Thursday, 16 July 2015

SU-76 Manual

"Orders to commanders of the 4th Ukrainian Front on the combat use of SPG regiments (SU-76) and their cooperation with infantry in combat
  1. SPGs (SU-76), organized into batteries or regiments, are tasked with not only supporting tanks, but mainly supporting infantry in defense and attack.
  2. When SPGs (SU-76) cooperate with infantry, the SPG (SU-76) should be viewed as an infantry support weapon that is less vulnerable and more mobile than regimental towed artillery.
  3. Based on this understanding, a regiment of SPGs should be assigned to a division, and inside the division, one regiment should be assigned to every battalion. The use of individual SPGs is undesirable, as the battery is indivisible.
  4. On the offensive, a battery of SU-76s attached to an infantry battalion positions itself among and behind the infantry lines, same as divisional and regimental artillery. The task of the SU-76 battery is set by the battalion commander, who gives specific targets, no more than 2-3 targets per SPG. The battery commander distributes targets between SPGs. The same commander, the battery commander, picks the positions of the battery based on the given task and terrain.
    During artillery barrages, the SPGs may be included in the direct fire group. In this case, the tasks are given to the SPGs by the direct fire group commander, through the SPG regiment commander.
    The tasks given to the SPG battery commander by the infantry commander do not free him from the responsibility of independently seeking out and destroying targets in his sector.
  5. When the infantry moves out, the battery supports the infantry until such a time as the infantry reaches the region of the targets being suppressed by the battery. When infantry reaches target depth, the battery moves out to the next line, either vehicle by vehicle or with the whole battery, depending on the situation, without losing communication or ceasing cooperation with infantry.
    When the battery reaches its new positions, the battalion commander issues new targets. If there are no orders from the battalion commander, the battery commander must personally discover and destroy the targets that impede infantry progress the most. During the offensive, the SPG battery acts as infantry support guns and fires from positions dictated by the position of our infantry.
    Infantry commanders and soldiers must know and remember that the SU-76 SPG is not a tank, but an SPG, and does not fight outside of infantry ranks. When the enemy is demoralized or retreating, SPG batteries, like regular infantry gun batteries, rapidly move forward, destroy the enemy at close range, and pursue him. The infantry must not lag behind its SPGs, but also rapidly follow.
  6. When organizing cooperation between infantry and artillery, ensure that there is a mutual understanding of objectives. Shared landmarks must be established to make directions easier. The simplest signals possible must be agreed upon, legible to junior infantry commanders and commanders of individual SPGs. 
  7. One of the objectives of self propelled artillery in the offensive is the support of infantry while it fortifies on new ground.
  8. In this case, when the infantry moves to a defensive position, the batteries become mobile or immobile artillery with a potentially wider range. Pick concealed positions to shoot from, dig the SPGs into the ground if possible. On the offensive, as in defense, when enemy tanks or SPGs appear, SU-76 batteries ignore all other objectives and fire immediately at enemy tanks or SPGs. The order of opening fire is covered by existing manuals on tank combat. This task remains a priority until all enemy tanks are suppressed or chased off.
  9. When the regiment fights in the region of a division, the SPG regiment commander remains with the divisional artillery commander or where the commander orders him to be. The regimental commander must, without ignoring the objectives given by the infantry commander, control his battery and control their fire, provide them with ammunition and other supplies. Regrouping or reassigning batteries can be done only through the SU-76 regiment commander.
  10. These directions do not apply to SPGs assigned to a tank destroyer regiment (SU-85), which follow special directions.
4th Ukrainian Front commander, Army General Petrov
Member of the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Colonel-General Mekhlis
Commander of Artillery of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant-General Kariofilli"

Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War, vol. 2, doc. 10.

