Common Questions: Red Army AFVs in Operation Barbarossa

Almost everyone who studied the history of armoured warfare would know about Operation Barbarossa, where only a few thousand German tanks swept away tens of thousands of Soviet tanks. I've seen these numbers used to back a number of claims, each more ridiculous than the last, but today, let's look at them in more detail. According to Order in Tank Forces: What happened to Stalin's tanks? by Dmitriy Shein, the Red Army had 25932 vehicles under its command. An impressive number, but the Soviet Union is a large country, so if you only count vehicles protecting the Western military regions, vehicles that were actually in the position to do something about the invading Germans, you get a somewhat different picture. Let's take a look.

Tank	Total	Western districts
KV-1	370	337
KV-2	134	132
T-35	59	51
T-34 (regular)	671	635
T-34 (radio)	221	197
T-28	481	424
T-37 (regular)	1933	927
T-37(radio)	388	154
T-38 (regular)	1046	438
T-40 (regular)	113	101
T-40 (radio)	17	14
T-40 (training)	2	0
T-26 (two-turret)	1261	589
T-26 (regular)	3935	1993
T-26 (radio)	3377	1528
T-26 (AA)	111	111
T-26 (radio and AA)	63	0
BT-2	580	396
BT-5 (regular)	1277	663
BT-5 (radio)	399	208
BT-5 (diesel)	12	7
BT-IS	2	0
BT-7 (regular)	2471	1499
BT-7 (artillery)	117	65
BT-7 (radio)	1881	1212
BT-7 (AA)	89	89
BT-7M (regular)	509	255
BT-7M (radio)	181	157
BT-7 RSMK	3	0
BT-7M (AA)	12	10
BT-8	2	0
Total regular tanks	21800	12223
T-37 (chemical)	10	0
OT-130	500	180
OT-133	327	179
OT-134	2	0
T-26 (teletank)	53	26
T-26 (teletank controller)	61	29
KhT-26	308	128
T-26 (TOS)	2	0
BT-2 (chemical)	14	0
BT-7 (chemical)	1	0
Total special tanks	1278	542
SU-5	28	17
T-26 (sapper)	57	12
T-26 (tractor)	211	100
T-27 tankette (regular)	2343	930
T-27 tankette (tractor)	182	151
T-27 tankette (chemical)	33	6
Total	25932	13981

So counting everything on tracks in possession of the USSR, including tractors, experiments, and training tanks, there are just short of 26 thousand vehicles, but only about 14 thousand are available in the West to fight the Germans. That's still a lot, right? Well, tanks don't fight forever. Mechanisms tend to wear out, especially with heavy use, and the Red Army put these tanks through quite a bit of use in the 1930s, from the Spanish Civil War, to action against Chinese bandits and Japan in the Far East, to the campaign in Poland, to the Winter War, not to mention training, which must be done constantly. So how many of these tanks were actually available to fight? Here's how the vehicles in the Western districts spread over the Soviet standards for repair categories.

Tank	1st category	2nd category	3rd category	4th category
KV-1	275	60	3	-
KV-2	124	7	1	-
T-35		42	5	4
T-34 (regular)	599	35	1	-
T-34 (radio)	195	2	-	-
T-28	-	283	94	47
T-37 (regular)	8	434	245	240
T-37(radio)	4	77	34	39
T-38 (regular)	4	270	96	68
T-40 (regular)	100	1	-	-
T-40 (radio)	13	1	-	-
T-26 (two-turret)	-	404	72	113
T-26 (regular)	375	1384	95	139
T-26 (radio)	321	1007	84	116
T-26 (AA)	111	-	-	-
BT-2	-	315	63	18
BT-5 (regular)	-	544	60	59
BT-5 (radio)	-	174	16	18
BT-5 (diesel)	-	7	-	-
BT-7 (regular)	-	2	-	-
BT-7 (artillery)	-	50	9	6
BT-7 (radio)	6	1020	143	43
BT-7 (AA)	3	81	5	-
BT-7M (regular)	-	248	6	1
BT-7M (radio)	-	152	5	-
BT-7 RSMK	-	1	-	-
BT-7M (AA)	-	10	-	-
Total regular tanks	2145	7900	1199	979
OT-130	10	147	18	5
OT-133	2	166	11	-
T-26 (teletank)	-	25	1	-
T-26 (teletank controller)	-	28	1	-
KhT-26	-	109	13	6
Total special tanks	12	475	44	11
SU-5	-	8	4	5
T-26 (sapper)	-	2	2	8
T-26 (tractor)	-	67	16	17
T-27 tankette (regular)	-	471	173	286
T-27 tankette (tractor)	-	63	35	53
T-27 tankette (chemical)	-	-	3	3
Total	2157	8986	1476	1362

