Thursday, 5 March 2015

World of Tank History Section: Taking Iwo Jima, Hell on Earth

The air over Iwo Jima smells of sulphur. It was mined here since before WWII. The name of the island itself means roughly "sulphur island" in Japanese.

When war erupted in the Pacific, Iwo Jima became the home of a radar station and a Japanese garrison. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was appointed as the commander on June 30th, 1944. Under his command, the island turned into a stronghold with underground tunnels, pillboxes, and caponiers. Additional forces were moved to the island, including the 26th Tank Regiment commanded by Colonel Takeichi Nishi with 22 Chi-Ha and Ha-Go tanks.

When Nishi arrived at Iwo Jima, he could see that the island was far too small for any maneuvers. Japanese tanks were largely used as immobile guns. The Japanese also built stone replicas of tanks to scare the Americans. The deception could only be discovered close up. The island was ready for a defense.

Key to Japanese Skies

The reinforcements were not for nothing. The island had great strategic value. After the Americans knocked Japan out of the Mariana Islands, Japan was within range of B-29 Superfortress bombers. The radar at Iwo Jima gave an early warning when Japan was about to be bombed and helped Japanese fighters intercept American bombers not only on the way to the target, but on the way back. Additionally, when refueling at Iwo Jima, Japanese bombers could reach the Mariana Islands and pay the Americans a visit.

Capturing Iwo Jima would not only punch a hole in Japanese air defences, but obtain a base for American escort fighters and damaged Superfortresses. Losing a B-29 was undesirable, as it cost half a million dollars and 11 trained airmen.

Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's corps was chosen to attack the island. The American landings began on the morning of February 19th, 1945. The first wave of attackers would be supported by LVT(A)-4 amphibious tanks, a modification of the LVT with a 75 mm howitzer in an open turret. However, the offensive started slipping from the very start. Vehicles sank in the soft volcanic terrain before even reaching shore. The Japanese did not impede the landings on the beach. They were waiting until the attackers went deep into the island, onto the minefields and ranged in positions.

After a few minutes, the Americans found themselves under machinegun, mortar, and howitzer fire from hidden fortifications, with no opportunity to entrench. Walls of foxholes dug in the soft terrain would immediately cave in. Even if an American managed to dig a big enough hole or hide in a crater, he would have to deal with sulphuric gas seeping from the ground.

The second wave contained real tanks, M4A3 Shermans. The beaches were filled with vehicles, as the terrain was too soft for even tank tracks.

A bulldozer from A company tried to clear the way, but hit a mine, then was hit three times with large caliber mortars. The bulldozer was completely destroyed. Other Shermans tried to move in as a column, but made it only 90 meters before being immobilized by a minefield. 7 hours after the landing, A company was missing 12 tanks out of 17: 7 were stuck and 5 were knocked out. Other companies also took heavy losses.

By that evening, losses surpassed all estimates, consisting of over 2000 men, dead and wounded. A more sensitive army may have stopped the operation there, but Americans back then were made from tougher stuff. By the evening they numbered 30,000, surpassing the Japanese garrison.

Fire and Armour

Shermans, especially the flamethrower versions, were invaluable when chewing through Japanese lines. Tanks suppressed machineguns with their fire, then closed in and covered pillboxes and tunnels in napalm. That is, if they could close in. The Japanese used not only anti-tank mines, but IEDs made from powerful bombs or torpedoes. Minefields were covered by machineguns and anti-tank guns. A Japanese 47 mm gun was quite obsolete by 1945, but it could still penetrate the side of an American tank at close range. Infantry also hunted tanks, both with explosives on poles and suicide bombers.

American tankers tried to improve their protection with anything they could find: steel plates, sandbags, even boards. Photos from Iwo Jima show tanks that look more like sheds with guns. In reports, tankers demanded Pershing tanks, reasoning that it is not vulnerable to 47 mm guns, pole mines, and other weapons, and the Sherman's 75 mm gun could not destroy reinforced concrete pillboxes. That came later.

