World of Tanks: Today in History: Happy Birthday, T-34

Experience in the Spanish Civil War demonstrated that the era of tanks with bulletproof armour has come to an end. These tanks were a perfect target for light and fast-firing anti-tank guns. Engineers were tasked with making a tank with shell-proof armour.

In 1937-1938, Kharkov factory #183 worked on the A-20 covertible drive tank project, armed with a 45 mm cannon. At the same time, the engineers worked on another project on their own initiative: a tracked vehicle with thicker armour, indexed A-32. It was to be equipped with a 76 mm gun and a V-2 diesel engine.

The engineers managed to prove to the army that the A-32 has promise, despite the latter's preference for the convertible drive. The tracked vehicle had better off-road performance, the diesel engine was more fuel efficient and, at least in theory, more reliable than the gasoline engine. The armament was also better than on the A-20. After government trials in 1939, the tank was renamed T-32, its armour was strengthened, and it was equipped with a 76 mm L-10 gun.

In September of 1939, the T-32, among others, was presented to a government commission which included K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan, and A. Zhdanov, among others. The vehicle was driven by N. Nosik. The tank performed well. On December 19th, 1939, the Committee of Defense in the Council of People's Commissars announced decree #443, which accepted the T-34 (the new official name of the tank) into service with the RKKA.

Aside from acceptance into service, decree #443 listed changes to the design. The army wanted better visibility, 45 mm armour, and replacement of the L-10 with a cheaper and better designed F-32. Two prototypes of the T-34 were to be built by January 15th, 1940.

A great and difficult journey awaited the T-34. The vehicle was contraversial and far from ideal, as was any tank in WWII. For us, it will always be a tank of victory, a symbol and legend of the RKKA armoured force.

Original article available here.

From Tank to Infantry

"Mechanic-driver of the 2nd tank battalion of the 10th tank brigade, Junior Sergeant Alexey Savvich Bulba

1. Year of birth: 1921
2. Nationality: Ukrainian
3. Social position: Student
4. Party affiliation: VLKSM member
5. In RKKA since: 1940
6. Participated in the civil war: fighting German fascism
7. Wounds and concussions: none
8. Prior award recommendations, if any: none
9. Prior awards and commendations, if any: none.

Brief summary of personal heroic deed in combat:

From the very start of the Great Patriotic War, BT tank driver comrade Bulba showed courage, as a true son of the great Russian people. He drove into battle in his menacing vehicle many times.

Comrade Bulba performed his heroic deed in battle for the Volobuyevka settlement. The Germans considered Volobuyevka an impenetrable fortress. 

Driver Bulba drove his tank along with his unit. As he approached the outskirts of the village, he saw that one of the houses was a reinforced hardpoint. He alerted the tank commander, and decided to ram through the side of the building. After a strong impact, the vehicle penetrated turret-deep into the house, but was shot, and caught fire. Comrade Bulba opened the hatch, and shot three soldiers point blank. The rest panicked and fled. Comrade Bulba left the house and joined the infantry escort. With a rifle in hand, he continued pursuing the fleeing enemy. In this battle, comrade Bulba's tank destroyed 2 machine guns and up to 40 enemy infantrymen.

In combat for Peremoga, comrade Bulba once more courageously drove his tank into battle, and destroyed up to 35 enemy soldiers and officers. After his tank was damaged by an enemy shell, he managed to recover it from the battlefield. He is worthy of a government award, the Order of the Red Banner."

MS-1 Restoration

A while ago, I posted an article on the history of the MS-1, which mentioned that MS-1 tanks that exist today, survived as "legless" bunkers. Therefore, they no longer had original suspensions. Various MS-1s that are installed as monuments had their suspensions rebuilt, with mixed results. A reminder: the original suspension of the MS-1 looks like this.

LiveJournal user bf_109e took a photo of the following MS-1 in Vladivostok.

Well, uh, at least they tried. The garish green colour is, sadly, seen on a number of other monument tanks. The suspension is not even remotely similar to the original. Closer inspection reveals that it does not even have road wheels, only what appears to be a stamped metal bit with round ends. This MS-1 isn't going anywhere any time soon. The gun also suffered the restoration process (few MS-1 bunkers retained their original guns).

