Track Bashing

 Changing tracks on T-34 and T-34-85 tanks at the Museum of National Military History

As the saying goes, there is no such thing as a light tank. Many operations that seem quite simple are actually very difficult to perform on a machine weighing several dozen tons. Many vehicles from the Great Patriotic War era were anything but light, and servicing them requires a lot of effort.

Changing tracks is a routine but difficult procedure.

The vehicles at the Museum of National Military History are not empty boxes, but rather fully functional military vehicles. This includes the museum's T-34 tanks. Both of them are used in various events. This involves swapping out the tracks from the stock ones to special parade tracks and back. This article will cover the details of this process.

Eternal Proving Grounds in the Middle East

Throughout the various Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-1982 Israel, Egypt, and Syria received foreign military vehicles in large amounts. The Middle East was an excellent proving grounds to compare the performance of Soviet and Western military vehicles in real combat. Let's see which vehicles Israeli and Arab tankers got their hands on and how they performed over the decades of conflict.

Aquino Tank Weekend Reenactment Day 1

The battle for Aquino airport in Italy on May 19th, 1944, was a difficult one for the Canadian Ontario Regiment and the British 26th Armoured Brigade that they were supporting. The attack against the German defensive line covered by fog failed. Even though the Hitler Line fell only a few days later, the sacrifice of the Ontario Regiment is still commemorated by the Ontario Regiment Museum at the Aquino Tank Weekend every year.

StuG Replica at Aquino

This StuG replica looks pretty good, but a quick count of the road wheels reveals that it's not a StuG at all. This is a vehicle on the FV 432 chassis, which is commonly used to make replicas of PzIII and StuG vehicles for reenactments.

Sd.Kfz.251/10 Ausf.D in Action

Another Sd.Kfz.251 from the Ontario Regiment Museum, this time a 251/10 Ausf.D. As far as I can tell, this is an actual German vehicle.

OT-810/Sd.Kfz.251 Ausf.C at Aquino Tank Weekend 2019

The Sd.Kfz.251 was one of the few German army vehicles to see any post-war service. Not only that, it was produced in Czechoslovakia under the index OT-810. Dubbed "Hitler's revenge" by the soldiers, it did not prove very popular, but it did ensure that reenactors dressed as German infantrymen would not have to walk to the battlefield.

T-62: Return of the Smoothbore

In the late 1950s, the Soviet government received information that NATO nations developed and adopted new 105 mm tank guns, which made the T-54 and T-55, the most common types of Soviet tank, vulnerable. The 100 mm rifled gun on the T-55 could not penetrate the front of the M48 Patton III, and the Americans were already developing the M60 Patton IV. In case of a duel, the T-55 would be at a disadvantage.

World of Tanks History Section: Merkava

On June 24th, 2006, Guy Kabili was ambushed. A 300 kilogram explosive flipped his tank, after which it was hit with three anti-tank rockets. Six of the seven men inside survived. Their saviour was the Merkava ("chariot") tank, created with the slogan "the most valuable part of a tank is the crew".

Development of a fortress on wheels

Israel Tal, the father of the Merkava, was a tanker, not an engineer. He commanded the Israeli 84th "Steel" tank division. Tal himself proposed the design of a domestic armoured vehicle after talks to purchase and produce British Chieftain and French AMX-30 tanks failed.

Relying on his rich combat experience and rejecting the need to rely on foreign partners, Israeli workers concentrated on creating a tank suited for local conditions and peculiarities. For instance, while Soviet designers had to deal with railroad standards when making new tanks, Israeli designers would be able to cover their potential theater of war with wheeled transport or using the tanks' own tracks.

Designers studied and compared several suspension systems from various countries, including captured Soviet vehicles, and decided that a spring suspension would work best. It was considered obsolete by this point, but resulted in superior resistance to mines and the ability to quickly swap out road wheels. The driver's observation device was tested in a wooden mockup mounted on a Jeep in areas of potential conflicts.

The Israeli version of the L7 105 mm rifled gun was used as the main weapon, due to its excellent reputation in combat. Later Merkava tanks received a 120 mm smoothbore gun.

The highest priority of the designers was the survival of the crew. To achieve this, the engine and transmission were placed in the front, and the crew and ammunition in the back, the most protected part. A rear hatch increased the chances of leaving a knocked out tank alive. Since the fighting compartment turned out to be very large, it could fit additional ammunition, infantry, or wounded. The Merkava served as a basis for a so called "tankbulance", vehicles with on-board medical equipment and doctors.

These new tanks were adopted into the Israeli army in 1979.

Practical application

The Merkava first saw battle in 1982 during a war in Lebanon. In early June, 200 of these tanks took part in "Operation Peace for Galilee". However, the first battle where they were supposed to engage Syrian T-72s never happened. There are many colourful stories about the slaughter of T-72s by Israeli tanks, but the truth is that the Merkavas simply didn't make it in time. Syrian T-72s fought only unarmoured Jeeps with TOW missiles from the Koah Yosi division.

Ironically, the first potential deadly enemy of the Merkava was an Israeli Magach (Patton). On June 9th, one Merkava from the 198th Battalion was knocked out by Syrians near Ain-a-Tina, after which it was mistakenly fired upon by tanks from another Israeli battalion. A good part of Merkavas lost in that conflict were lost due to friendly fire. For instance, on June 10-11th, Israeli helicopters fired on their own tanks twice. Five tanks were damaged, two crewmen died.

The largest use of Merkavas to this day happened in 2006, during the Second Lebanon War. 400 tanks including the newest Merkava-4s took part in an offensive on Hezbollah controlled territory. According to Israeli sources, over 1000 anti-tank rockets and shells were fired at these tanks, including Kornet rockets. 45 tanks were hit a total of 51 times, and about half of those hits penetrated. Three tanks were total losses, and 25 crew members died (these figures do not include losses due to mines and explosives).

