How to Paint Americans

I wrote plenty on how to paint Soviet tanks, but recently, I came across a similar manual for American vehicles, listing what to do, and, perhaps more importantly, what not to do. Samples and a full download link below. The manual also includes tips about tarps and camouflaging aircraft.

Download here from Yandex Disk.

Soviet Medium Tank Destroyers Part 2

You've read about Soviet experimental medium SPGs, but now here's some more exciting content from CAMD RF 38-11369-1, in the vein of the light SPG article.

"

Production vehicle, SPG SU-122, produced by the Ural Machine Building Factory of the NKTP

According to GOKO decrees in October-December 1942, the Uralmash factory designed and built an experimental prototype of the SU-122 SPG. The SU-122 consists of a 122 mm M-30 howitzer on the T-34 hull. 

From December 5th to December 19th of 1942, the SPG underwent trials at the Gorohovets proving grounds, over 430 km and 281 shots. The commission concluded that the SPG passed trials. GOKO decree #2559 on December 2nd, 1942, adopted the SU-122 SPG into the Red Army.

Experimental work on medium SPGs

1. On the SU-122M

The Uralmash factory, on its own initiative, developed a modernized SU-122M SPG. This vehicle was based on the SU-122 SPG trials, overseen by Major-General of the Tank Engineering Forces, comrade Ogurtsov.

The modernization was as follows:

1. Installation of a new D-11 122 mm howitzer instead of the M-30 122 mm howitzer.
2. Increase of the fighting compartment width by 350 mm and height by 100 mm.
3. Inclusion of a telescopic sight for direct fire.
4. Improved fuel and control systems.

In June of 1943, the SU-122M underwent trials at the Ural proving grounds over 329 shots and 859 km. The experimental prototype passed trials, but was not adopted by the Red Army, as a decision was already made to produce SU-85 SPGs that used 85 mm guns with improved anti-tank capability.

Experimental prototype of the modernized SU-122M SPG designed by the Ural Machine Building Factory of the NKTP

1. Combat weight: 31.43 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Gun: 122 mm M-30 howitzer
4. Muzzle velocity: 515 m/s
5. Horizontal traverse: 20 degrees
6. Vertical traverse: -3 degrees to 26 degrees 30 minutes
7. 122 mm shells: 40
8. Front armour thickness: 45 mm
9. Maximum speed: 55 kph
10. Average speed: 35 kph
11. Average off-road speed: 20 kph
12. Engine: V2-34
13. Maximum engine power: 450 hp
14. Fuel tank capacity: 460 L

2. On the SU-85

According to GKO decree #3289 from May 5th, 1943, the Uralmash factory developed and produced experimental SPGs in May-July of 1943.

1. SU-85-I, with a TsAKB S-18-1 85 mm gun
2. SU-85-II, with a factory #9 D5-S85 85 gun
3. SU-85-IV with a TsAKB S-18 85 mm gun

All of these SPGs were based on the SU-122 SPG. Over the period from July 25th to August 6th of 1943, all three SPGs underwent trials at the Gorohovets proving grounds over 500 km and 300 shots. A commission headed by Lieutenant-General of Artillery comrade Taranovich (today Colonel-General of Artillery). The D5-85S gun designed by factory #9 achieved superior results in trials.

Marshal of the Armoured Forces, comrade Fedorenko, Marshal of Artillery, comrade Yakovlev, and the People's Commissar of Tank Production comrade Malyshev visited the proving grounds in early August 1943, and agreed to the adoption of the SU-85 armed with a D5-85S gun, of which they informed comrade Stalin over the phone.

After this, Uralmash began mass production of SU-85 SPGs.

In September of 1943, Colonel-General of Tank Forces, comrade Biryukov visited the factory. According to an assignment from GOKO, he inspected the production lines, and occasionally offered help and coordination of factory #9 and Uralmash to aid in quantitative and qualitative improvements in production of the SU-85.

By his orders, one of the production SPGs was subjected to mobility and gunnery trials. The trials were conducted by Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel Kovalev.

The tactical-technical characteristics of the SU-85 SPG were confirmed by GOKO decree #4436 on October 27th, 1943, provided to NKO (comrade Fedorenko) and NKTP (comrade Malyshev). With this new SPG, the Red Army received its first medium tank destroyer, capable of fighting new enemy tanks.

Experimental prototype of the SU-85 SPG designed by the Ural Machine Building Factory of the NKTP

1. Combat weight: 29.15 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Front, side, and rear armour: 45 mm
4. Gun: 85 mm D5-S85
5. Muzzle velocity: 792 m/s
6. Horizontal traverse: 20 degrees
7. Vertical traverse: -4 to +25 degrees
8. 85 mm shells: 48
9. Maximum speed: 55 kph
10. Average speed: 35 kph
11. Average off-road speed: 20 kph
12. Engine: V2-34
13. Maximum power at 1700 RPM: 450 hp
14. Fuel: diesel
15. Fuel capacity: 460 L

3. On the SU-100 SPG

Following GOKO decree #481 from December 27th, 1943, Uralmash developed and produced two SU-100 prototypes in March-May of 1944, one with a 100 mm D-10S gun designed by factory #9, and one with a 100 mm S-34 gun, designed by TsAKB. The SU-100 was based on the SU-85.

