Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, visited Moscow in August of 1942. However, a Churchill arrived a month prior to that in another Soviet city, Archangelsk, with the PQ-17 caravan, and not just one. These, of course, were Churchill II and III infantry tanks. 301 tanks of this type were sent to the USSR, 253 of which arrived at their destination. Despite a rather small volume of shipments, the prime minister's namesake played an important role on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. Suffice it to say that these tanks, along with the KV-1S, were the primary heavy tanks of the Red Army during the Battle for Prokhorovka.
This blog is dedicated to bringing World War II era documents to the general public, with an overall focus on armoured warfare. Questions? Requests? Comments? Email me at tankarchives@gmail.com or find me on Twitter @Tank_Archives.
Showing posts with label Prokhorovka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prokhorovka. Show all posts
Saturday, 17 February 2018
Saturday, 12 July 2014
World of Tanks History Section: Prokhorovka Interview
The winter of 1942-1943 proved difficult for German soldiers. The Wehrmacht took heavy losses of vehicles and men. The Stalingrad catastrophe sapped the Reich's reputation, accentuating internal and external political problems. No one spoke of victory, the Germans could only hope to end the war with minimized losses.
In order to restore political and military prestige, the nazi leaders needed a successful campaign against its main enemy: the Soviet Union. This was the seed of Operation Citadel, an offensive at Kursk. Despite the fact that German commanders were sceptical about the chance of success, it was carried out anyway, and ended with a predictable German defeat.
One of the key moments of the battle was the tank battle at Prokhorovka. The amount of vehicles used was one of the greatest in all of WWII. Valeriy Nikolayevich Zamulin, Candidate of Historical Science, tells us details of this battle.
Valeriy Nikolayevich, the greatest tank battle at Kursk happened at Prokhorovka, on July 12th, 1943. There is much information about this battle, and it is largely contradictory...
Let's start with the fact that the Battle for Prokhorovka happened not only on July 12th. This day was only the culmination, its most dramatic moment. It started on July 10th, when the 2nd SS tank corps acted on the orders of the commander of the 4th tank army, General Hoth, to take Prokhorovka, to later deliver a strike to the rear of the defending Soviet forces, namely the 69th Army. The corps was composed of three motorized SS divisions: Death's Head, Adolf Hitler, and Das Reich. The battle lasted until July 16th. In the night of July 17th, German forces began their retreat to the Belgorod-Tomarovka-Borisovka line, their initial positions.
Data on the amount of vehicles that participated in the July 12th battle differs noticeably between American, Soviet, and German sources. How many tanks were really used?
The main events that used a large number of vehicles on July 12th at Prokhorovka happened in two placed. West of the station, in the so called "tank field", 514 Soviet tanks and SPGs faced off against 210 German tanks and assault guns for 9-10 hours. South of the station, 158 Soviet tanks and SPGs fought against 119 German vehicles. In total, 1001 armoured vehicles, according to documents declassified in the late 1990s.
The popular Soviet figure of 1500 vehicles is too high. It initially was an estimate in a report from the 5th Guards Tank Army for July of 1943, and migrated into historical literature from there.
Why overestimate the amount of vehicles?
The commander of the army needed to show that the losses for only 10 hours of battle were not the results of mistakes or miscalculations, but the army participated in an unbelievably grandiose battle. The losses from such a battle could not be small. In the open, these numbers were first encountered in the "Battle of Kursk: Summary" brochure, published in 1945.
What vehicles were used in battle?
The USSR used mostly T-34 medium tanks (70%), and light T-70s with a 45 mm gun, as well as three SPG regiments using SU-76, SU-122 and SU-152 vehicles. The 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant-General P.A. Rotmistrov had two regiments of English Churchill MkIV tanks. As for heavy KV-1 tanks, there were only two of them during the entire 7 days of battles here, and neither was used directly in combat.
The SS divisions had ordinary PzIII and PzIV tanks, StuG assault guns, and Hummel and Wespe SPGs for fire support. There were Tigers, but very few. On the eve of the famous battle, on July 11th, only 15 Tiger tanks were recorded as functional. Adolph Hitler division, which fought a the "tank field", only had 4.
Panthers and Ferdinands are often mentioned in connection with this battle, but there weren't any here. The Panther battalion that was destined for Prokhorovka was partially defeated by Katukov's 1st Tank Army west of Prokhorovka, and partially broke down. All Ferdinands were in the north, at Ponyri station.