Wednesday, 15 July 2015

Leftovers

"Reporting to TU GBTU KA Chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Blagonravov

I report that:
  1. From January 1st to July 1st, 1945, the following was sent:
    1. Train car #1726224, transport 105/6023, 160 road wheels for M4A2 tanks, to Bryansk warehouse #2707, June 1st, 1945.
    2. Train car #562541, transport 105/6024, Valentine tank spare parts (74 units), Matilda tank spare parts (1 unit), miscellaneous parts (12 units). Total: 87 units. Sent to Berezaika, June 1st, 1945.
    3. Train car #329148, transport 105/6024, M4A2 spare parts (26 units) to Bryansk warehouse #2707, June 1st, 1945.
    4. 3 ND-10 tractors, transport 109/4864, sent to Balashiha station, repair factory #24, April 1st, 1945.
    5. Workshops:
      1. Mechanical workshop "N": 1
      2. Workshop "H": 6
      3. I-30 charging stations: 4
      4. Total: 11
        Sent by transport 109/4872 to Nara station, to a subsidiary of factory #90.
  2. Loaded, but not shipped:
    1. Harley Davidson motorcycles: 83.
    2. M4A2 armament parts: 262 units.
    3. M4A2 spare parts: 2752 units.
  3. Remains in ports as of July 1st, 1945:
    1. Molotovsk: 
      1. M4A2 parts: 317 units
      2. M4A2 road wheels: 27 units
      3. TE-48 instruments: 2 units
        In total enough for two train cars
    2. Bakaritsa:
      1. ND-10 tractors: 3
      2. Type K welding workshops: 4
      3. Radio workshops: 5
      4. M4A2 instruments: 306 units
      5. M4A2 parts: 53 units
        In total enough for 15 train cars.
Chief of the Foreign Vehicle Acceptance Department of GBTU KA, Guards Engineer-Colonel Trelin."

Tuesday, 14 July 2015

Tiger Duel

"Award order
  1. Name: Nugayev, Nagjim Nugmanovich
  2. Rank: Junior Sergeant
  3. Position, unit: deputy gun commander, 1669th Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment
    is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
  4. Year of birth: 1910
  5. Nationality: Tatar
  6. Party affiliation: VKP(b) candidate since July of 1943
  7. Participation in the civil war, subsequent actions in defense of the USSR, and the Patriotic War (where, when): Patriotic War, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, May 1943.
  8. Wounds or concussions in the Patriotic War: wounded on October 5th, 1943.
  9. In the Red Army since: October 1941.
  10. Recruited by: Shahrizyab recruitment office, Uzbek ASSR.
  11. Prior awards: For Bravery medal on October 16th, 1943, by order regarding the 1669th Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment.
Brief and specific description of personal heroism or achievements: On October 5th, 1943, the enemy attempted to liquidate our foothold on the west shore of the Dniepr and capture Borodayevka with a large amount of infantry reinforced by tanks and aircraft. A Tiger tank, two medium, and one light tank were moving towards Junior Sergeant Nugayev's gun. The crew met the enemy heroically. A few shots, and the light and medium tanks were destroyed. However, the Tiger was almost at the gun, firing from its cannon and machineguns at 100-150 meters. The Tiger was knocked out by the gun. The enemy's attack failed. Nugayev was heavily wounded and sent to the hospital. In total, gunner Nugayev's gun destroyed three tanks in July of 1943, two cars, ten machineguns, up to 100 fascists, and suppressed the fire of three mortar batteries.

He is worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal."

CAMD RF 33-793756-34

Well well, that's quite an action-packed sequence, prime for Hollywood! Sadly, not all the details are here, like what kind of gun he was using. The choices are slim though, tank destroyer artillery units used 45 or 76 mm guns, so in this case it was most likely a ZiS-3.

Since a Tiger was mentioned, it's time to ask our good friend Wolfgang Schneider to confirm the fact. SS Panzer Regiment 3 was just rooting around west of the Dniepr around this time, let's see what happened to them.

"5 October 1943: Operational tanks: 5. In the days that follow, the company is employed sporadically in screening positions along the main line of resistance.
7 October 1943: The company is assembled in Usbenskoje.
8 October 1943: Support of a counterattack through a side arm of the Dnjepr and capture of the Kolerda Peninsula. One Tiger suffers an internal main-gun explosion.
9 October 1943: An enemy penetration west of Tschikalowka is cleared.
10 October 1943: Operational tanks: 2."

Well, that matches the description. Along with the dramatic gun explosion Tiger, two Tigers are lost in an unidentified way over these five days. It's likely that one of them met its end in front of Nugayev's gun.