The battles of 2006 showed once again that there is no such thing as an invincible tank, the only question is how much effort must be spent to destroy it. Even the best tanks will take heavy losses when used incorrectly. A battle at the dried out Saluki river serves as such an example. The Israeli offensive in this direction was delayed by two days. As a result, Hezbollah had time to prepare anti-tank defenses which were not discovered by Israeli scouts. Even though new Merkava-4 tanks were sent into battle, there were still losses. Tanks were fired upon from multiple directions, three out of 24 vehicles received penetrating hits, 7 tankers died. Considering the situation, a bold tank charge without reconnaissance and support, this is a relatively small loss,but it was possible for the whole column to remain on the sandy slopes of Saluki.

Merkava's designers managed to achieve their goal: maximum protection, especially for the crew. As Israel Tal once said "The tank with the better crew will be victorious!" Merkava's combat path shows that the tank's designers had their priorities straight. The most important component, the crew, was valued higher than anything else.

Original article available here.

Reactive Armour and Edge Effect

Penetration mechanics of even simple steel are complicated enough, but can be somewhat simplified for most uses, such as penetration tables and video game calculations. However, when reactive armour is thrown into the mix, how does one evaluate its increase in protection? How does the edge effect, present in only a small percentage of hits on conventional armour, affect it? An article in the Armoured Journal (Bronetankoviy Vestnik) by A.I. Anisko, S.V. Bodrov, D.A. Rototayev, and A.A. Scinarenko attempts to answer this question.

"Reactive armour is used to protect tanks from HEAT shells. Usually, these are removable containers with thin steel plates, sandwiching an explosive element. In order to place these elements correctly on the hull, one must first consider the protection of the reactive armour when used with the main armour. One methodology counts it as an equivalent thickness added to the main armour in certain conditions of HEAT shells striking the center of the container. Consider the dependence of the protection of the reactive armour and the time of reaction of the HEAT jet and protective plates. When the point of impact is moved from the center to the edge of the plate, the penetrative power of the HEAT shell decreases by 30-60%. However, the contribution of the edge effect to the protection of reactive armour has not been explored. 

A contained with two reactive armour elements were tested. The test was performed by detonating the warhead of a 93 mm AT grenade at an angle of 60 degrees. The warhead was placed to imitate a hit to various parts of the container (fig. 1). The peripheral points were 10-15 mm away from the side of the element."

Fig. 1. Locations of hits to the container.

The following is the data obtained when detonating the warhead, averaged over 5 trials for each point. Remaining penetration is defined as penetration through a plate of medium hardness steel after passing through the reactive armour. Q is defined as the contribution of the reactive armour to protection, obtained by subtracting remaining penetration from penetration through the same steel plate when no reactive armour is present. This table contains both the predicted and experimentally obtained Q.

Point	Remaining penetration	Q (calculated)	Q (experimental)
A	211	266	258
B	37	452	462
C	274	214	225
D	292	179	207
E	86	420	413
F	376	126	123

When hit in the center, the reactive armour has the greatest effectiveness, adding over 450 mm to the thickness of the armour. When hit in the sides, the effectiveness is about half as much, even less when the HEAT jet hits the corners of the plate. This is caused by the various sizes of the plate fragments that interact with the HEAT jet, as well as the number of fragments it is likely to pass through. 

The scientific model is pretty good, as you can see from the small differences between the predicted and observed values of Q. The model predicts that about 25% of the surface area of the reactive armour element will give more than 400 mm of additional protection, about 50% contributes more than 350 mm, and about 75% contributes more than 300 mm to the tank's armour.

The equation that governs this distribution is Q=123.85+3.4x1+3.77x2-0.027x12-0.016x22 and looks like this when plotted.

Fig. 2. A line equal to the protection contribution Q in a coordinate plane defined by x1 and x2.

World of Tanks History Section: T-14 Armata

30 years ago, engineers from Nizhniy Tagil created a foundation for a new tank with Object 187 and Object 187A. The innovative but unfortunate Object 195 was then built in metal. What was the fruit of the labours of Ural engineers?

On the way to a breakthrough

Successful decisions in the 1960s allowed Soviet engineers to achieve a tank with a very tight layout. The tanks were compact, not very heavy, and had excellent protection. On the other hand, if the enemy shell did punch through the armour, it was nearly guaranteed that it would destroy components or kill the crew. The ammunition rack in the fighting compartment was especially worrying.

In the end of the 1980s, all major Soviet tank factories were working on new tanks. Engineers aimed to boost the firepower (including by means of increasing the gun caliber), increase protection, and automate the vehicles. Additionally, a new layout was necessary, as the classic layout was no longer sufficient for survivability on the battlefield.

Soviet engineers had a difficult task. They needed to develop an innovative solution to protect the crew and fighting compartment, separating them from the ammunition rack. Kharkov, Nizhniy Tagil, and Leningrad were working on this task. The Nizhniy Tagil project from Uralvagonzavod, Object 187A, was never built in metal, but was the basis of the experimental "Perfection-88" program. In 2000, the Object 195 vehicle was created based on that research, a predecessor for the T-14 tank built on the heavy universal tracked Armata platform.

What is the logic in creating a unified platform? Production of spare parts is simplified. It is easier to repair the tanks, easier to train the personnel. A unified platform allows for larger production runs, which reduces unit cost. Vehicles on the same chassis have more or less the same speed, which is important when marching. For instance, a bridgelayer should not lag behind MBTs, as it needs to arrive on the battlefield at the same time.

Armata's older brother

Object 195 built by Uralvagonzavod included two important novelties: an unmanned fighting compartment and an armoured capsule for the crew. However, the new was just the somewhat forgotten old, as there were attempts in the 1950s to separate the crew and armament into different modules, but only in a prototype. Similar work was conducted in the 1980s.

Object 195's capsule increased armour from all sides: sides, roof, front. The tankers were also separated by armour from the fighting compartment. The design was such that when the ammunition detonated, the blast wave would go everywhere but in the direction of the crew. This did not guarantee survival, but it increased the odds by orders of magnitude.

The unmanned fighting compartment was completely automatic. It contained the ammunition and loading mechanism. The turret served only as a weapons mount. At the same time, it acted as added protection against ammunition that penetrated the roof. It is much harder to penetrate such an obstacle than a single armour plate. The crew entered the turret only during an emergency, such as a breakdown in the loading mechanism.