I want to highlight that the main causes of the failed Soviet counterattack on July 12th were the difficult terrain and the fact that Adolph Hitler division transferred to a defense. The greatest losses were suffered not from enemy tanks, but from artillery.
When the battle is described, the image of a massive field where tanks fight "point blank" appears. How was it really?
There are many stereotypes of the Prokhorovka tank battle, and they are far from reality. For instance, the terrain the 5th Guards advanced through did not allow for a massive tank rush which we often envision when reading about the battle. If this was possible, the Germans would have been overrun within the hour, as the main strike was delivered by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, counting 368 tanks and SPGs, that's theoretically 60 tanks per kilometer, not counting the SPGs.
And there were even more, over 200 tanks of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps in the second echelon of the army. A successful Soviet counterattack would have been disastrous for the Germans, even though they were facing the better equipped enemy units.
Unfortunately, the Soviet counterattack was wedged between the Psel river and Storozhevoye stow, only 900 meters, where a single tank battalion (26 tanks) could deploy with difficulty, let alone a brigade or a corps.
General I.F. Kirichenko's 29th Tank Corps could only send 30-35 tanks in two echelons at a time between the Oktyabrskiy farm and height 252. As a result, a "tank rush" could not be achieved, and the tanks were sent to battle in small numbers, with significant intervals, under heavy enemy fire. Our forces took heavy losses at the start of the battle, and the knocked out tanks impeded the vehicles advancing behind them.
A large ravine impeded the neighbouring 18th Corps, passable by tanks in only one place. Even after passing it, the tanks could not form up for an attack, they needed to drive a few hundred more meters under enemy fire. The real advance of Soviet forces was as follows: 3-4 groups of 30-35 vehicles in two rows, one brigade after another, with intervals of 30 minutes to one hour.
Estimates of losses of both sides at Prokhorovka differ by orders of magnitude. Which are the closes to reality?
The most complicated situation is with the Germans. 80, 130, 350 losses are mentioned. There is also utter idiocy: 5 German tanks. Historians, me among them, consider that the SS lost 122-163 vehicles on July 12th, 20-30 permanently.
The small number of permanent losses creates an illusion, but make no mistake, the SS was heavily bloodied. Despite the fact that they controlled the field of battle until July 17th and could evacuate their vehicles, the majority of them was sent home to Germany for restoration. These may not be permanent losses, but long-term.
Our forces lost 340 tanks and 19 SPGs on July 12th. Of those, 193 tanks and 14 SPGs could not be recovered. This is caused by the Germans destroying Soviet vehicles as they were retreating.
What happened in the vicinity of the station after July 12th?
On the night of the 13th, the command of the Voronezh Front received a report that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to heavy losses, was no longer battle capable. The best tank unit, which was necessary for a push to the Dnieper, lost near some railroad station in 10 hours, moving only two kilometers forward in the center, at the cost of a 4.5 km retreat at the flanks. The neighbouring 5th Guards Army, who also participated in the attack, faced similar difficulties.
Rotmistrov's guardsmen were incapable of holding the flank of the 69th Army, as heroically as they fought. As a result, the SS tank corps and the 3rd tank corps, newly arrived from the Belgorod direction, managed to encircle the 48th Infantry Corps of the 69th Army, four infantry divisions, at the Donets interfluve on July 15th. At dawn, the encircled units broke out, but with heavy losses. That marked the end of the Battle of Prokhorovka.
How important was the Battle of Prokhorovka to the Red Army?
A counteroffensive was planned on July 12th, the main part of which was the battle between the SS tank corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army. The goal of the offensive, the destruction of the SS tank corps, was not achieved; in those conditions, it would be impossible. The enemy held a large number of forces and caused them noticeable losses. Soviet propaganda inflated it to "the largest tank battle of all time". This was not it.
Nevertheless, the result of the tank battle was a victory, not a tie, as the German military historian Karl Frieser insists. The battle of Prokhorovka is a culminating moment in the Battle of Kursk, after which enemy resistance decreased drastically. I must remark that many publications have a logistical mistake: correlation equals causation! I don't want to equate the events called Battle of Prokhorovka and the battle at Prokhorovka on July 12th, 1943. The tank battle is only one part, if an important part, of the battle.
The Soviet forces achieved their objective: they did not let the enemy break through their defenses and caused serious losses to their enemy.
