BA-10 at the Height of Power

It was not a surprise that armoured cars quickly made way for tanks in the food chain of the battlefield. The problem with an armoured car is its chassis. Even the best car falls short of a tank, especially when it comes to cross-country terrain. Because of this armoured cars were relegated to reconnaissance and signals duties. The Red Army was no exception.

It just so happens that there are no aces among armoured car crews due to the special place they occupy on the battlefield. However, that was not always the case. For instance, BA-10 armoured cars played an important part in the battle for Bain-Tsagan and not as a method of reconnaissance.

Tanks at Khalkhin-Gol

 "To the Chief of the RKKA ABTU
August 19th, 1939

Directorate of the People's Commissar, 1st Department
#755895ss

On orders of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Class comrade Kulik, I send you a copy of the act on the inspection of combat and training in the 1st Army Group for your inspection and execution of necessary measures.

Deputy Chief of the 1st Department, 
Major Bibikov

Act [to certify that] I conducted an inspection of the combat and training in the 1st Army Group fighting in the region of Khalkhin-Gol during the period of July 11th-24th, 1939

1. Permanent units

[...]

Armoured units:

The 7th, 8th, and 9th Armoured Brigades are essentially armoured cavalry, more suitable for guarding borders and internal security. They did not train to fight alongside infantry and don't know how to do this. These units played a big role in the initial stages, but took heavy losses. The arrival of poorly trained reinforcements weakened them, they need to train and re-equip.

Video: Did T-34 Prototypes See Battle?

It is often claimed that T-34 tank prototypes were tested in combat in the Winter War, and sometimes even in the Battle of Khalkin Gol. I explore whether or not this was possible and where the tanks were at the time of these conflicts in my latest video.

Type 95 Ha-Go: Manchurian Prisoner

The fighting in July-August of 1939 near the Khalkin-Gol river was the Red Army's first real large engagement of the 1930s. The battle at Lake Hasan in 1938 was also fierce, but it was not comparable to Khalkin-Gol. Khalkin-Gol was also the first real test of strength for the Japanese Imperial Army as they, especially their tank units, had yet to face an enemy like the Red Army. During the fighting, some amount of Japanese armoured vehicles were captured by the Red Army. One of them was a Ha-Go tank from the 4th Tank Regiment, which was later closely studied in the USSR. What impression did Soviet engineers get from the Ha-Go?

World of Tanks History Section: Tanks in the Far East

Chaos reigned in the Far East in the 1920 and 1930s. China was a quilt of hostile states. Japan was eyeing continental territories, resulting in a full scale war. Great Britain attempted to participate in the conflict, which complicated affairs. In short, there was a rich potential for tank warfare.

Dramatis Personae

The USSR and Japan were the only ones who could really brag about their tanks in the region. The Chinese armies had a miserly amount of armoured vehicles, which could not influence the situation significantly.

Soviet MS-1s were typical infantry support tanks: slow, with anti-bullet armour. T-26es and BT tanks with 45 mm guns that appeared later were significantly superior.

Japanese light 7.5 ton Type 95 Ha-Go tanks were armed with a 37 mm gun and a machinegun. Their armour was also made to withstand bullets. These tanks were sufficient against Chinese armour, but not as effective against the Soviets. In 1937, the medium Chi-Ha tank appeared, which was more powerful, but still only adequate by local standards.

Tank battles in the Far East were pretty similar to those in colonial wars: the tanks were few in number, and mostly opposed by infantry, cavalry and artillery. The only conflicts that don't match this pattern are the battles at Lake Hasan and Khalkin-Gol.

All for One and One for All

The use of tanks in the Far East once again proved that tanks need a well refined mechanism for cooperation with other types of forces. Without them, the effectiveness of tanks is limited. For instance, the initial battles for Jalainur station on the Far-Eastern Railroad saw the use of 10 MS-1 tanks. Initially, the tanks fought alone, as the infantry was not too eager to support them. As a result, the Soviet offensive lost its tempo and the Chinese fortified region was not taken swiftly.

