Showing posts with label Lake Hasan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lake Hasan. Show all posts

Monday, 24 June 2024

Experience in the Far East

Soviet tanks and SPGs during the Battle of Lake Hasan and its impact on Soviet tank development

Battle is the main stimulus for development of tank armament and protection. No matter how much technology evolves during peace, only war will give a proper measure of its effectiveness. A conflict where tanks was used could be analyzed to show where to go from here. Even small conflicts like the Rif War yielded valuable experience for its combatants.

T-26 crews near Lake Hasan, summer 1938.

Soviet tanks first saw battle in the fall of 1929 during the East China Railroad Conflict. The experience gained there was minimal. Spain was a much better lesson, as Soviet T-26 and BT tanks were used fairly intensively. Experience in using the T-26 in late 1936 and early 1937 in Spain gave a lot of material for Soviet tank designers. Other local conflicts were also valuable. For instance, the events at Lake Hasan that erupted 85 years ago were the first time where the Red Army used its tanks and SPGs against a peer enemy.

Tuesday, 9 August 2016

Tanks at Lake Hasan: Technical Improvements

"Independent complaints and suggestions by commanders and soldiers after the battle.
  1. On improving tank designs
    1. Have identical looking tanks, either antennas on all of them or none of them, otherwise the enemy aims to knock out commanders' tanks first.
    2. Redesign the T-26 suspension, as the tracks slip off often. Increase the size of the track teeth, increase the diameter of the road wheels, affix the rubber tires. Reduce the tank's ground pressure by widening the tracks. Convert the ventilator to move the air parallel to the tank, with ventilation in the turret to avoid concentration of gases and reduce heat. Add observation slits with triplex glass in the rear of the turret and in the turret roof.
    3. Set the front of the tank hull at an angle, improve the effective armour, improve its quality. Make the turret aerodynamic. Make the floor of the tank thicker.
    4. Make reverse grilles for the oil radiator so it cannot be destroyed by a bayonet or a pickax.
    5. Introduce a side hatch near the driver for crew evacuation.
    6. Add pistol ports next to the driver and a machinegun for the driver.
    7. Increase the gun depression angle, as it was not always possible to fire while hull down.
    8. The turret mounting is insufficient. There were cases where turrets fell off. Improve the turret mount.
    9. Angle the vertical armour.
    10. Strengthen and improve the hatch latches.
    11. The tank needs to have a set amount of hand grenades.

Monday, 8 August 2016

Tanks at Lake Hasan: Tactics

"
  1. In battles for the Socialist Motherland, our tankers fearlessly and bravely went into battle, demonstrating bravery, courage, tenacity, and dedication to the Party and Motherland until their death. There was not one case where tankers faltered in battle. Crews that were trapped in a hopeless situation fired upon the enemy until their end, struck the samurai down with their fire, and died in their burning or knocked out tank, but did not surrender.
  2. In battle for Zaozernaya hill, the tanks showed their power and high combat quality. The Japanese fear of our tanks was demonstrated in the fact that all enemy firepower was directed against them: all artillery fired at tanks, all AT guns, all infantry, and finally, samurai charges at tanks by tank destroyer teams. The Japanese hated and feared tanks, opened artillery fire at individual tankers the moment they saw anyone in blue overalls.

Friday, 24 April 2015

World of Tanks History Section: Tanks in the Far East

Chaos reigned in the Far East in the 1920 and 1930s. China was a quilt of hostile states. Japan was eyeing continental territories, resulting in a full scale war. Great Britain attempted to participate in the conflict, which complicated affairs. In short, there was a rich potential for tank warfare.

Dramatis Personae

The USSR and Japan were the only ones who could really brag about their tanks in the region. The Chinese armies had a miserly amount of armoured vehicles, which could not influence the situation significantly.

Soviet MS-1s were typical infantry support tanks: slow, with anti-bullet armour. T-26es and BT tanks with 45 mm guns that appeared later were significantly superior.