The main armament of the Object 195 was the 152 mm smoothbore 2A83 gun, which provided many options when destroying targets with APFSDS shells or ATGMs.

Object 195 passed state trials in the late 2000s but never made it into production. There were several causes for this. The 152 mm gun was too powerful, there was no worthy adversary for its ammunition, and none were visible in the near future. The ammunition capacity was also very small, only 24 rounds. This is acceptable when fighting only enemy tanks, but the modern MBT has to solve a wide array of problems, and it is very possible that frequent restocking of ammunition will be difficult or impossible. There were also complaints about the armour: if the front was adequately protected, the roof and sides did not meet new increased requirements. Factories were also not ready for this new tank.

Soon after work on Object 195 was complete, Object 148 arose, also called T-14. This is the tank that today is called Armata. The T-14 includes all the best parts of Object 195, but on a qualitatively new technological level.

A portrait of the T-14

The Armata inherited the armoured crew capsule, unmanned fighting compartment, and rear engine compartment from Object 195. The tank has a modular design that makes repairs and modernization easy. Most components can be easily replaced. If necessary, the mass can be increased. It is a veritable 50-65 ton "Lego tank" (this is the alleged weight limit of the chassis).

The powerful front armour is comparable with the crew compartment capsule. The upper and lower front plates are protected by a new generation of reactive armour, in addition to composite armour. It is designed to destroy or destabilize incoming ammunition that threaten the main armour. Additional reactive armour also protects the sides. All armour components of the T-14 are easy to replace.

Why is the crew capsule in the front, right against the front armour? The tank's designers estimate that no modern tank gun or those that are likely to be developed in the near future can penetrate the front armour of the tank. The crew is most protected when it is closest to this shield. The only way the tank can be penetrated in the sides is if it is fired upon at a nearly 90 degree angle, and even then, the capsule is still protected by many layers of armour and reactive armour.

The T-14's turret is a mount for sights, various equipment, and of course the 152 mm 2A82 high power gun. The gun is designed to have high precision even without the high-tech fire control system. The gun has two variants: with a bore evacuator and without. The latter is installed in the Armata. As there is no crew in the fighting compartment, the gases that escape into it do not matter.

The engine is an X-shaped 12-cylinder diesel with 1200-1500 hp that can run for 10,000 hours at maximum power. This is high enough as it is, but can be even higher in economy mode. Even this mode retains good mobility. In order to make repairs easier, the engine and transmission exist as a single module, which can be replaced in under an hour.

The suspension has 7 road wheels like Object 195. Designers considered it optimal. Compared to its predecessor, the T-14 did not gain weight or increase in size, even though it is still heavier than a T-90A or T-80U.

In order to increase mobility, the T-14 is equipped with an adaptive controlled suspension that can be configured depending on the terrain, speed, and combat mission. The stiffness, travel, etc. are all configurable. The average and maximum speed of movement are increased, as is the precision when shooting on the move (although it is a secondary factor, as this is the job for the fire control system and gun stabilizer).

Every modern tank is filled with high-tech gadgets, and the T-14 is no exception. The tankers are now operators. They receive information from several channels of the fire control system, screens show maps and various information. The systems are controlled with buttons, joysticks, and touchscreens. The driver drives the tank with a steering wheel instead of levers, as it is more comfortable.

Unofficial sources claim that the T-14 will be equipped with a radar with a phase array that can track up to 100 targets at long ranges. The T-14 does have a phase array, but it is a part of the new Afghanit protection unit, which is designed to intercept enemy ammunition with special offensive elements. The new system protects not only from RPGs, but from roof penetrators and all types of shells: HEAT, HE, and subcaliber AP.

Each vehicle is a collection of compromises. Not all innovations designed by engineers made it in. For instance, the additional radar channel had to be excluded from the fire control system, but matrices for heat sensors designed for the new tank, completely made in Russia, are already entering trial production.

The road ahead

The T-14 is one of many vehicles that will be built on the Armata platform. Bridgelayers, flamethrower vehicles, minelayers and minesweepers, engineering vehicles, etc are all planned.

Today, three types of vehicles exist on the Armata chassis: heavy BMP-15 (an APC), BREM (armoured repair and evacuation vehicle), and the T-14 itself. A trial batch of each vehicle was built and will be shown at the May 9th parade in Moscow. After that, the vehicles will go to be improved, trialled by the army, and state trials.

The road of the T-14 to a production model is far from over. It is a potential path, as any "child" is victim to growing pains. It will be modified and improved before it can earn the name of a Main Battle Tank. The T-14 has great potential for modernization. Armament can be improved, the electronic "filler" can be upgraded, the armour can be increased. The tank's designers estimate that the lifespan of the tank is about 50 years.

Original article available here.

World of Tanks History Section: K2 Black Panther

When the South Korean military started work on a new tank in 1994, it is unlikely that they planned to earn the title of "most expensive". However, domestic engineers rejected the idea of using foreign components and decided that the planned MBT (Main Battle Tank) will be developed at home.

This allowed South Korea to not only secure its armoured shield, but avoid problems with licensing on the world arms market. However, the project would have to be started from scratch. This turned the design process into a national undertaking. The South Korean Agency for Defense Development teamed up with Hyundai, a known car manufacturer, on this project.

The tank was indexed K2黒豹 (Black Panther). Its mass production began in June of 2013, and K2s started reaching the army in 2014. The vehicle has yet to see combat. Today, it is recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records as the most expensive tank at $8.8 million.

Overview

The layout of the K2 is classical: driver's compartment in the front, fighting compartment in the center, engine and transmission in the rear. The Koreans designed a new engine for the Black Panther, a 1500 hp diesel, and an automatic gearbox. Both components are domestically produced. A fundamentally new suspension provides each road wheel with an independent control system. As a result, the tank can lean in any direction and make itself taller or shorter, stretching its clearance between 150 and 550 mm.

