Monday, 20 October 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Oboy Epicycloid

The end of the spring of 1915 was tough for the Russian Empire and its armies. An Austrian and German offensive that started on May 2nd threatened the entire front and the territory of the Polish Kingdom.

On May 4th, 1915, a fascinating letter reached Nikolai II's office, addressed personally to the Tsar. Its author was one Ivan Fedorovich Semchishin, a citizen of the city of Lvov, which was a part of the Russian Empire as of September of 1914. Semchishin's lack of fluency in Russian [unfortunately, the curious turns of phrase are lost in translation] was compensated by flowery prose and creativity. The letter was titled "A project of a machine for crushing trenches and military fortresses", and was immediately sent to military specialists at the Technical Committee of the Chief Military-Technical Directorate (GVTU). This organization processed proposals and inventions, which came in significant volume.

Changing the Landscape

The military engineers were no strangers to radical ideas, but Semchishin's project overcame even their imaginations. The author wrote: "If we had a large armoured barrel or roller with a motor inside which can spin on its axis, we could drive it over our enemies. My project, composed of a mobile fortress, realizes this principle and can be used to destroy fortified regions. It is called "Oboy"".

The author wrote of an armoured ellipsoid (which he called "epicycloid") of colossal size: 605 meters tall and 960 meters wide. Oboy's armour could withstand the enemy's bullets and shells, as well as mines. Two hatches were planned at each end, covered with robust caps. The crew would climb into them with 300 meter long rope ladders. Inside, the vehicle was equipped with a command post, projectors, and a wireless telegraph station.

Until recently, the Oboy was considered to have no armament, but archive documents show the opposite. The vehicle had provisions for heavy artillery. The design also included a sewer system, a ventilation system, a gas line, as well as "electric wires, telephones, elevators, fans, etc". The many floors of the vehicle would have hallways with living quarters, workshops, and stores. Semchishin's proposal was more than a house, but a whole mobile city.

The Oboy had no wheels, as it was itself a wheel. The vehicle would be propelled into motion by a system of steam engines, pendulums, and dynamo machines. The system produced "stores of energy, kinetic and potential". A flywheel would rotation into a rocking motion, allowing the ellipsoid to roll. The author did not specify how powerful this engine would have to be, but his design called for a mind-boggling maximum speed of 321 kph.

The engineers' verdict was laconic and absolute: the project is infeasible.

What if?

The military was correct. But now, after a century of technical progress, let's try to figure out why.

First of all, the Oboy would be impossible to build. There is no assembly plant today large enough to accommodate its size. Semchishin's supertank would have been taller than skyscrapers. There are also few buildings wider than 900 meters, none of which are capable of motion.

The vehicle would have to have been built near the front lines. In any other case, it would have expended its engine lifetime moving towards it, changing the landscape in its path.

The assembly of a prototype would be impossible to conceal from the enemy. If a team of saboteurs would be unable to impede such a colossal project, then an artillery barrage or a bombing run would leave it defenseless.

Even if the technology was available, the vehicle would crush itself when it moved. A mere 100 mm of armour would crumple like tinfoil under the Oboy's colossal mass.

A year later, another inventor proposed an idea of new armour. Using a cloth weaved from 1.9 cm thick rope and "so tightly wound that it would become like stone". This cloth, 71 cm thick, would be backed by 10 cm of steel. Even this invention, decades ahead of Soviet or American composite armour, would not protect the giant from its fate.

Two and a bit decades later, in July of 1943, the idea was reborn in miniature. Engineer-mechanic A.S. Dashevskiy proposed an ellipsoid "moving fortress". Its armour was 200 mm thick, but it was only 2.5 meters in diameter and 5 meters long. Dashevskiy's vehicle was like a mini Oboy.

Many spherical vehicles were proposed in the first half of the 20th century. Today, they become more and more known to those interested in military history. The Oboy "fortress destruction vehicle" remains the largest armoured vehicle designed in history.

Article author: Yuri Bakhurin. Yuri Bakhurin is a military historian, an author of many publications in regional and central scientific press: "Questions of History" magazine, "Military-Historical Magazine", "Military-Historical Archive", "Motherland", "Anthology of War", the "Reitar" almanac, and many more. He is also the author of the "Panzerjager Tiger (P) Ferdinand: Use in Combat" book.