LJ user kamikadze1993 posted pictures of three MS-1s in Khabarovsk. The first one isn't that bad.

The number of shock absorbers and road wheels is correct. Something that appears to be torsion bars was added, but surely we can overlook such a minor detail, especially since the gun is a lot more reasonable and the colour isn't hideous.

Kind of primitive, but better than the first one! At least this one actually has wheels.

Aaaaahhh! What is this? And they couldn't even bother to put some sheet metal where the track covers used to be? How terrible. Although, maybe I can start some rumours of a Christie suspension MS-1...

But it only gets worse! This one is in an actual museum, at the Lenino-Snegiryev museum in Istra. 

The suspension isn't the worst so far, but some, er, liberties were taken with the rest of the tank. The cannon is where the machine guns should be and the commander's cupola looks like a pot.

And here is a unique example of an MS-1 in working order. This one is located in the Kubinka tank museum, and its suspension looks pretty decent.

The vehicle was found in parts, so it's hard to judge its condition, but the deficiency in the suspension is obvious even when the tank is not moving. The middle shock absorber is missing, and the road wheels are connected to a horizontal bar. This is even more obvious when the vehicle is in motion: not all of the road wheels rotate very well.

Mix and Match

The Soviet practice of making monuments out of military surplus is quite widespread. In nearly every town, no matter how small, there will be some kind of monument to the fighting that took place there, with a cannon or a tank. However, sometimes the tank on the monument is a mix and match of tank parts, some of which don't even belong on the same tank. For example, a photograph of a tank at Parfino (credit to LiveJournal user wadimych):

While a casual passerby might see nothing but a tank, an expert would swiftly detect an anomaly. Why, that's clearly a KV-1S turret on a KV-1 hull! What are they trying to pull here? However, upon further inspection, the plot thickens.

A German AT gunner made his mark here, with a shell that managed to strike the hull and turret, before bouncing off harmlessly. This means that this tank, as a whole, saw combat. But how could this be? The answer, as always, lies in the archives.

RGASPI 644-2-102

"Comrade Stalin

Comrade Molotov

By the order of the GKO, the Kirov factory has been producing KV-1S tanks that weigh 41.5-42 tons with improved components since August.

Due to the higher T-34 production quotas and cessation of shipments from factory #264 (Stalingrad), it was decided to increase the production of T-34 hulls at Uralmash and transfer the production of KV hulls to factory #200.

In September, factory #200 increased KV hull production nearly twofold. In order to match the plan, factory #200 needs to produce twice as many hulls in October as it did in September. 

Despite measures that were taken, the production is behind schedule. 

In order to meet the production quotas for KV tanks in October, I ask of you to allow the use of KV hulls with side armour thickness of 75 mm.

The GOKO decree is attached.

People's Commissar of Tank Manufacturing, I. Zaltsmann."

RGASPI 644-2-102

"The State Committee of Defense decrees that the Kirov factory is allowed to produce 100 KV tanks with thickened side armour (75 mm) to meet October quotas.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, Molotov"

In total, 70 of these hybrids were produced. 8 were sent to the 9th Guards Regiment at Kubinka, 16 to the 10th Guards Regiment at Kosterovo, 3 to the Ulyanov academy, 34 to the 12th Guards Regiment at Noginsk, 9 to the ZKU, and 7 to the Amoured Car and Tank Center at Lubertsy. The serial numbers of these vehicles are available in CAMD RF 38-11355-887, "Notice of accepted and sent KV-1S tanks with heavy KV-1 hulls".

IS-4 Start to Finish

The IS tank, released in 1943, had 120 mm of front armour, compared to its predecessor's 75, in roughly the same configuration. However, while the KV's 75 mm rendered it nearly invincible against all modern anti-tank guns, the IS did not have such luxury. Work on an IS tank with superior armour began during that same year.

"K" Heavy Tank, a precursor project to the IS-4.

CAMD RF 38-11355-2189

The above is a fragment of the blueprints of the first Object 701, with a clear date: December 1943. Sadly, Kirov factory must have been short on paper, as they used the backs of early 701 blueprints for scrap in 1944. 

Object 701 was a lofty goal indeed. It was designed to be impenetrable to the most powerful anti-tank guns of the day, the D-25 and KwK 43. As we've seen from a previous article, the tank eventually achieved that objective. However, early prototypes of the hull had a couple of weaknesses.

