovka station on August 4th, 1943, two enemy tanks blocked the advance of our infantry with their nonstop fire. Pushing his gun out to an open position, he destroyed one tank and two MG nests, causing the other tank to retreat, letting our infantry advance.

During the period of fierce fighting since July 5th, 1943, comrade Parkhomenko caused the following damage to the enemy, mostly with direct fire: destroyed 8 tanks, 2 of which were Tigers, 2 guns, 3 mortars, 3 vehicles with cargo and soldiers, and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers.

He is worthy of the Order of Lenin and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

CAMD RF 33-793756-36

The Tigers were presumably from 13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1, attacking towards Oboyan. This is their entry in Schneider's diary:

"12 July 1943: Fierce Soviet tank attacks from the direction of Jamki, Prochorovka and Petrovka (on both sides of Kalinin) are pushed back. The II./SS-Panzer-Regiment "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" and the Tiger company knock out 163 enemy tanks. One Tiger is knocked out; nine Tigers undergo repair.
Total tanks: 12."

Looks like the lost Tigers are plausible, but that number of kill claims is awfully high. Let's take a look at it in another article.

Tuesday, 1 December 2015

First Panzerschreck

"Ofenrohr: new AT weapon of the German Army
From the interrogation of a prisoner from the 58th Infantry Division

The Ofenrohr is a rocket propelled AT mine, very similar to the Panzerfaust. It consists of the warhead with a fin stabilizer and a socket for plugging it into the launcher, and a launcher with a sight and firing mechanism. Two men operate the weapon while standing, kneeling, or lying down. One man holds the weapon on his shoulder, the other aims, giving commands to the holder as to where the weapon is pointing. As soon as the weapon is on target, the commander orders "fire" and gets out of the way, as a stream of hot gases is expelled from the rear.

When firing, it is necessary to wear a gas mask and gloves, otherwise it is possible to burn yourself with the exhaust gases.

The warhead is 70 cm long, 20 cm in diameter. Maximum range is 120 meters, at this range it penetrates 20 cm of armour. The system weighs about 5 kg in total.

The weapon is fired by pressing the trigger. A metal rod connected to the trigger enters a socket, closing the circuit. The rocket fuel in the rear of the projectile ignites, driving the warhead forward.

The penetration of the round is based on a hollow charge principle. The fuse is a contact type. Before firing, a safety pin is pulled out of the fuse.

The weapon can fire once, after which the barrel is no longer suitable for use. The sight consists of a front and rear posts.

Note: The Ofenrohr is not yet used at the company level, but almost all soldiers have been taught how to use it."

Via mihalchuk-1974.