Several changes were made to the old SPG to increase its combat ability:

1. As requested by USA GBTU, the front armour was increased. Instead of the 45 mm armour of the SU-85, the armour of the SU-100 was 75 mm, at the same angle.
2. Robustness of the front road wheels was increased.
3. Ventilation was improved.
4. Gearbox was improved.

Other changes were made, 15 in total. The SU-100 prototypes were tested twice. First trials of the SU-100 with the D-10S gun were carried out by a commission headed by Colonel Rupyshev at the Gorohovets proving grounds from March 9th to March 27th, 1944. The trials lasted 564 km and 1040 shots. The SPG passed these trials. However, the commission requested that some design defects be corrected before entering production.

Secondary trials were performed by the same commission at the Gorohovets proving grounds from June 24th to July 6th, 1944. 

The SU-100 prototype with the S-34 gun underwent trials. Trials were done in comparison with the SU-100 with the D-10S SPG. The SU-100 with the S-34 gun was trialled over 877 shots and 250 km, and did not pass trials. Work on this SPG concluded, as the SU-100 with the D-10S gun was more promising.

The D-10S prototype, after being corrected after March trials, was tested simultaneously. The SPG passed trials over 923 shots and 250 km, and was recommended for adoption by the Red Army.

Comrades Colonel Rypushev and Engineer-Majors Konev and Volgushev performed exemplary work during design and trials of the SPG.

GOKO decree #6131 from July 3rd, 1944, accepted the SU-100 for mass production and use by the Red Army.

Experimental prototype of the SU-100 SPG designed by the Ural Machine Building Factory of the NKTP

1. Combat weight: 31.6 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Front armour: 45-75 mm
4. Side and rear armour: 45 mm
5. Gun: 100 mm D-10S
6. Muzzle velocity: 900 m/s
7. Horizontal traverse: 16 degrees
8. Vertical traverse: -3 to +20 degrees
9. 100 mm shells: 33
10. Maximum speed: 50 kph
11. Average speed: 30 kph
12. Average off-road speed: 18-20 kph
13. Engine: V2-34
14. Maximum power at 1700 RPM: 450 hp
15. Fuel: diesel
16. Fuel capacity: 460 L

4. On the SU-122P SPG

In the end of 1943, Uralmash, on its own initiative with approval from USA GABTU, began work on equipping the SU-85 with a 122 mm gun. This work was conducted with the goal of exploring the viability of 122 mm guns on medium SPGs.

In June of 1944, a prototype was produced, indexed SU-122P. This prototype differed from the SU-100 experimental prototype only in armament. The SU-122P SPG was armed with a 122 mm D-25S gun.

In November 1944-February 1945, the SU-122P prototype was tested on the NIBT proving grounds over 1000 km, and fired 258 shots at the Leningrad proving grounds.

The pause between the prototype being ready and trials beginning can be explained by Uralmash being occupied with work on the SU-100, and did not submit the SU-122P for proving grounds trials.

Mobility and gunnery trials showed that armament of medium SPGs with a 122 mm D-25S gun is possible.

USA GBTU decided that an SPG with a rear fighting compartment be developed for this gun, as placing a 122 mm gun in a SU-85 (SU-100) SPG does not result in a comfortable placement of crew and ammunition. Work on the SU-122P ceased.

Experimental  prototype of the SU-122P SPG designed by the Ural Machine Building Factory of the NKTP

1. Combat weight: 31.5-32 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Front armour: 45-75 mm
4. Side and rear armour: 45 mm
5. Gun: 122 mm D-25S
6. Muzzle velocity: 781 m/s
7. Horizontal traverse: 16 degrees
8. Vertical traverse: -3 to +17 degrees
9. 100 mm shells: 26
10. Maximum speed: 50 kph
11. Average speed: 30 kph
12. Average off-road speed: 18-20 kph
13. Engine: V2-34
14. Maximum power at 1700 RPM: 450 hp
15. Fuel: diesel
16. Fuel capacity: 400 L

5. On the SU-85PM SPG

The experimental SU-85PM SPG was produced at Uralmash on its own initiative in August-December of 1943. This SPG was composed of a production SU-85 equipped with an increased power D5-S85PM gun, designed by factory #9. Due to a longer barrel and increased density of propellant, the muzzle velocity increased to 900 m/s, as opposed to 800 m/s of the stock gun.

The SPG was trialled in January-February of 1944 at the Gorohovets proving grounds, firing 755 shots. The SPG passed trials, but due to the installation of a D-10S gun, which was significantly more powerful than the D5-S85PM gun, the need for the latter disappeared.