Monday, 13 July 2015

War of the Worlds


"To the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, comrade Stalin

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

As I wish to defeat detestable fascism and its army quickly, I recommend my invention, KARAR: an armoured light jumping vehicle. The design, tactical, and combat capabilities are as follows.

Design: a steel ball-shaped turret, placed on six legs. The legs are the suspension, put in motion by an engine in the turret. The Karar moves by jumping between 5 and 20 meters. The jump is powered by the engine. Its power is transmitted to the legs by clutch A and rocker B. The rocker, pushing against the top of the leg, throws the body of the Karar in the desired direction. Two rockers push on two neighbouring legs, at the time of the jump the other legs are retracted. Before jumping, the turret is turned with the motor. There are six positions for the turret.

The Karar is piloted by one person who sits in the turret on a rotating chair. The driver is, at the same time, the gunner. The Karar is 3 meters tall, the turret diameter is up to 1.5 meters. The six legs are positioned in a six-pointed star with a diameter of 3.5 meters.

The Karar is made of light alloys, which makes it light overall, making the jumps quick and easy. See the overall view and specific parts in the attached diagram. I did not have the opportunity to provide detailed blueprints, as the idea of the Karar was born in a battlefield situation without the possibility of consultation for technical calculations and drafting of proper blueprints. It would be desirable to work with a real engineer. I could provide blueprints or models of the vehicle within a short time. According to my calculations, producing the Karar would be very cheap. The engine does not need to be powerful, and will use a little more fuel than a motorcycle. A notable feature of the Karar is the ease of replacing any component [you can stop reading now, the author's technical illiteracy can be seen in every word, but the author does not see it and demands an answer]

I ask that you review my proposal and give me an answer. In case I am needed personally, my address is Borovichi, mailbox 73/4, cadet Korneev Aleksandr Grigoryevich.

[Signature]

October 2nd, 1942"

From here.

Sunday, 12 July 2015

World of Tanks History Section: Railway Warriors

Land Merrimack: the first real armoured train, 1862

When the Northern forces sieged Richmond during the American Civil War, Southern commanders were afraid that assault guns will be used against the city. In order to counter this threat, General Lee ordered a train car with a powerful 165 mm naval gun. The Navy was supposed to build and service it. It already had experience with armour, as recently steamship Merrimack was refitted into ironclad Virginia.

The "Land Merrimack" consisted of an armoured train car protected by two layers of thick strips of rolled iron on an oak foundation. The armour was installed on the front and on the sides, the rear and the top remained open to allow for ventilation and crew evacuation. Behind the armoured car was a locomotive, protected from bullets by bales of cotton. The same "armour" was used on carts with riflemen.

The only use of the "Land Merrimack" in support of infantry happened during the battle for Savage's Station in late June of 1862. The armoured train was effective, killing many Northerners and forcing them to abandon a hospital with 500 wounded.

"Hairy Mary": the strangest armour, 1899

The first widespread use of armoured trains was during the Boer War of 1899-1902. The Boers actively used guerilla tactics to harass British supply lines. In order to protect them, the British started building armoured trains that served as mobile garrisons.

One of the most interesting armoured trains of the era was built using the Havelock locomotive. Instead of armoured plate, the locomotive was protected with tightly wound hemp rope 6 inches (15 cm) thick. This made the locomotive practically invulnerable to bullets and small caliber shells.

Due to its exotic exterior, the locomotive was nicknamed "Hairy Mary". This was the most unusual armour for this type of armoured vehicle.

The first Russian armoured train, 1914

This train was built in Tarnopol in the workshops of the 9th Railway Battalion on a captured Austro-Hungarian locomotive and three train cars: two with machineguns and one with a cannon. The armament was also captured. It consisted of one 80 mm Austrian gun and 12 machineguns. The train was protected by regular steel plates and sand sandwiched between boards. One of the machinegun cars had a turret for observation of the battlefield.

Despite the primitive design, the train fought well and proved itself in the first battles of WWI. For instance, in the Lvov direction, on August 22nd, 1914, a sudden attack by the armoured train allowed the capture of an important bridge and ensure the capture of Stanislawow. The armoured train of the 9th Battalion often earned the praise of commanders.