About the interviewee: Valeriy Nikolayevich Zamulin is a military historian, a Candidate of Sciences. In 2009, he defended his thesis on the historical issues of the Battle of Kursk, the defensive operation of the Voronezh front from July 5th to 23rd. From March 1996 to August 2009, he worked as a director and then deputy director of scientific work at the Federal Cultural Office "State Military-Historical Museum-Preserve "Prokhorovka Field"". He is the author of over 60 scientific publications, including 5 monographs in Russian and English. He participated in a number of documentary films and series on Russian television channels, as well as several radio shows on the Battle of Kursk.
Original article available here.
In order to restore political and military prestige, the nazi leaders needed a successful campaign against its main enemy: the Soviet Union. This was the seed of Operation Citadel, an offensive at Kursk. Despite the fact that German commanders were sceptical about the chance of success, it was carried out anyway, and ended with a predictable German defeat.
One of the key moments of the battle was the tank battle at Prokhorovka. The amount of vehicles used was one of the greatest in all of WWII. Valeriy Nikolayevich Zamulin, Candidate of Historical Science, tells us details of this battle.
Valeriy Nikolayevich, the greatest tank battle at Kursk happened at Prokhorovka, on July 12th, 1943. There is much information about this battle, and it is largely contradictory...
Let's start with the fact that the Battle for Prokhorovka happened not only on July 12th. This day was only the culmination, its most dramatic moment. It started on July 10th, when the 2nd SS tank corps acted on the orders of the commander of the 4th tank army, General Hoth, to take Prokhorovka, to later deliver a strike to the rear of the defending Soviet forces, namely the 69th Army. The corps was composed of three motorized SS divisions: Death's Head, Adolf Hitler, and Das Reich. The battle lasted until July 16th. In the night of July 17th, German forces began their retreat to the Belgorod-Tomarovka-Borisovka line, their initial positions.
Data on the amount of vehicles that participated in the July 12th battle differs noticeably between American, Soviet, and German sources. How many tanks were really used?
The main events that used a large number of vehicles on July 12th at Prokhorovka happened in two placed. West of the station, in the so called "tank field", 514 Soviet tanks and SPGs faced off against 210 German tanks and assault guns for 9-10 hours. South of the station, 158 Soviet tanks and SPGs fought against 119 German vehicles. In total, 1001 armoured vehicles, according to documents declassified in the late 1990s.
The popular Soviet figure of 1500 vehicles is too high. It initially was an estimate in a report from the 5th Guards Tank Army for July of 1943, and migrated into historical literature from there.
Why overestimate the amount of vehicles?
The commander of the army needed to show that the losses for only 10 hours of battle were not the results of mistakes or miscalculations, but the army participated in an unbelievably grandiose battle. The losses from such a battle could not be small. In the open, these numbers were first encountered in the "Battle of Kursk: Summary" brochure, published in 1945.
What vehicles were used in battle?
The USSR used mostly T-34 medium tanks (70%), and light T-70s with a 45 mm gun, as well as three SPG regiments using SU-76, SU-122 and SU-152 vehicles. The 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant-General P.A. Rotmistrov had two regiments of English Churchill MkIV tanks. As for heavy KV-1 tanks, there were only two of them during the entire 7 days of battles here, and neither was used directly in combat.
The SS divisions had ordinary PzIII and PzIV tanks, StuG assault guns, and Hummel and Wespe SPGs for fire support. There were Tigers, but very few. On the eve of the famous battle, on July 11th, only 15 Tiger tanks were recorded as functional. Adolph Hitler division, which fought a the "tank field", only had 4.
Panthers and Ferdinands are often mentioned in connection with this battle, but there weren't any here. The Panther battalion that was destined for Prokhorovka was partially defeated by Katukov's 1st Tank Army west of Prokhorovka, and partially broke down. All Ferdinands were in the north, at Ponyri station.
I want to highlight that the main causes of the failed Soviet counterattack on July 12th were the difficult terrain and the fact that Adolph Hitler division transferred to a defense. The greatest losses were suffered not from enemy tanks, but from artillery.
When the battle is described, the image of a massive field where tanks fight "point blank" appears. How was it really?
There are many stereotypes of the Prokhorovka tank battle, and they are far from reality. For instance, the terrain the 5th Guards advanced through did not allow for a massive tank rush which we often envision when reading about the battle. If this was possible, the Germans would have been overrun within the hour, as the main strike was delivered by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, counting 368 tanks and SPGs, that's theoretically 60 tanks per kilometer, not counting the SPGs.