CAMD RF 38-11355-2411

"Photo #20. Penetration of the spherical cover of the TSh-17 sight with 88 mm armour piercing shells. Penetration of the driver's observation device with 88 mm shells.

Due to the spherical shape of the sight cover, a hit at a perpendicular angle, and therefore penetration, is possible at various angles. The rolled roof of the tank can be penetrated by 88 mm shells (see photo #19).

The cover of the driver's observation device can be penetrated by 88 mm shells (see photo #20). The factory used 8S steel, which cannot be properly conditioned when over 75 mm thick. Kirov factory representatives insist that use of this grade of steel was unavoidable.

The turret platform roof is penetrated by the shockwave of an HE-fragmentation 122 mm shell."

Well, the tank is mostly protected. Can't penetrate the upper glacis (shot 59 barely dents it), but the weak spots require a redesign. Let's look at how the rear armour fared.

CAMD RF 38-11355-2411

"Photo #9. Intact connections between the rear hull sides and hull rear, as well as the upper rear plate and lower rear plate after concentrated fire by 75 and 88 mm guns armour piercing shells."

Impressive! The guns cannot even penetrate the rear armour of the tank. The sides, however...

CAMD RF 38-11355-2411

"Photo #10. Rear side hull separated from the front side hull after welding seam was destroyed."

A lucky hit to the welding seam can penetrate the hull side, otherwise it performs very well. The tank's armour proves worthy, but the design of the hull needs some work. 

That was Object 701 #1. Objects 701 #2 and #3 had improved welding seams and higher hardening of the turret armour. The test results greatly improved as well: "The armour of the Object 701 tank provides complete protection from 75 and 88 mm shells with muzzle velocity of up to 1000 m/s at any distance, in an arc of +/- 60 degrees from the front of the hull and +/- 30 degrees from the front of the turret." As a result of these trials, the hull and turret designs of the Object 701 were accepted. Object 701 #5 and #6 later had the front plate increased to 140 mm to counter potential 105 and 128 mm guns.

The drivetrain needed some work, though. Object 701 #4 received an improved transmission, which was further improved in #5 and #6 prototypes.

As for the armament, the gun was the same old D-25 that has proven itself against the toughest German armour. 

"According to your requests, the Chebarkul GAU proving grounds tested the 122 mm tank gun model 1943 (D-25) in the new heavy tank (object 701), developed by the Kirov factory, between May 11th and 15th of 1945. 

In total, 403 shots were fired. The trials established that:

1. The precision of the gun at 500, 1000, and 2000 meters is satisfactory.
2. The angle of incidence of AP and HE shells is the same, -2.9 minutes, nearly identical to the calculated angle (-3 minutes).
3. The practical rate of fire is 2-3 RPM, and peak is 3-4 RPM.
   The main complaints in the process of trials were about the fighting compartment equipment and gun installation.
1. The three propellant casing holder on the right side of the turret is impeded by the signal flare box and machine gun ammunition box.
2. The elevation mechanism carrier was crooked.

After the removal of the above deficiencies, especially after increasing the robustness of the elevation mechanism carrier, trials as to be repeated.

The 122 mm tank gun trialled in May of 1945 was produced in April-May of 1944. After that, the gun was substantially modified and improved. Most importantly, the gun's semi-automatics were improved, removing the possibility of breaking the breech opening roller pin. All other downsides of the gun can be explained by quality of production

Deputy chair of the AK GAU KA, Major-General of the Artillery Engineering Service, Zhevanik"

One of the modifications to the gun in that time must have been Kotin's loading assistance device, which increased the peak rate of fire on the IS-2 to 6 rounds per minute. 

However, May 1945 marked the defeat of Germany. Fighting the Japanese would not require a powerful new tank, and it was unclear what it would be used for, if anything. Engineers and equipment was needed for peacetime duties. Here are some excerpts from a Kirov factory report for the first quarter of 1946.

"All the best and most precise equipment was moved from tank-building plants to tractor building plants.

...

The remaining equipment is from before the War, and did not have proper service since then, and therefore, 40% of it requires medium or major repairs. 

...