Experimental prototype of the SU-85PM SPG designed by the Ural Machine Building Factory

1. Combat weight: 29.5 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Front, side, and rear armour: 45 mm
4. Gun: 85 mm D5-S85PM
5. Muzzle velocity: 900 m/s
6. Horizontal traverse: 20 degrees
7. Vertical traverse: -3 degrees 20 minutes to +26 degrees
8. 85 mm shells: 48
9. Maximum speed: 55 kph
10. Average speed: 30 kph
11. Average off-road speed: 18 kph
12. Engine: V2-34
13. Maximum power at 1700 RPM: 450 hp
14. Fuel: diesel
15. Fuel capacity: 460 L

6. On the SU-101 and SU-102 SPGs

Following the order of GBTU, Uralmash designed two experimental SPGs with rear fighting compartments in March of 1945. The prototypes differed in armament.

• The SU-101 SPG was equipped with the D-10S 100 mm gun.
• The SU-102 SPG was equipped with the D-25S 122 mm gun.

At the end of April 1945, Uralmash produced the first SU-101 SPG. After 76 km of trials, design defects became apparent. The driver's compartment rapidly heated to 50-60 degrees, making it impossible for the driver to work. Other defects were also discovered.

Gunnery trials showed weakness of attachment of armoured plates, as well as insufficient robustness of some plates.

Currently, Uralmash is improving the design of these SPGs. All changes are being made to the second prototype with the D-25S gun. Factory trials are scheduled for the end of June of 1945.

The new SU-102 prototype differs from the SU-100 in the following way:

1. New engine and new layout of components.
2. Increased armour of the fighting compartment and hull.
3. Increased power of the gun and machineguns.
4. Improved performance over horizontal obstacles (trenches) and movement on forest roads due to gun position.

The production of these experimental SPGs is a step forward in the development of medium SPGs, but the SU-101 and SU-102 no longer meet modern requirements for armament, armour, and transmission design.

The new medium SPG prototypes, in addition to removal of currently known defects, require subsequent improvement in all main design criteria.

Experimental medium SPG with rear fighting compartment.

Tactical-technical characteristics of the SU-101 and SU-102 SPGs

1. Combat weight: 33-33.5 tons
2. Crew: 4
3. Ground pressure: 0.84-0.85 kg/cm^2
4. Length with gun: 6850-7000 mm
5. Width: 3070 mm
6. Height: 2200 mm
7. Clearance: 430 mm
8. Front hull armour: 90 mm
9. Front fighting compartment armour: 120 mm
10. Side fighting compartment armour: 90-75 mm
11. Rear armour: 40 mm
12. Gun: 100 mm D-10S or 122 mm D-25S
13. Muzzle velocity: 900 (D-10S) or 781 (D-25S) m/s
14. Horizontal traverse: 20 degrees
15. Vertical traverse: -4 to +20 degrees
16. Sights: TSh-19 or TSh-17
17. 122 mm shells: 28
18. 100 mm shells: 36
19. Maximum speed: ~50 kph
20. Range (highway): 250-300 km
21. Range (off-road): 150-200 km
22. Engine: V2-44
23. Maximum power: 500 hp
24. Fuel: diesel
25. Fuel capacity: 440 L"

Hasan Tank Combat

"Notes on known defects and deficiencies of our tanks and recommendations on their correction

T-26 vehicle

1. The oil radiator can be reached by an enemy that can pierce it with a bayonet. It should be covered with rotating overlapping armour plates.
2. Old tanks can't lock their driver's hatch. There were cases where the enemy could open it and kill the crew. We have many tanks like this.
3. You can't use the fan, as it increases the possibility of the crew being harmed by bullets and lead splashes. Make the fan like on the BT tank.
4. Gases collect at the top of the turret, which reflects on the crew's health. There were cases of CO poisoning. It is necessary to put a fan at the top of the turret next to the periscope.
5. The air, due to gunpowder gases, high temperature, sweat, and other causes, is difficult to breathe. The tank should be equipped with chemically filtered breathing tubes.
6. The suspension is not protected from the outside.
7. The tank is hit frequently. The turret and hull armour should be streamlined.
8. The turret attachment is insufficiently rigid. There were several cases of turrets falling off.
9. Loss of tracks. The suspension cannot keep up with the mobility required from a tank. Sharp turns cause the track to slip off, and you cannot function without sharp turns on the battlefield.
10. Many cases of rubber tires flying off the road wheels.
11. There were cases when shells jammed hatches. In the event that the tank caught fire, the crews could not exit the tank, and burned up.
12. It is hard to see out of the tank. Several old variants of tanks have no observation ports at all in the turret, and existing ones are insufficient for full observation.
13. Tanks burn strongly due to gasoline, rubber bandages, and frequent painting due to holidays and inspections from important commanders. When painting tanks, remove the old layer, and do not paint over it.
14. There is a dead zone where the enemy is immune to the tank's weapons. The enemy could climb on the tank, hit it with crowbars, loosen the gun, destroy instruments and devices, pour gasoline on it, and set it on fire. It is necessary to have high explosive rounds in all tanks. Provide pistol ports for the driver on the sides.
15. The battery is placed in the tank poorly, and impedes observation and the use of pistol ports.
16. The tank moves slowly through swamps and gets stuck frequently. 
17. The driver sees the enemy in front of him, but cannot fire at him.
18. The front plate of the tank is vulnerable. There were many tanks with frontal penetrations. The front of the tank must be sharp.
19. Commanders' tanks are distinct from others. In battle, the enemy fires at those tanks first.
20. It isn't possible to replace the 1st and 2nd cylinder sparkplugs on the move, as the frame is too close to them.
21. The ventilation hatch can fit a grenade through it. There were cases where this happened.
22. Shells penetrate armour frequently. The following armour is vulnerable: front horizontal, driver's hatch, hull and turret walls.
23. There is nowhere to urinate during battle.
24. There is nothing the crew can use to fight fires.
25. Heat in the tank leads to high consumption of drinking water.
26. There were cases where the enemy could freely place a grenade in the rear compartment.
27. There is a periscope for observation, but it is inconvenient to use during battle.