And there were even more, over 200 tanks of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps in the second echelon of the army. A successful Soviet counterattack would have been disastrous for the Germans, even though they were facing the better equipped enemy units.
Unfortunately, the Soviet counterattack was wedged between the Psel river and Storozhevoye stow, only 900 meters, where a single tank battalion (26 tanks) could deploy with difficulty, let alone a brigade or a corps.
General I.F. Kirichenko's 29th Tank Corps could only send 30-35 tanks in two echelons at a time between the Oktyabrskiy farm and height 252. As a result, a "tank rush" could not be achieved, and the tanks were sent to battle in small numbers, with significant intervals, under heavy enemy fire. Our forces took heavy losses at the start of the battle, and the knocked out tanks impeded the vehicles advancing behind them.
A large ravine impeded the neighbouring 18th Corps, passable by tanks in only one place. Even after passing it, the tanks could not form up for an attack, they needed to drive a few hundred more meters under enemy fire. The real advance of Soviet forces was as follows: 3-4 groups of 30-35 vehicles in two rows, one brigade after another, with intervals of 30 minutes to one hour.
Estimates of losses of both sides at Prokhorovka differ by orders of magnitude. Which are the closes to reality?
The most complicated situation is with the Germans. 80, 130, 350 losses are mentioned. There is also utter idiocy: 5 German tanks. Historians, me among them, consider that the SS lost 122-163 vehicles on July 12th, 20-30 permanently.
The small number of permanent losses creates an illusion, but make no mistake, the SS was heavily bloodied. Despite the fact that they controlled the field of battle until July 17th and could evacuate their vehicles, the majority of them was sent home to Germany for restoration. These may not be permanent losses, but long-term.
Our forces lost 340 tanks and 19 SPGs on July 12th. Of those, 193 tanks and 14 SPGs could not be recovered. This is caused by the Germans destroying Soviet vehicles as they were retreating.
What happened in the vicinity of the station after July 12th?
On the night of the 13th, the command of the Voronezh Front received a report that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to heavy losses, was no longer battle capable. The best tank unit, which was necessary for a push to the Dnieper, lost near some railroad station in 10 hours, moving only two kilometers forward in the center, at the cost of a 4.5 km retreat at the flanks. The neighbouring 5th Guards Army, who also participated in the attack, faced similar difficulties.
Rotmistrov's guardsmen were incapable of holding the flank of the 69th Army, as heroically as they fought. As a result, the SS tank corps and the 3rd tank corps, newly arrived from the Belgorod direction, managed to encircle the 48th Infantry Corps of the 69th Army, four infantry divisions, at the Donets interfluve on July 15th. At dawn, the encircled units broke out, but with heavy losses. That marked the end of the Battle of Prokhorovka.
How important was the Battle of Prokhorovka to the Red Army?
A counteroffensive was planned on July 12th, the main part of which was the battle between the SS tank corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army. The goal of the offensive, the destruction of the SS tank corps, was not achieved; in those conditions, it would be impossible. The enemy held a large number of forces and caused them noticeable losses. Soviet propaganda inflated it to "the largest tank battle of all time". This was not it.
Nevertheless, the result of the tank battle was a victory, not a tie, as the German military historian Karl Frieser insists. The battle of Prokhorovka is a culminating moment in the Battle of Kursk, after which enemy resistance decreased drastically. I must remark that many publications have a logistical mistake: correlation equals causation! I don't want to equate the events called Battle of Prokhorovka and the battle at Prokhorovka on July 12th, 1943. The tank battle is only one part, if an important part, of the battle.
The Soviet forces achieved their objective: they did not let the enemy break through their defenses and caused serious losses to their enemy.
About the interviewee: Valeriy Nikolayevich Zamulin is a military historian, a Candidate of Sciences. In 2009, he defended his thesis on the historical issues of the Battle of Kursk, the defensive operation of the Voronezh front from July 5th to 23rd. From March 1996 to August 2009, he worked as a director and then deputy director of scientific work at the Federal Cultural Office "State Military-Historical Museum-Preserve "Prokhorovka Field"". He is the author of over 60 scientific publications, including 5 monographs in Russian and English. He participated in a number of documentary films and series on Russian television channels, as well as several radio shows on the Battle of Kursk.
