How to Kill a Tiger

There were many guides on how to take out Tiger tanks printed in the Red Army. I've shown two of them here, but this one is a lot more detailed.

World of Tanks History Section: Taking Workers' Village #6

On the morning of January 18th, 1943, the first stage of Operation Spark finally resulted in the long-awaited penetration of the Leningrad blockade. For the first time in two and a half years of fighting in the north-east direction, Army Group North suffered a defeat and was pushed back from the shores of Lake Ladoga towards a new line of defense.

With almost no time to rest, Soviet forces turned south from the lake, towards a small village and the Mga railroad station. Sinyavino heights lay between the Red Army and their goal, like a bastion built by nature itself. Their slopes rose up from peat bogs, all important regional roads lay across them or near them, and the heights themselves were reinforced by Germans long ago.This meant that the Soviet soldiers who just penetrated the blockade were in a dead end. To break out, they had to assault the enemy strongholds, one by one.

Concentration of Force

The taking of Workers' Village #6 was of utmost importance during the battle for Sinyavino. One of the few good quality roads passed through here. Having taken the village, Soviet forces could break out of the bogs, take over other key roads, and get a good chance at cutting off the Germans at the heights.

The enemy did not have time to prepare the village for battle. Additionally, the Germans expected the Red Army to come from the east, but they unexpectedly came from the north.

The first battles at Sinyavino began on January 15-16th, 1943, but elements of Lieutenant-General Vladimir Zakharovich Romanskiy's 2nd Shock Army did not reach it until the blockade was penetrated. Here, the general first had a chance to use tanks not individually, but as a whole brigade. This task was given to the 16th Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Korney Ivanovich Ivanov. At this time, the brigade had 20 T-34 tanks, 10 T-70s and 8 T-60s. By January of 1943, the brigade was a veteran of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and would be fighting close to where they saw their first battle in the distant past of September 1941.

By standards of the north-east direction, the region designated for the brigade was considered tank-capable. In reality, the tankers only had one narrow gauge railroad at their disposal, designed to move between peat quarries. Everything else was swamp, forest, and other difficult terrain.

Another problem for the 16th Tank Brigade was the lack of organic infantry support. They were to fight alongside the 147th Infantry Division, the only unit of the 2nd Shock Army that had yet to fight in the Leningrad direction. In addition, the division recently received reinforcements and did not have time to do exercises to increase cohesion.

The workers' village was protected by SS police units and was located at a joint between two German divisions. This meant that it was one of the weakest links in the German defenses. Here is where the Volkhov Front had to strike.

Difficulty of Cooperation

The attack began on January 20th, 1943. There was little time allotted for preparation, just one night. Infantry commanders could do nothing to prepare their soldiers for fighting alongside tanks.

Nevertheless, the first attack of our forces was pretty lucky. Soviet artillery hit the SS regiment's HQ, disabling its commanders. When tanks of the 16th brigade showed up, enemy infantry routed and began to retreat. Those who did not manage in time were encircled and destroyed north of Workers' Village #6. A handful of those surrounded managed to slip away at night. The village itself was defensed by a joint group of SS and soldiers from the 374th grenadier regiment, also recently escaped from an encirclement. They were in the way of the tank attack.

The tanks of the 16th brigade burst into the village. The first among them was driven by K.G. Tkachenko. His tracks crushed a few SS-men and an AT gun. Other tanks caught up and fighting began. As a result of the battle, almost the entire village was in Soviet hands. The entire left flank of the SS division hung in the air. For the Germans, the loss of the village seriously threatened their positions at Sinyavino, as their defenses could buckle at any time from a flanking attack. The Soviet forces could also attack southwards and completely cut off the roads that supplied the Germans at Sinyavino.

The enemy quickly understood this. Gathering up the remnants of battered units, the Germans counterattacked. Tankers met the German infantry with fire, and the battle could have gone our way, but it just so happened that the 147th Infantry Division lost nearly all commanders in its regiments. The only thing that they could do with untrained infantry was to lead them personally, but the moment that there was no one left in charge, the soldiers ran. The tankers defending the village had no assistance, and having lost seven tanks burned and four knocked out, managed to hold out on the northern outskirts.

Licking Wounds

The next day, tankers continued to fight for Workers' Village #6. Infantry helped little. Two more tanks were lost to German assault guns. However, the tankers held out.

The battle continued. Senior Sergeant Tkachenko's tank was ignited by a bottle with incendiary fluid, but he managed to drive the tank to a safe place. Lieutenant Gorbunov's tank was also damaged, but he managed to repair it, tying the steering cords directly to his shoulders. This let him drive away with two of his dead comrades. However, no amount of skill and courage could make up for the fact that infantry was pinned down and would not follow the tanks.

On January 22nd, the battle grew more fierce. Few remaining tanks from the 16th brigade burst into the village. They were followed by infantry from another, more experienced division. The Germans were thrown back, but they counterattacked several times during that day. Immobilized Soviet tanks fired from their positions to assist the infantry. By the end of the day, the village was firmly in Soviet hands. This success was provided by the tankers.

Worker's Village #6 was the first of many settlements liberated after the penetration of the blockade. This victory was earned at a great cost. The 16th Tank Brigade alone lost 14 T-34s, 2 T-60s, and 2 T-70s. 28 tankers died, 33 were wounded, and loss of infantry numbered in the thousands. German casualties were less, but the exact number is still unknown.