BT vehicle

1. The front part of the tank is hit with shells frequently.
2. The tank has a hard time traversing swamps.
3. The driver cannot fire.
4. The hatches are circular, and you cannot use them to take cover when leaving the tank.

Otherwise, the vehicle has the same problems as the T-26.

Overall notes

1. Drivers are unprepared to drive with hatches closed, observe from the turret, use terrain for cover, and approach the enemy stealthily.
2. The brake signal must be on at all time when moving at night.
3. Tanks should help each other in battle. If a tank loses a track, another tank must cover the crew. If samurai climb up on the tank, another must destroy them with the machinegun. Everyone must feel that his comrades will not abandon him in trouble. 
4. Company command trucks should be armoured, as they have to follow the tank until the attack, and sometimes during the attack. When the vehicle breaks down, it should be towed to cover and repaired. The trucks should match the brand of trucks in the company. 
5. When evacuating a tank, it is desirable to hook on the tank without leaving the engineering vehicle. Add a hatch next to the tow hook.
6. Outline markings, especially white ones, make it easier for the enemy to aim at the tank.
7. Move from wood fired field kitchens to gas kitchens, as it is difficult to find firewood.
8. Practice evacuation of a damaged tank from the battlefield.
9. In order to evacuate damaged tanks, have vehicles with Komintern tractor winches. The off-road performance of this vehicle must be better than the tank's.
10. Wheeled vehicles should not supply tanks with ammunition, fuel, or other supplies. It is necessary to have tracked armoured transports, preferably short ones, so that they may move unnoticed. Fuel vehicles should have nozzles to fuel up five tanks simultaneously, and each must have a self-evacuation device.
11. Add a hatch in the bottom of all tanks to gain access to components that require periodic lubrication.

Composed by participant in the Hasan lake battles, engineer Starkov

February 26th, 1939

One copy printed on March 15th, 1939"

Cheating at Statistics 6: Broken Tigers, Broken Hearts

I usually wouldn't post a Hero of the Soviet Union award order (otherwise I would have no time to post anything else), but this one is special. Vladimir Zelmanovich Vaisser managed to score a Hero of the Soviet Union and an Order of the Patriotic War, First Class in one battle, so it deserves further investigation.

"T-34 tank commander Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser, while defending the Chepovichi station on December 19th, 1943, demonstrated bravery and heroism. In an ambush, he allowed enemy tanks to approach, then opened fire. With precise shots, he destroyed two enemy tanks. The enemy attempted to flank the ambush, but comrade Vaisser expertly predicted the enemy's movements and ordered to move to a previously readied position, from which he destroyed a Panther tank and up to a platoon of soldiers and officers. The enemy's attempt to capture the station failed.

Guards Junior Lieutenant Veisser destroyed 3 enemy tanks and up to 50 fascists. He is worthy of a government award: Order of the Patriotic War, First Class.

2nd Tank Battalion commander, Captain Korolev"

Next day, the Germans came back, and Vaisser was not as lucky.

"T-34 tank commander, Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser demonstrated the greatest courage, heroism, and bravery in defense of the Chepovichi station.

40 Tiger and Panther tanks from the SS division "Adolf Hitler", with infantry support, attempted to take the Chernovichi railroad station in order to continue an offensive at Kiev. Comrade Vaisser's company stood in the station's defense.