Original article available here.
Wednesday, 6 March 2013
World of Tanks History Section: Battle of Prokhorovka
1. Introduction
The winter offensive by the RKKA and counterattack of the German operational group Kempf led to a spearhead pointed towards the West, in the region of Belgorod, Kursk, and Orel. Near Orel, the situation was reversed. The front line, if only slightly, bent towards the east, to the settlements of Efremov and Berezovka. This strange positioning gave the German high command the idea of a summer offensive which would encircle Soviet forces in the Kursk region.
The "Kursk arc" was very well positioned for this sort of strategy. The Wehrmacht no longer had the forces for a large scale offensive. They could only depend on localized strikes. The combined attack of the Kursk forces from the north and the south would cut off the Central and Voronezh Front forces and destroy them. The Germans called this "Operation Citadel".
2. Positioning
After a failed attempt to take the village of Oboyanskoye, the German attack was redirected towards the village of Prokhorovka, across the river Psel, towards Kursk. Knowing that they were in danger of a counterattack by Soviet tanks, the objective of the Germans was to keep the Soviet forces between the railroad and the river.
From the West, the 2nd SS division sent 294 tanks (15 of them Tigers) to Prokhorovka. From the South, the 3rd tank corps (119 tanks, 23 Tigers). SS division "Adolf Hitler" was already active between the railroad and the river. Despite what popular history suggests, Panthers did not fight at Prokhorovka, keeping to the Oboyan sector instead. Instead of Panthers, the Germans had captured T-34s.
The Soviet opposition at Prokhorovka consisted of the 5th Guards Tank Army, commanded by P. A. Rotmistrov, with 826 tanks and self propelled guns. Rotmistrov's forces were reinforced by two independent tank corps. A. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army was also taking part in the battle.
3. Battle
At 8:30 am, on July 12th, after an artillery barrage, Soviet forces moved into Prokhorovka. The first wave of the attack consisted of 4 tank corps. The German side moved out 500 tanks and self propelled guns, including 42 Tigers. The morning sun was shining in the eyes of the Germans, giving the Soviet forces an advantage in the early stages of the battle. Despite a somewhat sudden attack, Soviet forces were met with thick fire from anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Taking heavy losses, the 18th tank corps broke though to the Oktyabrskiy farm and captured it. Here, they met with a large amount of German forces, including 15 Tigers. In a brutal encounter, the Soviets pushed the Germans back to the village Vasilievskiy, but took too many casualties to continue the attack, and fortified for a defense.
Around 9 in the morning, battles around Prokhorovka started: next to Oktyabrskiy, village of Prelestniy, east of the settlement of Ivanovskie Vyselki, on both sides of the railroad. Neither side was pushing forward; the German assault stalled.
At the same time, south-west of Prokhorovka, between the river Psel and the railroad, a furious tank battle broke out. The Germans tried to break through this sector to get to an operationally advantageous position, and continue their push to Kursk. The Soviets, as stated before, launched their counterattack through here. 518 tanks were gathered in total, with a numerical advantage on the side of the RKKA. Due to the density of the attacking forces, the tanks mixed with each other. Soviet tanks, with their superior agility, could get close in the cloud of dust that was kicked up by the collective tracks, depriving the Germans of the advantage of their superior armour and guns.
A smaller, but equally furious fight erupted next to the village of Kalinin, around 13:00. The 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps had around 100 tanks. Opposing them were around the same number of tanks and self propelled guns from the Das Reich SS division. The Soviet forces retreated to the villages of Vinogradovo and Belenihino, and fortified for a defense.
During July 12th, the 30km stretch of front at Prokhorovka saw numerous large scale tank battles. The main battle, between the railroad and the village, continued on until sunset. At the end of the day, neither side had a clear advantage. Both sides took heavy casualties. The German side lost 80 tanks (sources vary) and the Red Army lost about 260 (again, there are major contradictions between different sources).
4. Conclusions
The Battle of Prokhorovka can be compared to the battle of Borodino in 1812. The major difference was that the Russians in 1812 were forced to retreat, while the Red Army successfully stopped the German advance, at the cost of a quarter of the available tanks.
Due to the heroism of Soviet soldiers, the Germans did not move further than Prokhorovka, and the Red Army began a massive offensive several days later, completely overtaking the strategic initiative. After the Battle of Kursk it was irrefutably clear that the fall of Germany would only be a matter of time.
