Sneaky IS-2

I've shown you how to be sneaky in a medium SPG, but in a heavy tank? That takes a little more art.

"Award order

1. Name: Petrov, Roman Ilyich
2. Rank: Guards Junior Lieutenant
3. Position, unit: Tank commander, 46th Independent Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment
   is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
4. Year of birth: 1919
5. Nationality: Russian
6. Party affiliation: none
7. Participation in the Civil War and defense of the USSR in subsequent conflicts, Patriotic War: in the Patriotic War since 1941
8. In the Red Army since: 1939
9. Recruited by: already in the Red Army
10. Wounds sustained in the Patriotic War: killed on June 14th, 1944.
11. Prior awards: "For Defense of Leningrad" medal, 1942

Brief and specific description of heroism or achievements: In battles to penetrate two heavily defended enemy lines by height 171,0, comrade Petrov demonstrated exceptional heroism during the execution of his orders from June 13th to June 14th, 1944. Comrade Petrov's tank was charged with reconnaissance of AT guns and other weapons at height 171,0. Comrade Petrov's tank #684 was subjected to a significant amount of shelling, and six shells hit the tank. In order to save the tank and fulfil his mission, comrade Petrov used his military cleverness and pretended that his tank was on fire, for which he ignited a smoke bomb inside the tank and stopped shooting. The tank crew sat inside the tank in gas masks for one hour. The enemy thought that the tank and its crew burned up and stopped shooting. 

Using the position next to the tank traps and loss of enemy attention, the crew continued to sit in the tank for the day, carefully observing the enemy and his defenses. 

On June 14th, when the regiment's tanks attacked height 171,0, comrade Petrov had complete information on the enemy's defenses, opened fire at enemy anti-tank guns, and allowed other tanks to approach, also correcting their fire. In this battle, comrade Petrov's tank destroyed one reinforced concrete pillbox, 6 machinegun nests, 2 armoured pillboxes, and one AT gun.

Comrade Petrov allowed an opening to be made in the tank traps before our tanks arrived, and their safe passage through the opening, giving the tanks and infantry the ability to take the tactically important height 171,0. 

During reconnaissance and taking of height 171,0, comrade Petrov demonstrated heroism worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In this battle, he died the death of heroes for our Soviet Motherland.

For the demonstrated courage, decisiveness, and heroism during the penetration of two Finn lines of defense at height 171,0, comrade Petrov is worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, posthumously.

46th OGTPP commander, Guards Colonel Parshev

HQ Chief, Guards Captain Topunov"

CAMD RF 33-793756-37

Modern Tank Off-Road Trials

Odds are you've seen the Swedish cross-country tank trials of the Sherman, Panther, and Strv m/42 and read about various similar trials here and here. Now, watch the modern T-80U, Centurion, and S-Tank effortlessly (well, mostly) tear up the obstacles their ancestors could not dream of conquering.

Part 1: T-80U vs Centurion in fall conditions.

Part 2: T-80U vs Centurion vs S-Tank in winter conditions.

Read the summary report for these tests here.

Also, watch the T-72 complete a similar challenge.

World of Tanks History Section: Hellcat

Until the start of WWII, the United States Army did not have the budget for improving its armoured forces, but the defeat of France in 1940 was a wakeup call for American generals. Debates raged on the topic of whether money should be spent on a medium tank that can fight enemy tanks or if cheaper field guns should be dealing with this problem.

General Leslie McNair, the commander of the American land forces, proposed another idea. He envisioned a maneuverable tank destroyer designed to attack enemy tank formations from the flanks. When his work was done, the army did not even await the end of trials and ordered 1000 new TDs.

The vehicle was adopted under the index M18 in early 1944 (the prototype was called T70). The vehicle immediately received an unofficial nickname, "Hellcat", due to the logo that the Buick company painted on its product: a huge panther with burning eyes gnawing on tank tracks. The motto on the logo was "Seek, Strike, Destroy".

Hellcats in Europe

The Hellcat's debut was during the Battle of Anzio, in the first half of 1944. 5 TDs were transferred to Italy. The vehicles reached their units in early May, and entered battle on May 23rd during the general Allied offensive. Naturally, a few vehicles could not impact the course of the battle, but they impressed their commanders with their speed. Their maneuverability kept them from being easy prey. However, the crews complained: there was little room inside the vehicle to work. There were also problems with ammunition storage.

Nevertheless, the Hellcats showed themselves well. On September 18th, 1944, in Nancy, Lieutenant Edwin Leiper, a platoon commander in the 704th battalion, headed his unit on the march to Montcourt. Suddenly, he spotted a German tank in the mist. He ordered his platoon to take up positions and open fire. The Hellcats only needed five minutes to destroy all five German tanks. In return, the Americans lost one Hellcat. Later, another Hellcat platoon commander, Henty Hartman, knocked out 6 tanks, most of them Panthers.