Japanese light 7.5 ton Type 95 Ha-Go tanks were armed with a 37 mm gun and a machinegun. Their armour was also made to withstand bullets. These tanks were sufficient against Chinese armour, but not as effective against the Soviets. In 1937, the medium Chi-Ha tank appeared, which was more powerful, but still only adequate by local standards.

Tank battles in the Far East were pretty similar to those in colonial wars: the tanks were few in number, and mostly opposed by infantry, cavalry and artillery. The only conflicts that don't match this pattern are the battles at Lake Hasan and Khalkin-Gol.

All for One and One for All

The use of tanks in the Far East once again proved that tanks need a well refined mechanism for cooperation with other types of forces. Without them, the effectiveness of tanks is limited. For instance, the initial battles for Jalainur station on the Far-Eastern Railroad saw the use of 10 MS-1 tanks. Initially, the tanks fought alone, as the infantry was not too eager to support them. As a result, the Soviet offensive lost its tempo and the Chinese fortified region was not taken swiftly.

On the next day, November 18th, MS-1 tanks fought in platoons of three, assisted by infantry. This worked. Tanks allowed Soviet horse-drawn batteries to pull up and fire on pillboxes at a point-blank range, and infantry could sneak up and pelt them with grenades. The results speak for themselves: the Soviets lost 7 tanks (all due to technical problems) and 200 men, the Chinese lost ten times as many, with over 8500 captured.

The Japanese used a curious tactic in China. When assaulting cities protected by strong walls, tanks went first, suppressing external defenders while infantry caught up. When infantry broke into the city, tanks went ahead once more and suppressed the remaining resistance. This tactic worked since the Chinese had few anti-tank weapons. When crossing rivers or channels, tanks were used as immobile batteries, firing from stationary positions. In some cases, they were used to cut off railroads or pursue fleeing enemies.

Fall of the Samurai

The 1938 border conflict at Lake Hasan in Primorskiy Krai and 1939 conflict at the Khalkin-Gol river in Mongolia was the first where the number of tanks used reached into the hundreds. 285 Soviet tanks fought at Hasan, including the new BT-7s, and nearly 600 tanks fought at Khalkin-Gol.

The Japanese treated the Lake Hasan conflict as recce in force. They wanted to check the how ready the USSR was for interference into the Sino-Japanese war and to evaluate the capabilities of the Red Army. Several infantry battalions supported by small numbers of artillery took two border heights: Bezymyannaya and Ozernaya. After several days of fierce combat, the heights were retaken.

After the clash, commanders wrote about the need for careful reconnaissance and observation of terrain where tanks were going to fight. It was not performed at Hasan, leading to heavy losses among T-26 and BT-7 trapped in a narrow path between mountains and swamps. Again, cooperation between tanks and other forces was weak.

The Khalkin-Gol conflict began with the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo making a claim on some Mongolian territory. Soon, these tensions escalated into a war that lasted several months.

The Red Army had a year to work on mistakes made at Lake Hasan, but in practice, the saying "measure twice, cut once" was forgotten by commanders eager to attack. Experience on how to properly cooperate between tanks, artillery, and infantry had to be obtained in battle once again.

However, Khalkin-Gol confirmed that tank units are perfectly prepared for mobile actions. The Soviet 11th Tank Brigade performed a long march in their BT-7s before attacking the enemy. Few vehicles fell behind due to technical reasons on this march. Tanks, especially flamethrower variants, were very useful when suppressing machinegun nests. The result was once again a Soviet victory.

The successes of the Red Army in the Far East were costly, but resulted in valuable experience. The most important thing was that two victories over Japan became a hefty argument for keeping the latter out of the war between the USSR and Germany which loomed over the horizon.

Article authors: Evgeniy Belash and Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here. 

Tuesday, 29 July 2014

World of Tanks: Today in History: Conflict at Lake Hasan

On July 29th, 1938, an armed conflict erupted between the USSR and Japan at Lake Hasan.