On the next day, November 18th, MS-1 tanks fought in platoons of three, assisted by infantry. This worked. Tanks allowed Soviet horse-drawn batteries to pull up and fire on pillboxes at a point-blank range, and infantry could sneak up and pelt them with grenades. The results speak for themselves: the Soviets lost 7 tanks (all due to technical problems) and 200 men, the Chinese lost ten times as many, with over 8500 captured.

The Japanese used a curious tactic in China. When assaulting cities protected by strong walls, tanks went first, suppressing external defenders while infantry caught up. When infantry broke into the city, tanks went ahead once more and suppressed the remaining resistance. This tactic worked since the Chinese had few anti-tank weapons. When crossing rivers or channels, tanks were used as immobile batteries, firing from stationary positions. In some cases, they were used to cut off railroads or pursue fleeing enemies.

Fall of the Samurai

The 1938 border conflict at Lake Hasan in Primorskiy Krai and 1939 conflict at the Khalkin-Gol river in Mongolia was the first where the number of tanks used reached into the hundreds. 285 Soviet tanks fought at Hasan, including the new BT-7s, and nearly 600 tanks fought at Khalkin-Gol.

The Japanese treated the Lake Hasan conflict as recce in force. They wanted to check the how ready the USSR was for interference into the Sino-Japanese war and to evaluate the capabilities of the Red Army. Several infantry battalions supported by small numbers of artillery took two border heights: Bezymyannaya and Ozernaya. After several days of fierce combat, the heights were retaken.

After the clash, commanders wrote about the need for careful reconnaissance and observation of terrain where tanks were going to fight. It was not performed at Hasan, leading to heavy losses among T-26 and BT-7 trapped in a narrow path between mountains and swamps. Again, cooperation between tanks and other forces was weak.

The Khalkin-Gol conflict began with the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo making a claim on some Mongolian territory. Soon, these tensions escalated into a war that lasted several months.

The Red Army had a year to work on mistakes made at Lake Hasan, but in practice, the saying "measure twice, cut once" was forgotten by commanders eager to attack. Experience on how to properly cooperate between tanks, artillery, and infantry had to be obtained in battle once again.

However, Khalkin-Gol confirmed that tank units are perfectly prepared for mobile actions. The Soviet 11th Tank Brigade performed a long march in their BT-7s before attacking the enemy. Few vehicles fell behind due to technical reasons on this march. Tanks, especially flamethrower variants, were very useful when suppressing machinegun nests. The result was once again a Soviet victory.

The successes of the Red Army in the Far East were costly, but resulted in valuable experience. The most important thing was that two victories over Japan became a hefty argument for keeping the latter out of the war between the USSR and Germany which loomed over the horizon.

Article authors: Evgeniy Belash and Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here. 

World of Tanks History Section: BT

The Collegiate of the Chief Directorate of Military Manufacturing met at the end of 1929. The main conclusion of these meetings was that the Soviet tank manufacturing industry is incapable of equipping the RKKA with armoured vehicles. Domestic tanks were inferior to foreign ones, newly planned tanks kept getting delayed, engineers lacked appropriate experience. Factories did not have enough materials, equipment, tools, skilled workers.

Based on these conclusions, the commission decided: if we can't do it ourselves, let's use foreign expertise, Invite engineers, buy tanks and documentation. On December 30th, a delegation was sent to America, headed by Innokentiy Halepskiy, the head of the Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the RKKA. The delegation's task was to familiarize themselves with samples of latest tanks and purchase them. At first, the work of the Cunningham company seemed the most interesting, but it turned out that the tanks did not match the advertised performance parameters, and are far behind the Vickers tank the USSR already purchased. Further negotiations with Cunningham ceased, and the delegation switched to convertible drive vehicles developed by Christie.