The 2nd Shock Army began attacking the Sinyavino Heights in January and fought here for many months. Remaining tanks from the 16th Tank Brigade held Workers' Villafe #6 until February 1943. A year later, this unit would participate in the final collapse of the blockade and earn the title of the best tankers of the Volkhov Front.

Original article available here.

World of Tanks History Section: Best Tankers of the Leningrad Direction

The operation to break the Leningrad blockade wasn't only the first major Soviet offensive of 1944, but also the first major use of armour by Leningrad and Volkov Fronts since 1941.

One of the more notable episodes of the Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Operation was the action of the tankers from the 59th Army during the liberation of Novgorod. In three years of difficult and bloody fighting in the Leningrad direction, few such examples of independent and effective action by a tank unit can be found. The heroes of this story are the tankers of Colonel Kirill Osipovich Urvanov's 16th Tank Brigade.

From the Foothold

The last time the brigade was actively used in battle was January of 1943, in an attempt to build on the success of the first penetration of the Leningrad blockade. Now, a year later, it composed the mobile group of the 6th Infantry Corps. The brigade had 48 tanks, 32 of them T-34s and the rest light T-60s and T-70s.

Opposing them was the German 28th Jaeger division. The German command reinforced them with assault guns from a tank destroyer unit and a large amount of AT guns.

The offensive of the 59th Army started in the Novgorod direction on January 14th, 1944. The first successes were on the auxiliary direction, where the Soviet operational group crossed lake Ilmen. On the main direction, the 239t Infantry Division attacked from the Volkhov foothold and also penetrated enemy defenses after some time. On January 15th the 16th Tank Brigade reinforced with an SPG regiment followed them into the breach.

The tanks fought in difficult conditions. First, the Soviet forces did not penetrate the defenses completely. Second, forests, swamps, deep snow, and the reinforced banks of Pitba river created many problems for the attackers. The first attack revealed all these issues, but there was no choice: it was still necessary to cross the swampy shores and minefields. Thanks to timely actions of the commander and personnel, a Soviet motorized infantry battalion managed to capture a foothold on the opposite side of the river by dusk. The rest of the infantry and the tanks followed them. By the end of January 15th, German defenses were penetrated. The 16th Tank Brigade turned south to the Novgorod-Chudovo highway. In addition, the Germans were driven out of Tyutitsa.

Pummelling at Podberezye

On the next day, the 16th Tank Brigade achieved great success due to competent direction from superior officers who managed to coordinate an artillery barrage that was necessary when attacking such a large stronghold. Tankers hit the village and the Podberezye railroad station. Senior Lieutenant Gorokhov's platoon entered the village first, then the others pulled up, fully clearing it of Germans. Having captured Podberezye, the Soviet forces took one of the largest German footholds, as well as cut off several enemy garrisons positioned to the east. This was a serious hit for the Germans. The 18th Army HQ demanded that the station be held at any cost, and this was quite a shock.

The 16th brigade also distinguished itself by defeating a German column that was trying to retreat from Podberezye. On January 16th, Soviet intelligence reported that the Germans were retreating west. Tankers had to cut off the enemy's retreat, and tanks were sent to the Podberezye-Nekohovo highway. Two T-60s were the first to reach the road: tanks commanded by Senior Sergeants Pridatko and Sviridov.

They saw a column of a German tank destroyer squadron, headed by an assault gun. The tankers opened fire. The Germans fired back and hit Sviridov's tank. The tank burned. With the last of his strength, the driver turned the tank perpendicular to the road, blocking the column.

Pridatko's crew managed to knock out several cars when the German assault gun rammed his tank. The light vehicles was crushed by the enemy's mass. By then, other tanks reached the battlefield, and a two hour battle ensued. When the Germans were finally defeated, 200 dead Germans, 45 cars, 10 guns, 8 motorcycles, and 3 radio stations littered the road. In addition, several dozen Germans were taken prisoner. Seems that most of the 28th Jaeger Division's AT guns were destroyed in this battle. German sources write that the 478th Tank Destroyer Battalion was lost here.

The front lines turned into several strongholds that the enemy still held onto. The Germans in Novgorod were in a serious danger of being encircled.

Novgorod is Ours!

The penetration of German defenses and battles over their strongholds came at a cost. In total. the 16th Tank Brigade lost 6 T-34 tanks and 4 light tanks. The fighting was far from over.

The tankers did not rest on their laurels. On January 17th, they moved further south along with the 65th Order of the Red Banner Infantry Division and another veteran of the swamps and forests, the 29th Tank Brigade. Tanks tore southwards across forest roads and swamps, threatening to cut off the main road west from Novgorod. They captured one important location, Vyazhishe village, reaching yet another railroad.

It became clear that significant effort was required to keep moving forward. Brigade commander Colonel Urvanov was selected as the head of the advance guard. While soldiers were clearing the road, he decided to send an SPG regiment and motorized infantry battalion to capture the railroad and hold it until the tanks can get out of the swamps.

By the end of January 17th, the armoured advance guard of the Soviet offensive was several kilometers away from the Novgorod-Luga highway. The motorized infantry battalion of the 16th Tank Brigade was ahead of the rest. If was the first to reach the railroad near the Nashi passing loop. Here, our tankers met their old friends from Sinyavino in the winter of 1943: elements of the 3rd Grenadier Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division and SS cavalry. Until the arrival of the main forces, the advance guard repelled up to eight attacks without retreating one step. Several days later, sad scraps of a single battalion from the 21st Division managed to make it through the encirclement.