"Fight to the last breath, but do not give up the station - this was the brigade commander's order," said Vaisser to his crew, as they opened precise fire at the enemy. Two shells knocked out a Panther, but an enemy shell set the hero's tank on fire. Comrade Vaisser personally left his tank, put the fire out, and continued the uneven battle. Another tank and APC with infantry was destroyed. The enemy concentrated powerful fire on the Junior Lieutenant's tank, and it was hit and set on fire again. The driver and machinegunner/radio operator were heavily injured. Comrade Vaisser and his turret commander [loader] jumped out of the tank, put out the fire with snow and their coats, dragged the wounded out, tended to their wounds, and climbed into their tank once more. 

Comrade Vaisser's powerful tank was no longer able to move, but the gun was operational, and the heroic commander fought on. A Tiger and a Panther were knocked out, but the immobile tank was a target, and the enemy knew this. Powerful fire from enemy SPGs destroyed the tank and set it on fire, wounding the turret commander. Guards Junior Lieutenant Vaisser was killed and burned up with the tank. 

The heroic battle of the brave tanker comrade Vaisser inspired all tankers to bravely carry out their order. The enemy took heavy losses and was beaten back. The station was not given up. Two days later our units, having worn out the enemy, moved in for an attack, continuing their success in the Novograd-Volynskiy direction. Guard Junior Lieutenant Vaisser is worthy of the highest government award, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of the 111st Tank Novograd-Volynskiy tank brigade, Colonel Granovskiy"

Schneider confirms how devastating this attack was for the Germans.

"19 December 1943. Seven operational tanks start an attack at 0900 hours on Meleni. Afterwards they advance across the railroad line Kiev-Korosten in the direction of Baljarka. One T-34 and several anti-tank guns are knocked out, and one Tiger is knocked out. Total tanks: 23

20 December 1943: The railroad station of Tschepowitschi is captured, several enemy tanks are knocked out. Three Tigers operational with twenty in for repairs. SS-Hauptsturmfurer Kling is recommended for the Knight's Cross, but the recommendation is not approved."

Ugh, that German transliteration. Nevertheless, the Germans admit to 20 Tiger losses (of course they were recovered, so it doesn't count!) but claim that they took the station. Let's see who's right.

Tigers from the 13th Company of the 1st SS "Adolf Hitler"

Oh look, it's the Tigers we were looking for! Surrounded by Red Armymen. Oops. Looks like someone is stretching the definition of repairs again. Let's see what happens to these Tigers later.

"21 December 1943: An enemy attack on the railroad station is beaten back; several enemy tanks are knocked out. Two Tigers are operational.

...

24 December 1943: ..."Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" is pulled from the line and marches south. Seven disabled Tigers have to be blown up near Tschepowitschi."

Oh, there they are! Hmm, I thought you had recovered them. Perhaps the ones that had to blow them up were the Soviets. With their tank guns. Several days earlier. Incidentally, 7 Tigers is the total Soviet kill claim for December 20th. Lines up quite nicely, no?

Panther Ausf. A #316 from the 1st SS Tank Division, destroyed in early 1944 in the Ukraine

Panthers! Panthers not mentioned in the combat diary. I guess they couldn't be bothered. Good thing Vaisser's commanders were more thorough. Incidentally, not all German combat diaries are so dismissive of their lighter tanks. 2nd SS honestly admits that they had 4 Panthers and 6 PzIVs in the area supporting their 5 working Tigers, but similarly does not report their loss.

On to the claim that the Germans took the railroad station. Usually, the diaries are full of exact (if suspect) numbers of enemy tanks destroyed, but on December 20th and 21st, the Germans report the destruction of "several" enemy tanks. If they kept the battlefield, should they not have been able to count more precisely? Indeed, Schneider's diaries is the only place that I could find that mentions the Germans keeping the station. All other sources, including the Museum of Combat Glory of the 25th Tank Corps, claim differently.

No wonder Kling didn't get his medal, I am surprised he was recommended for doing such a shoddy job. Here are the stylish tanks of the 25th "Broken Hearts" Tank Corps that pounded his face in.

"Broken heart" insignia, summer 1943.

"Broken heart" insignia, winter 1943-1944.

As you can see, a regular T-34, not even a T-34-85, is a deadly enemy for Tigers and Panthers.

T-50's Ancestor

All is fair in love and war, and that includes intellectual property. Parts of that one PzIII that was tested went to the Kirov factory, which made good use of them.

"To the Chief of the 3rd BTU Department, Military Engineer 1st grade, comrade Afonin

In response to your letter #144353s from January 21st, 1941, we respond that in design and production of the T-50 object, experience from the PzIII was used in the following components.

Position of the crew and armament in the turret.
As in the PzIII tank, the T-50's commander is positioned in the rear of the turret, behind the brass catcher. In order to provide circular vision, the turret had a special commander's cupola, 240 mm tall, equipped with 7 (8 in the initial batch) prismatic observation devices, covered with armour. The use of these devices instead of the triplex on the PzIII greatly improves the commander's safety.