Sources and literature:
  • RGVIA 803-1-1828 p. 123-134
  • RGVIA 803-1-1816 p. 140 and reverse
  • Y. Pasholok, Stalniye Shary Stalina, Moscow, Tactical Press, 2014
Original article available here.

Sunday, 19 October 2014

Kazantsev's Tankettes

"Excerpt from the orders of the enemy 339th infantry division from July 8th, 1942 (data of the 339th division intelligence)

Russian bombs (land torpedoes)

Army Group South has seen the use of bombs, invented by engineer 3rd grade Kamertsev (according to prisoners). Data on their size differs widely. According to one prisoner, it is 3.5 meters long, another says 1.5. Width: 1-1.5 meters, height: 0.75-1.25 meters. The explosives load also varies, one prisoner said 150-200 kg, another said 200 kg.

The bomb is mounted on a small tank (tankette), moving at 20 kph, connected by three cables to a dug in BT tank, which is its source of energy. Each BT tank can release two bombs, remotely controlled, and moving in a zig-zag pattern. The cable is up to 5 km long. The bomb explodes when it reaches its target using a detonator. If the cables are hit and torn, the bomb will explode in 7.5 minutes. The prisoners mention that these bombs are unsatisfactory, and there were losses when cleaning up stuck or dud bombs."

CAMD RF 38-11355-651

Saturday, 18 October 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Morozov's Top Ten

On October 16th, 1904, one of the most talented Soviet tank engineers, Alexander Alexandrovich Morozov, was born. He lived for 75 years, and gave nearly two thirds of his life to tanks. He started out a blueprint copier at a Kharkov factory, then served as a rank and file engineer, then section chief, then chief engineer. Morozov was never on the front lines, but his tanks took part in battle from the first days of the war.

He continued designing tanks after 1945, and his vehicles set the trends of Soviet tank design. Here are ten vehicles from this exceptional engineer's career that can be called exemplary.

1. BT-7. 

The convertible drive BT tanks were one of the main components of the RKKA tank forces before the war. The BT-7 was the last of this family.

The BT-7 was armed with a 45 mm gun, could reach speeds of 70 kph, and had anti-bullet armour. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, this armour was standard in nearly every army, but in the late 1930s, it was no longer enough.

The BT series served as a chassis for new technical solutions, like the installation of a 76 mm gun or experiments with sloped armour (BT-SV).

The BTs fought in the Spanish Civil War, at Khalkin-Gol, during the Winter War. In June of 1941, Soviet mechanized corps that were still armed mainly with BT-7s took the brunt of the Wehrmacht's offensive.

2. A-20

In 1937, a new tank for the Red Army was being developed. The A-20 still used the convertible drive, such was the requirement from the military. Externally, it had little in common with the BT-7, aside from large road wheels, characteristic of the Christie suspension.

The tank had a welded hull and a new turret. The armour plates were sloped to increase the chances of a ricochet. The front armour was up to 20 mm thick. The tank could accelerate up to 80 kph on a highway.

The vehicle was never mass produced. The only A-20 ever built fought with the 22nd Tank Brigade. Engineers, including A. Morozov, managed to convince the military that a purely tracked vehicle was better than a combination of wheels and tracks, and so the A-20 was not needed.

Morozov and his bureau did not waste their time. The A-20 was the predecessor of a vehicle that earned its legendary title.

3. T-34

The T-34 needs no introduction. Countless books and articles have been written about it. The T-34 fought in the Great Patriotic War from the first day to the last as the workhorse of the Red Army.

At the start of the war, this tank's 45 mm thick armour and 76 mm gun made it one of the most powerful tanks in the world. The Germans only managed to surpass it in armour and firepower with the Tiger, Panther, and Ferdinand.

The first T-34s were far from ideal, and were improved greatly throughout the war. A T-34 built in 1943 was significantly different from a T-34 built in 1940-41. Morozov played a key role in all of the tank's modernizations and improvements.

4. T-43

The tank was supposed to be a descendant of the T-34, but the design differed greatly from it. Due to a superior placement of components and alteration of the hull, the level of protection rose drastically. The front armour was increased to 75 mm. The tank used a torsion bar suspension, which was more compact than the T-34's Christie suspension.