The first Russian armoured train finished its career as a part of the Red Army on the South Front in 1919.

Armoured Motorized Train Car "Zaamurets": a train with a curious fate, 1916

A self propelled train car was built for the Russian army using the most advanced technology of the time. Its armour was sloped. It was propelled by gasoline engines, equipped with rangefinders and periscopes, as well as internal telephones. The Zaamurets was armed with 57 mm automatic Nordenfelt guns.

During its service, this train car changed hands many times. Starting out in the Russian army, it then was used by the Ukrainian units of the Central Rada in 1917. In January of 1918 the Zaamurets fought for the Reds, but literally a month later it was captured by a gang of anarchists and used to terrorize villages near Odessa. A while later, the Red Army recaptured it.

The Civil War brought the Zaamurets to Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk). Here, the Czechoslovak Legion, fighting for the White Army, captured it. The Czechs renamed it "Orlik", replaced some of the armament, and used it until their departure from Russia. The train was left to the Japanese, which later gave it to the Whites near Vladivostok. In 1922, the Zaamurets retreated with the Whites to Harbin. In the mid-1920s the train fought in the army of Chinese field commander Zhang Xu Chan. Some sources say that the Japanese captured it in 1931 in Manchuria.

Rain on Baku: an armoured train strategic operation, 1920

In the spring of 1920, the Red Army defeated the White Guards commander Anton Denikin and drew closer to the borders of Azerbaijan. The capture of this republic was very important, as it was rich in oil. However, the local government was prepared to burn the oil wells lest they fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

In order to resolve this situation, four armoured trains were selected: "Timofey Ulyanov", "Third International", "Red Dagestan" and "Red Astrakhan". On the night of April 27th, they penetrated enemy fortified lines, fought their way through 200 kilometers, and burst into Baku.

When Red sympathizers heard about the success of the armoured trains, a rebellion erupted in Baku. In only one day, control of the city was in Bolshevik hands.

Armoured Train #13: the smallest in history, 1940

This dwarf was built for a narrow rail gauge, only 38.1 cm wide. It consisted of two train cars, one with a Boys AT rifle, one with two machineguns, one of which could be used for anti-air.

Despite superstitions, the train was indexed #13. The locomotive was ironically named "Hercules". #13 entered service in July of 1940.

Despite the fact that the Germans never landed in Britain, the train still fought in battle. During the Battle of Britain, the train crew's AA gunners claimed that they shot down two enemy planes, a He-111 bomber and a Bf 109 fighter.

The train remained in service until 1943.

Armoured Train #1, 66th Squadron: the heaviest armed, 1942

This Soviet armoured train was built in Voroshilovgrad (today Lugansk) at the October Revolution factory. It consisted of an armoured locomotive and two armoured train platforms. The first had a T-34 turret with a 76 mm gun, two 76 mm guns separately, and 6 machineguns. The second had a KV-2 turret with a 152 mm howitzer, a 76 mm gun, and a 45 mm gun in a T-34 turret, as well as 8 machineguns. The train also had two DShK AA machineguns.

The train fought at Voroshiliovgrad with the 66th Squadron. Documents record that it repelled 18 German attacks from the air and mention that some planes were shot down.

German recon trains: the most maneuverable, 1944

The most maneuverable armoured trains of WWII were German light and heavy recon trains. They consisted of several (up to 10 for light and 12 for heavy) armoured draisines with internal combustion engines. A main feature of these trains was that, if necessary, the draisines could separate and travel independently. This increased the tactical flexibility of the armoured train.

The draisines were armed with machineguns, automatic 20 mm AA guns, and various caliber guns taken from German, Italian, and maybe even Soviet tanks.

These trains were used in the Balkans in the second half of 1944.

"Kozma Minin" and "Ilya Muromets", longest serving, 1942-1945

These two armoured trains were a part of the 31st Special Squadron. The "special" label indicated that these trains were equipped with rocket launchers. Additionally, "Kozma Minin" and "Ilya Muromets" were equipped with 76 mm guns, machineguns, and AA guns.