The Germans knew that Novgorod could not be held. The breakthrough began on the morning of January 20th. The Germans took heavy losses in the fighting around the city.

When tanks joined up with their motorized infantry, another push south followed. Soon those who spent days marching through swamps and crushing German garrisons were shaking the hands of their comrades who liberated Novgorod the Great.

This part of the operation concluded fortunately for the 16th Brigade. Total losses were 11 tanks, 54 dead, 148 injured and three MIA. Considering the conditions of the operation, these losses were acceptable.

Original article available here.

Lend Lease Trade-In

Somewhat recently, I wrote about the common myth about the 1st Mechanized Corps trading in their T-34s for Shermans. A reader emailed me and asked me about examples of swapping our domestic vehicles for imported ones. I thought of a good example from the archive of the 16th Independent Tank Brigade.

The brigade started its fighting in 1944 with 32 T-34s, 9 T-70s, and 7 T-60s. In early February, they were taking a heavy beating, with 2-4 T-34s and 3 or 4 light tanks fighting at any given time. They fought in this difficult condition until March, when they were finally given an order to settle down in Dno for the time being. After a six week long 553 km offensive, they deserved a rest, as well as some new tanks.

The next time I can see a full enumeration of the brigade's resources is on July 5th, and it got a little more colourful. 31 T-34s (11 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of evacuation), one T-34 engineering tank, 5 T-70s (2 undergoing repairs), 2 Valentine MkIIIs (1 undergoing repairs), 4 Valentine MkIXs (1 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of evacuation), and 4 Shermans (1 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of transport). This rag-tag gang of unlikely heroes has a strange fuel situation: 7 full resupplies of 1st grade gasoline, 2 of 2nd grade, but only 2 resupplies of diesel.

A subsequent report explains why. The brigade was equipped with whatever was available, as soon as it was available, and with a very flexible definition of "available". Only 7 T-34 tanks received did not require repairs, everything else required medium to major repairs, to be performed by the brigade and 31st Army Repair Base. Brigade mechanics complain about shoddy work by the base's technicians that has to be re-done. Since parts were in short supply, they had to be scavenged from knocked out tanks over a large territory (220 km in radius). By July 9th, the brigade had 27 T-34s, 1 Valentine MkIII, one Valentine MkIX, and 5 Shermans. Only 27 T-34s and one T-70 were capable of driving, and "the technical condition of the tanks (aside from 7 T-34s that arrived from Saratov factory) was not inspiring". While still not fully equipped, the brigade received orders for a 110 km march. The Lend-Lease vehicles were left behind, and 27 T-34s, 4 T-70s, and 3 SU-85s attempted the trek. It took 12 hours, with 2 T-34s, a T-70, and a SU-85 falling behind. The journal complains about a significant amount of dust on the road, causing a breakdown of the engines. Thankfully, once the brigade arrived at their destination, they received 30 new T-34-76 and T-34-85 tanks.

The summer must not have been kind to the brigade, since the brigade receives reinforcements again on August 20th, and what reinforcements are these... 55 Matildas and 11 Valentine MkIXs, "arrived from repair factories and having already fought on the fronts of the Patriotic War". The journal also mentions that two battalions had a T-34 each. As per tradition, it seems, the brigade begins a lengthy 160 km march over difficult terrain, leaving behind 10 Matildas and one Valentine on the way due to breakdowns and 18 Matildas due to a lack of oil. Another 30 km march loses 8 Matildas and 2 Valentines. The conclusion is predictable: "The vehicles received and the crews were not ready for battle... The crews that arrived knew the MkII and MkIX tanks poorly, their drivers were taught little, as a result of which 27 tanks fell behind for technical reasons over a 180 km march."

At the start of September, the brigade ended up with 4 combat ready T-34s (the two they saved plus two more that were repaired), 23 combat ready Matildas, and only one combat ready Valentine. 7 more Matildas and 9 Valentines were knocked out on enemy territory, 13 Matildas and one Valentine were recovered and need medium repairs, and 9 Matildas need major repairs. Only 3 Matildas burned up. I can't tell why (the photocopy is really bad), but by September 4th, the brigade is down to 2 T-34s again, with the other two sent off to another unit.

Sometime in early September, the brigade picked up a few SU-85s to supplement its antiques roadshow, which is good, since there were Panthers ahead. The repair guys again complain about the multitude of vehicles they have to fix up, commenting that parts for the Lend-Lease tanks were not available and had to be scavenged from damaged tanks. The T-34 engineering tank is mentioned again as being the primary method of recovering bogged down tanks. Despite the large amount of Matilda tanks the brigade started out with, there are no working ones left at the end of the month.

The bloodied brigade was then moved to the Stavka's reserves for restructuring. It was transferred to the 1st Polish Army on January 5th, 1945, and received 85 shiny new T-34-85 tanks in February. After such a colourful set of vehicles, it met the end of the war with a full complement of modern fighting machines.

Repairs in the 16th Tank Brigade

From L.V. Gorchakov collection.

I've written about combat successes and heroic actions of the brigade, but none of these would be possible without a healthy amount of support from less glamorous positions. The mechanics deserve their praise too, and, as such, get included in the appendix.

"Evacuation and repairs of equipment of the 16th Tank Brigade from September 23rd, 1941 to April 20th, 1942

In the aforementioned period, the following tanks were evacuated from the battlefield:

• KV: 9
• T-34: 26
• BT: 30
• T-26: 7
• German tanks: 5
• Total: 77

In this period, the following repairs were performed.