In 1932, Japanese forces occupied Manchuria (North-East China) and formed the Manchukuo puppet state. This triggered a round of border skirmishes. However, they were only a prelude to widespread military action.

As a pretence for the invasion of the USSR, Japan issued a territorial claim. The Japanese claimed a number of peaks in the region of Lake Hasan and Tumannaya (Tumen) river. On July 15th, 1938, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Mamoru Shigemitsu, handed a note to the Soviet government demanding the withdrawal of troops from the contested regions. In response, Soviet diplomats offered a map and documents of the Hunchun Treaty, signed between Russian and China in 1886, marking the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya peaks as Soviet territory.

However, Japanese military circles burned with the desire to test its northern neighbour. On July 20th, the ambassador made a repeat claim which was also declined. The Japanese government prepared three infantry divisions (15th, 19th, and 20th), one cavalry regiment, three machinegun battalions, individual tank units (up to a battalion in number), an AA artillery unit, three armoured trains, and 70 airplanes. 15 ships (1 cruiser and 14 minelayers) and 15 armoured boats were positioned at the entrance to the Tumen river. However, the only direct participant was the 19th infantry division, reinforced with machineguns and artillery.

The first blow was aimed at small numbers of Soviet border forces, which offered heroic resistance, but were unable to hold Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya peaks after July 30th. The difficult terrain forced Soviet command to send its units into battle very gradually. The main opponent of the Japanese became the 39th infantry corps, composed of the 32nd and 40th infantry regiments, and the 2nd mechanized brigade, which had more than 300 T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, as well as SU-5 SPGs.

As a result of active battles lasting until August 11th, Soviet forces destroyed the Japanese 19th division and pushed them past the border. Peace talks confirmed that the proper state of the border was in accordance with existing documents provided by the Soviet side.

The Red Army lost 960 men, and a further 2752 were wounded, with 527 sick. The Japanese lost 650, with 2500 wounded, according to Soviet estimates.

A year after, a movie titled "Tractor Drivers" hit Soviet screens, featuring the song "Three Tankers" that was inspired by events in the Far East, which later became the unofficial anthem of the Soviet tank forces.

Furrowed clouds blow over the border
The harsh land is enveloped in silence
On the high shores of the Amur
Defenders of the Motherland stand

A robust shield from the enemy stands there
There it stands, brave and strong
Near our far eastern borders
An armoured shock battalion

They live, as this song tells
An inseparable friendly family
Three tankers, three joyous friends
A fighting vehicle crew
(Song fragment)

Original article available here.

Sunday, 16 March 2014

Hasan Tank Combat


"Notes on known defects and deficiencies of our tanks and recommendations on their correction