As on the PzIII, the T-50's 45 mm gun has two coaxial machineguns. In order to reduce the size of the turret and increase the resistance of the front of the tank against shells, the T-50, unlike the PzIII, cannot aim these machineguns independently.

Additionally, the following components are installed with the PzIII as an example:

1. Three-coloured light indicators leading from the commander to the driver.
2. Indicator for gun moving past the sides of the tank.
3. Mobile lightbulb with electromagnet.
4. Individual fasteners in the ammunition racks and tools bin.

As for the transmission, despite its interesting design, neither its layout nor individual components were used on the T-50. The T-50's requirements list a rear drive wheel. As for the individual transmissions, they are of great interest. However, due to a limited amount of time allotted to design and construction of the T-50, the factory could not apply these components.

All engineers, testers, and researchers of the factory have familiarized themselves with the vehicle. A number of components, such as the spare gearbox, spare engine, and hydraulic shock absorber were disassembled and sketched. A number of components have been photographed.

Several engine parts were used in the design of a new engine at our factory.

Chief factory engineer, Zakosenko

Deputy chief designer, Ginzburg.

April 10th, 1941"

CAMD RF 38-11355-298

Importance of Height

Ask yourself, what factors are most important in an anti-tank gun? Is it penetration? Rate of fire? Those are important, but if you want your gun to last for more than a few seconds after its first shot, you need to consider two more: mobility and concealablility. As the following photograph illustrates, the FlaK 36 may have had plenty of the former two characteristics, but its lack of the latter two made it a poor anti-tank weapon.

Reports from Guderian's 4th Tank Division confirm this conjecture:

"Combat with Russian tanks using 8.8 cm AA guns and 10 cm guns is insufficient. Both guns are clumsy compared to tanks, and are usually detected, targeted, and destroyed before they can reach their positions. In only one engagement between Orel and Mtsensk, two 8.8 cm guns and one 10 cm gun, all heavy guns available for defense, were detected and destroyed. These guns are as big as a barn door, and present a very large and easy target"
A. Ulanov, D. Shein, First T-34s, p. 161

Edit: I found a better picture, but it's marked with a reflection instead of a watermark. 

KV-3 in Evacuation

As the Germans drew closer to Leningrad in the summer of 1941, belongings of the Kirov factory began being evacuated to Chelyabinsk. One of those was a partially completed KV-3.

"Order #47 of the Kirov Factory, from June 30th, 1941

Based on the order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production, I order that:

1. Department #1 chief must arrange the delivery of technical documentation regarding the object KV-3 and delivery of the prototype, parts, and instruments to ChTZ.
2. The Chief Engineer of department #1, comrade Kotin, must send all Object 222 blueprints, copies, technical requirements, and calculations. Due date: July 3rd, 1941.
3. Chiefs of Mh-1, Mh-2, Mh-3, Mh-4, Mh-6, and SB-2 must send all technical documentation on its production as of July 1st, and assemble a full description of the package, as well as devices, special instruments, parts, and assembled components in our possession. Due date: July 9th, 1941.
4. KTO Chief comrade Rohlin, OSL Chief comrade Lepin, OTsL Chief comrade Arsenyev, and TsMK Chief comrade Kulichkin must send all technical documentation, technological processes, technical requirements, blueprints, stamps, models, and all thermally conditioned stamps, models, and parts. Due date: July 9th, 1941.
5. Department #1 Chief Lantzberd and KTO Chief Rohlin must send the following comrades to ChTZ in order to enable the production of KV-3s.
1. Chief technologist of Department #1, Kabardino
2. Deputy chief engineer, Duhov
3. Senior machinist, Pavlov
4. PTB-1 senior engineer, Zilberg
5. PTB-1 senior engineer, Mirkin
6. OTK MH-2 chief, Salakin
7. OTK MH-2 senior technologist, Sokolov
8. MH-2 designer, Ilyin
9. MH-4 senior technologist, Mayorov
10. TB [text rubbed out] chief, Kalugin
11. SB-2 senior master, Zhukovskiy
12. SKB-2 designers, Merenkov, Schneidman, Burhanov, Shashmurin, Skvortsov, Petuh, and Sobolev
6. SB-2 Chief (Abramov) and OP-2 Chief (Nosov) should take the KV-3 vehicle hull, put the V-2-SN engine in (take it off the 220 vehicle) and send it to ChTZ on July 7th. Send the system and optics to ChTZ, do not wait for the turret to arrive.

Factory director Zaltsmann"

Kubinka

The Kubinka tank museum is home to not only a large number of rare (and sometimes unique) exhibits, but a large amount of them are fully equipped and in working order. This has been the goal of the museum since its inception. Here are the conclusions of a commission regarding some unique exhibits from April 1st, 1941.

"T-100 #810.

Condition:

1. The vehicle is completely unprepared for storage. All transmission, motor, turret, and electric components are covered in rust.
2. The vehicle is stored on pallets. Tracks and rims of road wheels are covered in rust.