The K2 weighs 55 tons, but retains good mobility. It can reach 70 kph on a highway or 52 off-road. The designers claim that the tank can be ready to cross a 4 meter deep water hazard in as little as half an hour.

The tank has a crew of three. The driver controls the tank from the driver's compartment, while the gunner and commander are placed in the turret.

Turret and Armament

South Korean specialists rejected the German Krupp-designed NPz K-140 prototype gun. In order to keep the tank domestic, they designed a new gun based on the German 120/L55 design. The tank's ammunition rack holds 40 shells, some of which are kept in an automatic loading mechanism. It allows the Black Panther to fire every 4 seconds, but once it is emptied, the crew will have to load rounds manually.

The ammunition for the K2 was also developed in South Korea. A subcaliber shell with a tungsten core is used to fight enemy tanks. A HEAT-fragmentation shell is used against lesser targets. The K2's trump card is a highly precise self-aiming multi-stage shell. While it is expensive, the tank can fire effectively from up to 8 kilometers away, even without a line of sight on the target.

The K2's unique suspension is not only used to increase the tank's off-road performance, but to tilt the tank in order to increase the gun's depression or elevation.

The tank also has a coaxial 7.62 mm machinegun and a 12.7 mm AA gun.

Fire Control System and Sights

The K2's fire control system is a collection of the most modern sensors and systems. Aside from night vision devices and a laser rangefinder, it includes a radar system. Antennae on the turret allow the tank to detect incoming shells or low-flying drones, and aim the gun at them. Ground targets can't hide from the tank: it can discover them from as far away as 10 kilometers.

The delayed firing system does not allow the gun to fire if the barrel is vibrating or the gun deviated from its target. This further increases accuracy when shooting at moving targets.

There are two sights on the Korean tank: the main one, for the gunner, and a panoramic sight for the commander that provides 360 degree vision. Both are equipped with a thermal camera and laser rangefinger. According to the Black Panther's designers, these sights will be further improved in the future.

Protection

The tank's composite armour is a closely guarded secret, as is common for any military vehicle. According to the tank's designers, its front armour can withstand a hit from its 120 mm gun without damage, albeit from an unspecified distance.

The Black Panther is also equipped with an active protection system. If the tank's radar detects an incoming ATGM, it will alert the crew and deploy smoke. The cloud that forms impedes the aim of the missile. A similar action can be taken if an enemy points its laser rangefinder at the tank. Special sensors can even determine where the beam is coming from.

Automatic Controls

In order to maximally remove human factors from performance in battle, the designers included a special system to automate communications, reconnaissance, and controls of the tank.

The Black Panther is equipped with a modern "friend or foe" system. A device on the gun mantlet can determine if a target is friendly or an enemy. In the first case, the gun will not fire, in the second case, permission is given automatically.

Fire suppression and radiation detectors also work automatically. Overall, the Black Panther tank is one of the most technologically advanced tanks today.

Article author: Yuri Bakhurin.

Original article available here.

Modern Tank Off-Road Trials

Odds are you've seen the Swedish cross-country tank trials of the Sherman, Panther, and Strv m/42 and read about various similar trials here and here. Now, watch the modern T-80U, Centurion, and S-Tank effortlessly (well, mostly) tear up the obstacles their ancestors could not dream of conquering.

Part 1: T-80U vs Centurion in fall conditions.

Part 2: T-80U vs Centurion vs S-Tank in winter conditions.

Read the summary report for these tests here.

Also, watch the T-72 complete a similar challenge.

World of Tanks History Section: T-90

Fierce competition began between Soviet tank manufacturers immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War. The situation was akin to an internal cold war. In the late 1980s, the management of UralVagonZavod, with significant effort, managed to secure the permission to perform a deep modernization of the T-72 tank. This was the start of the T-90.

Russia's First

The T-72, Soviet Union's most numerous tank, was what is called a "mobilization vehicle" designed for participation in the second echelon and combat against forces other than the enemy's best. Its crews would be tankers with second rate training, therefore controls of these vehicles were simplified. The main drawback of the design was the fire control system, which was far from perfect. The new vehicle from the Urals was supposed to get rid of this deficiency.

The prototype indexed Object 188 was presented to the government for trials in January of 1989. The vehicle showed itself well. It was reliable in all conditions, including long term operation under pressure. The Object 188 travelled 14,000 km without serious breakdowns during trials. This was the range before major repairs required of it by its designers.

In 1991, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR approved the tank for adoption by the Soviet Army. Due to the difficult political situation in the country that ended with its dissolution, the final decision was not made until October of 1992. Object 188 was supposed to receive the index T-72B, but B.N. Yeltsin, Russia's president at the time, personally ordered that it should be indexed T-90. This was the Russian Federation's first tank.

90's Insides

The most important feature of the T-90 is the Irtish fire control system. This system was sorely needed in the T-72. The system includes an automatic fire control feature, night and day aiming devices, a ballistic computer, a gun stabilizer, and many other components. Due to this system, the T-90 can effectively hit vehicles at long distances. During a demonstration for foreign delegates, a T-90 driving at a speed of 25 kph destroyed 7 targets at ranges of 1.5-2.5 kilometers in less than a minute.

Irtish does more than just seek, locate, and identify the target. It calculates many factors that can influence a hit. The speed of the target, the speed of the tank, corrections for wind, atmospheric pressure, wear and tear of the barrel, these are only a few parameters that are used in the calculations.

The T-90 is equipped with a system of optical-electrical protection from anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). This system tracks the launch of a missile and jams its control signal. If necessary, grenades are deployed that create an aerosol cloud around the tank, weakening and deflecting laser designator beams that are used to guide modern ATGMs.

Like all Soviet tanks made after 1954, the T-90's crew is protected from weapons of mass destruction. A special polymer liner with additions of lithium, boron, and lead protects the crew from radiation. Filters protect the air inside the tank from poisonous gases and radioactive dust.

The T-90's shield, sword, and heart

Following Soviet design traditions, the T-90 is small and densely packed. This is both a blessing and a curse. Due to the small silhouette, it is hard to aim at. However, a penetrating shell is bound to hit a module or a crewman.