Vehicle	Major repairs	Medium repairs	Minor repairs
KV	10	16	56
T-34	3	24	141
BT	21	30	154
T-26	19	9	44
BA-10	-	-	5
BA-20	-	3	40
ZiS-5s	-	8	114
ZiS-6	-	-	10
GAZ-AA	-	8	104
GAZ-AAA	-	3	48
M-1	-	8	70
GAZ-64	-	-	10
ZiS-32	-	-	12
M-72	-	10	88
IZh-9	-	8	56
ST-2	-	5	62
STZ-5	-	8	56
ChTZ-65	-	1	20
AT guns	-	4	14
German halftrack	-	1	5
Total	51*	145	1093

The numbers show that a large amount of work was done to evacuate broken down vehicles from the battlefield and repair them. Difficulty arose from the fact that the evacuation was done from the battlefield under enemy fire, due to which 15 soldiers and commanders were lost. 

The following comrades, with energy and initiative, worked in evacuation and repair of the combat vehicles.

1. Deputy commander of the brigade's technical department, Major Zhidovetskiy
2. Captain Demyanov
3. Military Technician 2nd grade Simonov
4. Military Technician 1st grade, Novichkov
5. Captain Golmachev
6. Military Technician 1st grade, Musienko
7. Political Instructor Gorchakov
8. Senior Sergeant Yartsev
9. Military Technician 2nd grade Rosochinskiy.

Additionally, 15 soldiers, junior commanders, and technicians received gratitude and were rewarded with medals for swift and high quality repair."

*The incorrect sum is present in the original document.

Heroes of the 16th Tank Brigade

From L.V. Gorchakov collection.

As a part of the application for Guards status, the commander of the 16th Tank Brigade includes a summary of particularly courageous individuals within the Brigade. Here it is. People described in the previous article have been omitted, as there is no additional information here.

"A Short Summary of Particularly Outstanding Tankers, Motorized Infantrymen, AA Gunners and Mortar Crews of the 16th Tank Brigade

1. Senior Lieutenant Antonyuk: Participated in 43 attacks. His vehicle destroyed 27 AT guns, 25 mortars, 48 machineguns, 5 tanks, one ammunition warehouse, 2 infantry cannons, 34 dugouts, 1 kitchen, and up to 1000 soldiers and officers. Comrade Antonyuk has already been awarded the Order of the Red Star and has been nominated for a Hero of the Soviet Union.
2. Lieutenant Martynov: In one day, he destroyed 5 German tanks and captured 3 tanks in an uneven battle with a whole tank company. He was nominated for the highest government award, Hero of the Soviet Union.
3. Junior Lieutenant Vasilyev: On April 20th, 1942, he received the order to penetrate the enemy's front line of defense to cut off the Myagry-Dubovik road. He slowly progressed through the thick forest and swamps. Due to a small amount of assigned infantry, he was cut off from his unit. In this scenario, Vasilyev made the decision to destroy the enemy positions at any cost. His reconnaissance squads reported that there were German fortifications in the area, with their gun ports turned towards the road. Comrade Vasilyev had a portion of his infantry climb up on his tank with a mounted machinegun, and with a skilful maneuver, emerged in the rear of those fortifications, destroying 10 dugouts and the fascists inside them. In order to break out of encirclement, where the tank has been for three days, it was necessary to destroy the enemy AT gun battery. In order to distract it, comrade Vasilyev retains a portion of his infantry to open fire at the battery, places a mounted machinegun on his engine deck to muffle the engine noise, and approached within 50-80 meters of the Germans' rear. Suddenly opening fire, he destroyed three guns. The remaining gun was crushed underneath the tank's tracks, providing an exit for his tank and infantry escort.
   Over three days of constant fighting, Jr. Lieutenant Vasilyev destroyed 5 AT guns, 14 dugouts, 8 mortars with crews, and killed 500 soldiers and officers. His trophies included 50000 rounds of ammunition, 8 submachineguns (6 German), 9 hand and 9 mounted machineguns, valuable documents, and one prisoner. In total, Vasilyev's record includes 9 attacks, in which he destroyed 6 AT guns, 28 dugouts, 4 AT rifles, 8 mortars, and exterminated up to 800 soldiers and officers. Comrade Vasilyev was nominated for the highest government award, Hero of the Soviet Union.
4. Senior Lieutenant Danilov: Participated in 32 attacks, destroyed 2 tanks, 2 armoured cars, one motorcycle, 23 machineguns, 24 AT guns, 28 mortars, 6 infantry cannons, 27 earth fortifications, and up to 900 occupants. Comrade Danilov has been twice nominated for a government award, one of which, an Order of the Red Banner, he has already received.
5. Senior Sergeant Makarov: Drove a tank into an attack 36 times, and always emerged victorious. Over the last 4 attacks, his crew destroyed: 7 AT guns, 2 mortar batteries, 2 field guns, 2 mounted machineguns, 2 dugouts, 1 earth fortification. In one of these attacks, his tank sustained damage to the turret and suspension. A skilful maneuver took the tank out of enemy territory.
   In total, comrade Makarov destroyed 1 tank, 1 armoured car, 8 machineguns, 12 AT guns, 14 mortars, 12 earth fortifications, and up to 400 occupants.
   Comrade Makarov has been nominated for awards thrice, having received two already: an Order of the Red Banner and a For Courage medal.
6. Battalion Commissar Pochepayev: Participated in 9 attacks. His tank destroyed 2 AT guns, 18 mortars, 8 machineguns, 2 infantry cannons, 19 dugouts, and over 120 soldiers and officers.
   Comrade Pochepayev has been awarded an Order of the Red Star.
7. Comrade Matyuhin: Tank commander, participated in 13 attacks, destroying 4 infantry cannons, 1 tank, 28 machineguns, 12 mortars, and up to 800 soldiers and officers. Comrade Matyuhin has been awarded an Order of the Red Banner.
8. Junior Political Instructor Chistyakov: Artilleryman-sniper. In one battle, he knocked out 3 tanks with 3 shells. In total, acting as a part of Lieutenant Martynov's crew at Gontovaya Lipka, Tortolovo, [illegible] and [illegible], he destroyed 8 tanks, 12 AT guns, 1 machinegun, and exterminated up to 460 occupants.
   Comrade Chistyakov has been awarded an order twice.
9. Political Instructor Gorchakov: His crew was in battle for two days straight. The faces of driver Totsenko, gunner order-bearer Sankevich and radio operator Korobkov were covered in soot. The frost caused snow to form on the inside walls of the tank. These men did not think of rest or food, they only aimed to catch up to the enemy fleeing in fear. In this battle, this brave crew destroyed 12 dugouts with infantry, 3 mortar batteries, 3 earth fortifications, 3 mounted machineguns, 2 AT guns, and destroyed one and captured one field gun. Up to 300 soldiers and officers were crushed or shot by the crew. Comrade Gorchakov was nominated for an award.
10. Sergeant Pomogalov: Tank commander. In an attack on Pogostye, he enabled infantry to progress 2 kilometers into enemy territory. A group of German submachinegunners up to a company in size attempted to flank the infantry, but comrade Pomogalov predicted their maneuver. His cannon and machinegun fire killed 40 fascist submachinegunners, and forced the rest to flee.
    Comrade Pomogalov participated in numerous attacks, destroying a medium tank, 3 AT guns, 3 machineguns, 1 mortar, 4 dugouts, and up to 100 soldiers and officers.
    Comrade Pomogalov is nominated for an Order of Lenin.
11. Major Kudryavtsev: Commander of the 1st Independent Tank Battalion. In January of 1942, on a mission from the brigade commander, he spent 13 days behind enemy lines with soldiers and commanders, blocking their supplies and exterminating fascist scum.
    On March 12th, while on a mission from the brigade commander to penetrate the Leningrad blockade, comrade Kudryavtsev, with his tank battalion, penetrated enemy fortifications and moved forward. However, as they approached the Shal fortification region, the infantry was pinned down. Comrade Kudryavtsev displayed necessary initiative and gathered infantry from various units, placing it on his tanks. He attacked the region with sudden strikes from all sides, succeeding in taking this heavily fortified area. The enemy left up to 300 soldiers and officers, 3 AT guns, 10 machineguns, 8 earth fortifications, and 10 dugouts.
    Comrade Kudryavtsev has been nominated for a government award: the Order of the Red Banner.