Commission conclusions: perform technical inspection #3 and keep in the museum.

T-100Y #1352

Condition:

1. Fighting compartment, gun, engine, and transmission parts are covered in rust.
2.  The vehicle is not stored on pallets, and is not prepared for long term storage.

Commission conclusions: perform technical inspection #3 and transfer to the Artillery Directorate.

T-29

Condition:

1. The rubber tires on five road wheels have come off.
2. Most track links are damaged.
3. The left front frame is missing the roller nut.
4. The vehicle arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.

Commission conclusions: keep in the museum.

T-46

Condition:

1. The turret is not fully equipped. There are no ball mounts in the turret, protective cups for the PT-1, right turret hatch, gun port caps, gun mantlet, frame, or periscope glass.
2. The crew seats and electric turret motor are missing.
3. The vehicle arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.

Commission conclusions: re-equip the vehicle and keep in the museum.

T-111

Condition: 

1. The vehicle is fully equipped, arrived from the factory recently, is completely painted, and in a satisfactory condition.

Commission conclusions: keep in the museum.

SU-14 #23547

Condition:

1. Currently being repaired at the workshop, needs repairs for both side friction clutches, main friction clutch, and technical inspection #3. It is being prepared for trials.

Commission conclusions: return to Artillery Directorate upon completion of trials.

Ricardo #15200

Condition:

1. The right half-turret is in pieces, has been removed from its place and kept in the bay.
2. The gun is missing, and the gun carrier on the left is missing.
3. The artillery crew seats are missing.
4. The leather from seats and cushions in the driver's compartment is missing.
5. Both magnetos and all sparkplugs are missing, wires are torn throughout the vehicle.
6. The track has frozen into the ice, the vehicle is rusted inside and outside, and not painted.

Commission conclusions: re-equip the vehicle, correct defects, and keep in the museum.

Vickers 12-ton

Condition:

1. 4 sockets and ball mounts are missing from the fighting compartment.
2. The gun and mantlet are missing.
3. The lever cap for the engine grille is missing.
4. The vehicle was not placed on a pallet, the tracks have frozen into the ice. Oil is pooling under the engine.
5. The vehicle is clean and in a satisfactory condition.

Commission conclusion: re-equip the vehicle and keep in the museum."

CAMD RF 38-11355-12

The "Ricardo" vehicle mentioned is a British MkV, one of the initial exhibits at the museum. The sparkplugs from that tank were stolen in early 2000s and sold to a Western collector. Such a shame they weren't originals.

Here's the story of another exhibit. See if you can guess what it was.

"To the deputy chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces HQ, Guards Major-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Markov

On the issue of: obtaining a transport for the transportation of the SU-380 to the NIBT proving grounds.

One 380 mm self-propelled howitzer on the Tiger-H hull was discovered at Kirchmeiser's factory (Germany). The deputy chief of the Armoured and Motorized Group of the Soviet Occupation Force in Germany, Guards Engineer-Colonel comrade Karpenko responded to the inquiry from the GBTU chief, stating that the SU-380 will be sent to the NIBT proving grounds after receiving transport.

Since it is imperative that the SPG be delivered to the proving grounds urgently, I ask for you to order the allotment of one railroad platform for the transport of the SU-380 to the NIBT proving grounds (Kubinka railroad station, West railroad).

USA BTU KA Chief, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Forces, Demyanenko"
CAMD RF 38-11369-709

The SPG in question, is, of course, the Sturmtiger. 

Soviet Stabilizers

"Minutes of the meeting of the Scientific-Technical Committee of the RKKA UMM, February 12th, 1930

Present:

NTK chair, comrade Ozerov

5th Section chair, comrade Keller

Engineer, comrade Norenberg

From NTK AU, comrade Saks

Meeting chair: Ozerov

Secretary: Keller

On the topic of: engineer Norenberg's proposal of a servo-gyroscopic device for tank gun stabilization

Conclusions:

1. First, build an (experimental) stabilizer for the 37 mm gun, as well as stabilize the turret horizontally with a servo-gyroscopic device.
   In the vertical plane, stabilize the gun relative to the turret, without correcting oscillations parallel to the firing axis, such as tilting. The device must allow the gunner to move the gun with his own force, without lag from the stabilization equipment. 
2. Engineer Norenberg must provide overall draft blueprints by March 1st, 1930.
3. Ask NTK AU and NTK UMM to develop preliminary Technical Specifications.
4. 5th Section of the NTK UMM should familiarize engineer Norenberg with the nature of tank oscillations.
5. Propose to engineer Norenberg to provide an overall diagram and dimensional blueprints of the gun stabilizer devices.

Signatures."

Look at that, bi-planar stabilization, in 1930! Sadly, I have not seen anything on more stabilizers for the MS-1, but this is far from the last time gun stabilizers appear in Soviet documents.