The tank's designers aimed to protect it well. Aside from traditional composite armour, the tank received built in reactive armour. At first, reactive armour helped only against HEAT shells. Modern reactive armour also protects against subcaliber armour piercing shells, but not as well. If the penetration of a HEAT shell is reduced by over 50%, then APFSDS penetration is reduced by only 20%. The T-90 even has reactive armour on the roof.

The main weapon of the tank is a smooth barrelled 125 mm gun with a two piece round. Due to the automatic loading mechanism, it can reach a rate of fire of 8 RPM. The gun can fire subcaliber, HEAT, and HE ammunition. Recently, a new ammunition type was added: HE-shrapnel with an air burst fuse. This shell is very effective at fighting unprotected infantry and helicopters.

As well as traditional shells, the T-90's gun can also fire ATGMs. The ATGM guarantees a hit at 5000 meters. When the T-90 was adopted for service, it was a worldwide record.

The tank engine is a multifuel diesel. This means that it will run not only on diesel, but on gasoline and kerosene. Trials showed that only gasoline slightly reduces the engine's power.

The T-90 is equipped with underwater driving equipment that can be installed in as little as 15 minutes, and a self-entrenching system, with which it can dig itself a trench in warm ground in less than half an hour.

Over 20 years that passed since the tank entered production, but not very many have been produced. About 2000 units were made to this day, and about half of them were exported, mainly to India. The tank has yet to see battle.

Article author: Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here.

Swedes on Britain's Armoured Forces

Today's article is once again brought to you by Something Awful forums poster TheFluff, who discovered some critique of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). Swedish observers who were present during the exercises held in 1973 were rather unkind.

"The gunnery practice was finished by two tests with a gun camera, one against a fixed target and one against a moving one, as per usual Swedish standard. The results were bad. The first time the results may possibly be explained by the gunners not taking the trial seriously, but even after they had evaluated their own results and re-did the test the results were very bad. It is possible that more training could have improved the results somewhat, but the more likely explanation is that a large portion of the British gunners simply aren't suited for their job as gunners. In some cases, problems with bad eyesight were apparent. It should be noted that British tank personnel is not tested in the same way as Swedish personnel before being assigned as tank gunners."

"Both the methods the tank crews used for engaging targets and their laying skills were unacceptable and clearly worse than that of the average Swedish crew."

On command style and discipline:

"Exercise of command was relatively tame and commanders rarely supervised anything. The subordinates were left with a lot of freedom to solve rather ill-defined problems on their own. When it came to looking after their equipment, the personnel was rather sloppy and nonchalant."

"The readiness (in a broad sense of the word) at the BAOR appears to be rather low."

"Radio traffic was very lively, but rarely contained orders."

On observation and crew resource management:

"The number of targets detected was on par with the performance of Swedish crews. However, the time to open fire was in most cases far longer than can reasonably be expected. In part, this is due to lack of training on the tank, but more importantly it's also due to the way the British crews work together. The tank commander always have to give orders about everything and the gunner is forbidden from opening fire on his own initiative when he spots a target, unlike in Swedish regulations for tank crews. Just like in the 1968 trials, it has been impossible to convince the Brits to try the Swedish method, which is also employed by the Germans for example. The reason cited by the Brits is that tanks carry so few rounds that the commander cannot risk the gunner opening fire on a non-essential target and that the gunners in general aren't all that good at neither judging the importance of a target nor at adjusting their fire. (...) This severely limited the advantages of the S-tank's duplicated controls.

(...)

Nor were the Brits willing to accept the principle that whoever sees a target first fires on it. If the tank commander spots a target, the gunner should still open fire on it. According to Swedish tests, if the commander has to hand the target over to the gunner, the time to open fire is on average two seconds longer than if the gunner opens fire by himself. If questions regarding the target's exact position are raised, this time increases further, up to 10 seconds or more in many cases. Our proposal to try the Swedish method in parallel with the British was rejected without any reason given."

On tactics:

"(in a discussion on delaying fights) The target marker equipment made this exercise an excellent and very illustrative example of how not to fight this type of action (in both Chieftain and the S-tank)."

"Coordination between infantry, artillery and tanks is nonexistent.
(...)
The infantry is deployed way too late to take terrain from which the enemy can fight the tanks with close-in AT weapons.
(...)
The assaults are not planned in depth. On the first day it took seven hours to advance seven kilometers, employing 17 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon against an enemy with 9 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon, deployed in three lines."

More on the exercise:

"The BLUFOR tank units appear very unprofessional. Uses unsuitable formations, roads and combat positions. In general, they appear to think they are invulnerable. Tank commanders and loaders stand very far up in their hatches. Drivers have hatches open and drive with their head above the edge.

There is no coordination of attacks between tanks, infantry and artillery. Tanks attack alone into forests. Infantry attacks alone across open fields straight at defending tanks. When attacking, units are not concentrated, neither in space nor in time. Attacks are always conducted in a "trickling" fashion.

Radio traffic is very intensive but there are rarely orders given.

At the OPFOR, unit commanders are often deployed very far behind their units, battle group commanders about 5 km behind and combat team commanders 500-1000 meters behind.

CYCLOPS (the S-tank squadron) combat positioning during the delaying action was usually pretty good.

All tanks, both Chieftain and S-tanks, are driven very carelessly. No attention is paid to neither civilian traffic nor property damage. Reports on engine failures have a hard time reaching the maintenance units. Map reading capabilities are overall very bad.

(...)

The experiences from these exercises appear to be highly questionable."

"British tank crews always carry a lot of baggage, both combat and non-combat equipment (cooking equipment, food, tents etc), on and/or in their tanks. Unlike our crews, they are completely independent of separate cooking units and baggage trains. This meant that the space available in the S-tank was far too small for their equipment."