The best tank engineers, plant managers, technologists, foremen, and highly qualified employees were transferred to tractor production. For example: out of 212 tank engineers, 112 remained by January 1st, 1945, and 66 remain as of January 1st, 1946. The 146 employees were transferred to other positions, including managers and production line foremen.

The remaining 66 engineers perform the following duties. 16 engineers develop new objects, while 50 of the less qualified engineers work on Object 701 and production of the IS-3 tank. 

This is insufficient for preparation of the 701st for production. The number must be increased to 100 engineers. 

...

There used to be 470 controllers and 7839 employees in the 11 tank building plants as of June 1st, 1945. These numbers are now reduced to 5 plants, 198 controllers, and 3358 employees. 

The employees are new, and had to familiarize themselves with the new technologies in April-May, leading to lower quality of joints and installations of IS-3 components. "

CAMD RF 38-11355-3130

The IS-4 was cancelled after production of just over 250 units. The heavily armoured sluggish behemoth of old was incompatible with the modern maneuverable war, especially with the looming threat of nuclear escalation. 

Factory #174 Experiments

"I report that in order to complete the request of Marshal Kulik on the production of SPGs, I received and transferred to the Chief Engineer of the factory, Military Engineer 1st class comrade Ginsburg, the following:

1. 37 mm automatic AA gun model 1939 (ZiK-37) - 2
2. 76 mm tank gun model 1927/32 (KT-28) - 1
3. Blueprints for the ZiK-37 and KT-28.
4. Dimensional samples of ammunition for the KT-28 gun and 57 mm ZiS-4 gun.

Additionally, ANIOP transferred one T-34 tank with a 57 mm ZiS-4 gun to factory #174.

I received requirements for a 76 mm SPG, a 57 mm AT SPG, and a 37 mm AA SPG. In order to complete the design, I still require the following:

1. 76 mm AA gun model 1938 (4K)
2. Blueprints of the 4K AA gun.
3. Dimensional samples of ammunition for the 37 mm AA gun model 1939 (ZiK-37)

[Handwritten:] On the 3rd point, UVZA will send blueprints. On the 1st and 2nd point, UVZA knows nothing about that.

ANIOP gave us a T-34 without a TMFD telescopic sight for the ZiS-4 gun. 

Currently, the Chief Engineer has distributed tasks for design of SPGs to his subordinates, but the work is in the beginning stages. Meanwhile the due date for returning the T-34 (June 15th) has already passed. 

I ask to give an order to transfer the above items to the factory and extend the time for using the T-34 tank.

At the same time, I wish to know if there is a formal contract for the production of these SPGs, or if the factory agreed to fulfil Marshal Kulik's request without a contract.

Military representative UVNA GAU KA, Military engineer third class, Erofeev

June 15th, 1941"

CAMD RF 81-12104-112

Nothing too unusual in terms of SPG designs, but the T-34 with a 57 mm ZiS-4 is more interesting. It is unlikely that this is one of the 14 tanks identified in the article, therefore the amount of these vehicles increases to 15.

SG-122

In late 1942, SU-122s and SU-76es entered production. However, as it often happens, not enough vehicles were produced to meet the army's needs. The need for a 76 mm SPG was solved with the SU-76I. In case of a medium SPG armed with a 122 mm howitzer, the military was luckier. Work on a StuG III with a 122 mm howitzer began earlier that year.

"To the chief of the repairs directorate of ABTU KA, brigade engineer Sosenkov
Copy to factory #592 director Pankratov

In accordance with the decision of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces comrade Fedorenko on the re-armament of captured StuGs with model 1938 122 mm howitzers at factory #592, I ask you to arrange for four repaired StuGs to be delivered to factory #592. In order for work to proceed without delay, the first StuG should be received by April 25th.

April 13th, 1942
Chairman of the technical council, E. Satel"

The vehicle was indexed Self-Propelled Howitzer SG-122 (StuG) (Samohodnaya Gaubitsa SG-122 (Artshturm)), more commonly called just SG-122 and sometimes SU-122/T-3. The crew consisted of a driver, a commander, two loaders, and a gunner. As with many pre-war Soviet indirect fire guns, the M-30 had vertical and horizontal traverse controls on opposite sides of the gun, forcing the commander to aim horizontally, and the gunner to aim vertically. One of the loaders also performed the job of a radio operator.