T-26 vehicle
  1. The oil radiator can be reached by an enemy that can pierce it with a bayonet. It should be covered with rotating overlapping armour plates.
  2. Old tanks can't lock their driver's hatch. There were cases where the enemy could open it and kill the crew. We have many tanks like this.
  3. You can't use the fan, as it increases the possibility of the crew being harmed by bullets and lead splashes. Make the fan like on the BT tank.
  4. Gases collect at the top of the turret, which reflects on the crew's health. There were cases of CO poisoning. It is necessary to put a fan at the top of the turret next to the periscope.
  5. The air, due to gunpowder gases, high temperature, sweat, and other causes, is difficult to breathe. The tank should be equipped with chemically filtered breathing tubes.
  6. The suspension is not protected from the outside.
  7. The tank is hit frequently. The turret and hull armour should be streamlined.
  8. The turret attachment is insufficiently rigid. There were several cases of turrets falling off.
  9. Loss of tracks. The suspension cannot keep up with the mobility required from a tank. Sharp turns cause the track to slip off, and you cannot function without sharp turns on the battlefield.
  10. Many cases of rubber tires flying off the road wheels.
  11. There were cases when shells jammed hatches. In the event that the tank caught fire, the crews could not exit the tank, and burned up.
  12. It is hard to see out of the tank. Several old variants of tanks have no observation ports at all in the turret, and existing ones are insufficient for full observation.
  13. Tanks burn strongly due to gasoline, rubber bandages, and frequent painting due to holidays and inspections from important commanders. When painting tanks, remove the old layer, and do not paint over it.
  14. There is a dead zone where the enemy is immune to the tank's weapons. The enemy could climb on the tank, hit it with crowbars, loosen the gun, destroy instruments and devices, pour gasoline on it, and set it on fire. It is necessary to have high explosive rounds in all tanks. Provide pistol ports for the driver on the sides.
  15. The battery is placed in the tank poorly, and impedes observation and the use of pistol ports.
  16. The tank moves slowly through swamps and gets stuck frequently. 
  17. The driver sees the enemy in front of him, but cannot fire at him.
  18. The front plate of the tank is vulnerable. There were many tanks with frontal penetrations. The front of the tank must be sharp.
  19. Commanders' tanks are distinct from others. In battle, the enemy fires at those tanks first.
  20. It isn't possible to replace the 1st and 2nd cylinder sparkplugs on the move, as the frame is too close to them.
  21. The ventilation hatch can fit a grenade through it. There were cases where this happened.
  22. Shells penetrate armour frequently. The following armour is vulnerable: front horizontal, driver's hatch, hull and turret walls.
  23. There is nowhere to urinate during battle.
  24. There is nothing the crew can use to fight fires.
  25. Heat in the tank leads to high consumption of drinking water.
  26. There were cases where the enemy could freely place a grenade in the rear compartment.
  27. There is a periscope for observation, but it is inconvenient to use during battle.
BT vehicle
  1. The front part of the tank is hit with shells frequently.
  2. The tank has a hard time traversing swamps.
  3. The driver cannot fire.
  4. The hatches are circular, and you cannot use them to take cover when leaving the tank.
Otherwise, the vehicle has the same problems as the T-26.

Overall notes
  1. Drivers are unprepared to drive with hatches closed, observe from the turret, use terrain for cover, and approach the enemy stealthily.
  2. The brake signal must be on at all time when moving at night.
  3. Tanks should help each other in battle. If a tank loses a track, another tank must cover the crew. If samurai climb up on the tank, another must destroy them with the machinegun. Everyone must feel that his comrades will not abandon him in trouble. 
  4. Company command trucks should be armoured, as they have to follow the tank until the attack, and sometimes during the attack. When the vehicle breaks down, it should be towed to cover and repaired. The trucks should match the brand of trucks in the company. 
  5. When evacuating a tank, it is desirable to hook on the tank without leaving the engineering vehicle. Add a hatch next to the tow hook.
  6. Outline markings, especially white ones, make it easier for the enemy to aim at the tank.
  7. Move from wood fired field kitchens to gas kitchens, as it is difficult to find firewood.
  8. Practice evacuation of a damaged tank from the battlefield.
  9. In order to evacuate damaged tanks, have vehicles with Komintern tractor winches. The off-road performance of this vehicle must be better than the tank's.
  10. Wheeled vehicles should not supply tanks with ammunition, fuel, or other supplies. It is necessary to have tracked armoured transports, preferably short ones, so that they may move unnoticed. Fuel vehicles should have nozzles to fuel up five tanks simultaneously, and each must have a self-evacuation device.
  11. Add a hatch in the bottom of all tanks to gain access to components that require periodic lubrication.
Composed by participant in the Hasan lake battles, engineer Starkov
February 26th, 1939
One copy printed on March 15th, 1939"


Friday, 7 June 2013

World of Tanks History Section: Conflict on the Khalkin-Gol River

1. Preamble

In July of 1927, Japan published a “Political program on relations with China”. This document declared that Manchuria and Mongolia are of special interest to the land of the rising sun. Literally days later, General Tanaka handed the Japanese Emperor a memorandum, which announced, without any diplomatic ambiguity: “In order to conquer China, we need to conquer Mongolia and Manchuria. In order to conquer the world, we need to conquer China.”