The trains entered service in 1942, as a part of the Bryansk Front. In 1943, they fought at Bolkhov and Mtsensk, covering weaknesses in Soviet defenses. In these battles, they destroyed 11 German strongholds, a mortar battery, and two trains.

In 1944 and 1945, "Kozma Minin" and "Ilya Muromets" fought their way through the Ukraine, Poland, and Germany, covering the Red Army during the crossing of the Vistula and the liberation of Warsaw. They met the end of the war in Germany, at Frankfurt an der Oder, protecting the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Original article available here.

Saturday, 11 July 2015

World of Tanks History Section: Armchair Generals

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, officers of the General Staff tasked with studying the experience of war were like pearl hunters in muddy waters. Numerous letters arrived addressed to them with suggestions on how to sooner defeat Germany. Many of them were odd or curious. Here are some excerpts from secret suggestions in 1942.

More forces, new and interesting ones

Major-General Pulko-Dmitriyev of the Tashkent Intendant Academy found, as he thought, a flawless plan of fighting German tanks. In his words "a fascist tank division would break upon" a special anti-tank battalion armed with 300 AT rifle crews. According to the author, such a division contained 300 tanks.

The officer that received this letter wrote in the margins that a German tank division does not have this many tanks. The main idea that every enemy tank needs a dedicated AT rifle was not commented upon.

Comrade Yagudin from Baku wrote that the era of flying tanks is close, same with fortress tanks and mosquito tanks (the author does not mention if they were just very small or were also capable of flight). Until these tanks were made, it was important to organize the forces correctly. The author wanted a motorized brigade, consisting of tank, airborne, artillery, and motorized infantry groups. A brigade is not the largest unit, consisting of about 50 tanks, but Yagudin came up with a 500 vehicle monster which could easily be classified as a corps or even an army.

With this brigade, he proposed "an offensive in the Bryansk-Smolensk-Gomel-Minsk direction, developing success on flanks, and at the same time moving up the remainder of the front, especially the flanks (Baltic and Black Sea shores)"

Saving the best for last, Captain Matyevosyan from the 22nd Army proposed "Amphibian tanks that could carry tank riders and fly up to 25 meters in the air over a range of 10-20 kilometers". The General Staff did not appreciate this proposal, as the phrase about 25 meters is thickly underlined and there is a short message in the margin: "Science fiction"

How to Defeat Germany for Dummies

A burning desire to defeat the enemy is not enough. One also needs knowledge and experience, otherwise these attempts will look silly. For instance, comrade Kargopolov from Stalingrad attempted to grasp the theory and practice of modern warfare and came to the following conclusion: "Do we need this idea of battle, why seek a meeting with dynamic armed enemy forces? When one thinks about it, one must admit that we do not." Instead of fighting the German army, the author proposed to concentrate as many armoured and mechanized forces in the direction of Smolensk-Minsk as possible and move them forward. In 6-7 days, they will be at the walls of Berlin. Secondary offensives would be aimed in the direction of Rzhev-Riga and Elets-Kursk-Kiev.

The author did not forget about the Allies, proposing that they move their tank forces by air and, without worrying about France or Belgium, aim towards the Rhine to meet the Soviet tank armies somewhere in the middle of Germany.

Sergeant Fedorov had an original idea, attacking from the rear. He proposed waiting for long Arctic nights on the Leningrad Front and sneak by with "transport like northern dogs, reindeer, skiers". Fedorov imagined that this will bring unparalleled success. He also cursed lazy scientists and demanded that doctors and chemists develop sleeping gas.

Military Engineer Second Class Malyuk of the Siberian railroad also had grandiose ideas. He invented "strategic triangles" and "strategic trapezoids" to strike suddenly at the German forces, as they would allow to "with relatively few losses, move forward and discover the intentions of the enemy". This "military geometry" was built upon a strike force of 9-10 divisions (a good 100,000 men). This was only the beginning, Malyuk started making plans for groups of 25-30 divisions. According to his prognosis, a successful execution of this plan would allow these units to reach the Baltic in 10-15 days, and Bucharest and the Danube in 20-25, surrounding all enemy armies. After that, as the author logically concluded, "Hitler has one way out, the noose."