The T-43 was better armoured, but this also made it heavier. Its ground pressure came close to that of heavy tanks.

The tank was accepted into service, but was not placed into production, as the military demanded an 85 mm gun. The T-43 was so tightly coupled that there was no potential for modernization. Introducing it into production demanded the development of new technological processes, which the USSR could not allow in time of war.

5. T-34-85

The main problem with the T-34 was that in 1943, its gun was no longer sufficiently powerful. In the middle of 1943, it was decided that n 85 mm gun will be installed. In order to do this, engineers developed a larger turret with better armour, big enough for three crewmen.

The 85 mm ZiS-S-53 gun was based on an AA gun design, and provided superior penetration. This increased the effectiveness of the T-34 when fighting new German tanks. The vehicle retained excellent mobility.

It cannot be said that the T-34-85 was a radical leap forward that gave Soviet forces unparalleled supremacy, but this was a necessary and timely replacement of the T-34.

6. T-44

This tank was the leap forward. It seemed similar to the T-34-85, but its internals differed greatly.

The T-44 had a new diesel engine, placed perpendicularly across the hull. This allowed the turret to be moved further back to balance the suspension. The driver's hatch was removed from the front plate, which raised the vehicle's protection. All components and mechanisms were improved.

The Christie suspension was replaced with torsion bars. This allowed the tank to be smaller and have more room inside, making life easier for crews and repairmen.

The T-44 was accepted for service in 1944, but it had no time to serve in battle, partially due to the fact that Soviet leadership did not wish to reduce the number of T-34-85s being produced. 2000 T-44s were built after the war.

7. T-54

Another leap forward. Designed in 1946, the T-54 remained in the Soviet design school for a long time. The first vehicles had expected growing pains, but after being improved, it became a reliable and technologically efficient vehicle with a large resource for modernization.

The T-54 had a new rounded turret with up to 200 mm of front armour, an improved hull, improved transmission, and a series of other improvements. The vehicle had a 100 mm D-10T gun, which, for a while, was the most powerful tank gun in the world. Its shell could penetrate 125 mm of armour at 2000 meters.

The T-54 was used by about 30 countries worldwide, and participated in many 20th century conflicts.

8. T-55

The T-55 was developed in 1958, and had many improvements over the T-55. One of the most important ones was the installation of a full anti-radiation system. The tank had a semi-automatic rammer. The caliber and type of gun were the same as on the T-54.

The T-55 remained in production until 1979. It fought in many conflicts, and 30 countries still use it to this day. More than 10 foreign variants of the vehicle exist.

The T-55 could reach 50 kph on a highway, and its range was up to 500 km on one tank of fuel.

9. T-64

The vehicle made for a new 115 mm gun, also known as "Object 432". The tank was in production from 1960, and was a laboratory of sorts for engineers and technologists. The vehicle turned out very complicated and not exceptionally reliable. Many were built before it was accepted into service, for testing by the army. The information that came back from the military was used to continue perfecting the design.

In 1966, Object 432 was approved for service. It had a 115 mm smoothbore gun. The tank's armour was composite, and used materials other than steel to defeat HEAT shells and protect from radiation. The same armour was used on the T-64A.

10. T-64A

In the end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s, the age of Main Battle Tanks began. The MBT concept called for a tank that could perform many tasks, combining mobility, firepower, and protection.

The T-64A was accepted into service in 1969. The tank had an automatic loading mechanism, which allowed manual shell type selection. Because of this, the loader was excluded from the crew.

This was the first Soviet tank to use an optical rangefinder. It had the same composite armour as the T-64. It is hard to say whether or not the T-64A was the best tank in the world, but in the 1990s, Western military specialists admitted that it would have been a very dangerous opponent.


About the designer: 

Alecander Alexandrovich Morozov was born on October 16th, 1904 in the village of Bezhitsa, located inside the modern boundaries of Bryansk. After finishing a "real academy" (an educational institution with a focus on natural sciences and mathematics), he worked at the Kharkov Locomotive Factory. He was a file clerk, then a copier. From 1926 to 1928, he served as an aircraft engine technician.