Five days after the beginning of the attack, soldiers of the 5th Marine Division raised an American flag over the dead Suribachi volcano. Two hours later, it was replaced with a bigger one, but this flag was the one immortalized in Joe Rosenthal's famous photograph. The flag did not mean that the island was taken. The defending soldiers had to be cleared out meter by meter from the north part, where the main target lay: the airport capable of accepting B-29 bombers. It was only taken by February 26th. On March 4th, the first Superfortress made a successful landing on the hastily repaired landing strip.

Fighting for the island continued for another month. Even when the Americans controlled the surface, the Japanese attacked from hidden tunnels. The last attack, personally headed by General Kuribayashi, took place on the night of March 26th. Individual Japanese soldiers continued hiding in numerous caves even after Japan's surrender.

Article authors: Andrei Ulanov and Aleksandr Tomzov

Sources:
  • Jig Report 4th Marine Division Iwo Jima.
  • King Report 4th Marine Division IwoJima.
  • Operations Report 4th Marine Division Iwo Jima
  • Harper, David E. Tank Warfare on Iwo Jima.
Original article available here

Wednesday, 4 March 2015

SU-5 Munitions Carrier

"Experimental munitions carrier project for the SU-5
  1. Purpose:
    The SU-5 SPG (small triplex) passed trials and show promising results. This SPG can be used in a mechanized unit as well as regular artillery battery in a motorized infantry or cavalry unit. However, the SU-5-1 (76 mm mod. 1902/30 gun) carries only 8 shells on board. Other variants carry no ammunition. It is necessary to develop an ammunition carrier that has a sufficient amount of shells that follows the SPG. This carrier must have identical or greater technical and battlefield qualities compared to the SU-5. The SPG and carrier will form one fighting unit.
  2. Requirements:
    1. The carrier will be developed on the chassis of a Komintern tractor, with minimal alterations.
    2. The tactical and technical characteristics of the carrier, such as speed, clearance, maximum grade, tilt, etc. must be no lower than those of the SU-5 SPG.
    3. It should take no longer than the SU-5 to move from travel position to combat position (30 seconds).
    4. The crew will consist of 3, including a driver. If it is not possible to widen the cabin to fit 3 men, 2 is sufficient.
    5. The engine, cabin, and fuel tank must be armoured.
    6. Armour protection is equivalent to the SU-5.
    7. Considering that the Komintern can carry a 2 ton weight, the following amounts of ammunition can be carried:
      1. 76 mm: 120 rounds
      2. 122 mm: 50 rounds
      3. 152 mm: 30 rounds
        The mass for each ammunition supply ranges from 1200-1500 kg, so 500-800 kg can be used for armour.
    8. Rounds must be placed in existing containers, and containers placed in slots in ammunition racks.
    9. The vehicle must have a roof to prevent moisture from getting to the shells and ammunition racks.
    10. It must be possible to continuously pass off shells to the SPG so that the transfer of shells does not limit the rate of fire. Containers should be easy to remove from their slots.
    11. The carrier should be easily convertible between shell types (76 mm, 122 mm, 152 mm) simply by swapping slots.
    12. The carrier should have tow hooks in the front and back to tow a similar carrier or a SU-5.
    13. A DT machinegun should be installed, and 1000-1500 rounds carried for protection."

Tuesday, 3 March 2015

Tiger II Trials: Gunnery

The previous article covered the mobility aspect of the Soviet Tiger II trials, this one will cover how its gun and turret performed.

"Maneuverability of fire

Aiming the cannon and coaxial machinegun is done with the turning mechanism, elevation mechanism, and hydraulic turning mechanism which works only when the engine is running. The hydraulic mechanism has two gears and is controlled by a foot pedal.

The horizontal aiming speed of the gun depends on the rate at which the engine is running. Data on the aiming mechanisms is given in the following table.

Mechanism
Range (degrees)
Number of turns in range
Angle for one turn
Turning mechanism (manual)
360
673
30 minutes
Elevation mechanism
22
36
36 minutes

The hand crank and hydraulic rotation mechanism are independent. The effectiveness of the hydraulic turning mechanism is given as follows:

Gear
Engine RPM
Turret traverse
Time
1
500
360
1 min. 20 sec.
2
500
360
1 min. 15 sec.
1
1000
360
1 min. 26 sec.
2
1000
360
43 sec.
1
1500
360
54 sec.
2
1500
360
27 sec.
1
2000
360
40 sec.
2
2000
360
20 sec.

