Cheating at Statistics: SU Strike at Balaton

One of the easiest way to find an event ripe for a Cheating at Statistics segment is to look for a fairly frequently occurring scenario. German tanks (usually Tigers) achieve some kind of fantastic victory over a numerically superior enemy force. Then, despite their crushing victory, they immediately withdraw. Such a scenario occurs on March 13th, 1945, during the Battle of Lake Balaton.

"13 March 1945: Attack to the east with Kampfgruppe Bradel between Velenczefurdo and Tukrospuszta. The attack hits 24 dug-in ISU-152s covering a minefield. All 16 Tigers receive severe battle damage (3 total losses). After clearing some passages through the minefield, 2 Tigers seize the strongpoint, knocking out all the assault guns.

Total tanks: 32

14 March 1945: The battalion is pulled out of the line."

In addition to the usual suspect, there is another hint: 24 ISU-152s is a lot of SPGs. A heavy SPG regiment consists of only 21 ISU-152s, 5 per battery and then one commander's vehicle. 24 of these SPGs knocked out means that there would have to be something worth defending with two SPG regiments. This is a battle too big to pass up.

Three in Transition

The German Z.W.38 medium tank that entered production in early 1939 was having a hard time on the assembly line. The PzIII Ausf.E was better than its predecessors, but still had a large number of drawbacks. It turned out that driving at a speed greater than 40 kph resulted in rapid destruction of road wheels rims. There were also issues with the gearbox that had to be solved during production. Nevertheless, the PzIII gradually became the backbone of the German tank forces. The subsequent Ausf.G and Ausf.H variants became steps on the way to more numerous models of this vehicle. These tanks were the most numerous German tanks during the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

T-34 Radio

"Minutes of the Meeting of the Military Commission on March 3rd, 1940, on the trials of the A-34 tank

...

It was established that:

1. The position of the radio in the turret does not allow for proper work due to it being inconvenient to use the radio. The position of the radio does not permit the radio operator to do his job and overloads the commander, distracting him from his job. The location of the radio in the turret does not satisfactorily resolve the issue of radio communication.
2. The 71TK-3 radio installed in the tank is bulky and takes up a lot of space. The 71TK-3 radio is complex to produce and difficult to use (takes two hands to operate, individual receiver and transmitter units, lack of a duplex). The commission considers it necessary to ask the ABTU and Communications Directorate to ask the industry to produce a special tank radio that would satisfy requirements (compactness, simplicity of use, reliability when working at long range).
3. In order to better solve the issue of tank communication, the commission deems it necessary to ask the factory to develop a variant of installing the 71TK-3 radio in A-34 and A-32 tanks in the front. Produce the reworked radio installation variant no later than May 1st, 1940."

RGVA 31811-2-1181 p.56

Vodka Thieves

"Decree of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front #0119

June 30th, 1944

Active Army

On the punishment of the Chief Quartermaster of the 186th Rifle Division, Major of the Intendant Service, Lev Yefremovich Goldberg and Chief Quartermaster of the 238th Rifle Regiment, 186th Rifle Division, Captain of the Intendant Service Petr Alekseevich Paut, for abusing their positions.

As Chief Quartermaster of the 186th RD, Major Goldberg regularly issued vodka illegally to various persons, distributing 234 L of vodka this way in three months. Partially, this shortfall was compensated by an agreement with the Chief Quartermaster of the 238th regiment of that division, Captain Paut, by composition of fictional documents regarding the issue of vodka.

Power Steering

"September 4th, 1938

#288201

To: Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Industry, comrade Tevosyan

The ABTU is undertaking a series of experiments regarding installation of servo devices on tanks that make it significantly easier to steer. We consider it time to raise the question of preparing factory #183 for production of tanks with servo controls.

This work must include the joint development of blueprints of servo mechanisms this year between factory #183 and NII-20 and the production of a BT-7 sample tank with servo controls. Assembly of the sample tank will be preceded by all necessary trials of these mechanisms. All improvements requested during trials on proving grounds and during service must be implemented.

We ask you to give the necessary directions to factory #183.

ABTU Chief, Corps Commander Pavlov

ABTU Military Commissar, Divisional Engineer Alliluyev"

RGVA 31811-2-842 p. 172

Zamulin on Losses

Zamulin: "For example, the talk of five tanks that the Germans lost on July 12th. Losses of both sides at Prokhorovka on July 12th is a significant and still unsolved mystery. The claims of Western researchers that the SS Corps lost only 5 tanks on July 12th is nonsense. This evaluation is based on, first of all, the absence of necessary documents. There are no document for the divisions. Either they were destroyed, or they were never written, or they are lying somewhere where researchers have not gotten to them yet. Documents that state precisely how much the SS Corps lost on July 12th does not exist. Yes, we know how much the corps had on the evening of July 11th, and how much they had on the 13th, in the afternoon. We can estimate the amount of losses, but this estimate is a bit of a cheat. Why?