Despite the fact that Christie's tanks reached record speeds, the US army showed no interest in them, as the navy was considered the main weapon of the US. The army was in a secondary role, and had few tanks (why have tanks when the odds of an invasion is negligible?). When Halepskiy familiarized himself with Christie's tanks, he hesitated. On one hand, the tank had no place in the USSR's tank doctrine. On the other hand, the engineer, although with no love for the Communists, was willing to cooperate. He was prepared to not only share all documentation on the tank, but to accompany them to the USSR. The reason for this was simple: the commission was willing to pay a significant amount of money.

The last doubts about the purchase disappeared when the commission discovered that Poland was willing to buy the tanks. If someone were to make a list of the most dangerous enemies of the USSR at the time, Poland would have made top 3. It had a powerful army for the time, with a rapidly developing tank force.

On April 28th, 1930, a contract for two Christie tanks was signed, with accompanying documentation. These were new models were named M1940. The USSR was ready to pay 60 thousand dollars. When the tanks made it to the USSR, it turned out that they were lacking turrets and armament, and the documentation was incomplete. Christie was penalized 25 thousand dollars, and was not invited to the USSR.

The vehicles were sent to trials. In order to objectively evaluate the performance of the tanks, the turret weight had to be accounted for. As the replacement turret was still in development, it was replaced with an 800 kg weight.

Trials showed that Christie's child was poorly behaved, and prone to tantrums. An attempt to turn at high speed on grassy terrain resulted in a wheel carrier falling off. Two days were spent repairing it, but it broke off again after 500 meters. It was repaired again, and failed again. Deadlines were approaching, so it was decided to keep testing in wheel mode. Even here, the tank was not performing well. The tank had great difficulty moving on harsh terrain, and was completely helpless in sand. The driver was rapidly worn out by the inconsistent behaviour of the vehicle and the fact that the steering wheel was literally jumping out of his hands. The engine was in need of constant tuning. The battery could not always start the engine, and entirely incapable of it in cold weather. The gearbox heated up after 2-3 hours, and often broke. The front hatch was too small to fit a person, and the entire crew had to climb in through the turret ring.

Despite the vehicle's questionable qualities, the army decided to adopt it. According to existing classification, it would have been named T-28 or T-29. However, since it did not match doctrine, it was given a new index: BT (fast tank).

Mass production of the BT tank was planned on the Yaroslav automotive factory. However, it was obvious that the factory would be incapable of supporting this load. The Bolshevik factory was considered an alternative, but was also overloaded. Suddenly, the Kharkov Komintern factory was freed up when an order for 200 T-24s was cancelled. The BT order was moved there.

The poor performance of Christie's tank showed that copying it would be fruitless. The turret also had to be developed anew. The task of finishing the tank was given to N. Toskin.

In 1931, 6 BT tanks were scheduled to be produced for the November 7th parade. The factory, however, was not particularly eager to produce a new, untested tank. The pressure came from the very top, and three prototypes managed to be produced, two of which made it to the parade. The third tank suffered an engine fire. This incident cast doubt on the necessity of developing the BT tank, but production continued.

Mass production of the BT started slowly. There was a deficit in everything: raw materials, tools, skilled workers. Parts shipments were constantly late. 50 sets of ball bearings were due for January 1st, 1932. 7 sets were actually produced. 8 "Liberty" engines, 3 hulls, and 4 gearboxes were produced. There was a problem with engines, overall. The "Liberty" engine was produced in the USSR under the brand "M-5", but was already removed from production at that point. It was necessary to buy all the "Liberty" engines available in the US, even broken and used ones. These engines were hard to start, constantly overheated, and sometimes self-ignited.

At this stage, the BT achieved the fame of unprecedented breakdowns. The engines broke, the tracks, made from poorly conditioned steel at the Kramator factory broke, the gearboxes worked poorly.

Most BT tanks made it to army units with no armament, as the PS-2 gun that was intended for the tank was not accepted into service. The B-3 gun was accepted instead, a mix of the PS-2 and German 1K Rheinmetall gun. However, these guns were produced in limited numbers, and it was impossible to outfit a tank with them. As a temporary measure, the gun was replaced with dual machine guns. There was a plan to replace them with a 45 mm gun, but most BT tanks stayed with machine guns. The mass produced BT had four main armament types:

-Two machine guns in one mount.
-Two machine guns in one mount and a third one separately.
-One 37 mm cannon, no machine gun.
-One 37 mm cannon and one machine gun.