Original article available here.
The winter offensive by the RKKA and counterattack of the German operational group Kempf led to a spearhead pointed towards the West, in the region of Belgorod, Kursk, and Orel. Near Orel, the situation was reversed. The front line, if only slightly, bent towards the east, to the settlements of Efremov and Berezovka. This strange positioning gave the German high command the idea of a summer offensive which would encircle Soviet forces in the Kursk region.
The "Kursk arc" was very well positioned for this sort of strategy. The Wehrmacht no longer had the forces for a large scale offensive. They could only depend on localized strikes. The combined attack of the Kursk forces from the north and the south would cut off the Central and Voronezh Front forces and destroy them. The Germans called this "Operation Citadel".
2. Positioning
After a failed attempt to take the village of Oboyanskoye, the German attack was redirected towards the village of Prokhorovka, across the river Psel, towards Kursk. Knowing that they were in danger of a counterattack by Soviet tanks, the objective of the Germans was to keep the Soviet forces between the railroad and the river.
From the West, the 2nd SS division sent 294 tanks (15 of them Tigers) to Prokhorovka. From the South, the 3rd tank corps (119 tanks, 23 Tigers). SS division "Adolf Hitler" was already active between the railroad and the river. Despite what popular history suggests, Panthers did not fight at Prokhorovka, keeping to the Oboyan sector instead. Instead of Panthers, the Germans had captured T-34s.
The Soviet opposition at Prokhorovka consisted of the 5th Guards Tank Army, commanded by P. A. Rotmistrov, with 826 tanks and self propelled guns. Rotmistrov's forces were reinforced by two independent tank corps. A. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army was also taking part in the battle.
3. Battle
At 8:30 am, on July 12th, after an artillery barrage, Soviet forces moved into Prokhorovka. The first wave of the attack consisted of 4 tank corps. The German side moved out 500 tanks and self propelled guns, including 42 Tigers. The morning sun was shining in the eyes of the Germans, giving the Soviet forces an advantage in the early stages of the battle. Despite a somewhat sudden attack, Soviet forces were met with thick fire from anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Taking heavy losses, the 18th tank corps broke though to the Oktyabrskiy farm and captured it. Here, they met with a large amount of German forces, including 15 Tigers. In a brutal encounter, the Soviets pushed the Germans back to the village Vasilievskiy, but took too many casualties to continue the attack, and fortified for a defense.
Around 9 in the morning, battles around Prokhorovka started: next to Oktyabrskiy, village of Prelestniy, east of the settlement of Ivanovskie Vyselki, on both sides of the railroad. Neither side was pushing forward; the German assault stalled.
At the same time, south-west of Prokhorovka, between the river Psel and the railroad, a furious tank battle broke out. The Germans tried to break through this sector to get to an operationally advantageous position, and continue their push to Kursk. The Soviets, as stated before, launched their counterattack through here. 518 tanks were gathered in total, with a numerical advantage on the side of the RKKA. Due to the density of the attacking forces, the tanks mixed with each other. Soviet tanks, with their superior agility, could get close in the cloud of dust that was kicked up by the collective tracks, depriving the Germans of the advantage of their superior armour and guns.
A smaller, but equally furious fight erupted next to the village of Kalinin, around 13:00. The 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps had around 100 tanks. Opposing them were around the same number of tanks and self propelled guns from the Das Reich SS division. The Soviet forces retreated to the villages of Vinogradovo and Belenihino, and fortified for a defense.
During July 12th, the 30km stretch of front at Prokhorovka saw numerous large scale tank battles. The main battle, between the railroad and the village, continued on until sunset. At the end of the day, neither side had a clear advantage. Both sides took heavy casualties. The German side lost 80 tanks (sources vary) and the Red Army lost about 260 (again, there are major contradictions between different sources).
4. Conclusions
The Battle of Prokhorovka can be compared to the battle of Borodino in 1812. The major difference was that the Russians in 1812 were forced to retreat, while the Red Army successfully stopped the German advance, at the cost of a quarter of the available tanks.
Due to the heroism of Soviet soldiers, the Germans did not move further than Prokhorovka, and the Red Army began a massive offensive several days later, completely overtaking the strategic initiative. After the Battle of Kursk it was irrefutably clear that the fall of Germany would only be a matter of time.
Original article available here.
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