This is just a partial list of outstanding tankers, There are many of them, fearless Red warriors prepared to give their life for a righteous cause. 

Outstanding motorized infantrymen, mortar gunners, and AA gunners include:

1. Political Instructor Kazachinskiy: Exterminated 70 fascists.
2. Red Armyman Nalivayko: 50 fascists.
3. Lieutenant Shalygin, Adjutant, exterminated 47 fascists, awarded an Order of the Red Star.
4. Senior Lieutenant Ryabikov: Deputy commander of the motorized infantry battalion, exterminated 28 fascists. Awarded an Order of the Red Star.
5. Red Armyman, machinegunner Verzelov: exterminated 28 fascists.
6. Junior Lieutenant Pozdeev: commander of a machinegun platoon, exterminated 28 fascists.
7. ..."

The rest of the list is just straightforward kill counts, which aren't very interesting. Certainly no captivating stories like with the tankers.

Guards Application

A unit doesn't just receive a Guards designation all willy-nilly. Like any title, it must be earned. The commander of the 16th Tank Brigade compiled a report in order to apply for the status of a Guards brigade. His efforts were insufficient, but not unrewarded, as his brigade was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

"Summary of the combat action of the 16th Tank Brigade, starting from September 23rd, 1941

To the Military Council of the 54th Army

A report on the combat action of the 16th Tank Brigade over the course of 8 months of the Patriotic War.

A. Combat action of the brigade

The 16th Tank Brigade began formation in the city of Vladimir during a difficult time for our Motherland. In 19 days, on September 23rd, 1941, it entered battle on the south shore of Lake Ladoga as a part of the 54th Army, and fought for 8 months nonstop along with infantry of this army. The army always successfully crushed fascist scum, cleaving the path to victory for infantry, even in difficult forested and swamped areas, limiting action to 2-3 tanks, or even single vehicles, in the Sinyavino-Mgin, Volhov, and Tikhvin directions. Many battles are shining examples of this success:

1. Battles for Gontavaya Lipka and Tortolovo
2. Battles around Volhov: Zhubkino, Zamoshye, Vyachkovo
3. Battles in the Tikhvin direction, where the brigade was covering a 40 km front: Sorokino, Valya, Hvalovo, height 70.9 ("cannon mountain")
4. Capture of villages Shala and Dubovik
5. Actions of the brigade at Lipovik (twice)

These are far from all examples of the courage and bravery of the brigade members, remorselessly crushing the enemy, in most cases while outnumbered. Even in cases when the situation did not allow for organization of cooperation with infantry, tankers and motorized infantry of the brigade improvised cooperation on the the battlefield, demonstrating resourcefulness, bravery, and heroism, stopped at nothing, and always emerged victorious, leading accompanying personnel by example.