In 1928, he returned to HPZ. Despite its peaceful title, this factory was one of the key Soviet producers of armoured vehicles, including tanks.

In 1931, he finished a machine-building college, and became a group chief in the factory's design bureau. In 1936, he was promoted to section chief. In 1938, he was promoted to Deputy Chief Engineer.

Before the war, he worked on the T-24 tank and BT tanks. Along with Mikhail Koshkin and Nikolai Kucherenko, he worked on the future workhorse of the Red Army, the T-34 medium tank.

When Koshkin died in 1940, Morozov became Chief Engineer. In 1941, the factory was evacuated to Nizhniy Tagil. Here, Morozov directed the development of the T-43, T-34-85, T-44, and T-54. After the war, Morozov designed the T-55, T-64, and T-54A.

The T-54 earned Morozov his third USSR Government Award. He earned two Hero of Socialist Labour titles and two first class Stalin Awards. In 1972, Morozov was awarded the title of Doctor of Technical Sciences.

Original article available here.

Friday, 17 October 2014

Tiger II Trials: Visibility

"Visibility from the tank

The Tiger B tank has the following observation devices:
  • Telescopic ball sight
  • Fire correction periscope
  • Optical machinegun sight
  • Ten periscopic observation devices
The telescopic ball sight with adjustable magnification and field of view is installed left of the gun. The head of the sight is attached to the oscillating part of the gun, and the eyepiece is attached to a support on the turret roof. The field of vision is 25 degrees with 2.5x magnification and 12 degrees 30 minutes with 5x magnification. 

The fire correction periscope is carried in the turret bustle. When in use, it is mounted on the commander's cupola. The field of view of the fire correction periscope is 6 degrees, magnification is 6x, periscopic width is 1250 mm.

The optical machinegun sight is attached to the radio operator's machinegun and has 1.6x magnification, field of view of 18 degrees, and a 6 meter dead zone.

10 periscopic observation devices are placed in four points: seven of them are in the commander's cupola, one each for the loader, radio operator, and driver. The commander's observation devices are all identical and are positioned in a circle on the vertical armour of the cupola. The periscopes have the following field of view:

Device position
Field of view (degrees)
Dead zone (meters)
Horizontal
Vertical
Front
65
25
11
Front right
65
18
19
Right
65
15
25
Rear right
65
20
15
Rear left
65
22
12
Left
65
25
11
Front left
65
25
11

The vertical field of view and dead zone of the observation devices is variable due to the commander's cupola being offset to the left side of the turret roof.

The periscopic sight of the loader is immobile in the right front of the turret. It has a horizontal field of view of 57 degrees, vertical field of view of 18 degrees and dead zone of 28 meters.

The periscopic sight of the gunner is immobile in the roof of the fighting compartment. It has a horizontal field of view of 60 degrees, vertical field of view of 16 degrees and dead zone of 11 meters.

The periscopic sight of the driver can turn in its mount in the roof of the driver's compartment. It has a horizontal field of view of 60 degrees, vertical field of view of 16 degrees when immobile, or up to 100 degrees horizontal and 40 degrees vertical with rotation. The dead zone is 7 meters.

Figure 9: Sight range (horizontal)


Figure 10: Sight range (vertical)"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2860

Thursday, 16 October 2014

Nezhinets' Wonder-tank

"To the GABTU chief, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko

From a student of the VAMM Stalin Military Academy, Lieutenant Nezhinets, Ivan Ivanovich

From May 1938, I worked alongside Military Technician 2nd Grade comrade I.M. Sharalapov on orders from Colonel-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Pavlov. We completed all tasks assigned to us.

In response to my letter in May 1940 addressed to Colonel-General Pavlov, Colonel-General Pavlov replied with orders to develop special equipment for tank units. This equipment has been developed by comrade Sharalapov and I, and a new universal tank designed to use it.

This tank uses a new 300 hp diesel type engine, which burns fuel in a different way and a hydraulic gearbox. There is no electric starter, which makes the tank easier to maintain and resistant to various rays. The suspension has a convertible drive, the hull and turret are aerodynamic in shape. The conical turret has a rotation mechanism. The gun has a loading mechanism, which lets the third crewman work on fire correction and other equipment which will be used in more difficult combat situations.