M18s played an important role in the Ardennes operation, also known as the Battle of the Bulge. One of the most critical points of the operation was the attempted capture of Allied fuel warehouses in Noville, without which the offensive would have stalled. A battalion of Hellcats was sent to counterattack a group of German tanks that was suddenly discovered. During this hurried march, the Hellcats demonstrated their maximum speed: 89 kph. The counterattack was a success: 24 German tanks, including several Tigers, were destroyed. The enemy lost nearly 500 soldiers and officers. This greatly upset the German plans. The Hellcats' "shoot and scoot" tactics showed themselves well.

German Headache

The Hellcat's 76 mm gun could penetrate only 88 mm at long ranges. This was more than enough for PzIV tanks, but not enough for new Tigers and Panthers. The Hellcats could not penetrate the front of these tanks at a range of just under a kilometer, and attempting to get closer was suicidal. On the other hand, the Hellcat could easily penetrate these tanks from the side or rear. Their large dimensions made aiming easy. The odds of destroying a Panther or Tiger completely were high due to the ammunition stored on the sides of the fighting compartment.

The Hellcats' maneuverability showed itself yet again. American designers reasoned that high caliber German guns would be able to penetrate the armour of most Allied tanks anyway but the speedy Hellcat could return fire effectively, and had superior mobility. One American officer wrote: "The Hellcat is the most effective vehicle that I have ever seen in the fight against Germany."

During WWII, M18 Hellcats were also shipped to China, supporting the fight against Japan. After the war, Hellcats were used by Yugoslavia, South Korea, and Venezuela. In some armies, Hellcats served until the end of the 2000s. As the saying goes, cats have nine lives, and the Hellcat definitely confirms that with its good design and characteristics.

Article author: Yuri Bakhurin.

Original article available here.

Bolshevik Factory Experiments, 1931

"Minutes of the technical meeting of the Technical Department, December 8th, 1930

Topics

1. Completion of the shock worker quota on experimental mechanization projects.
1. Planning for 1931. Criteria for experimental tank building for 1931 must be established.
1. Complete work strictly on time: project approval, completion of blueprints, production of parts.
2. Blueprints: in the first half of the production period, blueprints should be prepared for the following components:
1. Engine: case, crankshaft, piston rods, cylinders, countershafts and distribution mechanisms, cylinder heads, covers, tray.
2. Hull: all parts that need to be riveted.
3. Suspension: road wheels, idler rim, drive wheels, etc.
3. The overall drawings should be prepared by the start of production work, component drawings should be finished during production, before assembly.
4. Intermediates: as agreed.
5. Production work:
1. Equipment should be provided by January 15th, 1931.
2. The work force should be as follows:
1. Machinist: 20, 4-6th class
2. Finisher: 1, 5th class
3. Driller: 1, 5th class
   The above are the general minimum requirements. If they are not met, the program for 1931 will be downsized or cancelled.
2. Calculation of work of the experimental tank-tractor group for 1931, production effort (after January 1st, 1931). Note: includes vehicles only, excluding suspension and engines.
   

   Vehicle	Work description	Work pre-production	Work post-production
   T-19 with factory engine and suspension	1 vehicle, 1 engine	2000	3000
   T-19 with GKB engine and suspension	1 vehicle, 1 engine	10000	200
   Motorized 76 mm SPG on T-19 chassis	1 vehicle, 1 engine	3000	1000
   76 mm SPG with shortened recoil on T-19 chassis	1 vehicle, 1 engine	3000	1000
   Quad 37 mm Rheinmetall AA SPG on the T-19 chassis	1 vehicle, 1 engine	3000	1000
   Medium tractor with T-19 suspension and reworked engine	1 unchanged vehicle, 1 altered engine, T-19 suspension	4000	200
   Conversion of a T-19 tank into a radio tank		3000	1000
   Smoke tank on T-19 chassis	New tank, T-19 suspension and engine	4000	2000
   Bridgelayer on T-19 chassis	New tank, T-19 suspension and engine	4000	2000

1. 7 suspensions from the 2nd experimental production batch, 4000 each = 28000
2. 6 engines from the 2nd experimental production batch, 5000 each, 30000
3. 1 modernized T-19 engine, 6000
4. Total 2nd batch: 91000 pre-production, 12000 post-production
5. Total T-19s: 103000 pre-production, 16000 post-production, 119000
   Produce engines with the following schedule:
1. First engine finished by January 15th
2. Two months are allotted for trials, until March 15th
3. Trials of the first T-19 hull and suspension should be done by April 15th
3. Rolling over from last year:
1. T-20 engine from the Main Design Bureau
2. T-12 engine, 180 hp
3. 3.5 ton tractor with a T-18 engine
4. AMB-700 engine
5. T-23 tankette
4. Individual vehicles:
1. Halftrack tankette with T-20 engine
2. 76 mm mod. 1927 regimental gun on a T-18 chassis
3. Tank destroyer on a T-18 chassis
4. T-24 increased power engine

There are 12 months, 14000 man-hours each, from January 1st 1931 to January 1st, 1932. As of December 1st, the engine plant can give us 9000 hours. The addition of 7 lathes, 2 milling tools, and 1 drill press will increase that by 500 hours (in two shifts).