A necessary and important step of these militaristic aspirations was the military defeat of the USSR. However, during the late 20s, the small country was not ready for such a conflict. Japan decided to limit itself to occupation of Manchuria.

At this time, a young officer class was formed from former rural and urban minor bourgeoisie. These men were militaristically minded, and considered the government's foreign policy insufficiently decisive. They themselves had decisiveness to spare, and a number of coups and political assassinations were attempted by these young officers since 1930. Terror and propaganda grew the military mood in Japan. In September 1931, the invasion of Manchuria began.

By March 1st, 1932, the occupation of Manchuria was complete. It was replaced with the state of Manchukuo, formally led by the Emperor Puyi. Realistically, the Emperor had no power. The country entirely followed the political directions of the Land of the Rising Sun. An ambassador had the power to veto any decision of the marionette Emperor.

Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan presented a claim to the USSR on territories next to lake Hasan and river Tumannaya. From 1934 to 1938, the border was violated 231 times by the Japanese, where 35 of these incursions led to serious battles. The Japanese government demanded twice, on July 9th and 20th, that the USSR leave disputed territories. The demands were rejected, and, on July 29th, Japan attacked Soviet forces. Despite committing a series of regrettable mistakes, the Red Army achieved a decisive victory.

The defeat at lake Hasan damaged the reputation of the Japanese army. The military controlling the country could not allow this to happen. Before the echoes of the last shot fell silent, Tokyo was already preparing a new offensive, even greater in scale.

A victorious campaign was necessary for Japan, and not only to heal its bruised ego. In 1936, the Soviet Union signed a pact of mutual aid with the People's Republic of Mongolia. In accordance with this pact, Mongolia provided a base for the 57th special corps of the RKKA, a large group of Soviet forces, consisting of more than 30 000 soldiers, 265 tanks, 280 armoured cars, 107 airplanes, and a large amount of auxiliary vehicles and artillery. The Japanese were building a railroad close to the border with Mongolia, and this neighbour made them very unhappy. Additionally, the USSR provided military aid to China, which Japan also wanted to conquer.

2. The Conflict Begins

Japan had time to develop two plans of attack, but did not have time to execute either. The war started in May of 1939, and not in the early 1940s as the Japanese commanders had hoped.

In its infancy, the conflict at Halkin-Gol was identical to the conflict at Lake Hasan, but this time Japan's demands were made to Mongolia, and not the USSR. Technically, the demands were made by the government of Manchukuo, but, as stated above, Manchukuo did not have the ability to make their own political decisions. Effectively, Tokyo demanded that the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia be moved to the river of Khalkin-Gol, even though all documents listed the border 20-25 kilometers east of there. Mongolia's objections, and documents placing the border correctly were ignored. Military incursions began, like on Hasan, but on a much larger scale. In 1938, Japanese soldiers crossed the border in small groups, but Mongolia saw crossings of up to a battalion at a time. The conflict practically already started, but war was not declared.

May 11th, 1939, is considered the start of the resistance at Khalkin-Gol. On that day, 300 Japanese soldiers, supported by 7 armoured cars, attacked a Mongolian border patrol near Nomon-Han-Burd-Obo. After killing about 20 patrolling soldiers, the attackers crossed to the eastern bank of Khalkin-Gol.

The Japanese air force began combat operations on May 14th, commanded by the ace Marimoto . Border observation points and airports were attacked from the air. Under the cover of the air force, the Kwantung army swiftly reinforced the attacking forces. Everything was planned perfectly. Barracks and warehouses on Manchuria's territory were built far in advance.

3. The Situation Develops

Upon receiving the news of the location of the enemy forces, the command of the 57th Corps ordered to strengthen the border of the People's Republic of Mongolia. By May 29th, the forward detachments of the 9th motorized brigade reached the region. The tanks traveled 700 km by themselves, which, at the time, was a very impressive feat. The border was also reinforced by the 149th infantry regiment. Despite all this, the Japanese forces had an advantage over the Mongolian and Soviet forces combined: 2.5 times as many soldiers, and 6 times as many armoured cars. The Soviet Union had a tank advantage: 186 tanks versus Japan's 130.