396 BT tanks were produced in 1932. In 1933, the BT was renamed BT-2, and 224 more were produced.

The army was not too happy with the new tank. It was too unreliable. The only way it could make the command staff happy was by setting records when jumping from ramps. The BT-2 was seen as a training vehicle, until superior tanks were built. BT-2 tanks were almost entirely used for educational and secondary tasks.

The tank was produced from 1932 to 1933. In 1933, the tank was replaced by its modernization, indexed BT-5.

Regardless, the tank became a new step in Soviet tank-building. It was the first to use a powerful engine, convertible drive, a candle suspension, and a powerful gun for its time. If you compare the BT-2 to foreign tanks of the era, it was one of the best, and remained competitive until the end of the 1930s.

The BT-2 first fought at Khalkin-Gol in 1939, and then during the campaign in West Belarus and Ukraine. A large amount of these tanks took part in the Winter War. In the latter conflict, the largest cause of losses was not combat. The BTs broke down, and had to be sent to the factory for repairs.

By 1941, the tank was totally obsolete. Its armour protected only from bullets, and did not pose a problem for AT rifles at close ranges. Any German tank, aside from the PzKpfw I, could penetrate the BT-2 at any distance. The BT-2 was suitable for scouting, patrols, and other support tasks, as a part of a larger tank force. However, the first years of the war offered no choice.

About 390 BT tanks fought in WWII. They were included in mechanized corps, and fought through the entire front. Most tanks were destroyed in the summer and fall of 1941. However, the tanks continued to fight on the Leningrad front until 1943. A photo exists of a machine gun BT, taken in 1942. According to some sources, BTs were still used in 1944.

No BT-2s survive to this day.

Original article available here.

World of Tanks History Section: Conflict on the Khalkin-Gol River

1. Preamble

In July of 1927, Japan published a “Political program on relations with China”. This document declared that Manchuria and Mongolia are of special interest to the land of the rising sun. Literally days later, General Tanaka handed the Japanese Emperor a memorandum, which announced, without any diplomatic ambiguity: “In order to conquer China, we need to conquer Mongolia and Manchuria. In order to conquer the world, we need to conquer China.”

A necessary and important step of these militaristic aspirations was the military defeat of the USSR. However, during the late 20s, the small country was not ready for such a conflict. Japan decided to limit itself to occupation of Manchuria.

At this time, a young officer class was formed from former rural and urban minor bourgeoisie. These men were militaristically minded, and considered the government's foreign policy insufficiently decisive. They themselves had decisiveness to spare, and a number of coups and political assassinations were attempted by these young officers since 1930. Terror and propaganda grew the military mood in Japan. In September 1931, the invasion of Manchuria began.

By March 1st, 1932, the occupation of Manchuria was complete. It was replaced with the state of Manchukuo, formally led by the Emperor Puyi. Realistically, the Emperor had no power. The country entirely followed the political directions of the Land of the Rising Sun. An ambassador had the power to veto any decision of the marionette Emperor.

Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan presented a claim to the USSR on territories next to lake Hasan and river Tumannaya. From 1934 to 1938, the border was violated 231 times by the Japanese, where 35 of these incursions led to serious battles. The Japanese government demanded twice, on July 9th and 20th, that the USSR leave disputed territories. The demands were rejected, and, on July 29th, Japan attacked Soviet forces. Despite committing a series of regrettable mistakes, the Red Army achieved a decisive victory.

The defeat at lake Hasan damaged the reputation of the Japanese army. The military controlling the country could not allow this to happen. Before the echoes of the last shot fell silent, Tokyo was already preparing a new offensive, even greater in scale.