The T-19 tank needs:

• Engine
• 100 forged parts
• 90 modeled parts
• 5 cast steel parts
• 5 cast iron parts
• 80 cast coloured metal parts
• 350 bar stock parts
• 60 furnace parts
• Suspension
• 100 forged parts
• 40 cast steel parts
• 5 cast coloured metal parts
• 300 bar stock parts
• 15 furnace parts"

V. Lehn Collection

Battle for the Kharkov Railroad

"Name: Parshin, Viktor Stepanovich
Rank: Lieutenant
Position, unit: Platoon commander in the 2nd Tank Battalion in the 32nd Tank Brigade
is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

1. Year of birth: 1921
2. Nationality: Russian
3. In the Red Army since: 1939
4. Party affiliation: VLKSM member
5. Participation in battle: Patriotic War: Western Front from July 1st, 1941 to September 10th, 1941 in the 115th Tank Regiment, 55nd Tank Division. Voronezh front, 32nd Tank Brigade since July 20th, 1943.
6. Wounds or concussions: none
7. Prior awards: none
8. Recruited by: Kozel recruitment office, Smolensk oblast.

Brief and specific description of personal heroism or merit: in offensive battles from August 3rd, 1943, Lieutenant Parshin showed himself to be a strong willed, decisive, brave, and tactically clever officer that shows initiative. 

On August 12th, 1943, in battles for the Kharkov-Sumy, the Germans moved forward significant forces to capture a strategic object at Pavlovo. Comrade Parshin was ordered to die before he let the enemy take it. Comrade Parshin heroically fulfilled his Motherland's orders. Furious at their failure, the fascists throw 14 Tiger tanks and 6 PzIV tanks into battle. Comrade Parshin carefully observed the enemy movements. With precise fire, he burned up three enemy tanks, but the tanks kept moving forward and crossing the railroad embankment. Lieutenant Parshin, risking his life in his T-34, left his ambush and engaged the group of Tiger tanks.

At high speed, Parshin's tank drove at the Tigers, closing in to 50-100 meters and destroying them one after another. Comrade Parshin destroyed another PzIV and three Tiger tanks. The remaining German tanks, frightened by the menacing Soviet tank, fled in all directions, getting stuck on obstacles, where they were destroyed by other tanks.

For selfless service to the Motherland and heroism displayed during the destruction of 4 PzIV tanks, 3 Tiger tanks and, and up to a company of submachinegunners, Viktor Stepanovich Parshin is worthy of the highest government award: the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Battalion, Guards Captain Vakulenko"

CAMD RF 33-793756-36

Quite a story! Deflecting an attack of 14 Tigers with only a platoon of T-34s is quite a feat, definitely worthy of high praise. However, let's see what the German records say, just to be thorough.

"11 August 1943: Assembly of the battalion in Feskij (13 Tigers).
12 August 1943: The battalion is attached to SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Das Reich"
and moves to the Maximowka railway station. In the late afternoon, the Gawrischi railway
station is captured; a defensive position is established. March order back to Powlowo at
2300 hours."

13 Tigers, not 14, but the big difference is that the Germans report success in taking the station, while the Soviets report success in defending it. This isn't the first time I've seen such an incident, and the fact that the Germans report retreat at the end of the day suggests that once again, the lifespan of that defensive position was rather brief.

It's difficult to validate the kill claims in this battle. The German diary is quite vague. The battalion keeps reporting 13 functional Tigers over the next few days, but the total count of 37 vehicles suggests that they had plenty of damaged ones to refill with.

However, the battle raged on, and just a week later, a formidable battle takes place:

"18-19 August 1943: Attack with 8 Tigers on Hill 228.1 northeast of Maximowka with SS-Panzer-Abteilung 5 of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Wiking"; 47 T-34s, 2 IS-122s and, 3
antitank guns destroyed. 9 Tigers operational."

Wow! With only 8 Tigers, 49 tanks and 3 guns are destroyed! Except, as most of my readers probably realized, the IS-122 (otherwise known as IS-2) has not yet passed trials at this point, let alone entered production and seen any battlefield. But all is not lost, let's see where the rest of the tanks came from, the T-34s. It's easy enough to figure out where they came from, as the 32nd Tank Brigade was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army at the time. The 5th GTA wasn't doing so well at the time. As Petr Bukeyhanov writes in his book Offensive. Operation Kutuzov. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. July-August 1943, "...between August 3rd and August 10th, the 5th Guards Tank Army took heavy losses and was significantly weakened ... only 106 vehicles were available to defend the 15 kilometer front at Aleksandrovka-Pavlovo-Maksimovka". It is difficult to believe that the weakened unit, which, according to Bukeyhanov, "remained the main force of the Soviet defense in the Bogodukhov direction" could lose just under half of all of its tanks in a single day to the Tigers alone and continue fighting here until the retreat of the Tiger battalion on August 22nd. The Soviet observation that "by August 18th the Germans ceased active operations in the Bogodukhov direction and went on the defensive" also casts doubt that the SS-men managed to fight such a victorious battle.

World of Tanks History Section: T-90

Fierce competition began between Soviet tank manufacturers immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War. The situation was akin to an internal cold war. In the late 1980s, the management of UralVagonZavod, with significant effort, managed to secure the permission to perform a deep modernization of the T-72 tank. This was the start of the T-90.