Now, what do these repair categories mean? 1st category includes brand new tanks, 2nd category includes tanks that have been in use and are suitable for duty, including tanks that need light repairs, 3rd category is tanks that need service in regional workshops (medium repairs) and 4th is tanks that need a major overhaul at a central workshop or a factory (major repairs). 

Naturally, 3rd and 4th category tanks might as well be scrap metal when it actually comes to fighting a war. First category tanks you can rely on, but second category? Well, there's a catch. See that part where tanks that need light repairs are also lumped in here?  While "light repairs" includes any repairs that can be performed by the crew or the technical company, they still need parts. Something as banal as a tank that's missing a track still counts as a second category tank, effectively a functional combat ready tank, but cannot actually drive into battle. This is where things get bad. According to Shein, an inspection in the spring of 1941 revealed that a staggering 25% of category 2 tanks are not combat capable due to the absence of spare track links. And these are just track links, there are any number of small but vital parts that can render a tank combat ineffective (gun components, engine components, etc). That fearsome number up there, 25932, goes down quite a bit. By Shein's estimates, no more than 7-7.5 thousand tanks were available for battle on June 22nd, 1941, opposed by 3658 tanks and 377 SPGs (a total of 4035 vehicles). 

7500 tanks vs 4035 still gives the Soviets an advantage, but even the best tank with the best crew is nothing more than a cog in the machine that is its army. As you could tell from the above paragraph, the Red Army machine wasn't exactly well oiled. For instance, according to Shein, the army's demand for 76 mm armour piercing shells was only 12% satisfied, meaning that all these fancy new tanks had nothing to shoot as this German tanker recalled. A GABTU report on the state of tanks in the Red Army (CAMD RF 38-11373-67) dated June 1st, 1941, reveals just how seriously the rapidly expanding Red Army was lacking just about everything in 1941. The deficiencies of support vehicles (for wartime) include:

• Tractors: 51,653 (plus 14,277 obsolete tractors that need replacing)
• Vehicles: 483,738
• Light and pickup trucks: 32,025
• GAZ trucks: 96,156
• ZiS trucks: 181,453
• Type A mobile workshops: 5,243
• Type B mobile workshops: 2,822
• Fuel trucks: 49,662
• Other: 116,377
• Trailers: 69,691
• Motorcycles: 56,129 (plus an unspecified number of motorcycles that are no longer in production that need replacing)

Plus the following breakdowns had to be corrected:

• Tractors:
• Medium repairs: 6,550
• Major repairs: 5,628
• Irreparable: 198
• Vehicles:
• Medium repairs: 43,464
• Major repairs: 19,902
• Irreparable: 2,208
• Trailers:
• Medium repairs: 3,690
• Major repairs: 588
• Irreparable: 1,463
• Motorcycles:
• Medium repairs: 3,023
• Major repairs: 2,231
• Irreparable: 704

The document notes that the poor state of equipment can be blamed on "uncharacteristic activity in 1939-1940", a lack of parts (219 million rubles' worth out of 410 million rubles' worth to just maintain the existing tanks, not even to build up spares), and a lack of mobile workshops (only 38% of the required number).