1. Most powerful anti-tank and anti-infantry fortifications at Gontovaya Lipka were taken with help from the 310th and Guards 4th Infantry Divisions on October 21-22nd, 1941, involving a river crossing.
2. Right after Gontovaya Lipka, the brigade captured the no worse defended fortifications at Tortolovo (the infantry lagged behind) and held it against counterattacks for a day.
3. In early November 1941, the 16th Tank Brigade was transferred to the left flank of the 54th Army, where the city of Volhov was in danger of being captured, cutting off elements of the 54th Army.
   Moving on both shores of the river, in cooperation with weakened retreating elements of the 285th Infantry Division, 6th Naval Brigade, the 16th Tank Brigade:
1. Stopped the enemy's further advance northwards towards the joint between the 54th and 4th Armies.
2. Prevented the capture of Volhov and the encirclement of the 54th Army.
4. Having held the enemy in the Volhov direction, the 16th Tank Brigade (less its motorized infantry battalion) was dismounted at the joint between the 54th and 4th Armies across a front of 40 km, where its actions aided the 4th Army in its famous defeat of the fascist occupants in the Tihvin region.
5. In the middle of March of 1942, the brigade, in cooperation with the 294th Infantry Division, penetrated the enemy fortifications at Pogostye and Zharok, after which, acting on the initiative of the commander of the 1st Independent Tank Battalion, Major Kudryavtsev, the Shal Fortification Region (village Shal) was hit from three sides with tank infantry (March 12th, 1942), guaranteeing the successful penetration of the region by the 4th Guards Infantry Corps.
   For the capture of the Shal fortifications, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front thanked the 16th Tank Brigade.
6. On March 25th, 1942, the 16th Tank Brigade was roused by the Staff Commander of the 54th Army, Major-General Berezinskiy, and transferred in the direction of the Dubovik-Zenino and regional border intersection, with the aim of defeating the threat to the left flank of the 4th Guards Infantry Corps, which was successfully breaking through in the Korodynya-Luban direction.
   The brigade, in cooperation with the thinned out 198th Infantry Division, captured marker 41.3 near river Reli, dealing great damage to the enemy and disrupting the joint between the Kirish and Maluksin groups.
7. Having been removed from combat to restore its vehicles, the 16th Tank Brigade was transferred to the region north of Dubovik and, in cooperation with 285th Infantry Division, captured Dubovik and held it for two days under intense artillery fire and bombings.
8. In cooperation with elements of the 4th Guards Infantry Corps, in operations from May 8th to May 11th, the 16th Tank Brigade, in most difficult conditions of spring mud, in a thick forest, through swamps and minefields, laid a path for the infantry to capture the Klin grove, crossed the river Chagoda, and blocked off the Dubovik-Lipovik road, which earned an expression of gratitude from the commander of the 4th Guards Infantry Corps.

The brigade owes these successes to its collective of combat brotherhood, bearing true heroes of the Patriotic war, having taught tens and then hundreds of tank destroyers, sharpshooters, AA gunners in battle, carefully and skilfully applying the mighty combat vehicles they have been given. 

Over the 8 months of its presence in battle, the brigade has not seen one instance of its members attempting to evade their task of protecting the Motherland. On the contrary, the brigade is proud of names known by the whole country, such as:

1. Senior Lieutenant Martynov: In a battle by the village of Zhubkino, he took one KV tank into battle against a German tank company. Outnumbered, he returned victorious, having destroyed 5 tanks and captured 3 (the crews fled), with the remaining 6 tanks avoiding battle. Comrade Martynov also destroyed one armoured car, 15 horse carts, up to 8 "Hanses" and "Fritzes", and towed his trophies intact to the repair and fuel station.
2. Senior Lieutenant Antonyuk: Participated in 43 attacks. Destroyed 27 AT guns, 25 mortars, 48 machineguns, 5 tanks, one ammunition depot, 2 field guns, 34 dugouts, 1 field kitchen, and up to 1000 soldiers and officers.
3. Senior Lieutenant Bachilov: His vehicle was the first to penetrate enemy defenses at Dubovik, having destroyed 5 AT guns, 5 AT rifles, 4 mounted and 6 hand-held machineguns, 10 carts with ammunition, 8 earth emplacements, 12 dugouts, and up to 100 soldiers and officers. Bachilov's tank was damaged, and could not move, so he was forced to remain in enemy territory. The enemy gathered 100 submachinegunners and a tank to try and capture Bachilov's vehicle, but his courageous crew destroyed the enemy tank, after which the enemy knocked out his gun and machinegun. As the enemy drew closer, Bachilov made the only correct decision, to call artillery fire on his location. Bachilov corrected artillery fire through his radio, not leaving his vehicle for the enemy.
4. Junior Lieutenant Sherstnev: During a night attack in the Shal region, his vehicle lost a track and it slipped off the road wheels. The enemy advanced, wishing to capture the vehicle. Sherstnev repaired the track at night, resuming the attack in the morning, destroying 8 earth emplacements, 7 machinegun nests, captured an anti-tank gun, 2 mounted machineguns, 40,000 rounds for them, and killed up to 250 fascists. Sherstnev was wounded with shrapnel to the back, but did not leave the battle, serving as a commander of two tanks at once (the commander of the other was heavily wounded).
5. Senior Lieutenant Polyakov: Heroically defended a tank stuck in a hole (Shal region). His cool-headness and courage triumphed and he left 20 fascist corpses lying next to the tank. Before the next battle, Polyakov was accepted as a VKP(b) candidate. In that battle, he destroyed one medium tank, two mortar batteries, 4 dugouts with infantry, 20 submachinegunners. Our infantry was pinned down by mortar and machinegun fire. Comrade Polyakov exited his tank and raised the infantry into an attack with cries "For the Motherland, for Stalin!". The enemy was routed, but in this battle, comrade Polyakov fell the death of brave men, having completed his battle objective.
6. Junior Lieutenant Vasilyev: Participated in 9 attacks, and, during the last one, in the region of Dubovik, he was trapped in an encirclement with a group of infantry. He continued fighting for three days with no refills of fuel or ammunition, having taken up the initiative of coordinating infantry and tank actions. Over three days, Vasilyev destroyed 28 dugouts, 5 AT guns, 8 mortars, and up to 500 soldiers and officers, captured a large amount of ammunition and other trophies. 
7. Captain Kiryashin: Former platoon commander, currently the commander of the motorized infantry battalion. With his rifle, he killed 200 fascists. Kiryashin trained a group of soldiers numbering over 150 which proved themselves in combat against fascist scum.
8. Former Private, currently Senior Sergeant Pershin, a student of Captain Kiryashin. Went on several scouting missions behind enemy lines. Twice performed particularly daring raids:
1. In the first, he stole a hand machinegun with ammunition from a German machinegunner, and then killed the machinegunnner with a grenade.
2. In the second, with a small group of scouts, he penetrated deep into enemy lines, scattered the Germans' rifles, and then killed them by throwing grenades into chimneys. Aside from that, he killed 50 soldiers and officers with his PPSh.