The tank has a mass of approximately 14 tons, with a maximum speed of 100 kph. If one or two track links break on one track, the tank does not stop moving, due to an improved chassis. Driving the vehicle will be made simpler due to a lack of clutch. In the winter, the vehicle can be heated by recycling air.

When tanks are used in more difficult combat situations, it is equipped with special devices which protect the crew from anti-tank rifles and poison gases (the tank is air-tight). The engine is cooled with special devices. The driver's controls are two-sided, making it easy for large tank units to make 180 degree turns in tight spaces and makes vehicles more maneuverable in combat.

The vehicle is designed for improved independence from other vehicles. It is equipped with a hydraulic compressor to generate pressurized compressed air, with several advantages over the one designed in 1939. The compressed air can be used to:

  1. Start vehicles.
  2. Operate tow cranes when the engine has broken down.
  3. To repel poison gases.
  4. To clean the vehicle from dirt and dust.
  5. For other specialized uses.
Such a vehicle can also be equipped with a trailer.

Comrade Lieutenant-General, allow me to report to you more detailed combat and technical characteristics on this vehicle.

Lieutenant Nezhinets
February 7th, 1941"

Wednesday, 15 October 2014

Seelow Spotlights

Many people have heard of spotlights being used to blind the Germans when storming Seelow Heights, but details are not as widely available. Lucky for you, I have you covered.

"The peculiarities of a nighttime attack to penetrate enemy defenses on the West shore of the Oder river

A distinctive feature of the Berlin operation was the use of nighttime artillery barrages and infantry attacks in order to achieve greater surprise.

Over two days (April 14th and 15th, 1945) before the attack, reconnaissance was performed to discover the true location of the enemy and the possibility of retreat to a second line of defense. Reconnaissance in the early morning forced the enemy to increase the level of caution and rouse the front line for deflecting attacks at dawn. In these conditions, attacking at night, before dawn, would achieve a complete surprise.

Among measures taken to ensure the success of a nighttime offensive, the use of spotlights in the breakthrough region deserves attention. According to personal orders from Front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Zhukov, 140 spotlights were installed near the front lines. The spotlight units were tasked with lighting up the path of our infantry and blinding the enemy when the attack started (5:30 on April 16th, 1945).

Spotlight units arrived at their positions in the second half of April 15th and were subordinated directly to the artillery commanders of the infantry corps. Infantry division and regiment commanders were familiarized with the nature of the upcoming illumination, but did not participate in its execution directly.

12-15 spotlights were placed in the path of an advancing infantry corps (2.5-3 km wide), 200-250 meters apart, 1 to 1.2 kilometers away from the front line. The spotlights were removed from their trucks, and placed 2 meters above the ground. The control center for the spotlight companies was placed near artillery corps HQs.

It was impossible to create an even illuminated front due to the uneven terrain. Because of this, corps and division commanders took measures to ensure that infantry kept their heading. Special "azimuth men" were trained, one per infantry company. Special night units were formed for regiment and battalion commanders. These units were tasked with sending signals, illuminating terrain not covered by spotlights , and marking the direction of battalion movement with tracers. These units contained handheld machineguns with large amounts of tracer rounds, as well as flares. The boundaries between advancing regiments were marked with 76 mm tracer shells.

At 5:00 on April 16th, 1945, the artillery barrage began, lasting for 25 minutes. At 5:25, specially designated spotlights signalled "attack" with vertical beams, and the remaining spotlights turned on their horizontal beams.

Due to technical difficulties and damage from enemy machineguns, it was impossible to achieve full and simultaneous illumination on the area of attack.

The spotlights were placed 1-1.2 km behind the front line to provide illumination for 3 km into enemy territory. In practice, this could not be achieved on some sections of the front lines, as the artillery barrage kicked up a large cloud of dust and smoke that remained in the air for several hours (even after dawn). Spotlights could not penetrate this cloud, and the penetration of some was quite shallow.

Nevertheless, the desired effect was achieved. In most cases, the light from spotlights , even with gaps, helped infantry orient themselves and hold their heading. Tanks and infantry in zones lit up by spotlights moved much faster and with more confidence than infantry and tanks that advanced in darkness.