As you can see, the Red Army had a notable deficiency in parts and all kinds of vehicles, most notably, fuel trucks. If you have no fuel trucks, you can forget about any kind of meaningful maneuver, which was in great demand during the chaos of 1941. Even if you do have fuel trucks, they are somewhat useless if you don't have fuel... which was another problem in the Red Army in 1941. Maksim Kolomiets says, in his lecture (7:13) "...there was another serious problem, in all military districts, but in the Baltic Military District it was the most noticeable. This was a problem with fuel. Say you have some information on fuel inventory, they say "the district has almost 100%, diesel, gasoline, etc" but there is a small nuance, a footnote for those tables, that says how much of that amount is actually present within that district. If you look at the Baltic district, there is maybe 30%. I mean, administratively, it was controlled by the district, but if you look at its real location, it's in Vladimir oblast, Kalinin oblast, Moscow oblast... etc. The 2nd Tank Division as of 18:00 on June 21st was equipped with 40% of the needed gasoline for BT tanks, 48% diesel fuel, and 48% tractor kerosene, on average 1.5 fuel loads. ... On one hand it looks like a lot, but it's really a miserly amount." Kolomiets then also talks about the ammunition shortage Shein mentioned: "The division only had one ammunition load of 76 mm high explosive shells. They did not have a single armour piercing round. Two loads for 152 mm howitzers on KV-2s, 1.5 loads of 45 mm shells for BT tanks. ... If you look at the amount of ammunition and fuel, the division was equipped for maximum one day of battle."

So there you have it. No spare parts, scarce fuel and ammunition, poor odds of evacuating tanks with even minimal damage and lesser odds still of ever getting them repaired, and this is before valuable equipment and supplies were left behind during the retreat. There is no army in the world that could, under these conditions, soundly defeat a well prepared invader.

Unknown Reliability

Military intelligence rakes in a lot of very questionable information. Like these new German tanks, for example.

This one is just a barrel of laughs. There seems to be some confusion over the Maus and its proposed 150 mm gun turret, a new Tiger turret to fit a 105 mm gun (the gun would need a whole extra loader, so a new turret is understandable) and... a something. I honestly have no idea how this heap of armament was supposed to be arranged. It's a shame the report didn't include at least a doodle.

Via Yuri Pasholok.

World of Tanks History Section: IS-2, the Guardsmen's Heavy Hammer

The success of the Red Army in 1944 was in no small part aided by the arrival of IS-2 (IS-122) heavy tanks on the battlefield. They were formed into independent heavy tank regiments. Considering the importance of the tasks they would complete, these units were assigned the title of Guards in advance. In any offensive, a regiment of IS-2 tanks was the ace up the sleeve of a tank corps commander, primarily as a reserve for fighting enemy tanks.

Each regiment consisted of four companies of five vehicles each, plus a commander's tank. Later, even larger units were formed, heavy tank brigades.

Battle elephants of the tank forces

During offensives, IS tanks protected the flanks or fought enemy counterattacks. They moved behind the front lines either in columns or small groups. They were also used to capture strongholds and transportation hubs. In this case, a tank brigade would have a platoon or company of IS tanks supporting its first echelon. This was an unpleasant and deadly surprise for German tanks that attempted to counterattack the T-34s or shoot at them from an ambush.

In defense, IS-2 tanks deflected German armoured attacks, destroyed MG nests and artillery. Tanks moved out in the direction of a likely attack and formed a checkerboard pattern, 1.5-2 kilometers in width and up to 3 kilometers in depth. There was also a practice of keeping some IS tanks on the front lines with the T-34s. In this case, the majority of the force was held back about five kilometers to cover all possible paths of enemy attack.

Good reconnaissance was always necessary to guarantee victory of a heavy tank unit. They had to know not only about the enemy, but the terrain. T-34s could cross swamps, sands, light bridges. The 46-ton IS could get stuck or cause unnecessary wear to their suspension. If a path had to be made, a sapper platoon could not be enough. This would have threatened the success of the mission.

Before battle, the tankers prepared carefully. All officers received maps with the current situation marked on them. Crews, down to the last crewman, were familiarized with the terrain and first line of enemy defenses. Everyone knew the role of their regiment in the breakthrough.

The IS-2 was a reliable tank and could travel up to 100 kilometers per day in skilled hands, exceeding the factory warranty period in engine-hours.