Russia's First

The T-72, Soviet Union's most numerous tank, was what is called a "mobilization vehicle" designed for participation in the second echelon and combat against forces other than the enemy's best. Its crews would be tankers with second rate training, therefore controls of these vehicles were simplified. The main drawback of the design was the fire control system, which was far from perfect. The new vehicle from the Urals was supposed to get rid of this deficiency.

The prototype indexed Object 188 was presented to the government for trials in January of 1989. The vehicle showed itself well. It was reliable in all conditions, including long term operation under pressure. The Object 188 travelled 14,000 km without serious breakdowns during trials. This was the range before major repairs required of it by its designers.

In 1991, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR approved the tank for adoption by the Soviet Army. Due to the difficult political situation in the country that ended with its dissolution, the final decision was not made until October of 1992. Object 188 was supposed to receive the index T-72B, but B.N. Yeltsin, Russia's president at the time, personally ordered that it should be indexed T-90. This was the Russian Federation's first tank.

90's Insides

The most important feature of the T-90 is the Irtish fire control system. This system was sorely needed in the T-72. The system includes an automatic fire control feature, night and day aiming devices, a ballistic computer, a gun stabilizer, and many other components. Due to this system, the T-90 can effectively hit vehicles at long distances. During a demonstration for foreign delegates, a T-90 driving at a speed of 25 kph destroyed 7 targets at ranges of 1.5-2.5 kilometers in less than a minute.

Irtish does more than just seek, locate, and identify the target. It calculates many factors that can influence a hit. The speed of the target, the speed of the tank, corrections for wind, atmospheric pressure, wear and tear of the barrel, these are only a few parameters that are used in the calculations.

The T-90 is equipped with a system of optical-electrical protection from anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). This system tracks the launch of a missile and jams its control signal. If necessary, grenades are deployed that create an aerosol cloud around the tank, weakening and deflecting laser designator beams that are used to guide modern ATGMs.

Like all Soviet tanks made after 1954, the T-90's crew is protected from weapons of mass destruction. A special polymer liner with additions of lithium, boron, and lead protects the crew from radiation. Filters protect the air inside the tank from poisonous gases and radioactive dust.

The T-90's shield, sword, and heart

Following Soviet design traditions, the T-90 is small and densely packed. This is both a blessing and a curse. Due to the small silhouette, it is hard to aim at. However, a penetrating shell is bound to hit a module or a crewman.

The tank's designers aimed to protect it well. Aside from traditional composite armour, the tank received built in reactive armour. At first, reactive armour helped only against HEAT shells. Modern reactive armour also protects against subcaliber armour piercing shells, but not as well. If the penetration of a HEAT shell is reduced by over 50%, then APFSDS penetration is reduced by only 20%. The T-90 even has reactive armour on the roof.

The main weapon of the tank is a smooth barrelled 125 mm gun with a two piece round. Due to the automatic loading mechanism, it can reach a rate of fire of 8 RPM. The gun can fire subcaliber, HEAT, and HE ammunition. Recently, a new ammunition type was added: HE-shrapnel with an air burst fuse. This shell is very effective at fighting unprotected infantry and helicopters.

As well as traditional shells, the T-90's gun can also fire ATGMs. The ATGM guarantees a hit at 5000 meters. When the T-90 was adopted for service, it was a worldwide record.

The tank engine is a multifuel diesel. This means that it will run not only on diesel, but on gasoline and kerosene. Trials showed that only gasoline slightly reduces the engine's power.

The T-90 is equipped with underwater driving equipment that can be installed in as little as 15 minutes, and a self-entrenching system, with which it can dig itself a trench in warm ground in less than half an hour.

Over 20 years that passed since the tank entered production, but not very many have been produced. About 2000 units were made to this day, and about half of them were exported, mainly to India. The tank has yet to see battle.

Article author: Vladimir Pinayev

Original article available here.

Swedes on Britain's Armoured Forces

Today's article is once again brought to you by Something Awful forums poster TheFluff, who discovered some critique of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). Swedish observers who were present during the exercises held in 1973 were rather unkind.

"The gunnery practice was finished by two tests with a gun camera, one against a fixed target and one against a moving one, as per usual Swedish standard. The results were bad. The first time the results may possibly be explained by the gunners not taking the trial seriously, but even after they had evaluated their own results and re-did the test the results were very bad. It is possible that more training could have improved the results somewhat, but the more likely explanation is that a large portion of the British gunners simply aren't suited for their job as gunners. In some cases, problems with bad eyesight were apparent. It should be noted that British tank personnel is not tested in the same way as Swedish personnel before being assigned as tank gunners."

"Both the methods the tank crews used for engaging targets and their laying skills were unacceptable and clearly worse than that of the average Swedish crew."

On command style and discipline:

"Exercise of command was relatively tame and commanders rarely supervised anything. The subordinates were left with a lot of freedom to solve rather ill-defined problems on their own. When it came to looking after their equipment, the personnel was rather sloppy and nonchalant."

"The readiness (in a broad sense of the word) at the BAOR appears to be rather low."

"Radio traffic was very lively, but rarely contained orders."