I spoke with, I personally know very well and spoke with this man, about this issue, a participant in the battle from the German side, the commander of the 7th company of the Leibstandarte tank regiment, Rudolph von Ribbentrop. "

Interviewer: "Ribbentrop's son?"

Zamulin: "Yes, his eldest son. He came to me with Artem Drabkin in 2015 to Prokhorovka field, we walked around, I drove him around these places. I asked a question about tanks. He said "I cannot speak for every division. I can say that officially my company had 4 tanks on the 11th, that's it. Immediately before the attack, another PzIV was given to me that was not recorded in any papers. I also received a message that after some time another tank will arrive. Turns out there was six. It's impossible to, based on the data by Swedish researches, this book that came out, Zetterling and Frankson, it says that they analyzed the documents and on the evening of the 11th Leibstandarte had only 77 vehicles, but that was in the evening and only based on documents. We have no idea what the division looked like at that moment. Ribbentrop says that two more tanks came in the morning, regular tanks that took part in the fighting."

Interviewer: "And how many came to other companies?"

Zamulin: "Exactly, yes, and how many arrived during the day? Consider that Leinstandarte's tanks effectively played the role of stationary guns that day. They fired through an anti-tank ditch and fought at a large distance, and I don't think that if Leibstandarte took losses these would be losses that could not be repaired after some amount of time, but they were losses nevertheless. Imagine if two corps, the 18th and 29th, they had 360 tanks together, attacking in echelons. 150 in one, 150 in another, and combined arms divisions from the 5th Guards Army behind them. All of this was moving and shooting. Positional fighting, counterattacks, imagine that 360 tanks over 10 hours, and this is just tanks, to say nothing of artillery, knocked out only 5 enemy tanks. How?"

Interviewer: "Maybe 5 were total losses. They'll never tell."

Zamulin: "Exactly, now we come to this. Maybe it was only total losses. Maybe it was a fabrication. Maybe it was something else."

Interviewer: "It's hard with German losses in general. These 10-day reports..."

Zamulin: "Yes, yes. But look at what's published in the media. The Welt German newspaper, the Russian edition at least, published a teeth-shattering article for the 75th anniversary where it said that the Russians lost Prokhorovka based on Töppel and Frieser's research, the former Bundeswehr military historian, retired colonel, he also writes about five tanks and so on. I consider that if the Ministry of Defense made such an unprecedented step and put so much information online for free access, we must perform a complete, thorough, and scrupulous investigation, to understand for ourselves..."

Source

Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.E through F: The First Mass Medium

In the 1930s only the USSR and Japan managed to spin up mass production of medium tanks, producing several hundred of their respective types. In other armies the creation of medium tanks hit significant difficulties. For instance, the main German Z.W. tank had big problems, primarily with the suspension. As a result, the production of the tank, accepted into service as the PzIII, slipped. The situation changed only in the fall of 1939 when German factories began producing the PzIII Ausf. F. This was the first German medium tank that was produced in the amount of over 400 units. At the same time, it was the first German tank that was produced by six factories at the same time.

Small Arms Reconnaissance

"Translated from German

206th Infantry Division

Division HQ

February 19th, 1944

Daily order #4

The capture and delivery of Russian submachinegun 43 to Army HQ is considered a task of great importance. As motivation for the capture and delivery of submachinegun 43, it is recommended to offer special leave as described in section 25 of combined army news.

The captured weapon must be delivered to the division along with the magazine and cleaning device.

(Signature illegible)

Translated by translator of the intelligence department of the 1st Baltic Front, Guards Captain Figelman

October 1st, 1944"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin

New Tracks

"Report #014

Bureau 540

May 21st, 1940

On trials of cast Hadfield steel tracks on the A-34 tank

...

2. Trials

1. A set of tracks composed of track links cast from Hadfield steel was installed on the A-34 tank #311-18-3, which travelled over 417 km between May 12th and May 17th, 1940, of which 195 was on dirt roads, 80 was on sand roads, and 142 was on a cobblestone highway. The average speed of driving on the dirt road was 22.9 kph, the average speed of driving on the cobblestone highway was 37 kph.
2. The following took place during the travel: rivets bursting and loss of 50% or rivets, cases of pins wobbling out of the eyes (2 cases at the start of the trials, the first at 61 km, the second at 120 km). The wobbling is explained by the fact that the pins have not yet broken in thanks to the large gap between the eye and the pin (18 +/- 1 mm, while the pin is 18 +/- 0.12 mm thick). In addition, the tracks were tightened three times.
3. Tracks composed of cast track links were subjected to special trials on cobblestones, consisting of the following:
1. Driving on the cobblestone highway in 4th gear at 1700-1800 RPM.
2. 3 trials of braking while moving in 4th gear at 1700-1800 RPM.
3. Driving over stones (cobblestones).

While driving on a cobblestone highway at 1700-1800 RPM at a speed of 36-37 kph, the tank had travelled for 111 km. No defects were discovered along the way, aside from lost track pin splints.