The effort required to elevate the gun when the tank is horizontal is as follows.

Gun position
Effort in kilograms
Elevation
Depression
-5 degrees
6
1.5
0 degrees
7
1.2
+5 degrees
9
2
+10 degrees
8
1
+15 degrees
10
2

The effort needed to turn the turret with the tank flat on the ground is 2-3 kg.

Turret and gun looseness:
The looseness of the gun is 3 thousandths vertically. The looseness of the turret is 4 thousandths horizontally.

Gunnery trials

Muzzle velocity and maximum pressure:

The stock round from the 88 mm KwK 43 tank gun was used. The results attained were averages from armour piercing and high explosive rounds, six of each.

Type of shell
Number of shots
Muzzle velocity
Maximum pressure
Armour piercing
6
1018
3006
High explosive
6
759
-

Examination of precision and accuracy of the 88 mm KwK 43 gun in place:

To determine the accuracy and precision of the gun with armour piercing tracer shells, the gun was fired at vertical targets from a range of 1000-2000 meters. Aiming was done with the telescopic monocular sight with variable magnification. The visibility was good. The angle of the tank was 0 degrees. Time to fire was unlimited. Correction to aim was made after every shot.

Conditions
Range
# of shots
# of hits
100% radius
50% radius
1st group, 4x4 meter target
1000
10
10
48 cm
36 cm
2nd group, 4x4 meter target
1000
10
10
67 cm
43 cm
3rd group, 6x6 meter target
2000
10
10
93 cm
62 cm
Precision and accuracy of the 88 mm tank gun KwK 43 at ranges of 1000 and 2000 meters are good.

Determining rate of fire and accuracy when shooting in place:

The rate of fire of the gun was checked against one, two, three, and four targets with HE shells, in groups of 5 shots, with the following conditions:
  • The shells are in the ready rack.
  • The time is counted from the "load" command to the last shot.
  • Change of range is performed when shifting fire.
  • Correction of fire is performed after every shot.
The results were as follows:

Conditions and targets
Range to target
# of shots
# of hits
# of close misses (within 30 meters)
Time to fire (seconds)
Rate of fire (RPM)
Manual turning mechanism
PzIII
800
5
3
2
54
5.6
PzII
800
2
2
-
58
5.2
PzIII 15 degrees away
900
3
3
-
PzII
800
2
2
-
57
5.2
PzIII 15 degrees away
900
3
3
-


PzII
900
1
1
-
70
4.3
PzIII
800
2
2
-
T-40 35 degrees away
1400
2
2
-
Hydraulic turning mechanism
PzIII
800
5
4
1
53
5.6
PzII
800
2
2
-
52
5.7
PzIII 15 degrees away
900
2
2
-


PzII
500
1
1
-
59
5.4
PzIII
800
2
2
-
T-40 35 degrees away
1400
2
1
1
PzII
500
1
1
-
58
5.2
PzIV
650
1
1
-
PzIII
800
1
1
-
T-40 35 degrees away
1400
2
1
1

The maximum aimed rate of fire when firing in place at one target with the manual traverse is identical to the rate of fire when using the hydraulic traverse, 5.6 RPM. When firing at multiple targets in a 35 degree range, the rate of fire is 5 RPM with the manual traverse and 5.4 RPM with the hydraulic traverse. The accuracy of the gun when shooting in place is good.

Effectiveness of firing from the move

An AP-tracer shell was fired at a 4x6 meter target at a range of 900-1100 meters under off-road conditions while moving at 10-12 kph. There were three attempts at 4 shots each. The tank was aiming at 0 degrees, aiming was done through the optical sight at the 2.5x setting while using the hydraulic turning mechanism.

Results: 12 shots were made, one of which was to range in and 11 were counted. 8 shots hit, or 72%. Effectiveness of firing on the move was as follows, from the center of the target:
  1. x: -185 y: -80
  2. x: -170 y: -55
  3. x: -150 y: -20
  4. x: -145 y: -15
  5. x: +125 y: -10
  6. x: +150 y: +150
  7. x: +155 y: +185
  8. x: +205 y: +305
Horizontal aiming with the hydraulic traverse allows precise aiming at the target, and the semiautomatic braking elevation mechanism allows precise aiming vertically. These two factors increase effectiveness when firing on the move.