Political Chief Kovalev's Red Vice

The plan of a breakthrough and defeat of German armies developed by reservist political chief Kovalev was largely born from a surplus of red pencils, paper, and spare time.


The massive red pincers in this drawing were Kovalev's plan. The first "armoured breakthrough group" was supposed to attack in the direction of Stalino (Donetsk), Dnepropetrovsk, and Kirovograd. When they reached the Ukrainian steppes, they would split up into two parts that would join up around Ploesti.

In order to realize this plan, "only" 15 tank divisions and 16 motorized divisions were needed. According to Kovalev, this would cut off Germany from Romanian oil and prevent German control over the Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies. As a result, "the armies would no doubt quarrel".

Many parts of Kovalev's plan were unclear. For instance, where would the Red Army get tank divisions in 1942? At that time, the tank forces have not yet recovered from the heavy losses of 1941 and the largest tank unit was a brigade (60 tanks). Even if all tanks, including light T-60s, were gathered up, there would not be enough vehicles. The political chief also did not mention what would prevent the Germans from communicating with their allies via radio.

The reply from the General Staff stated that the plan does not consider the current situation in our armies and is "in general, a fantasy".

One can only be surprised by the patience and professionalism of the General Staff that, during the very difficult year of 1942, wrote over and over: "The data you have communicated in the letter will be considered. In the future when developing suggestions, please:
  • Consider the situation at hand.
  • Back up your suggestions with calculations of forces and supplies that they require.
  • When composing plans and suggestions, do not depart from reality."
Original article available here.

Friday, 10 July 2015

Heroic Churchill

"Award Order:
  1. Name: Tyrin, Georgiy Mikhailov
  2. Rank: Guards Starshina
  3. Position, unit: Mk-4 [Churchill] tank commander, 15th Independent Guards Breakthough Tank Regiment, 8th Guards Tank Corps.
    is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
  4. Year of birth: 1918
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member since June 1942
  7. Participation in the Civil War and subsequent actions in defense of the USSR (where, when): war with Finland, South-Western Front from July 1941 to August 1941, South Front from August 1941 to October 1941, Western Front from October 1941 to November 1941, South Front from February 1941 to March 1942, North Caucasus Front from March 1942 to March 1943, Voronezh Front from August 1943 to present.
  8. Wounds and concussions in the Patriotic War: light wound in June 1941, heavy wound in October 1941, light wound in July 1941.
  9. In the Red Army since: November 1938.
  10. Recruited by: Duginsk recruitment office, Smolensk oblast
  11. Prior awards: Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Patriotic War 1st class
Brief and specific description of heroism or achievements: Comrade Tyrin has been in battle with Germano-fascist invaders on the Voronezh Front since September 8th, 1943, and displayed heroism in the Suma, Poltava, and Kiev oblasts. Comrade Tyrin's tank was the first to burst into regional center Lipovaya Dolina and hold the crossing of the Hohol river until the rest of the forces arrived.

Near the settlement of Petrivka, comrade Tyrin destroyed one T-6 Tiger tank with his gun, 3 trucks with various cargo, 3 machinegun nests with their crews, 1 transport with ammunition, 5 horse carts with military cargo, and up to 25 soldiers and officers of the enemy.

Comrade Tyrin was the first across the Dnieper, liberating the settlements of Greater Bukrin, Lesser Bukrin, and Hodorov in the Right-Shore Ukraine. First to enter these settlements, he destroyed two Panther tanks, 1 PzIV tank, 2 vehicles with enemy soldiers, and captured two soldiers.

He is dedicated to the cause of Lenin-Stalin and his Socialist Motherland. He is worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

CAMD RF 33-793756-48

KV on a Diet

"State Committee of Defense
Decree #GOKO-1331ss
February 23rd, 1942, Moscow, Kremlin

On the reduction of KV-1 weight

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
The NKTP (comrade Malyshev) and director of the Kirov factory comrade Makhonin must produce KV-1 tanks that are 1.3 tons lighter by February 25th, with the following changes:
  1. Removal of additional fuel tanks (580 kg)
  2. Reduction of on-board ammunition storage to 90 shells
  3. Reduction of the on-board parts and tools kit by 200 kg
  4. Use of tracks with teeth on every other track link.
Chair of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin."