This list of heroes is by no means complete (see attachment #1). These "aged" heroes train the brigade for more and more victories.

Over 8 months of battles, the 16th Tank Brigade has fought a numerically superior enemy, having crossed forests, swamps, rivers, deep snow, off-road terrain, and delivered crushing blows to the enemy, completing missions for the Army and the Front as a powerful cohesive fighting force. It is a menace to the enemy and a reliable foundation, capable of completing any task on the front of this Patriotic War.

The Brigade captured and destroyed the following in 8 months (September 23rd 1941 to May 20th, 1942)

Item	Destroyed	Captured	Total
Anti-tank guns	136	25	161
Tanks	61	3	64
Machineguns	152	159	311
Mortars	217	42	259
75 mm infantry cannons	11	-	11
SMGs	-	41	41
Rifles	-	554	554
Radios	-	8	8
Anti-tank rifles	9	10	19
MG barrels	-	16	16
Flamethrowers	-	6	6
Pistols	-	7	7
Shells	-	3480	3480
Rifle rounds	-	86000	86000
Mines	-	1870	1870
Grenades	-	2400	2400
Flares	-	500	500
Cars	1	4	5
Warehouses	-	1	1
Horses	25	35	60
Kitchens	1	1	2
Soldiers and officers	8913	13	8926
Airplanes	14	-	14
Armoured cars	4	-	4
Tankettes	2	-	2
Motorcycles	2	-	2
Dugouts	448	-	448
Earth fortifications	181	-	181
Tents	27	-	27
Fuel warehouses	2	-	2
Ammunition warehouses	2	-	2
Sheds with infantry and equipment	2	-	2
Carts	25	35	60

Then there are a bunch of stats on political work (VLKSM membership, party membership, amount of money spent on war loans, stuff like that) that isn't very interesting. Then we get to more good stuff, awards.

"214 men from the brigade were recommended for a government award, 105 of which have already been awarded. The Military Council of the 54th Army has declared gratitude and awarded monetary or otherwise valuable items to 5 members of intermediate commanders, 7 members of junior commanders, and gratitude was expressed to 35 Red Armymen, 61 members of junior commanders, and 75 members of  intermediate and senior commanders."

Some more pomp about gratitudes, previously described above, goes here. This article is getting long enough, so attachments of more detailed successes of the brigade are going into another part.

54th Army, March 1942

From L.V. Gorchakov's collection.

"To the Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Leningrad Front, Major-General comrade Bolotnikov

I present to you a report on the performance of the 16th, 98th, 122nd, and 124th Tank Brigades over the month of March of 1942.

The conditions faced during the month of March fully correspond to those faced in February. All experience gained in February was applied and proven in battle by tank units in March. The following needs to be said regarding combat actions for March.

1. Combat actions were organized by brigade headquarters and commanders more thoroughly. The commanders of the 124th TBr considered the deficiencies in planning during February, and made every attempt to not let them happen again in March.

The template for controlling the battle, passed on to brigades by the Army Armoured Forces HQ was applied in practice, using all types of communication: radio, telephone, radio armoured cars, couriers, and observers, and fully proved itself. However, as a rule, there was not enough time to carefully plan a battle down to the details.

A limited amount of time provided for preparation (observation, reconnaissance, preparation of combined arms cooperation) allowed by Army HQ negatively affected the quality of preparation and the actions of the tank units.

It is necessary to say that repeated attacks in one direction over the span of several days had no effect, and increased the amount of casualties, as the enemy had time to built up a thick wall of anti-tank guns. On the contrary, practice showed that hidden concentrations of tanks and then a sudden attack brings significant successes with almost no losses in materiel or manpower. 