It must be noted that the sudden illumination of enemy positions demoralized his infantry and blinded machinegunners and artillery observers. The enemy was passive in areas illuminated by spotlights . Conversely, the enemy opened heavy fire from some darkened sections at advancing units. In order to minimize these dark regions, one infantry corps successfully panned their spotlights by 65-70 degrees (see attachment #1).

Despite some deficiencies in illuminating the terrain with spotlights , the rate of advance was sufficiently fast. In one hour, infantry and tanks moved 1.5-2 km into enemy lines.

The following conclusions can be made from studying the experience during the Berlin operation:

  1. Spotlights should create a continuous front. If there are not enough spotlights , spotlights should sweep back and forth to blind remaining enemies and prevent flanking fire from darkened areas.
  2. Divisional commanders should be tasked with coordinating spotlights units, placing spotlights before the attack, and directing the spotlights as infantry and tanks advance.
  3. In infantry units, despite the ability to signal with spotlights, practice directing infantry with beams and tracer trajectories.
  4. When illuminating terrain during attacks, keep in mind that spotlights cannot penetrate the smoke and dust kicked up by an artillery barrage. The brightness of a beam is inversely proportional to the distance; with increasing distance, the brightness is greatly reduced. Keep this in mind when calculating the brightness of spotlights necessary for illuminating certain positions."
And of course, here is the attachment.

CAMD RF 233-2356-775

Solid lines represent immobile spotlights, and dotted lines represent the area covered by spotlights that pan back and forth.

Tuesday, 14 October 2014

Effectiveness of German Infantry Anti-tank Measures

VIF2NE poster panzeralex dug up some figures from Guderian's Inspector General of the Tank Forces archives on the effectiveness of Panzerfausts, which are of considerable interest. Here are the figures:

Total number of kill claims on the Eastern Front for February of 1944: 1219
Of those:
  • Tanks: 397
  • Tank destroyers (StuG and Marder): 355
  • AT guns: 291
  • Other (artillery, mines, etc): 114
  • Handheld anti-tank weapons: 62
    • Panzerfaust: 35
    • Panzerschreck: 19
    • Haft H3: 5
    • Teller mines: 2
    • Hand grenades:1
For March, data is only given for hand-held anti-tank weapons. 
Total: 105
  • Panzerfaust: 47
  • Panzerschreck: 23
  • Teller mines: 18
  • Haft H3: 13
  • Hand grenades: 3
  • Flare gun: 1
In February, the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck are responsible for the vast majority (87%) of infantry kill claims, but a very small number of overall claims (4%). This is consistent with Soviet reports that only 3% of tanks of the 1st Belorussian Front were destroyed by these weapons. 

Another interesting note is that the magnetic Haft H3 mines are responsible for a tiny amount of casualties, making one question why the Germans bothered developing anti-magnetic mine Zimmert coating when their mines were so ineffective even against Zimmerit-free vehicles.

A year later, during the Budapest Offensive Operation, the effectiveness of Panzerfausts was, shall we say, greatly reduced:

"According to data from the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in February of 1945, out of 160 total tanks and SPGs damaged in combat, two were damaged by Panzerfausts, composing a total of 0.5-0.6% of total losses. The damage caused by Panzerfausts was as follows:
  • One T-34 tank had its track broken from 50 meters.
  • One T-34 tank was hit in the side armour plate, resulting in only a crack. Range: 50 meters"

Monday, 13 October 2014

Cheating at Statistics 8: Seeing Things

Many engagements involving Tigers have been elevated to legendary status, and many more have been forgotten. It is a shame, as it can be difficult to reassemble bits and pieces of engagements that are rather interesting. For instance, documents of the 7th Guards Independent Heavy Tank Regiment record a somewhat unusual vehicle, the KV-85, engaging in battle with Tigers. Here is their account of the battle (from M. Baryatinskiy, Heavy KV Tank in Battle, Moscow, 2007):

"According to orders from the HQ of the 17th Corps, remaining 5 tanks and SPGs (3 KV-85 tanks and 2 SU-122 SPGs) set up for a defense of the Telman farm to deflect enemy attacks towards Rososhe, the Kommunar farm and Bolshevik farm at 7:00 on January 28th, 1944. 50 infantrymen and 2 AT guns filled the defensive perimeter. A concentration of enemy tanks was spotted south of Rososhe. At 11:30, 12 enemy T-6 tanks and 13 medium and small tanks attacked the Telman farm from the south, with infantry cover.