On observation and crew resource management:

"The number of targets detected was on par with the performance of Swedish crews. However, the time to open fire was in most cases far longer than can reasonably be expected. In part, this is due to lack of training on the tank, but more importantly it's also due to the way the British crews work together. The tank commander always have to give orders about everything and the gunner is forbidden from opening fire on his own initiative when he spots a target, unlike in Swedish regulations for tank crews. Just like in the 1968 trials, it has been impossible to convince the Brits to try the Swedish method, which is also employed by the Germans for example. The reason cited by the Brits is that tanks carry so few rounds that the commander cannot risk the gunner opening fire on a non-essential target and that the gunners in general aren't all that good at neither judging the importance of a target nor at adjusting their fire. (...) This severely limited the advantages of the S-tank's duplicated controls.

(...)

Nor were the Brits willing to accept the principle that whoever sees a target first fires on it. If the tank commander spots a target, the gunner should still open fire on it. According to Swedish tests, if the commander has to hand the target over to the gunner, the time to open fire is on average two seconds longer than if the gunner opens fire by himself. If questions regarding the target's exact position are raised, this time increases further, up to 10 seconds or more in many cases. Our proposal to try the Swedish method in parallel with the British was rejected without any reason given."

On tactics:

"(in a discussion on delaying fights) The target marker equipment made this exercise an excellent and very illustrative example of how not to fight this type of action (in both Chieftain and the S-tank)."

"Coordination between infantry, artillery and tanks is nonexistent.
(...)
The infantry is deployed way too late to take terrain from which the enemy can fight the tanks with close-in AT weapons.
(...)
The assaults are not planned in depth. On the first day it took seven hours to advance seven kilometers, employing 17 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon against an enemy with 9 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon, deployed in three lines."

More on the exercise:

"The BLUFOR tank units appear very unprofessional. Uses unsuitable formations, roads and combat positions. In general, they appear to think they are invulnerable. Tank commanders and loaders stand very far up in their hatches. Drivers have hatches open and drive with their head above the edge.

There is no coordination of attacks between tanks, infantry and artillery. Tanks attack alone into forests. Infantry attacks alone across open fields straight at defending tanks. When attacking, units are not concentrated, neither in space nor in time. Attacks are always conducted in a "trickling" fashion.

Radio traffic is very intensive but there are rarely orders given.

At the OPFOR, unit commanders are often deployed very far behind their units, battle group commanders about 5 km behind and combat team commanders 500-1000 meters behind.

CYCLOPS (the S-tank squadron) combat positioning during the delaying action was usually pretty good.

All tanks, both Chieftain and S-tanks, are driven very carelessly. No attention is paid to neither civilian traffic nor property damage. Reports on engine failures have a hard time reaching the maintenance units. Map reading capabilities are overall very bad.

(...)

The experiences from these exercises appear to be highly questionable."

"British tank crews always carry a lot of baggage, both combat and non-combat equipment (cooking equipment, food, tents etc), on and/or in their tanks. Unlike our crews, they are completely independent of separate cooking units and baggage trains. This meant that the space available in the S-tank was far too small for their equipment."

"Deployment width and depth is considerable in the smaller units. Tank platoons are often deployed over a width/depth of 600-800 meters. (...) Tank platoons are frequently deployed independently behind each other. Support is organized within the platoon and not between platoons. The rear platoon is usually 500-1000 meters behind the front one. Hence, the result is that the enemy knocks them out one by one, platoon after platoon. Both platoon commanders and tank commanders act very independently and choose both their own routes and positions and their own timings for advancing or repositioning. The whole thing frequently resembles a guerrilla war or every man for himself.
The infantry is used way too late to take terrain from which the enemy can fight the tanks up close with weapons such as recoilless rifles. The tanks attack first. When they start taking fire, the mechanized infantry is deployed. There is no planning for attacks in depth. On the first day, it took seven hours to advance seven kilometers with the BLUFOR's combat team (17 tanks and a mechanized infantry platoon) against an OPFOR with 9 tanks and one mechanized infantry platoon, deployed in three lines.

If a platoon or squadron commander's tank gets engine problems, the commanders do not move to another tank. Tanks are frequently deployed in very unsuitable positions where they are easily knocked out. The observation and recon duties are conducted badly. The soldiers seem very passive. Chieftains are often positioned behind a ridge with the gun and the chassis side against the enemy. The S-tank crews rarely clean their optics.

When fighting a delaying action, the tanks in a platoon retreat by turns along the whole depth of the deployment. Withdrawal is frequently started far too late, and the tanks are thus knocked out one by one. Despite the terrain allowing opening fire at long distances (2-3 km), fire is often opened far too late (500 m). There is never a rear platoon deployed to cover the front platoon's withdrawal.

In light of the heavy criticism above, it has been very hard to judge how well the S-tank has proven itself. The results have mostly been influenced by troop performance and and not by the tank's performance. As far as it has been possible for us to observe, though, we cannot say that the S-tank has suffered more losses than the Chieftains.

S-tank availability has been good. Most of the time all tanks have been in working condition in daytime. On the OPFOR side, the Chieftain availability has dropped steadily. Near the end of the exercise the availability was down to 50%, and thus a Chieftain platoon was transferred from BLUFOR to OPFOR."