Early morning on May 28th, Japan began a massive offensive. Their goal was the encirclement and destruction of Soviet and Mongolian forces east of the Khalkin-Gol river. The attack was supported by 40 bombers, attacking river crossings and the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Fierce battle raged all day. The Japanese managed to push back a Mongolian cavalry detachment and Senior Lieutenant Bykov's squad, aiding them in the defense. Soviet forces retreated to the delta of Khailastyn-Gol. The Japanese could not complete the encirclement. While trying to cross the river, the Japanese took heavy losses from Lieutenant Bakhtin's artillery battery. The attack stalled. A map was captured, showing the locations of Japanese forces. Additionally, the map marked the disputed territory as Manchurian.

By May 29th, the battle has not calmed. RKKA and Mongolian forces began a counterattack, with the support of two artillery divisions. By the evening, the Japanese were thrown back two kilometers from the river. Japan lost 400 soldiers and officers, and numerous trophies were taken.

The first battles showed that there were not enough forces at Halkin-Gol to push back the attack. Reinforcements were sent: a Soviet tank brigade, 3 motorized brigades, a motorized infantry division, a heavy artillery division, a Mongolian cavalry division and over 100 fighter planes.

June did not see many land battles, but a major air battle broke out. While the Soviets and Japanese fought for the skies, the commander of the 57th Special Corps was replaced. Instead of N. F. Feklenko, whose actions were deemed insufficiently decisive, a future legend, G. K. Zhukov, took command.

4. Final Round

By July, Japanese command developed a plan for further action, titled “Second stage of the nomonhan incident”. This plan consisted of a strong push by the right flank of the Japanese forces to encircle and destroy Soviet-Mongolian forces. Lieutenant-General Kamatsubara, the commander of the Japanese forces, wrote that the morale of the enemy is low, and the time for the crushing blow has come.

The Japanese advance began on July 2nd. After an artillery barrage, infantry and tanks under the command of General Yasuoki went into battle first. The Japanese sent 80 tanks into battle, forcing back Soviet forces on the south-west.

On the night between July 2nd and 3rd, General Kobayasi's second group forded Halkin-Gol and took the Bain-Tsagan mountain. This location allowed the Japanese to deliver a strike to the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian defensive line. Seeing the hazardous situation, Zhukov sent in his mobile reserves. Without scouts or infantry escort, the 11th tank brigade went into battle straight from the march. They were supported by Mongolian armoured cars and aircraft.

The Soviet tanks, accompanies by all available artillery and aircraft, shook the Japanese lines. They did not have enough time to entrench, but defended with all their strength. With their artillery, 15 Soviet tanks were knocked out. Without infantry support, it was very difficult for the tanks to fight. Only towards the middle of the day did the 24th Infantry Regiment join them in battle. Tanks and infantry, despite fierce resistance, moved up. The Japanese were partially encircled and were forced up to the top of the mountain. All Japanese forces that managed to cross the river were trapped. 400 tanks, 800 artillery pieces, and several hundred aircraft were in battle from both sides.

At 1500 hours on July 5th, the Japanese broke their lines and fled across the river. Due to the premature demolition of the bridge by Japanese sappers, many soldiers and officers drowned trying to cross. Only the two meter depth of Halkin-Gol prevented tank forces from pursuing the enemy.

Zhukov's decision to attack was initially met with many complaints and protests, but was later accepted as the only reasonable action in that situation. After their defeat at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese never attempted to cross Halkin-Gol again.

Zhukov started preparing for an attack. The 57th Corps was expanded into the 1st Army Group under the command of G. M. Shtern. New tank brigades and infantry divisions joined in. At the beginning of the attack, the RKKA possessed 57 000 troops, over 500 artillery guns and mortars, 498 tanks, and 516 airplanes.