"Deployment width and depth is considerable in the smaller units. Tank platoons are often deployed over a width/depth of 600-800 meters. (...) Tank platoons are frequently deployed independently behind each other. Support is organized within the platoon and not between platoons. The rear platoon is usually 500-1000 meters behind the front one. Hence, the result is that the enemy knocks them out one by one, platoon after platoon. Both platoon commanders and tank commanders act very independently and choose both their own routes and positions and their own timings for advancing or repositioning. The whole thing frequently resembles a guerrilla war or every man for himself.
The infantry is used way too late to take terrain from which the enemy can fight the tanks up close with weapons such as recoilless rifles. The tanks attack first. When they start taking fire, the mechanized infantry is deployed. There is no planning for attacks in depth. On the first day, it took seven hours to advance seven kilometers with the BLUFOR's combat team (17 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon) against an OPFOR with 9 tanks and one mechanized infantry platoon, deployed in three lines.

If a platoon or squadron commander's tank gets engine problems, the commanders do not move to another tank. Tanks are frequently deployed in very unsuitable positions where they are easily knocked out. The observation and recon duties are conducted badly. The soldiers seem very passive. Chieftains are often positioned behind a ridge with the gun and the chassis side against the enemy. The S-tank crews rarely clean their optics.

When fighting a delaying action, the tanks in a platoon retreat by turns along the whole depth of the deployment. Withdrawal is frequently started far too late, and the tanks are thus knocked out one by one. Despite the terrain allowing opening fire at long distances (2-3 km), fire is often opened far too late (500 m). There is never a rear platoon deployed to cover the front platoon's withdrawal.

In light of the heavy criticism above, it has been very hard to judge how well the S-tank has proven itself. The results have mostly been influenced by troop performance and and not by the tank's performance. As far as it has been possible for us to observe, though, we cannot say that the S-tank has suffered more losses than the Chieftains.

S-tank availability has been good. Most of the time all tanks have been in working condition in daytime. On the OPFOR side, the Chieftain availability has dropped steadily. Near the end of the exercise the availability was down to 50%, and thus a Chieftain platoon was transferred from BLUFOR to OPFOR."

On the British vehicles:

"The Chieftain tank:
The reliability seems surprisingly low. During the exercises, the number of tanks that had to drop out due to mechanical trouble was relatively high. Mostly, it's the engine that is the problem. When a Chieftain stops, after a little while there's always an oil slick on the ground or garage floor under it. The gun stabilization also fails frequently. The accuracy of the contra-rotating feature in the commander's observation cupola is very low. It is almost never used by the Brits. The tank's speed over terrain does not seem to be superior to that of the S-tank. The commander's observation equipment is very good.

The Scorpion tank:
The Swedish personnel got an excellent briefing on the tank and was also allowed to drive it. It is very fast and easy to drive. The observation equipment is absolutely excellent. (...)

The FV 432 APC:
Appears to have a large number of different reliability problems, mainly concerning the steering gears. The vehicles are so far gone that they are considered a danger to traffic. According to maintenance personnel, a lot of the problems are caused by the soldiers not doing sufficient daily maintenance."

On civilian relations:

"Very little attention is paid to the fact that the unit is exercising on private property. Careless driving on public roads and the maneuver area isn't delimited. Damage to planted fields is frequent despite good opportunities to choose routes over fields where the harvest has already been taken in. Apparently the property damage costs for a similar exercise in the same area last year were on the order of 10 million SEK (about 62 million SEK today, ~6 million EUR). These damages are paid for by the German authorities."

Beyond Armour Effects

I previously showed that 50 mm APCR did little damage to the components and crew of a Valentine tank after penetration. But how does APCR perform in general? B.M. Bakshinov, S.V. Lomov, and V.I. Timokhin decided to try it out.

"The main cause of damage when penetrating armour is a stream of fragments. The subcaliber armour piercing shell generates the most fragments, and its parameters are used to determine performance of crew protection measures. However, it is not enough to determine the damage caused by homogeneous steel subcaliber ammunition, since modern foreign subcaliber shells use casings from heavier metals (tungsten, nickel, iron, etc).

An experiment was carried out to determine behind-armour effect of the domestic equivalent. A "sieve" type target made up of two aluminium plates 3 mm each and a steel plate 8-10 mm thick was placed 0.5-1 meter behind 70-220 mm of medium hardness steel. The angle of obliquity was set to 60 degrees from normal, velocity was set to match a range of 2 kilometers. The number of fragments that penetrated the sieve was recorded, as well as their spread from the central axis.

The experiment allowed the formulation of conclusions on behind-armour effect of subcaliber shells:

1. Two groups of fragments are generated, differing vastly in penetrating power and number.
2. As excess penetration grows, the number of lethal fragments increases sharply, and then stabilizes.
3. The angle of dispersion weakly correlates with excess penetration.
4. There is a limited number of fragments capable of penetrating 30 mm of aluminium at a small spread. As excess penetration grows, their spread decreases.
5. Most fragments cannot penetrate more than 20-25 mm of aluminium."

Fig 1. Parameters of behind-armour effect of a heavy alloy subcaliber shell. Number of lethal fragments vs: a) their angle of spread, b) in proportion to excess penetration, d) angle of aluminium penetrating fragments and d) penetration of aluminium. Empty shapes are data points, dark shapes and lines are interpolations.

Fig. 2. Fragment spread with 180 mm of excess penetration. The penetration of the fragment is proportional to the length of the cone that represents its group, to scale.

A comparison is also made with effectiveness of domestic shells.

Shell	Fragments capable of penetrating 3-6 mm of aluminium		Fragments capable of penetrating at least 30 mm of aluminium
	Number	Angle of spread	Number	Angle of spread
With excess penetration of 100-200 mm
Heavy alloy	200-300	100	7	20-30
3BM9	200-300	100-120	2-3	20-30
3BM15	150-200	110	2	20
With excess penetration of 250-300 mm
Heavy alloy	300-400	100	20-25	12
3BM22	200-300	100	20	24
3BM26	200-300	120	37	32

The article also gives some details on the shell compositions. 3BM9 has an all steel case, 3BM15 has a front heavy alloy core, and 3BM22 and 3BM26 have a heavy alloy core in the rear. The paper reveals that in the latter cases, the fins of the shell and core fragment after they enter the armour, creating more lethal fragments and resulting in a larger angle of spread.