On the British vehicles:

"The Chieftain tank:
The reliability seems surprisingly low. During the exercises, the number of tanks that had to drop out due to mechanical trouble was relatively high. Mostly, it's the engine that is the problem. When a Chieftain stops, after a little while there's always an oil slick on the ground or garage floor under it. The gun stabilization also fails frequently. The accuracy of the contra-rotating feature in the commander's observation cupola is very low. It is almost never used by the Brits. The tank's speed over terrain does not seem to be superior to that of the S-tank. The commander's observation equipment is very good.

The Scorpion tank:
The Swedish personnel got an excellent briefing on the tank and was also allowed to drive it. It is very fast and easy to drive. The observation equipment is absolutely excellent. (...)

The FV 432 APC:
Appears to have a large number of different reliability problems, mainly concerning the steering gears. The vehicles are so far gone that they are considered a danger to traffic. According to maintenance personnel, a lot of the problems are caused by the soldiers not doing sufficient daily maintenance."

On civilian relations:

"Very little attention is paid to the fact that the unit is exercising on private property. Careless driving on public roads and the maneuver area isn't delimited. Damage to planted fields is frequent despite good opportunities to choose routes over fields where the harvest has already been taken in. Apparently the property damage costs for a similar exercise in the same area last year were on the order of 10 million SEK (about 62 million SEK today, ~6 million EUR). These damages are paid for by the German authorities."

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 2

Part 1.

"Lelyushenko (Brigade Commander, 39th Tank Brigade): I will concentrate on issues that turned up in our experience, using the 39th Tank Brigade as an example. I think that it was a mistake to enter the battle against the White Finns with only two tank battalions. When we were leaving West Belarus, I had 5 battalions, so I ended up with 110 tanks instead of 350. Three battalions were designated as independent and assigned to infantry divisions. These battalions did not have means of repairing their vehicles or replenishing their ranks. The HQ and political department could only service half of the brigade. These tank battalions ended up with 7-8 tanks by December 15th, 1939, and very few men. They had no way to evacuate their tanks or repair them. Tank brigades have excellent mobile workshops for this, a small factory. If a tank is knocked out in the morning, it will be back in action by evening. I had only two battalions, plus later the 204th Flamethrower Battalion and 65th Ski Battalion, and ended the war with almost as many tanks as I had at the start. I repaired my own tanks, and those from other brigades. As a result, the brigade remained combat capable, ready to complete any mission.
What's new with tanks in this war? Before the war, commanders thought that tanks will be of little use in a real war, as the terrain will be 50% forests, 25% water, some percentage of swamps, and only about 10% of terrain will be suitable for tanks. Practice shows that tanks could be used in the Finnish theater, and not only could, but should, with the caveat that organization of cooperation with infantry needs to be theater specific. Infantry must follow tanks closely. When tanks moved slowly (I am talking about tanks with applique armour that were invulnerable to 37 mm guns), infantry walked confidently, holding onto them.
...
Another issue was new to me. Commanders thought that tanks should not be used at night, and they were used rarely in this way. Experience showed that tanks should be used at night, but how? They should not be used for long range attacks, but for short pushes with infantry to capture important defensive objects. This is how you achieve success. For example, we defeated the enemy with our infantry at the Ilvesk fortified region. Infantry feels our force and support. Tanks, with their guns and flamethrowers, repelled any attempt to counterattack our infantry.
Can tanks be used at night? They can and should be used, but should be combined with carefully organized infantry units and good reconnaissance.
The issue of assault and blocking groups. An assault group is composed of a company of infantry, a platoon of tanks, two anti-tank guns, and one sapper unit. Assault groups should be trained in attacking pillboxes on real terrain. The infantry, not just the sappers, needs to know how to calculate the necessary amount of explosives, attach them, and use them. I had three cases where all sappers were wounded and there was no one among the infantry that could destroy the fortifications. Everyone needs to learn the absolute minimum about explosives in peace time.
Returning to the issues of tank force organization. I think that a tank battalion attached to an infantry division is not enough. They must be removed to create tank regiments and brigades. Experience at the Finnish front shows that the tank battalions are not viable. These battalions don't have the means to evacuate and repair tanks. Replacement of manpower is complicated, as the battalion has no resources to draw the replacements from. Here is what I did in my tank brigade: form an unofficial training battalion. I gathered up 150 men from the supplies, communications, HQ reserve, and other companies. I trained them once in a while, preparing mechanics, drivers, motorists, tank commanders, gunners. This worked out well. I did not receive enough drivers, so I trained my own. They were taught the traditions of combat spirit, and I've never seen one that faltered in battle and turned back, they all raced forward to complete their mission. The 39th Tank Brigade completed all objectives that were given to it."

Seems that this idea of explosives training was not unique.

"Bychevskiy (Major, chief of engineers of the 13th Army): ... I agree that tankers and infantry need to be taught to deal with explosives. There is nothing difficult during explosives training in regular military academies. In practice, we saw that soldiers and commanders could master explosives quickly, and in the end could dismantle minefields on their own. A short training course right on the front lines (3-4 days) showed good results. We definitely need to introduce explosives training for infantry and tankers so they can deal with minefields on their own."