Anatomy of a tank elite

Even before the Great Patriotic War, Marshall Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny said "The Red Army is strong, but our communications will be the end of us". As much communications equipment as possible was dedicated to the heavy tanks. Each IS-2 regiment HQ had several radios, both for contact with their vehicles and their superiors. Radios were on 24 hours a day, tank radios were on for at least several minutes during every hour. The HQ and regimental commander could always talk to the company commander and any individual tank. During extended stops, a telephone line was set up between the regiment and tank corps. The HQ had communications officers from every tank company. Aside from radios, the regiment also had armoured cars and motorcycles for couriers. Unlike the rest of the tank forces, communications in heavy tank regiments worked flawlessly.

How did IS tanks go into battle? Recce in force consisted of a tank platoon, sapper platoon in an APC, and a few squads of submachinegunners (20 men). This force went out 5-7 km ahead of the main units which were organized in a similar way, but without sappers.

In order to avoid ambushes, the commander of the regiment did not lead the charge, but rode in the third tank. The main column had an operations group: a fast Willys all-terrain vehicle, an APC with the HQ radio, an armoured car, and a few motorcycles for couriers.

After the tanks came trucks with ammunition, fuel, and supplies, medical and repair vehicles, a field kitchen. When they ran into the enemy, the tanks took up a battle formation, the operations group took its place behind the main forces, and the support vehicles retreated to cover.

When necessary, the infantry sent out couriers, guides, and guarded the tanks at night.

Guardsmen's Hammer in action

After the scouts discovered the location of the enemy, IS-2 tanks engaged from 1200-1500 meters, a range from which their guns were superior to the Germans', according to tank crews. The 122 mm gun was considered the best method of fighting enemy tanks at long range. Post-war authors heckle the IS-2 for having a small ammunition load, but it was usually sufficient for a day of fighting. The thing that the tankers did not like about the gun was the cloud of smoke emitted by every shot that revealed their location.

While early sights lacked field of view, combat in early 1944 showed that the tank could knock out a Panther at 1300 meters from any angle, and earlier tanks at a range of up to two kilometers. In July of 1944, the tanks received a new sight which, as was written in battle reports, demonstrated "tactical superiority of our sights over similar German sights".

The 88 mm German shell could penetrate an early IS-2 from 800-1000 meters. If the Soviet tankers were careless, they could be taken out from the flank, but if they followed the field manual and moved in "hops" after the T-34s, supported each other, and scouted the enemy carefully, then they were very tough targets.

A skilled crew could destroy even the most dangerous enemy vehicle. For instance, in battles for the Sandomierz foothold, on August 13th, 1944, in only one day, tanks of Lieutenants Klimenkov, Udalov, and Belyakov destroyed six King Tigers with no losses of their own.

On July 20th, 1944, near the city of Magerov, Lieutenant Boris Slyunayev, under cover from another tank, stealthily approached a crossroads and observed an enemy ambush for 10-15 minutes. After all enemies were accounted for, he fired several shots from a kilometer away, destroying a Ferdinand, an APC, and two guns with crews. In August of 1944, the same Slyunayev, covering the crossing of the Vistula, deflected 12 attacks, destroyed a Tiger, an SPG, and killed 50 Germans. In August, Slyunayev's regiment claimed the destruction of a 128 mm SPG, likely another Ferdinand. In 1945, Slyunayev destroyed an armoured train near the city of Lubenau.

According to memoirs of Soviet tankers, heavy German tanks strived to avoid sections of the front defended by IS tanks.

In March of 1945, IS tanks of the 82nd regiment spent about 3 ammunition loads per day, destroyed 13 tanks and SPGs, 42 guns, captured 5 SPGs and 40 locomotives. In Berlin, where IS-2 tanks were used in street fighting, the consumption of ammunition often reached 2-3 loads per day.

After the war, tankers wrote with full confidence: "There are difficult tasks, but there are no impossible ones. Our motto is "detect, strike, destroy". No one gets away."

Original article available here.

T-26 Ramp

Remember that crazy jumping T-26? Turns out it wasn't the only one of its kind. Other attempts were made to make the T-26 get better at climbing obstacles. Behold, the Strazhits system! Instead of jumping over obstacles, the T-26 simply carries a portable ramp to drive over them!