World of Tanks History Section: Gorlitskiy's "Waffentrager"

Lev Izraelevich Gorlitskiy started the war in the role of the chief designer of artillery at factory #185 in Leningrad. From June to October of 1941, his department was tasked with placing weapons into long-term fortified positions to protect approaches to Leningrad. In October, the factory was evacuated to Sverdlovsk and became a part of the Ural heavy machinebuilding factory.

One year later, in October of 1942, Gorlitskiy headed a newly formed design bureau at Uralmash, tasked with developing SPGs. A very sharp need in them was felt after new Tiger tanks appeared on the battlefield.

Deadly Classic

Three SPGs developed by Lev Izraelevich in 1942-1944 contributed significantly to victory over Germany.

Gorlitskiy's first creation was the SU-122, an assault gun. A 122 mm howitzer was placed in an immobile casemate. The gun shot HE, later HEAT ammunition. Despite numerous drawbacks, the vehicle was received well. The gun was effective against soft targets and personnel, but the low muzzle velocity did not allow it to effectively engage tanks.

SU-85 (1943) was a specialized SPG, designed to fight German Tigers and Panthers. its 85 mm gun could penetrate their armour from short and medium distances, but could be ineffective at ranges over 800 meters.

In 1944, Gorlitskiy's design bureau developed a tank destroyer with a 100 mm gun: the SU-100. It was the most dangerous enemy of all German vehicles. The only tanks it had problems with at long distances were King Tigers, Jagdtigers, and Ferdinands.

The design of all of the above vehicles was classic for Soviet SPGs: a chassis of a serial tank, casemate in the front, decent frontal armour. This layout was simple and technologically sound, but had two drawbacks. One was that the front of the chassis was overloaded, which decreased reliability of the suspension. The second was that long anti-tank guns made it more likely that the gun will stick into the ground in an unlucky move.

These issues could not be resolved in the classic style, a new approach was necessary. Layouts with a rear fighting compartment were tested, but Gorlitskiy had even more novel ideas.

New Look at SPGs

Gorlitskiy wrote in his memoirs that he wanted to make a vehicle "with long term prospects, compatible with all modern requirements". Under the new system of SPGs, the vehicles would be a part of a support class. These SPGs had to be universal, with the ability to destroy enemy tanks, fortifications, and personnel equally well.

The first step of Gorlitskiy's design bureau was to carefully study domestic and foreign experience. German Waffentrager vehicles aroused their interest. These vehicles consisted of a tracked mount with a gun on top, protected only by a light shield. This was Gorlitskiy's inspiration for the SU-100P or "item-105".

The SU-100P was not like any fully armoured Soviet SPG. Gorlitskiy bet on mobility and firepower. A new chassis was designed with armour no thicker than 15 mm. It carried a D-10S gun on a rotating mount. The gun was covered by a small open cabin and had an unheard of horizontal gun traverse: 155 degrees. The vehicle could fire from direct or indirect positions.

The SU-100P chassis was made from scratch, In a rare case among Soviet designs, the engine compartment was located in the front. A new gearbox gave the tank's driver control at any speed and on a road of any complexity. For the first time in Soviet tank building, rubberized track link bearings were used, increasing the lifespan of tracks.

In 1955, after trials and improvements, the SU-100P was accepted by the Soviet Army, but only a small number was made: no more than 24 vehicles. The main reason for this was the "rocket boom" that reigned during Khrushchev's rule.

The SU-100P's chassis had better luck. It turned out to be very much in demand. Even during trials, the chassis was borrowed by two other vehicles: the SU-152G and SU-152 "Taran". Later, the chassis was lengthened to 7 road wheels and used by many vehicles. Among them are the BTR-122 tracked APC, Krug AA missile platform, and other launchers. The chassis was also used by the Akatsiya SPG, Tulpan self propelled mortar, and Giatsint-S 152 mm SPG.

Article author: Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here.

MS-1 Rebuilding

A while ago I posted some photos of how not to restore an MS-1. Today, you will see how it should be done, by forums poster interest68.

In 2002, he initiated a search for an MS-1 hull near the Russian-Chinese border, where several of these tanks were installed and then torn out of the ground when they became completely obsolete even as bunkers. He succeeded, although the brutal treatment of the tank was evident: the roof of the fighting compartment and turret were missing.

Major Igor Maltsev is the MS-1 hull. Top: Evgeniy Rybakov, Rafik Kudzhayev, Captain Vitaliy Zykov.

The tank is being dug out during April of 2003.

The turret was found separately, in another border zone, spotted accidentally from the window of a moving car. The turret is equipped with a mantlet for two DT machineguns instead of a cannon.

The hull and turret, dug up in and indoors.

In order to avoid the abominations linked to above, new road wheels must be made. If you want to see how to make MS-1 road wheels out of T-55 shock absorbers, look no further than these blueprints.

 And here's what the finished product looks like:

Many photographs and materials are examined to recreate the track precisely. Here is a wooden mockup.

The original engine is long gone, but a Komatsu excavator offers a suitable replacement.

While tracks are out for casting, the restoration team is working on the hull. There is a new roof and engine compartment bulkhead.

The hull roof is ready, and the turret ring is populated with ball bearings. The turret spins when placed on top, but not freely. The bearings are not lubricated, and the underside of the turret is still covered in debris.

The suspension is nearly complete! There were financial difficulties in the process of casting an entire new set of tracks, and so it was necessary to use the excavator track.

The front idlers and axles are being put in place.

The tank is ready for a test drive!

The most important part is done, now to spice up the interior. 

Insides are done, but the armament still needs some finishing touches.

interest86 writes about his completed vehicle: "After installing the gun and machinegun, the turret became very cramped, and it was not a place for someone with my frame. The vehicle is very inconvenient for the crew in general. The driver has no back to his seat, and this is very difficult. One immediately gets the idea to insert an improvised back after a few minutes out of something like a board, which can be easily inserted between the shelves and fighting compartment bulkhead.

After years of labours, the tank is up and running!