A victorious campaign was necessary for Japan, and not only to heal its bruised ego. In 1936, the Soviet Union signed a pact of mutual aid with the People's Republic of Mongolia. In accordance with this pact, Mongolia provided a base for the 57th special corps of the RKKA, a large group of Soviet forces, consisting of more than 30 000 soldiers, 265 tanks, 280 armoured cars, 107 airplanes, and a large amount of auxiliary vehicles and artillery. The Japanese were building a railroad close to the border with Mongolia, and this neighbour made them very unhappy. Additionally, the USSR provided military aid to China, which Japan also wanted to conquer.

2. The Conflict Begins

Japan had time to develop two plans of attack, but did not have time to execute either. The war started in May of 1939, and not in the early 1940s as the Japanese commanders had hoped.

In its infancy, the conflict at Halkin-Gol was identical to the conflict at Lake Hasan, but this time Japan's demands were made to Mongolia, and not the USSR. Technically, the demands were made by the government of Manchukuo, but, as stated above, Manchukuo did not have the ability to make their own political decisions. Effectively, Tokyo demanded that the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia be moved to the river of Khalkin-Gol, even though all documents listed the border 20-25 kilometers east of there. Mongolia's objections, and documents placing the border correctly were ignored. Military incursions began, like on Hasan, but on a much larger scale. In 1938, Japanese soldiers crossed the border in small groups, but Mongolia saw crossings of up to a battalion at a time. The conflict practically already started, but war was not declared.

May 11th, 1939, is considered the start of the resistance at Khalkin-Gol. On that day, 300 Japanese soldiers, supported by 7 armoured cars, attacked a Mongolian border patrol near Nomon-Han-Burd-Obo. After killing about 20 patrolling soldiers, the attackers crossed to the eastern bank of Khalkin-Gol.

The Japanese air force began combat operations on May 14th, commanded by the ace Marimoto . Border observation points and airports were attacked from the air. Under the cover of the air force, the Kwantung army swiftly reinforced the attacking forces. Everything was planned perfectly. Barracks and warehouses on Manchuria's territory were built far in advance.

3. The Situation Develops

Upon receiving the news of the location of the enemy forces, the command of the 57th Corps ordered to strengthen the border of the People's Republic of Mongolia. By May 29th, the forward detachments of the 9th motorized brigade reached the region. The tanks traveled 700 km by themselves, which, at the time, was a very impressive feat. The border was also reinforced by the 149th infantry regiment. Despite all this, the Japanese forces had an advantage over the Mongolian and Soviet forces combined: 2.5 times as many soldiers, and 6 times as many armoured cars. The Soviet Union had a tank advantage: 186 tanks versus Japan's 130.

Early morning on May 28th, Japan began a massive offensive. Their goal was the encirclement and destruction of Soviet and Mongolian forces east of the Khalkin-Gol river. The attack was supported by 40 bombers, attacking river crossings and the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Fierce battle raged all day. The Japanese managed to push back a Mongolian cavalry detachment and Senior Lieutenant Bykov's squad, aiding them in the defense. Soviet forces retreated to the delta of Khailastyn-Gol. The Japanese could not complete the encirclement. While trying to cross the river, the Japanese took heavy losses from Lieutenant Bakhtin's artillery battery. The attack stalled. A map was captured, showing the locations of Japanese forces. Additionally, the map marked the disputed territory as Manchurian.

By May 29th, the battle has not calmed. RKKA and Mongolian forces began a counterattack, with the support of two artillery divisions. By the evening, the Japanese were thrown back two kilometers from the river. Japan lost 400 soldiers and officers, and numerous trophies were taken.

The first battles showed that there were not enough forces at Halkin-Gol to push back the attack. Reinforcements were sent: a Soviet tank brigade, 3 motorized brigades, a motorized infantry division, a heavy artillery division, a Mongolian cavalry division and over 100 fighter planes.

June did not see many land battles, but a major air battle broke out. While the Soviets and Japanese fought for the skies, the commander of the 57th Special Corps was replaced. Instead of N. F. Feklenko, whose actions were deemed insufficiently decisive, a future legend, G. K. Zhukov, took command.