The vehicle was armed with a 122 mm model 1938 howitzer (M-30). Much like the SU-76I, the SG-122 was protected with up to 45 mm of armour. The majority of the vehicle's insides remained the same. The radio was moved from the left side to the right, into a special addition to the vehicle's hull. External gas tanks were added to increase the vehicle's operational range.

SG-122(A), first prototype.

SG-122(A), first prototype, cutaway, showing maximum gun elevation.

SG-122(A), first prototype, top view, cutaway.

After trials in September, the following deficiencies in the design were discovered:

1. Insufficient off-road performance on soft terrain, and high pressure on front road wheels.
2. High pressure on the commander, due to also performing the duties of a gunner.
3. Insufficient operational range.
4. Difficulty in using gun ports due the position of the ammo rack.
5. Insufficient robustness of casemate armour plates.
6. Rapid buildup of gases in the fighting compartment. 

Two new prototypes were built on the PzIII chassis to resolve these issues. The vehicle was lightened by using 35 mm armour plates instead of 45 mm, and was equipped with wider winter tracks. The commander and gunner switched places, with the commander now performing horizontal aiming. Front hatches were removed to increase protection. The commander was also given an improver periscope and panoramic sight. The gun ports were replaced with those of superior design from the SU-76I. Their size allowed not only the use of the Nagant revolver, but any small arms used by the Red Army. The rate of fire was increased (according to Svirin, to a very rapid 7-8 RPM) by adding a loading tray. Large and awkward gun shields were replaced with an improved mantlet, more capable of protecting the weapon from bullets and shrapnel. An exhaust fan directly above the gun helped vent gases after firing.  

SG-122, improved prototype, front view, cutaway.

They were tested at the Gorohovets proving grounds shortly after the SU-122 decree, on December 5th. The SU-35 (SU-122) participated in these trials as well. Based on trial results, orders for the SG-122 were cancelled. Only 21 of these vehicles were produced. It is unknown how many used PzIII hulls and how many used StuG hulls, but M. Svirin writes that 8 StuG hulls were used for conversion into SU-76Is and SG-122s.

Actual combat use was complicated by a lack of spare parts and the use of a captured radio, which operated on a different range of frequencies than Soviet ones. In February of 1943, all existing vehicles were transferred to training units.

One experimental vehicle was produced using the PzIV chassis, indexed SU-122/T-4.

Information and images retrieved from Battlefield.ru, Solyankin et al, Domestic Armoured Vehicles of the 20th Century, Volume 2, Exprint, 2005 and M. Svirin, SturmGeshuetz III Assault Gun, Zeughaus, 2007

Seasoned Veteran

CAMD RF 38-11355-745

"On April 6th, 1942, a commission consisting of GAU KA military acceptance representative military technician 2nd class Ivanov, REU GABTU KA military acceptance representative military technician 2nd class Petrov, and representative of the Stalingrad Tractor Factory repair plant #5 comrade Dzyuba, composed this act on the inspection of T-34 vehicle #513491, which arrived from the South-Western Front for repairs at STZ.

1. L-11 gun #606: the rifling, chamber, and external unpainted parts are completely covered in rust. The breech stopper is missing. The instrument and parts kit is missing. The assembly needs cleaning. 
2. The coaxial machinegun is functional, needs cleaning. The instrument and parts kit is missing.
3. Various devices and the second machinegun are missing.
4. 18 DT disk magazines are present, that need cleaning. 
5. Documents on the armament are missing.

This concludes the current act.

Military technician 2nd grade Ivanov

Military technician 2nd grade Petrov

Dzyuba"

This T-34 certainly has seen some sights. The L-11 indicates that it's a model 1940, which ceased production in March of 1941, and were mostly lost in the first months of the war, or upgraded. To date, no T-34 model 1940s have been found.

End of the SU-76

"Decree of the State Committee of Defense #3530ss, June 6 7, 1943
Moscow, Kremlin

On SU-76 SPGs

The State Committee of Defense decrees that SU-76 SPGs, designed by comrade Ginzburg of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production, and accepted by GOKO decree #2559 on December 2nd, 1942, turned out to be of unsatisfactory quality. Furthermore, the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) did not carry out trials with due diligence before accepting the SU-76 for production.