Easy, right? Well turns out it did work, just in a "frictionless vacuum". The system quite obviously only works when there is a flat bit of ground right in front of the vehicle, and that ground has to be very firm, otherwise the tracks will slip and there is a risk that the triangular ramps will get flipped. Needless to say, this system was not accepted for service.

Wonder Bullet

"Act

On July 6th, 1941, based on the orders of the OTB chief, Major of State Security comrade Kravchenko and GAU KA chief, Colonel-General comrade Yakovlev we, [long list of commission members] performed trials of 7.62 mm AP-I bullets with a ceramic-metallic core and gunpowder developed by the OTB NKVD at the OTB NKVD proving grounds to establish their effectiveness.

Experimental rounds of two types were submitted for trials. One type had 4.15 grams of propellant, the other 4.2 grams. Characteristics of the rounds are shown in attachment #3.

Trials were performed against 20 mm surface hardened armour (see characteristics in attachment #1) with the air temperature of 28-29 degrees and range of 100 and 150 meters.

The following bullets were used to test the quality of the armour plate and compare the effectiveness of experimental bullets:

1. Stock rounds with B-32 bullets.
2. Rounds with 3.15 grams of propellant and a metallic-ceramic core.
3. Rounds with 4.2 grams of experimental gunpowder and B-32 bullets.

These bullets were fired at 50 meters, as firing them from larger ranges made no sense due to their ineffectiveness against 20 mm of surface hardened armour from even 50 meters. Results are contained in the following table:

	Hits	Complete penetrations	Incomplete penetrations	Complete penetrations, part of bullet is stuck	% penetrations
Stock round with B-32 bullet	5	0	51		0
Experimental round with B-32 bullet	5	0	51		0
Experimental round with metallic-ceramic bullet (w=3.15)	5	0	52		0
Experimental round with metallic-ceramic bullet (w=4.15)	5	3		2	100
	21	3	13	21	95.2
Experimental round with metallic-ceramic bullet (w=4.2)	5	3		2	100

Notes:

1. Dents on one side, no effect on the other side.
2. Three hits caused bulges on the rear side, two had the bullet tip penetrate completely.
3. The bullet tip penetrated completely.

In order to test the incendiary action of the bullets, experimental rounds (w=4.2) were fired from a range of 150 meters at a 20 mm plate with a full gasoline tank up against it. As a result, the gasoline ignited from the first shot that hit the gasoline (the first shot that was fired hit above the gasoline). Both bullets penetrated the armour completely.

Conclusions

1. The effectiveness of the experimental OTB NKVD rounds is superior to all currently known 7.62 mm armour piercing incendiary bullets.
2. The results should be immediately checked at NIPSVO to establish ballistic norms and more carefully establish the armour penetration effectiveness. For this purpose, USV GAU should produce 500 bullets with ceramic-metallic cores by July 6th, 1941, and OTB NKVD must assemble them and send them to NIPSVO by July 7th, 1941.
3. Due to good results of trials, do not wait for NIPSVO trials to complete and begin production with existing propellant. USV GAU must provide the bullets for this batch. The batch must be complete by July 15th, 1941.
4. NKO must give the order to NKB for production of the gunpowder developed by the OTB NKVD at factory #40 in the amount of 7-10 tons, and NKV must set up production of 7.62 mm bullets with ceramic-metallic cores at factory #188.
5. Calculate the propellant load with the aim to produce average pressure less than 3200 kg/cm^2 as both rounds tested had similar results."

RGASPI 664-1-1

Horsing Around

"Decree of the State Committee of Defence
On the introduction of horse drawn M-8 rocket launchers

1. Accept the horse drawn convertible wheel/sled M-8 rocket launcher  into service. When producing new M-8 launchers, include all changes suggested by the Western Front.
2. Cease production of M-8 launchers on the ZiS-6 truck chassis as of November 15th, 1941 in favour of horse-drawn launcher production.
3. Have NII-45 (Kazan) organize assembly of horse-drawn M-8 launchers. Assembly of components should be organized in Kazan.
   The Chair of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR, comrade Gafiatulin, must organize the cooperation in production of components and ensure the production of 40 launchers in November of 1941, 100 launchers in December of 1941, and 120 launchers in January of 1942.

I. Stalin."

RGASPI 664-2-25