From effective positions, cover from buildings and haystacks, our tanks and SPGs let the enemy approach to straight shot range and opened fire, upsetting the enemy's formation and knocking out 6 tanks (3 of them Tigers), destroying up to a platoon of infantry. Senior Lieutenant Kuleshov's KV-85 was selected to destroy the German infantry that has broken though. With fire and tracks, he carried out his orders. At 13:00, German forces that did not wish to attack the Soviets head on flanked the Telman farm and encircled the Soviet group.

The battle of our tanks when surrounded by a numerically superior force shows exceptional skill and heroism of our tankers. The tank group (3 KV-85 and 2 SU-122), commanded by the company commander, Guards Senior Lieutenant Podust, defended the farm, while at the same time not letting the Germans move their forces elsewhere. Tanks frequently moved positions and fired on German tanks, SU-122s entered open terrain and shot up infantry on APCs heading for Ilyintsy, preventing the Germans from maneuvering freely and allowing elements of the 17th Infantry Corps to withdraw. Tanks continued fighting until 19:30, even though there was no longer any infantry at the farm.

Maneuvers and effective use of cover ensured heavy damage to enemy forces with very light casualties (2 wounded). On January 28th, 1944, 5 Tiger tanks were destroyed or knocked out, as well as 5 PzIVs, 3 PzIIIs, 7 APCs, 6 AT guns, 4 machinegun nests, 28 horsecarts, and up to 3 platoons of infantry.

At 20:00, the tank group attempted a breakthrough, and at 22:00, after battle, broke out to Soviet positions, having lost one SU-122."

Well, that was heroic and all, but I am a sceptic, and I must first at least establish that such a battle took place. Flipping through my good friend Tigers in Combat, we will find no mention of Telman farms or Rososhe, but there is only one mention of any SU-122s in January of 1944, in the journal of the Feldherrnhalle battalion, mentioning the name "Oratoff". Luckily for us, Oratoff still exists on the map, a city near Vinnitsa. A prior mention of "five enemy tank corps spotted 100 kilometers north of Winniza" tells us we're in the right place. Time to pull out a map!


Vinnitsa is that blob near the lower center of the map, and what do you know, two arrows clash right on top of Oratoff (sadly not pictured on the map), the top one being the 1st Tank Army, the unit that the 7th Guards were fighting with. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have our battle. We also see the German tendency to grossly overestimate Soviet forces: despite reporting five tank corps north of Vinnitsa, the Soviet map only shows the 3rd Guards Tank Army there, home to two tank corps. Even if you include the 1st Tank Army to the north-east, that is only one additional tank corps. 

All right, we figured out where we are, time to take a look at the German account of the battle. The account is rather sparse:

"28 January 1944: Breakthrough to the Oratoff railway station."

Well that really doesn't give us interesting to look at. Thankfully, the next few lines offer something better:

"29 January 1944: Fighting at Oratoff. Abortive recovery attempt of disabled Tigers 112 and 132.
Total tanks: 66. Within five days, 267 tanks are knocked out with a loss of 3 Tigers and 4 Panthers."

Very good, we are getting somewhere! Time to determine how accurately the sides counted their kills.

The Soviet count is easy. Let' start with the Tigers. The Soviets claim five knocked out or damaged, the Germans give three outright losses and 2 that they were able to recover (as we have determined previously, the Germans do not count vehicles that can be recovered towards their losses). Everything adds up here. The Tiger battalion doesn't own up to losing any "lesser" tanks, so those probably came from the German 3rd tank division, also present on the Soviet map, whose records I unfortunately do not have. Similarly, Soviet records don't claim the 4 Panthers lost, so perhaps they fell to another part of the 1st Tank Army.