The idea of a turret stabilizer appears once more in 1939, for the BT-7, in a list of experimental developments at factory #185. In that same year, a stabilizer is proposed for the T-28's gun. Stabilizers were also proposed for the IS tank (and were actually built for the IS-5, although I am unsure about others). 

More stabilizers are mentioned in CAMD RF 38-11369-1.

"3. Work on stabilizing tank weapons.

In tank combat, aside from shooting from a stationary position, a tank must fire on the move. The conditions of firing on the move had to be as close as possible to the conditions of firing while stationary, from the point of view of accuracy, rate of fire, and convenience of loading. 

In order to solve this task, SKB NKSP, according to GOKO decree #3826 from July 28th, 1943, began designing and manufacturing experimental gun stabilizers for medium tanks in July of 1943, according to technical-tactical requirements from USA GBTU.

The design of domestic stabilizers took into account the experience with American gun stabilizers. However, domestic stabilizers work on a completely different principle, as they are based on the idea of forceful stabilization. This provides our stabilizers with higher precision than American indicator stabilizers.

The following gun systems were equipped with stabilizers: 76 mm American gun on the M4-A4 tank, 76 mm F-34 gun on the T-34, and the 85 mm S-53 gun on the T-34-85. The  latter designs corrected the deficiencies of the former.

Currently, according to GOKO degre #6896s from November 7th, 1944, a trial run of 5 T-34 tanks with STP-S-53 stabilizers are being prepared for trials."

While I haven't read anything about the Soviet Sherman stabilizer, the stabilizers for the T-34 (STP-34) and T-34-85 (STP-S-53) are more widely known. I do not have a photograph or a description of the STP-34, but I do have them for the STP-S-53. Since they were designed and built at the same time, it is likely they operated on the same principles.

STP-S-53 stabilizer in a T-34-85 tank

1. Hydraulic cylinder 2. Oil tank 3. Hydraulic pump 4. Electric motor 5. Damping gyroscope 6. Force gyroscope 7. Vertical aiming flywheel 8. Stabilizer switch 9. Hydraulics switch 10. GKZ-T modulator

Solyankin et al describe this device in their book "Domestic Armoured Vehicles, 20th century, volume 2". Skipping over the technical minutiae, let's go straight to the conclusions: "Trials showed good results. Conditions of firing on the move were close to conditions of firing from a stationary position. The stabilizer eased the task of vertical aiming, and the automatic firing mechanism reduced the shell's lag time, further decreasing vertical dispersion."

Up-Armoured BTs in the Far East

In a previous article, I briefly mentioned a BT-7 with additional armour. Not many details were available at the time, but Yuri Pasholok found some.

"Results of trials of the BT-7 tank with armour screens, over the period of March 18-28, 1944

The trials were performed on a BT-7 #0189-2 from the 203rd Tank Brigade with screens, radio, and a small link track. The tank's engine worked for 28 hours and 27 minutes since the last major repairs.

The armour screens made the tank heavier by 1.5 tons. The tank was tested with 100% of its combat loadout and 3 crewmen. The route and conditions of trials are listed in the trials journal, which is attached.

The trials were performed over 843 km (380 km on a highway, 463 on a dirt road, off-road, and on obstacles). The engine worked for 33 hours and 10 minutes.

As a result of trials, it was discovered that:

1. There is enough fuel in the main tanks to travel 322 km without refueling.
2. Due to the increased weight of the tank, it moves after 500-600 revolutions of the engine at first gear (earlier, 400 revolutions). On dirt roads of unsatisfactory quality, the front of the tank shakes significantly in the vertical plane, which makes controlling the tank difficult and limits the speed of movement. It is possible to move at 8-12 kph in first or second gear in the medium usage mode.
3. After two hours of nonstop motion and a total 120 km march over 5 hours with two stops (for inspection), the temperature of the engine and transmission components is normal.
4. At a speed of under 30 kph, engine RPM of less than 1650, and the unit mass of KB-70 gasoline at 0.765, and external temperature of -10 degrees, an average of 33.8 kg of gasoline is used in an hour.
   Lubrication of parts was performed using the standard table of lubrication for a BT-7 tank, and provides normal operation of all tank components.
5. The increased weight does not affect the turret turning mechanism significantly. At a tilt of 25 degrees, the mechanism still allows for normal rates of turning, and allows for firing on the move.
6. The increased weight does not impede the ability of the BT to overcome obstacles.
7. An external inspection and inspection of the disassembled transmission and suspension components revealed that they were completely functional. (See the post-trials technical inspection act).

Conclusions:

1. Trials of the BT-7 tank with additional armour screens shows that the BT-7's combat and technical characteristics are not harmed. A screened BT-7 is a viable vehicle, and usable in combat in the Far East theater.
2. Due to the tank's increased weight, it is necessary to increase the norm of gasoline consumption from 28 kg per hour to 30 kg per hour."

CAMD RF 38-11355-2586