"State Committee of Defense
Decree #GOKO-1332ss
February 23rd, 1942, Moscow, Kremlin

On the reduction of the thickness of the KV-1 cast turret to 95-100 mm.

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
The NKTP (comrade Malyshev) and director of the Kirov factory comrade Makhonin must produce KV-1 tanks with a cast turret that is 95-100 mm thick by April 1st, 1942.

Chair of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin."


"State Committee of Defense
Decree #GOKO-1334ss
February 23rd, 1942, Moscow, Kremlin

On the production of KV-1 tanks weighing 45-45.5 tons with 650 hp diesel engines.

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
  1. The NKTP (comrade Malyshev) and director of the Kirov factory comrade Makhonin must begin production of KV-1 tanks weighing 45-45.5 tons with 650 hp diesel engines starting on April 15th, 1942.
  2. The NKTP and Kirov factory are allowed to reduce the weight of the KV-1 by doing the following:
    1. Reduction of the total thickness of tanks with armour screens to 95 mm.
    2. Reduction of removable roof elements, turret roof, and hatches to 30 mm, keeping the average hardness at 3.4-3.8 by the Brinell scale.
    3. Reduction of the rear armour to 60 mm.
    4. Reduction of the rear floor to 20 mm.
  3. The acceptable tolerance of thicknesses for 75 mm plate is between -2 mm to +1 mm, with the appropriate change to technical conditions for armour robustness. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals to start supplying armour with this tolerance starting on March 10th, 1942.

Chair of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin."

    Wednesday, 8 July 2015

    Counter-Counter-Attack Manual

    "Orders to commanders of the 4th Ukrainian Front on fighting enemy tanks and SPGs in depth

    When our forces penetrate enemy defenses and especially when they fight in depth, the enemy counterattacks with groups of tanks and SPGs. These groups act carefully from ambushes or fire on our attacking forces from two or more kilometers away. In areas where our infantry is not prepared to fight mobile enemy units, the offensive slows down or stalls.

    The sensitivity of our first echelon troops to enemy tanks and SPGs can be explained by insufficiently effective organization of countermeasures to enemy tanks and SPGs. Current faults with our anti-tank defenses are as follows:
    1. Infantry support artillery lags behind our lines, as a result of which when enemy tanks are encountered these guns are either silent or fire ineffectively from long distances.
    2. Our tanks and SPGs also occasionally lag behind and maneuver poorly. There is insufficient cooperation between SPGs. As such, our tanks face significant losses when an ambush is encountered.
    3. Observation of the battlefield is inadequate. There are no special observers looking for enemy tanks. Artillerymen often spot enemy tanks and SPGs either too late or not at all. There is no special signal for when tanks and SPGs are spotted.
    4. Infantry and artillery does not use effective means to indicate the direction of tank attacks, so our artillery opens fire with a delay, fires in a disorganized fashion, often without observers.
    In order to increase effectiveness when fighting enemy tanks and SPGs in depth and improve cooperation between infantry and tanks, commanders must do the following:
    1. First echelon battalions (assault battalions) must be able to independently suppress and destroy enemy weapons, personnel, tanks, and SPGs. In order to achieve this, assign 3-4 tanks or SPGs, one 76 mm divisional gun battery, and 120 mm mortars. Guns and mortars need ropes to tow them behind advancing infantry by hand. An infantry squad must be assigned to each 76 mm gun to help their crews.
    2. Each regiment in the first echelon of the advancing division must be assigned a 76 mm ZiS-3 gun battery with the sole objective of destroying enemy tanks and SPGs. These batteries must be maneuverable and daring. If tanks or SPGs appear out of effective range, the batteries must move forward under the cover of terrain or smoke. Attach men to these units from the rear and command platoons to help them push their guns. Equip the guns with ropes and entrenching tools.
      Each division must also have 1-2 122 mm guns or 152 mm gun-howitzers for the same purpose. These guns must follow infantry and destroy enemy tanks and SPGs at 1.5-2 kilometers. The divisional artillery commander must have a direct line of communication to these guns, either by radio or telephone.
    3. SPG groups dedicated to battalion support must be composed of either mixed SU-76 and SU-122 SPGs, SU-152 SPGs, or SU-85 SPGs. Pay special attention to the cooperation between SPGs and AT gun batteries attached to the regiment or battalion.
    4. As forces move out in areas where tanks are likely to appear, prepare suppressing and concentrated fire by one or two artillery squadrons or rocket artillery batteries, which open fire immediately as enemy tanks appear. When repelling tanks attacks, use carefully aimed indirect fire from heavy gun and howitzer batteries. 
    5. In order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy tanks, especially heavy tanks, use smoke shells or bombs.
    6. The main signal for signalling the approach of enemy tanks is smoke or mid-air detonations of shrapnel shells, as well as tracers from machineguns. Keep a supply of smoke or shrapnel rounds and tracers in forward batteries and machinegun squads.
    7. Each observation point (artillery, infantry, tank, combined arms) must have special observers responsible for the detection of tanks that must report their appearance in the sector. Use aircraft, especially artillery spotters, to locate tanks in time.
    8. Commanders of guns, batteries, squadrons, tanks, and SPGs, officers, sergeants and privates of other types of forces that excel at destroying enemy tanks and clear the way for infantry must be rewarded for each destroyed tank or SPG: the crew of the weapon responsible with an Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd class, the officer with an Order of the Red Banner.
    9. These directions must be studied by all officers of artillery, infantry, tank, and engineering units.
    Spread the word of rewards for destroyed enemy tanks and SPGs to privates and sergeants."