The Japanese also gathered forces, planning to attack on August 24th. Simultaneously with collecting forces for an attack, they started construction of defensive emplacements.

On August 20th, Soviet forces started their attack, beating the Japanese by 4 days. The strike was so sudden, that it took an hour for Japanese artillery to open fire. Japanese command could not establish where the Soviets were attacking from. It was considered that the attack was evenly spaced out along the front, where in reality, the southern forces were responsible for the main push. This mistake by Japanese commanders led to a well defended center, but weak flanks. As a result, on August 26th, 1939, Soviet forces entirely encircled the Japanese 6th Army. Attempts to break the encirclement failed.

On August 28th, the assault of the last line of defense at Remizov's Height began. At that time, the Japanese had no artillery left, only machineguns and mortars. Approximately 400 Japanese soldiers were killed trying to break out at night.

By the morning of August 31st, Mongolia had no Japanese forces remaining on its territory. After that, the battle on the land ended, and the battle in the air began. But even here, Japan was not successful, taking out 14 Soviet planes at the cost of 70 of their own. Accepting their defeat, Japan requested a ceasefire, which was signed on September 15th, 1939.

The most important consequence of the victory at Khalkin-Gol was that Japan never attacked the USSR during WWII. Even Hitler's demands did not sway them. This defeat also led to a government crisis in Japan.

It is worth mentioning that the victory of Soviet forces left an optimistic impression of the preparedness of the Red Army for war, for which a great price was paid in 1941. Regardless, the triumph of Soviet forces at Khalkin-Gol deserved the respect and pride of their descendants.

Original article available here.

Wednesday, 13 March 2013

World of Tanks History Section: T-26


In 1929, the Red Army decided that the current armament of the RKKA does not meet the requirements of modern war. An independent solution of this problem was not possible at the time. Soviet engineers lacked experience, and the manufacturing base was weak. The only solution was to rely on foreign expertise.

In 1930, a delegation from the Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the RKKA, led by Innokentiy Halepskiy, bought a number of vehicles abroad, including tanks. One of these tanks was the British Vickers Mark E, more commonly known as "6-ton Vickers".

The British army was not interested in any modification of this tank. Not because the tank was bad. Military minds of Foggy Albion, let's just say, had an excessively creative approach to tank design. The 6-ton Vickers did not fit in their doctrine. The developers had to focus on marketing this tank externally.

The USSR purchased the two turret variant, armed with machine guns. These were named V-26, and did not cause much excitement in tank specialists. However, on January 8th, 1931, RKKA high command was introduced to the Vickers. They were in awe of the agility of this new tank, the ease with which they nearly flew across the proving grounds, leaped over trenches, and spun in place. The next day, Voroshilov ordered an immediate inquiry into the possibility of producing the V-26 domestically. A commission, led by S. Ginzburg, reported that the optimal solution would be to produce a "hybrid" vehicle, with some parts from the original replaced with those currently being developed for the T-19 tank. However, initial production started with no changes. Intelligence reported that Poland was ready to mass produce the 6-ton Vickers for its own army. These reports did not exactly correspond to reality, but orders are orders. The Vickers started production under the index T-26.

Manufacturing the T-26 was the job of the Bolshevik factory in Leningrad. The factory was loaded with other orders, but there was no other choice. The Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk factories were still being built. The head of production, and all further modernization, was the same S. Ginzburg.

Following the best traditions of the administrative bureaucracy, the initial order was for an incredibly unrealistic 500 T-26es by the end of 1931. Almost immediately, the order was reduced to 300, which was equally optimistic. The first half of 1931 was spend converting all blueprints to metric, prepare the manufacturing base, and create pre-production samples. This first stage was strictly closed to any changes, even if they clearly improved the design.