As the tank broke down, it was not possible to fully examine the semiautomatic braking elevation mechanism over a large amount of shots fired on the move.

...

Reliability of the gun and its mechanisms

During trials, 152 shots were fired, of which 60 were AP-T and 92 were HE-fragmentation grenades. The recoil length was normal and fell within the range of 510-525 mm.

After 58 shots, the semiautomatic guide failed. (See photo #11)

Photo #11. Destroyed semiautomatic guide.

After 90 shots, the roller arm failed. (See photo #12)

Photo #12. Destroyed roller arm.

After a new roller was installed, 62 shots were made, and the gun functioned normally."

CAMD RF 38-11355-2860

Monday, 2 March 2015

T-34 Improvements

Andrei Ulanov posted an interesting note listing some requests by front line soldiers.

"The self propelled German gun penetrates a T-34 at a range of 2 kilometers. To combat it, a portion of the tanks (every tenth) must mount the 85 mm anti-tank gun (equal in power to the German gun). It is also necessary to add armour to the front of the hull and turret to increase it to a combined thickness of 250-300 mm, and increase the top of the hull and turret to 100 mm. 

A drawback of the T-34's design is the roof of the engine compartment, which allows setting the tank on fire with incendiary fluid. I suggest that air intake should be done from behind the armour, removing any openings from the top, which will significantly increase its resistance to incendiary bottles and small bombs.

The second drawback is the turret produced at the Stalingrad factory, which can have its cheek knocked out by an armour piercing shell. The Tagil factory turret has no such defect, and is significantly more robust.

The third drawback is weak protection of the fuel tanks. I suggest that in order to prevent fires, they should have armour screens to reduce the chance of fire. It would be better to place the tanks on the floor. In both cases, they should be protected by 100-150 mm of spaced armour. 98% of unrecoverable losses consist of burned up tanks."

Since the document is dated September 1942, the German SPG in question is not the Ferdinand, as one could have thought when faced with a request for a ridiculously armoured tank destroyer. I can only imagine T-34-85BMs with 300 mm of armour on the front, immune to bombs and anti-tank guns, hitting the battlefield in 1942. The Tiger would turn green from jealousy. 

Sunday, 1 March 2015

Unbuttoned

Previously, it was established that Soviet tank commanders were instructed to get inside the tank and shut their hatch when under fire, but as we all know, rules were made to be broken.

"Award order #11949
  1. Name: Bezrukov, Nikolai Grigoryevich
  2. Rank: Major
  3. Position and unit: Commander of the 1st battalion, 150th Tank Brigade
  4. Year of birth: 1918
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member since 1942
  7. Participation in the Civil War or subsequent combat in defense of the USSR: Great Patriotic War since June 27th, 1941
  8. Wounds or concussions: wounded on September 8th, 1943
  9. In RKKA since: 1939.
  10. Commissioned at: already in RKKA.
  11. Prior awards: "For Bravery" medal, Order of the Patriotic War.
Brief and specific summary of heroism:

Comrade Bezrukov fights in the Patriotic war since the very first days. Over two years, his tank destroyed over 400 fascists and many enemy vehicles and armament. He faced death many times, but his bravery, tenacity, courage, and heroism carried him unharmed through heated battles with the enemy. During the war, comrade Bezrukov rose from turret commander to tank battalion commander. Skilfully guiding his battalion during penetration of a defensive line on August 26th, 1943, his tank was the first to tear into enemy fortifications, forming a path for a successful offensive by the main forces, which successfully completed their objective.

In battles for Putivl on September 2nd, 1943, he entered the city first, and secured a river crossing. On September 7th, 1943, during the battles for Buryn, he corrected the fire of battalion tanks from atop his tank. He was heavily wounded while doing this, but did not leave the battlefield until the enemy was defeated. In these battles, comrade Bezrukov's battalion destroyed up to 10 enemy tanks and SPGs, significant amounts of other armament and vehicles, and 300 fascists. 40 soldiers were taken prisoner.

For his skilful and decisive command, tenacity, bravery and heroism, comrade Bezrukov is worth of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the awards of Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Commander of the 150th Tank Brigade, Colonel Ugryumov"

CAMD RF 33-793756-5