    Collection of Combat Documents from the Great Patriotic War, vol. 2, doc. 09.

    Tuesday, 7 July 2015

    Another Heroic Sherman

    "Award Order
    • Name: Sologub, Nikolai Andreevich
    • Rank: Lieutenant
    • Position, unit: tank commander, 134th Tank Regiment, 30th Noviy Bug, Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Cavalry Division
      is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
    1. Year of birth: 1915
    2. Nationality: Russian
    3. In the Red Army since: 1939
    4. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member since 1942
    5. Participation in battle: Crimean Front, North Caucasus Front, South-Western Front, 1st Belorussian Front.
    6. Wounds or concussions: concussed on May 2nd, 1942
    7. Previous awards: none
    8. Recruited by: Zdvin recruitment office, Novosibirsk oblast
    Brief and specific description of heroism: Lieutenant Sologub, a commander of an M4A2 medium tank, is a brave and courageous officer tanker.

    His tank regiment received the order to make a 40 km long raid along the enemy rear and capture the railroad junction and city of Stolbtsy on the Neman river. Comrade Sologub demonstrated the height of courage in this battle. He was the first to burst into the city and take the enemy by surprise. Battle raged on for the large railroad bridge in the center of the city. Tank units, including comrade Sologub, fought for 4 hours. The enemy was knocked out of the city. Comrade Sologub's personal score in the battle for Stolbtsy consisted of an armoured train, 3 guns, up to 10 machinegun nests, and up to 50 soldiers and officers.

    On July 17th, 1944, the 30th Cavalry Division continued their raid and captured Videmlya, blocking the Kamenets-Brest highway. The enemy decided to take back the road and sent 12 tanks supported by artillery against the 138th Cavalry Regiment. The situation was critical. Lieutenant Sologub received an order: stop the enemy tanks. Bravely driving towards the enemy, Lieutenant Sologub waited until he was within 500-600 meters and then opened fire. The first few shots set two tanks on fire. The stunned fascist tankers started firing chaotically, turning in every direction. Comrade Sologub's tank was hit in the engine compartment and he could not move. The enemy, seeing that he was in trouble, got cocky. Comrade Sologub decided to keep firing from his disabled tank. One after another, two more tanks were knocked out. The rest routed and ran. In this battle, comrade Sologub destroyed 4 heavy tanks and up to 100 Germans. His heroic act affected the success of battle for the whole division; the Germans did not attack again that day. Lieutenant Sologub is worthy of the highest state award: the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

    CAMD RF 33-793756-45

    The heavy tanks mentioned in the award order are likely Panthers, since the closest heavy tank battalion was quite a bit further to the north, at Grodno.