4. Final Round

By July, Japanese command developed a plan for further action, titled “Second stage of the nomonhan incident”. This plan consisted of a strong push by the right flank of the Japanese forces to encircle and destroy Soviet-Mongolian forces. Lieutenant-General Kamatsubara, the commander of the Japanese forces, wrote that the morale of the enemy is low, and the time for the crushing blow has come.

The Japanese advance began on July 2nd. After an artillery barrage, infantry and tanks under the command of General Yasuoki went into battle first. The Japanese sent 80 tanks into battle, forcing back Soviet forces on the south-west.

On the night between July 2nd and 3rd, General Kobayasi's second group forded Halkin-Gol and took the Bain-Tsagan mountain. This location allowed the Japanese to deliver a strike to the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian defensive line. Seeing the hazardous situation, Zhukov sent in his mobile reserves. Without scouts or infantry escort, the 11th tank brigade went into battle straight from the march. They were supported by Mongolian armoured cars and aircraft.

The Soviet tanks, accompanies by all available artillery and aircraft, shook the Japanese lines. They did not have enough time to entrench, but defended with all their strength. With their artillery, 15 Soviet tanks were knocked out. Without infantry support, it was very difficult for the tanks to fight. Only towards the middle of the day did the 24th Infantry Regiment join them in battle. Tanks and infantry, despite fierce resistance, moved up. The Japanese were partially encircled and were forced up to the top of the mountain. All Japanese forces that managed to cross the river were trapped. 400 tanks, 800 artillery pieces, and several hundred aircraft were in battle from both sides.

At 1500 hours on July 5th, the Japanese broke their lines and fled across the river. Due to the premature demolition of the bridge by Japanese sappers, many soldiers and officers drowned trying to cross. Only the two meter depth of Halkin-Gol prevented tank forces from pursuing the enemy.

Zhukov's decision to attack was initially met with many complaints and protests, but was later accepted as the only reasonable action in that situation. After their defeat at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese never attempted to cross Halkin-Gol again.

Zhukov started preparing for an attack. The 57th Corps was expanded into the 1st Army Group under the command of G. M. Shtern. New tank brigades and infantry divisions joined in. At the beginning of the attack, the RKKA possessed 57 000 troops, over 500 artillery guns and mortars, 498 tanks, and 516 airplanes.

The Japanese also gathered forces, planning to attack on August 24th. Simultaneously with collecting forces for an attack, they started construction of defensive emplacements.

On August 20th, Soviet forces started their attack, beating the Japanese by 4 days. The strike was so sudden, that it took an hour for Japanese artillery to open fire. Japanese command could not establish where the Soviets were attacking from. It was considered that the attack was evenly spaced out along the front, where in reality, the southern forces were responsible for the main push. This mistake by Japanese commanders led to a well defended center, but weak flanks. As a result, on August 26th, 1939, Soviet forces entirely encircled the Japanese 6th Army. Attempts to break the encirclement failed.

On August 28th, the assault of the last line of defense at Remizov's Height began. At that time, the Japanese had no artillery left, only machineguns and mortars. Approximately 400 Japanese soldiers were killed trying to break out at night.

By the morning of August 31st, Mongolia had no Japanese forces remaining on its territory. After that, the battle on the land ended, and the battle in the air began. But even here, Japan was not successful, taking out 14 Soviet planes at the cost of 70 of their own. Accepting their defeat, Japan requested a ceasefire, which was signed on September 15th, 1939.

The most important consequence of the victory at Khalkin-Gol was that Japan never attacked the USSR during WWII. Even Hitler's demands did not sway them. This defeat also led to a government crisis in Japan.

It is worth mentioning that the victory of Soviet forces left an optimistic impression of the preparedness of the Red Army for war, for which a great price was paid in 1941. Regardless, the triumph of Soviet forces at Khalkin-Gol deserved the respect and pride of their descendants.

Original article available here.