The German claim is much more bold: 267 tanks knocked out! That is a rather significant force. Like in Korner's case, let's count how many tanks the 1st Tank Army had at its disposal: the 6th Tank Corps (3 tank brigades, 65 tanks each for 191 total), 112th Tank Brigade (another 21 tanks), and four tank regiments (also 21 tanks apiece, 84 total) for a grand total of 300 tanks. But that's only a maximum number of available tanks, how many tanks did the Soviets actually have in this area? Luckily for us, the 1st Tank Army has a rather detailed memoir, The Combat Path of the First Tank Army and Its Heroes. Volume 3 describes the relevant time period, where Guards Colonel Koltunov writes on page 12: "...on all sections of the front, our units, having one fifth to one sixth of their numbers remaining at best, deflected furious attacks of large enemy groups of tanks and infantry, supported by aircraft."

A fifth or sixth of maximum capacity at best! That puts the Soviet forces at an optimistic estimate of 50-60 vehicles which makes sense, given the 7th Guards' poorly equipped state (3 KV-85s out of a tank regiment's 21, plus a couple of SU-122s, likely folded in from an SPG unit). Even assuming that the 1st Tank Army has suffered no casualties at all in its month-long offensive and all of its losses came from the attacking Tigers, there is still quite a bit of overclaim. 

Sunday, 12 October 2014

Remote Control

"February 17th, 1935
To the director of the Institute of GlavExProm Telemechanics and Communications and head of the Technical Institute

Minutes of the meeting on the topic of telemechanization of T-26 and T-46 tanks.

Present:
  • Director of the GlavExProm telemechanical institute, comrade Suchkov
  • Chief of the Technical Institute, comrade Mileynovskiy
  • Chief of the 2nd department of the Technical Institute, comrade Belov
  • Director of the Experimental Kirov Factory, comrade Barykov
Summary:
  1. The GlavExProm ITC is considered the head organization of telemechanization of the T-26 and T-46 tanks.
  2. The main designer of the T-26 and T-46 vehicles and the driver and commander's control panels is the Experimental Kirov Factory.
  3. ITC promises to supply Kirov Factory with the necessary amount of workers for the duration of the development and to locally produce all electromechanical components.
  4. Kirov Factory and ITS promise to complete the telemechanization project by July 1st, 1935. 
  5. The cost of the T-26 project is 100,000 rubles and the T-46 is 120,000 rubles.
  6. The cost and time for production will be determined after the blueprints are completed.
Suchkov
Milenovskiy
Belov
Barykov"

Saturday, 11 October 2014

Hatches

A number of sources, both memoirs and secondary sources founded on the memoirs, write that Soviet tank crewmen did not look out of their tanks through the hatches, which reduced their visibility on the battlefield, some going as far as claiming that it was actually forbidden. But was it? The Soviet 1944 armoured vehicle manual certainly doesn't say so. In fact, what it says is the opposite.

"154. In combat conditions, all crew members and observation posts observe the battlefield. Platoon commanders operating on flanks should pay special attention to open flanks. Before contact with the enemy is made, observation is to be performed from open hatches. The observers report anything that is observed to their commander."

"250. The crew must constantly and carefully observe the battlefield, look for landmarks, seek targets, and keep them in sight, reporting them to the tank commander. If the target is lost, it is permissable to carefully observe through an open hatch. The crew must pay attention to the platoon commander's vehicle in battle and follow his signals."

This manual is applicable to tanks (medium, heavy, and special), armoured cars (light and medium), SPGs, APCs, and special vehicles, so nearly any crew would have read it and would be obliged to follow it.

Soviet memoirs also contain instances of commanders remaining unbuttoned even during battle.
Nikonov, Ivan Sergeevich: "As soon as it dawned, the Germans attacked. I saw out of my hatch how the infantry was retreating, pushing a 45-er. Tanks appeared. I ordered my crew to let them come within 500-600 meters. The battle started, we were shooting at them, they were shooting at us. ...
I commanded the battle while out of the hatch up to my belt. I never ducked down and shut myself in my tank. What is the commander's mission? Ready the tank before battle, pick the correct target in battle, correctly judge the situation, correct the fire. Fortifications in front of me were pockmarked with shells that fell too close. A few shells flew past me..."

Ivanitskiy, Ivan Sidorovich: "Did you open hatches when you attacked?" "Of course, cracked them open by about the size of your palm. It's hard to see through the periscope, you open the hatch to get the best visibility. It's dangerous, of course. A fragment can fly in, but you can see where you're going and what's happening around you."