Braking: 

1. Braking was performed while travelling at 1600 RPM with a headstart of 300-350 meters. The braking distance was 7 meters. No defects were discovered.
2. Braking was performed while travelling at 1800 RPM with a headstart of 360-400 meters. The braking distance was 12 meters over 4 seconds. No defects were discovered.
3. Braking was performed while travelling at 1800 RPM with a headstart of 250-300 meters. The braking distance was 12 meters over 5 seconds. No defects were discovered.

In addition to this, the tank drove over stones that were additionally piled onto the cobblestone highway. The tank drove over the stones, and no defects were discovered.

After the trials ended, the tracks were taken off and the right track was inspected carefully. 50% of track pin splints were lost. The track was taken apart and each link was examined with a magnifying glass.

Results of the inspection:

1. The flat tracks have no cracks from impacts and driving on the cobblestone highway, or any other mechanical damage.
2. The tracks with teeth, of the 37 inspected, have the following:
1. 6 have no cracks or damage.
2. 29 have tracks along the wheel contact surface near the base of the tooth from the side of contact of the tooth and the drive wheel, 10 mm to 40 mm in length.
3. 2 have cracks down to the middle.
   The cracks at the base of the tooth are all of the same type. This means that the track link with a tooth has a weak point in the base of the tooth that must be reinforced. This is a design defect.
4. To compare, stamped track links that have been through 3131 km of trials were inspected. Out of 40 inspected track links, only one crack was found, 15-20 mm long, on the first track link near the tooth.

Measurements were made of the pins and eyes of the cast tracks, the results were as follows:

Item	Distance travelled in km	Average wear in mm	Maximum wear in mm
Cast link pin	417	0.25	0.48
Cast link eye	417	0.34	0.62
Stamped link pin	3131	1.2	1.34
Stamped link eye	3131	1.22	1.34

The table of average wear of track link pins and eyes shows that the pins of the cast track links are worn down less than the eyes, but on stamped links the pins and eyes wear down at the same rate. Larger wear on the cast tracks is a disadvantage of the Hadfield steel track links, as it is desirable to replace the pins rather than the links when refurbishing tracks.

Note: the data on the wear of the pins and eyes of either the cast Hadfield tracks or the stamped Chromansil tracks cannot be considered definitive, as the stamped tracks were tested in winter conditions and the cast tracks were tested in the summer.

Conclusions

Trials showed that a tank equipped with track links cast from Hadfield steel did not stop due to track breakage during the run of 417 km. The tracks composed of cast links worked well without jamming, slipping, or other defects, and in general were analogous to the stamped track performance.

The results of assembly and trials revealed that the following is necessary:

1. Correction of casting defects (cracks, pits)
2. Creation of cleaner casts that would allow the eyes to line up and the pins to fit without individual filing down of the track links, as had to be done for the test tracks.
3. Ensuring a clean eye so the pins break in better.
4. Reinforcement of the track tooth base to prevent cracks from forming in the indicated spot.

We consider that the above trials confirmed the possibility of using track links cast from Hadfield steel on the A-34 tank instead of stamped links. With the aforementioned changes, the cast links will be useable on the A-34 tank.

Track links that are cast and do not need mechanical finishing and expensive stamping equipment are easier and cheaper to make.

As for the lifespan of the cast track links, it is necessary to produce a track made of links with the aforementioned corrections and put it through warranty trials in summer conditions. At the same time, we consider it necessary for the first tracks to continue testing past the 417 km until their total destruction to determine the effect of the discovered defects on the lifespan of the tracks."

RGVA 31811-2-1181 pp. 119-126

Winding Down

"To comrade V. Molotov

In accordance with your decree on May 15th, 1943, on the letter from GAU Chief comrade Yakovlev regarding reducing the supply of tank guns for SU-122 and SU-76 SPGs in the second quarter of 1943, I report the following:

The GAU (comrade Yakovlev) asks to reduce the quota for the second quarter compared to what was approved by the GOKO #3292 on May 6th, 1943, for production of the SU-76, SU-122, and KV-8S:

• 76 mm ZIS-3 divisional guns: from 350 to 250
• 122 mm M-30 mod. 1938 howitzers: from 400 to 340

Cancel the order for 30 45 mm guns with the ZIS-5 elevation mechanism completely.

Regarding the reduction of 122 mm howitzers, comrade Yakovlev refers to the closeness of factory #9 and the Uralmash factory, for which it is satisfactory to have a two-week buffer of howitzers, no more than 65 units, but the factory does not have that many.

The People's Commissar of Tank Production (comrade Zaltsmann) does not disagree with comrade Yakovlev's proposal.

The GBTU (comrade Afonin) disagrees only with the reduction of M-30 howitzer supplies to Uralmash, as the reserve at Uralmash as of May 1st is only 12 units. Given that the quota for SU-122 SPGs in the second quarter of 1943 is 315, the reduction of howitzer supplies to 340 is excessive, especially since it does not fill the GAU's reserve for two weeks of production in the amount of 65 units.

I consider it reasonable to accept the proposal of comrade Yakovlev, with the exception of maintaining the amount of M-30 howitzers at 400 units.

E. Kruglov."

CAMD RF 38-11355-1743 p. 161