The modifications proposed by the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev), confirmed by GOKO decree #3184ss on April 14th, 1943, did not result in serious improvements and did not increase the quality of the SU-76 to satisfactory levels, which also suggests that the NKTP and GAU KA trials were executed poorly.

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:

1. Production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38 must cease immediately.
2. The People's Commissar of Tank Production, comrade Zaltsmann, must be made aware of his mistakes regarding production of SU-76 SPGs at factory #38.
   The designer of the SU-76 SPG, comrade Ginzburg, must be removed from work at the NKTP, and not allowed to participate in NKTP projects further. He is to be transferred to the NKO for assignment to less critical work in the Acting Army.
   The chief of GAU KA, comrade Yakovlev, must increase the amount of control and responsibility for all experimental work on armoured vehicles, paying special attention to members of trial commissions.
   The NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must find and punish guilty workers in the NKTP and GAU KA, which carelessly performed trials of the SU-76 SPG.
3. The NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and factory #38 (comrade Yakovlev) must:
1. Produce spare parts for the SU-76 SPG and T-70 tank according to attachment #1.
2. Install, by July 15th, 1943, on all SU-76 SPGs in the armed forces, flexible couplings, additional friction clutches, reinforced idler carriers, and improved track spring stops.
   In order to complete these tasks, send factory #38 brigades into the field.
4. The NKO (comrade Fedorenko) must, by June 30th, 1943, present the People's Commissar of Defense with his plan regarding continued use of SU-76 SPGs produced prior to June 1st, 1943, by factory #38.
5. The Commander of the Armoured Vehicle and Tank Forces of the Red Army (comrade Fedorenko), along with the GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must complete trials of new 76 mm SPGs produced by factory #38. During trials, pay special attention to reliability of main assemblies.
6. After the completion of trials, the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and NKO (comrade Fedorenko) must provide the GOKO with a conclusion on the possibility of accepting a new 76 mm SPG into service in the Red Army by July 5th.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense.

I. Stalin."

RGASPI 644-2-178

You should all know what happens next. The SU-15 and SU-16 take to the proving grounds in June, and the SU-15 goes on to become the SU-76M, the most successful light SPG used by any army of WWII.

SU-76 and SU-122 Production

This is quite a wide-reaching decree, dealing with three tanks: the rise of the SU-35 (SU-122) and SU-12 (SU-76), and the end of the T-70, as the SU-76 was replacing it as a cheap infantry support method. Also, it lists the large (very, very large) amount of steps and people involved in manufacturing a new tank.

"State Committee of Defense Decree #2559ss

December 2nd, 1942
Moscow, Kremlin

On the production of SPGs at the Uralmash factory and factory #38

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:

1. NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) must arrange for:
1. Beginning of production of self propelled SU-35 guns on the T-34 chassis with 122 mm M-30 howitzers at the Uralmash factory. 
2. Beginning of production of the SU-12 SPGs on the T-70 chassis with the 76 mm ZiS-3 gun, and removal the T-70 from production at factory #38 (city of Kirov).
2. Establish the following production schedules for the T-34 and T-70 tanks, and SU-35 and SU-12 SPGs.
1. Uralmash
1. T-34
1. December 1942: 100
2. January 1943: 100
3. February 1943: 110
4. March 1943: 135
2. SU-35
1. December 1942: 25
2. January 1943: 100
3. February 1943: 100
4. March 1943: 100
2. Factory #38
1. T-70
1. December 1942: 200
2. January 1st, 1943: remove the T-70 from production
2. SU-12
1. December 1942: 25
2. January 1943: 150
3. February 1943: 200
4. March 1943: 300
3. Establish the following schedules for production of tank hulls in December of 1942:
1. Uralmash: T-34 hulls: 650
2. Uralmash: SU-35 hulls: 35
3. Factory #38: T-70 hulls: 120
4. Allow the NKTP (comrade Zaltsmann) and factory directors (comrade Muzrukov from Uralmash and comrade Yakovlev from factory #38) to arrange production of 125 SU-35s and 175 SU-12s based on prototype blueprints.
5. GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must confirm the blueprints at the end of trials for mass production of the SPG.
6. The People's Commissar of Medium Machinery (comrade Akopov) must ensure that factory #38 produces the following spread out evenly over 5-day periods:
1. GAZ-202 engines with a shielded 12-volt electrical network and a gearbox for the SU-12 in the following amounts:
1. December 1942: 120
2. January 1943: 340
3. February 1943: 460
4. March 1943: 600
2. Supply factory #38 with hot and cold stampings, cast gray and malleable iron in the amounts negotiated for the T-70, as well as cold stampings and malleable iron components for the new SU-12, from the Gorkiy factory.
3. Produce for factory #38, and deliver evenly over month-long periods, the following, according to factory #38 and NKTP specifications.
1. 200 devices
2. 100 stamps for cold stamping
3. 300 special cutting tools
7. People's Commissariat of Armament (comrade Ustinov) and GAU KA (comrade Yakovlev) must ensure the supply of M-30 howitzers, ZiS-3 guns, and optics for them, completely suitable for mounting in an SPG, and matching the technical specifications of the Uralmash and #38 factories, in the following amounts:
1. M-30
1. Before December 15th, 1942: 25
2. Before December 20th, 1942: 30
3. January 1943: 100
4. February 1943: 100
5. March 1943: 100
2. ZiS-3
1. December 1942: 75
2. January 1943: 175
3. February 1943: 250
4. March 1943: 300
8. The People's Commissariat of Rubber Production (comrade Mitrohin) must provide rubber for road wheels and deliver it in accordance with goals set by the NKTP.
9. The People's Commissariat of Electric Plants (comrade Shimerin) must set a daily limit for factory #38: 3500 kW for December 1942, and 4000 kW for the first quarter of 1943.
10. The People's Commissariat of Tool Production (comrade Efremov) must produce 20 special assembly tools for factory #38 in the first quarter of 1943, for production of road wheels, balancers, winches, and torsion bars, billed to the NKTP.
11. The People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals (comrade Tevrosyan) must provide armour plates for SPGs according to special instructions and dimensions given by Uralmash and factory #38, billed to the NKTP.
12. The People's Commissariat of Heavy Machinery (comrade Kazakov) must provide 18000 cubic meters of oxygen to Uralmash per day.
13. The Chief of Military Production in the USSR Council of Commissars (comrade Shapiro) must produce a proving grounds at factory #38 by February 1st, 1943 for SPGs.
14. The Kirov regional committee must provide land for factory #38's proving grounds.
15. The People's Commissariat of Finance (comrade Zverev) must issue 5 million roubles from the reserve funds of the USSR Council of Commissars for the preparations for production of SPGs in December of 1942 and first quarter of 1943.
16. The Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Workforce in the USSR Council of Commissars (comrade Shvernik), the Kirov regional committee (comrade Ivolgin) and Kirov regional party committee (comrade Lukyanov) must:
1. Mobilize 1000 women before February 1st, 1943, for factory #38 from the surrounding region.
2. Issue 4000 square meters of living space to factory #38, obtained by increasing density.
17. NKPS (comrade Hrulev) must issue a cargo train to factory #38 on the North-Pechorskiy line for the first quarter of 1943.
18. Comrades Saburov, Malyshev and Zaltsmann, must, as soon as possible, present GOKO with a proposal for new production resources for the T-70 tank to replace factory #38, considering the availability of grounds of the Mytishi train factory (factory #592) and elements of factory #8.
19. Consider points 3 and 4 of GOKO decree #2429ss from October 19th, 1942, to be superseded by the current decree, and order NKTP and NKSM to cease production of 45 mm and 37 mm SPGs. 
20. Uralmash director and chief engineer, comrades Murzukov and Umnyagin, as well as director and chief engineer of factory #38, comrades Yakovlev and Terentyev must know that GOKO tasks them with a special responsibility of completing this decree on time.
21. The control of fulfilment of this decree is given to comrade Petrosyants.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense

I. Stalin."

RGASPI 644-2-113

Ultimately, neither vehicle went on to become very successful. The SU-76 ceased production in 1943 due to poor reliability, replaced by the SU-76M. The SU-122 was replaced with the SU-85 in 1943 as well. As for the T-70, no additional production resources were found, and its production also ceased in 1943.