For example, the success of the Shal operation and the decisive penetration of the enemy defenses is explained by a sudden and secret reshuffle by the 16th Tank Brigade from the Pogostin direction.

When organizing such an operation, it is necessary to take into account all elements that may influence its success. In this operation, the poor condition of roads and passages through the railroad embankment for tanks could have sabotaged the success of the operation. My personal intervention and order to send tanks not through passages, but over the embankment allowed the start of the operation to commence on time, and did not let the enemy discover our movements in time to prepare an anti-tank defense.

Tank columns used in the previous months, 3-5 tanks per column with heavy or medium tanks in the front making a path for light tanks confirmed their usefulness in the forest. In this formation, crews can look after each other, cover tanks that are ahead, and sufficiently well guard their flanks.

Motorized infantry battalions, due to their organization and armament, are a powerful combat unit and must be used in combination with tanks in order to secure their successes and cover both the brigade in general and its units on vulnerable flanks.

2. Causes of large losses, aside from those listed in February, include:

1. Ignorance of terms from the Red Army combined arms manual, deciding tasks of infantry, artillery, and tanks.
2. Poor skill of combined arms commanders, demanding tanks to advance without preliminary suppression of AT guns and splitting tank units into small groups.

The main deficiencies when using tanks in a way that violates NKO order #057 are as follows:

1. Artillery support for tanks, in most cases, is absent, even though there is a point made in infantry orders about supporting tank attacks with artillery (311th, 11th, 281st, 80th infantry divisions).
   The guns directly accompanying tanks were not given enough crews, which caused them to constantly lag behind the advancing tanks.
   As a result of passive artillery, tanks had to fight enemy AT guns themselves, which were often firing thermite shells. As a result, there were large losses.
   For example, in the 122nd TBr, over several days of fighting alongside the 281st Infantry Division, 10 tanks were lost, 3 of them irreparably. 16th TBr, fighting alongside 80th Infantry Division lost a total of 6 light tanks without making any significant progress. 98th TBr was supporting the 4th GSK and over three days of battle (March 20th-22nd) lost 6 tanks permanently. 
2. Tanks are still being used in small groups. For example, on March 24th-28th, 320th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Infantry Division used 2 tanks. March 13-14th, 1062nd Infantry Regiment in the 281st Infantry Division used 3 tanks, on March 16th, out of 8 tanks working with the 281st Infantry Division, 3 were passed on the the 11th Infantry Division. 12 tanks from the 98th TBr were assigned to the 3rd GSD and 33rd Infantry Brigade, which also split up tanks to give to its regiments. 3 tanks were assigned to support 115th Infantry Division.
   This kind of separation into small groups negatively impacts the organization of tank actions and does not achieve positive results.
   Aside from this, application of these small groups in one direction repeatedly over several days lets the enemy built up an anti-tank defense, and destroy these tanks, often irreparably.
3. There are cases when there is not enough time to organize the use of tanks after receiving objectives from Army HQ (agreement on cooperation, tank reconnaissance, observation, etc).
   As a result of this, tank losses grow.
   For example, when the 122nd TBr fought alongside the 219th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Infantry Division, three tanks were destroyed by enemy mines and explosives, when 16th TBr fought alongside the 281th Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division, hurriedly organized combat plans, poor knowledge of infantry commanders and little time allotted for reconnaissance, two tanks were destroyed by AT guns immediately when they arrived at their positions.
4. Lately, fearing that the infantry will retreat at night from a held position, infantry commanders leave tanks within the infantry camps overnight. As a result, tank crews spend several days in a row fighting, having no time to conduct technical inspections and preventative maintenance. This leads to excessive wear of tank parts and losses due to breakdowns.
5. A number of combined arms commanders' attempts to use tanks incorrectly was prevented by me personally. For example, Major-General Starikov wanted to send tanks into a night attack, Major-General Berezinskiy tried to send individual vehicles into battle. In connection to this, it is important to remind combined arms commanders about NKO order #057 and warn them about using and taking care of tanks in accordance with Red Army requirements.

Assumptions and conclusions made in the previous report about repairs and evacuations are fully confirmed in March. March experience shows that uninterrupted use of tanks in battle for several days does not allow for any thorough inspection of the tanks' technical condition and timely lubrication of its components, which leads to unnecessary wear on the tanks and mechanical breakdowns.

When tanks were removed from the brigade for service, the inspection of defects was often poor, and underestimated the amount of time needed to repair the tank. This led to low quality of repairs and rapid breakdowns of tanks.

There are not enough repair resources available. A repair company only has a small platoon of repair vehicles. Repair companies had to be reinforced with 20-25 specialists from Army repair bases and brigades sent from Leningrad factories. 

Actions in swampy forests require engineering units in order to place roads immediately after advancing infantry. Without these roads, the transportation of fuel, lubricants, and ammunition for uninterrupted supply of tanks is jeopardized. 

The political and morale condition of the tank crews and unit in general is high. Crews had to fight for days with little sleep or no sleep, spending nights among the infantry where they had to resupply their tank and, if possible, perform a technical inspection. Breaks of 3-5 days in the fighting did not give any rest to the tank crews, which had to work to restore their vehicles. Despite these difficult conditions, there were no cases of low morale or cowardice. The personnel act bravely and decisively, show initiative, and cause large losses to the enemy, leading to the failure of his defensive lines (Konduya, Shala, Zenino) and our units' successfully progress forward."