Lelyushenko was not alone in using tanks at night either.

"Mladentsev: (Colonel, commander of the 387th Infantry Regiment): ... On using tanks: tankers, your field manual says that tanks should not be used at night. I used them, and it worked well. Tanks move forward, infantry moves forward, they work together, and work together wonderfully. Infantry is morally supported, tankers are not afraid of the night, even if visibility is poor. Infantry and tanks penetrated enemy fortifications together, and destroyed his counterattacks. Tanks can and must fight at night. We need to practice cooperation of tanks and infantry in peace time."

"Frolov (Corps Commander, 14th Army): ... On tanks: the T-26 tank fully proved itself. The BT was not useful, I should have pulled them back to Petsalmo. Artillery must be replaced. We need a light mountain gun. New model 1936 guns [76 mm F-22] are good, but not useful here. The 122 mm howitzer showed itself well, but it needs a ChTZ tractor, no other tractor can pull it here."

Pavlov (Army Commander 2nd Class, Red Army ABTU Chief): ... Tanks assigned to divisions met a terrible fate, and would have in any war. Pardon my honesty, but everyone that claimed that these tanks will be used to teach cooperation was bluffing, there was no cooperation. More than 7000 tanks were scattered across infantry divisions, and they had no effect. They were helpless. A tank battalion in an infantry division, T-37 and T-26 tanks, is a limited organization. Weak T-37 tanks are incapable of traversing any mud. These battalions were ineffective. Correct me if I'm wrong, but they were mostly used to guard the divisional or regimental HQ.
Voice from the audience: Correct.
Pavlov: And this is more than 7000 tanks. These same battalions inside the brigades, they fought well and achieved more, since they were controlled by the brigade HQ. I have to say that not only HQ staff, but political workers looked after the control. Comrade Lelyushenko said: we're going to attack, political workers, go to the infantry units, make sure they will follow the tanks. This is how we achieved cooperation. It is not always possible to check the cooperation with independent battalions.
Where am I going with this? We need to restore tank brigades using tanks from infantry divisions. In the Kiev Military District, I have 4 brigades with 14 tanks. The tanks were transferred, the brigades fell apart. I will say it outright: if there is mobilization tomorrow, our brigades will not be ready. The tanks will have to be sent back from as far as the Leningrad district. We need to end this practice. As long as I am the commander of this type of armed forces, I will make sure that no more units are dismantled. If they need tanks, take the whole unit.
...
Regarding the T-37, it is a special type of vehicle, it must be moved to special battalions at the corps level so the commander can use T-37 tanks properly. As far as new types of tanks are concerned, I will make a note: commanders, don't flood the Commissariat and comrade Stalin with telegrams, let us solve the issues of organization in Moscow properly. I know how it is in practice, as soon as a new vehicle is available everyone starts saying that the old vehicles are no good. They say: give us T-34s and KVs, only they are compatible with our theater, no other tanks are compatible. I will tell you now that I will take measures to ensure that not a single telegram like this even receives an answer. We will determine what district gets how many tanks at the General Staff, wait your turn."

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 1

After the conclusion of the Winter War, it was clear that application of tank forces in the Red Army needs to be reviewed. Here are some excerpts from a meeting of VKP(b) bigwigs discussing the effectiveness of the tanks and suggesting changes to how they are used, from rkka.ru archives. I will also include some interesting parts that characterize the army as a whole.

"Semenov (Brigade Commissar, Military Commissar of the 50th Infantry Corps): ... We did not study Finland during peacetime enough, we did not study it properly. During wargames, we reached Vyborg in no time at all, with a break for lunch. The White Finn tactics are based on close combat, with an organized system of rifle and mortar fire, with light ski units. Our units turned out to not be ready to fight on skis, they were bound to roads, and their supply lines dragged 10 km behind. We were only saved due to a shortage of Finnish aircraft. For instance, the 123rd and 84th infantry divisions, 1st, 13th, 15th, 35th, and 20th tank brigades, and elements of the 90th Division were all stuck on one narrow road. Many people had to work for several days to untangle this traffic jam."

"Pshennikov (Brigade Commander, 142nd Infantry Division): ... Next issue, the use of tanks. When we were fighting in no man's land, despite my division advancing along a wide front, there was a lack of roads. I had a tank brigade that operated on a front of one regiment with only one road. What happened? The tank brigade clogged up the road and I had nothing to feed that regiment with. All carts had to be stopped and supplies carried to the regiment on foot. In future wars, tank units need their own roads. If there is no other road, don't reinforce the division with tanks, or maybe with just one battalion.
I also think that it is necessary to review tank division compositions, as T-37 and T-38 tanks did not show themselves well. Divisions need to have T-26 tanks. Even those have a drawback, their tracks slip off. That is their greatest weakness, and it must be resolved."