Soviet engineers successfully copied elements of the design. The ability of the elements once assembled, however, was limited. The 10 tanks that managed to leave the production line by summer were, at most, functional models. Their engines constantly broke down in the most creative and varying ways imaginable. The acceptable mode of operation allowed for 65% of engine parts to be discarded. Engines had mismatching dimensions, crumbling valves, the driveshaft was insufficiently hardened. Armoured hulls, released by the Izhor factory, had cracks in them. 10 mm of armour could be penetrated by a regular rifle bullet at 100-150 meters, which was considered impossible. Only by 1934, did the quality of the released vehicles drastically improve.

At first, the T-26 was produced with two turrets, located next to each other. This allowed the two gunners to fire in different directions at once, and was considered a good solution for an infantry support tank. As an alternative to a machine gun, is was possible to place a 37 mm cannon in one of the turrets.

In 1933, the T-26 underwent a change. Instead of two turrets, the tank got one, that could rotate in a full circle. The turret received a new 45 mm gun, which was superior to the 37 mm gun. Initially, all new tanks were to receive this upgrade, but due to deficits, both variants were produced until the end of 1933. The new gun and turret increased the weight of the tank, and a new engine and suspension had to be developed. The engineers did not reach great success here, and the tank became slower and more sluggish.

By the beginning of 1936, tank builders finally crossed out the half-track concept. The newly developed T-46 was too complicated and expensive. Work to modernize the T-26 had to be restarted. Bolted armour was replaced with welded, increasing its durability. The gun mantlet was altered, the fuel system was improved. The suspension was redesigned yet again. Due to new technology of electrical hardening, exceptional strength of the track links was achieved.

All of these modernizations could not hide the fact that, by the end of the 1930s, the T-26 no longer excelled in its category. Other countries had equal, or superior, tanks. An attempt was made to arm the tank with a 76 mm gun, but the project did not live long due to a manufacturing defect.

The first T-26es saw battle in the Spanish Civil War. Tanks supplied to the Republicans by the Soviet Union were used in nearly every operation, and performed admirably. A contribution to the T-26's status of a dangerous enemy was the fact that the German and Italian tanks that opposed it were only armed with machine guns. At the same time, the thin armour of the T-26 made it an easy target for AT guns. After evaluating the performance of the T-26, Soviet engineers installed additional armour screens.

Soviet tankers used the T-26 in the battle for lake Hasan. Due to incompetent commanders, many tanks were lost. During the assault on Zaozernaya hill, the tanks ran into a well prepared defensive line. Considering their weak armour, any frontal assault would lead to significant casualties. 85 tanks were destroyed, out of which, 9 burned. However, commanders reported a high survivability. A T-26 could withstand 5-6 Japanese shells. It's a shame that this quality had to be discovered in combat, and not on proving grounds.

In all conflicts the T-26 saw, its poor reliability shined through. Many vehicles were lost without participating in battle. During the Winter War, the Red Army lost 3178 tanks, 1275 of which were breakdowns. This war was difficult for all tanks. The terrain in most combat zones was poorly suited for armoured vehicles.

By June 22nd, 1941, 10 thousand T-26es of various types were in service. Its use in the first part of the war could only be described as a failure. The primary cause of low effectiveness of the T-26 was its obsolescence. The tank ceased to be exceptional in the 1930s. By 1941, it was weak. Its armour protected only from bullets. The weak engine did not provide a very high maneuverability. The poor reliability was another cause. A large number of vehicles was abandoned by their crews when there were not enough time or resources to repair them.

The second cause was the human factor. The level of commanders in the Red Army was quite low. Frequently, they had no idea how to use tanks correctly. Frontal assaults were deadly for the "cardboard" T-26. Instead of being used en masse, the tanks were subdivided up to individual vehicles. Coordination between units was lacking since there was no surplus of radios, and those that were available, were frequently poorly used. The situation with commanders' maps was a catastrophe. Frequently, hand-drawn diagrams were used. Even if the commander had a map, that didn't mean he knew how to use it. Reports and memoirs list many of these occurrences.

The combination of these two causes led to the destruction of most T-26es in the first 6 months of the Great Patriotic War.

The last operation T-26es were used in was the destruction of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

Original article available here.