More words from the man responsible for this feat: "The work took about three years, but preparing for the restoration took even more time. We needed to retain all technical subtleties, so it was not just a copy, but as close to possible to the original. It is known that this tank participated in the events at Lake Hasan. To this day, no more than 5 tanks of this kind remain. Experts already admit that our tank is the closest to the original."

Preferred Seating

Sure, you can fit a lot of riders on a tank, but surely some of those soldiers ride more comfortably than others? VIF2NE poster Ryadovoy-K shares his experience on the subject. The advice is specific to the BMP-2, but the theory can be applied to any vehicle.

"We had to ride the "two" often and many times, and most importantly, for long stretches of time. All soldiers knew what places are good and what places are bad. Riding in a bad place for half a day delivers no pleasure, only problems.

The best spot is marked in red, but only if the infantry commander's hatch is open. However the driver could forbid this. Old vehicles could have a bad rubber seal, and once you open that hatch, it will leak during rain. Drivers slept on their seat and the seat of the infantry commander, and nobody wants to get wet. Further down the list: orange and yellow. Riding atop the front of the turret is good. You can sit well and see well. Light green is good when the BMP is fully functional and the wind is not coming from the front or the right. A BMP that's acting up could spew oil from the exhaust collector, and when the wind is blowing, you end up breathing in the exhaust.

Red with a stripe is worse than riding on the front of the turret, but it will do. If nobody is sitting on orange, you can lean on the turret, and it's easy to hold onto the gun when the vehicle lurches. Others say that they would place a seat from a car here, and it would become the best spot.

Blue: sitting behind the turret is inconvenient, as you're sitting against the direction of motion, and during the summer dust gathers there like with a vacuum cleaner and causes you problems. Yellow with a stripe: you can lean on the turret and hold onto the gun, but the proximity of the exhaust times the direction of air makes a significant drawback.

Black with a stripe and blue with a stripe. People sat here when the BMP carried one to two squads at the same time. It's uncomfortable (there is nothing to lean on with your back) and you feel the vehicle lurching more strongly.

Black, purple, gray, white: we tried not to sit here at all. In the first two, sitting against the direction of motion is uncomfortable, and during the summer you will choke on dust. The gray and white spots can only be occupied when the rear hatches were open, but this is not allowed, as dust will collect inside the vehicle. On old vehicles, this also causes leaks (the rider compartment was also used for sleeping, and nobody needed water pouring in).

The worst option is green with a stripe. Sitting right next to the exhaust causes a torturous pain in your eyes and difficulty breathing.

The gunner sits in the green spot and the commander sits on the light blue spot."

World of Tanks History Section: Mikhail Svirin: Man, Historian, Soldier

Mikhail Svirin was one of the historians that opened up an entirely new history of armoured vehicles, based on documents declassified in the late 80s and early 90s. These people laid down the foundation on which a new generation of researchers is building their work even now. Unfortunately, in May of this year, he passed away. The editor in chief of the publisher "Tactical Press", Gregoriy Pernavskiy, writes about Svirin, having known this exceptional man personally:

There are people that appear in your life and disappear without any noticeable trace. Others walk the same path as you, and even if they leave, you will always think what they would say when you do something. Mikhail Nikolayevich was one of those people.

I try to remember who we met through in the second half of the 1990s. I remember only that it was long before the rise of the "Military-Historical Forum" that gave the world a generation of authors which turned the world of military history upside down. These people were already in the second generation. They knew where to go, and, most important, what to look for.

Svirin was a part of the first generation of military history enthusiasts, and a history enthusiast in general. In those days, no doors opened for us. The only historical education came from the state. Enthusiasts, amateurs, those of us with hot hearts, had no place in this system. We did not give up. Through back doors, we gained access to technical libraries, talked to "elders" from design bureaus, met up with other enthusiasts. Slowly, as concrete cracks under great pressure, the dogmas of the old system fell.

In the 1990s, new books and magazines were printed. They were few in number, and for us enthusiasts, they were worth their weight in gold. They were traded, Xeroxed, given visible places in collections. The names Svirin, Kolomiyets, Baryatinskiy were known to all that are connected to military history. They deserve this fame. These three men rolled the boulder up the hill, and due to their efforts, many stars rose, and continue to rise.

As for "Uncle Misha", he achieved many things: founded the excellent military historical "Polygon" magazine for model enthusiasts. Alas, it did not survive. Turns out that amateur researchers don't have extra money. In order to publish his book on the T-28, Svirin sold his car. People are split into "effective managers" and those who do real things, strive and suffer for them. These are people from two different worlds.

Without his magazine, Svirin started the most difficult project of his life. He wrote his magnum opus "History of the Soviet Tank", known to all armoured vehicle enthusiasts. Mikhail Nikolayevich was not just a writer, he was a true scientist. His main talent was combining military and political history, explaining the reasons why engineers settled on one decision or other.

Of course, Svirin's book is not the gospel truth. It contains mistakes, leaps of faith, imperfections. It describes far from all dramatic episodes in the history of Soviet tank building. This is easily explained. What modern enthusiasts have easy access to was simply impossible for enthusiasts of the 70s and 80s. Conclusions were often made with incomplete or distorted information. Nevertheless, aside from maybe encyclopedias, there is no overall history of the Soviet tank, and will not be for a long time.

Aside from books, Uncle Misha wrote for internet resources and forums. Meetings with him became fascinating and unique lectures. In his last years, he almost entirely switched to a patriotic upbringing of children and teenagers, and stopped writing, mostly because he has said most of what he wanted. Most, but not all. His health failed him. The wounds of the "peaceful war" (Svirin took part in mine clearing in Checnya and suffered concussions there) took their toll.

For years, his injuries caused him horrible pain. Any other man would have turned into a furious beast, but not Svirin. He was nearly an avatar of good. Himself in need of help, he was always ready to offer a helping hand and at least contribute advice. He had friends that were always ready to help, Maksim Kolomiyets, Sergey Burkatovskiy, Aleksandr Kontorovich, and many more. Uncle Misha was a truly great man and a real fighter. He knew that his cause was just, and he never surrendered.

Article author: Grigoriy Pernavskiy

Original article available here.