"Sinitsin (Regimental Commissar, Military Commissar of the Front Armoured Forces): Comrades, I consider it my duty to raise some issues on the use of armoured forces in Western Ukraine and against the White Finns. Comrades that spoke before me correctly brought up on the poor cooperation between tanks and infantry. I've been in tank forces for a while, but I have never seen proper cooperation between tanks and infantry in training. If we want to have proper cooperation between tanks and infantry, we need to include a tank brigade in each infantry corps and force the commander to train tanks and infantry together. This will have an effect.
I think that tank battalions with 15 T-26es and several T-38s worked poorly, since there was no repair bases for them, and the vague directions given by combined arms commanders, as a rule, resulted in their disablement. Spreading tanks out without proper orders does not achieve anything. Tank battalions should not be included in infantry divisions.
There is no tank master in the region, front, or army. ABTU is no more or less than an inspectorate. In this condition, we cannot prepare tank forces properly, as nobody is really responsible for training or control. I think that ABTU and tank force directorates should be organized like the VVS. This will increase responsibility for actions, create a centralized training center, and military councils and commanders will have someone to hold responsible for the state of tank forces. Some words on tankers: it is known how important tanks are in any battle, but we have problems with finding qualified crewmen. For instance, there is a regular captain in the Leningrad district who is in charge of assigning tank unit commanders. Where does he know them from? He doesn't, nobody studies these issues, and there is chaos going on with our crews. I think it is necessary to have training and assignments under control of the armoured forces chief. This will make things more reasonable.

The next issue is about the types of tanks. It is sad that a regular 37 mm shell penetrates our tanks, not to mention larger calibers. I think that we need to move to tanks armed with larger calibers and thicker armour due to enemy anti-tank artillery.
Stalin: Is 45 mm enough for T-26es?
Sinitsin: It is enough, but the KV is a new type of tank, and 45 mm is not enough.
Stalin: Is 75 mm enough?
Sinitsin: Yes, that is enough. We need to make more tanks like this and quickly. My next issue is discipline. We talk too much, but the state of affairs is poor. We need to stop talking and prepare our forces properly. I will give you an example. In the 13th Army, I saw a soldier that was lightly wounded in the arm, led to the rear by 3-4 men led by a political chief to take care of him, and then this group sticks around the rear instead of going back and fighting.
It is also necessary to improve training in military academies. We have young lieutenants that just finished the academy, and they don't know how to shoot their pistols. I must make a remark about political workers, there are many comrades with a very low level of military knowledge. We need to end this now and train our commanders and political workers better."

Continued in part 2.

NKVD on Tank Use in the Winter War. Part 3: Organization

Part 2.

"The control of armoured forces during the period of war had a separation between the commanders of the units and their technical possessions, formation, organization, supplies, and support from the rear. All of these elements were scattered around various departments and directorates. UABTB controlled the combat units, the Directorate of Military Technical Supplies (UVTS) controlled supplies and technical support, the 4th HQ Department was tasked with organization, OKNS did the delivery, the 5th and 6th departments controlled the rear, the 1st Department and OABTV controlled the operations, OABTV also dealt with training. There was no unified system of control and supply for armoured forces, and as a result, no one person had the responsibility for the entire armoured force.

The inventory of human resources among the soldiers and officers was done poorly. Armoured forces' rubrics cover a spectrum of specialities which are not differentiated, which resulted in BT specialists being sent to work on T-26, T-38 tanks, etc. There was a deficiency in the population of the junior commanders and privates as a result of this. Up to 50% of the reinforcements sent to the armoured forces consisted of poorly educated Red Armymen which did not satisfy the forces' requirements.

Inter-departmental confusion resulted in negative consequences. The chief of the North-Western Frotn UABTV and the chief of the 5th Department of the Front HQ, contrary to the UVTS, issued a proposal, approved by the Front council (#0043, February 24th, 1940). According to this proposal, medium repairs of all vehicles was to be conducted at army level evacuation bases, for which all army repair services were to be concentrated at these bases, and all supplies would be delivered there. In practice, this meant that tank units lost all of their evacuation and repair ability, their commanders lost the responsibility of medium repairs, and created large bases on the front, which is unacceptable from the points of view of security, air defense, and combat repair ability. This also meant the introduction of needless and difficult trips in the absence of sufficient transport, which would overload the roads and increase the length of time for repairing a vehicle. In the end, the result was an unavoidable failure to perform medium repairs and disarmament of all tank brigades in a very short term.

This decree was met with confusion by all army units, and was not followed.

The above dispersion of tactical, operational, organizational, and technical functions between various departments and directorates can be explained by the fact that the armoured forces are considered a partial and secondary component in the RKKA system. Currently, armoured forces, alongside aviation and artillery, are the most notable type of forces in the Red Army, both in number and importance, and is one of the decisive components of a battle or operation. Experience at Khalkin-Gol, Poland, and especially in Finland confirms this. Practice demands that the control and supply of armoured forces needs to be collected in the hands of one chief, RKKA ABTU, similar to the VVS directorate, as an HQ and a supply directorate. The district HQ should have an armoured force HQ, which has its own HQ, a supply department, an HR department, etc.

This way, a strong and precise system is created to control armoured forces, without any of the drawbacks of the current system.

Chief of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Leningrad Military District
Major of State Security, Sidnev"

Via slon-76.