Chemical T-46

"August 19th, 1935
To: Director of the S.M. Kirov Experimental Machinebuilding Factory

When the T-46 flamethrower was examined, the following conclusions were made:

1. The 50 L fuel tank (40 L usable volume) can make 10-12 shots at a range of 25 meters and 5-6 at a range of 40 meters. It is easy to work with this device.
   However, the volume is insufficient, and needs to be increased to 100 L.
2. The flamethrower equipment cannot be used to emit smokescreens.
3. If ABTU accepts this flamethrower, the following changes must be made:
1. Replace the flexible hose with a metal pipe, turning will be enabled with a ball joint.
2. Replace the hose nozzle with a more modern type, like on BT and T-37 tanks.
3. Add a pressure meter to measure the pressure inside the fuel mixture tank.
4. The pressure meter and reductor should be placed on a panel in the front of the turret. Use the M-34 reductor.
5. In order to hold the fuel mixture tank, weld a ring of iron with openings for bolts to the bottom.
4. It must be noted that the conversion of the T-46 to a chemical tank is more difficult than the conversion of the T-26. The chemical T-26 has a 400 L tank. If possible, the T-46 needs to have equipment of equivalent power.
5. A place for a 80-100 L smoke mixture tank is desirable.

Chief of the Chemical Department of NIHI RKKA

Minkov"

V. Lehn collection

Armata Przeciwpancerna wz. 36

"Photo #1 (negative #06652). System in combat position.

Photo #2 (negative #06654). System in combat position from the rear left. δ marks the position of the travel locking bar.

Based on trials of the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish anti-tank gun over 384 shots and 200 kilometers performed in February-March 1941, ANIOP makes the following conclusions:

1. The 37 mm mod. 1936 captured Polish gun is one of the newest types of armament in modern foreign armies.
1. Mass in combat position: 408 kg.
2. Muzzle velocity 790 m/s.
3. Gas pressure: 2700 kg/cm^2.
4. Shell mass: 0.700 kg.
5. Precision: same as the domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 gun.
6. Rate of fire: same as the domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 gun.
7. Horizontal traverse: 50 degrees.
8. Length in combat position: 2826 mm.
2. The domestic 45 mm mod. 1932 anti-tank gun on automobile wheels with porous rubber tires is a significantly more powerful AT measure than the Polish 37 mm mod. 1936 gun, while having similar characteristics otherwise. Mass in combat position is similar.
   Coefficient of metal use:
   45 mm mod. 1932 gun: 94.7
   37 mm mod. 1936 gun (Polish, captured): 55.2
3. The domestic 37 mm mod. 1930 gun is less satisfactory according to modern tactical-technical requirements than the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish gun.
4. The penetration of the Polish 37 mm gun is significantly less than that of the 45 mm gun. The latter can penetrate 40 mm of modern armour (K=2550) at an angle of 30 degrees at up to 400 meters, and at normal up to 800 meters. Under these conditions, the robustness of shells is acceptable (see ANIOP report #001326 from February 28th, 1941).
   The 37 mm Polish AP shell is less robust than our type 129 AP shell, which performed satisfactorily against 16 and 20 mm armour plates. Our shell penetrated these plates intact, while the Polish shells fragment.
   In terms of penetration, both 37 mm shells (domestic and Polish) are insufficiently powerful, and can only be used against light tanks with armour on the order of 20 mm.
   Tactical ranges for both shells are comparable, as the ballistics of the two systems are very close.
5. The design of the 37 mm mod. 1936 Polish gun and its mechanism is of interest to our designers and manufacturers (shield, lever trigger, recoil brake cylinder, recoil lubricant, powder charge)."

CAMD RF 81-12038-132

Heavy Triplex

"Tactical-Technical Requirements for a 254 mm gun, 305 mm howitzer, and 400 mm mortar on a T-35 chassis

Main requirements:

Item	254 mm gun	305 mm howitzer	400 mm mortar
Range (km)	*	21	13
Combat mass (tons)	55-60	55-60	55-60
Travel mass (tons)	55-60	55-60	55-60
Shell mass (kg)	200-240	340	640
Vertical traverse arc (degrees)	55	65	70
Horizontal traverse arc (degrees)	10	10	10
Rate of fire (RPM)	1	1/2	1/3
Time to deploy from travel to combat mode and back (minutes	5	5	5

*Muzzle velocity and range depend on final choice of shell

Requirements:

• Stress on suspension elements must be evenly distributed.
• The system must be stable in motion when tilted at least 20 degrees.
• The system must be able to traverse a 35 degree grade.
• The ground pressure must be 0.6-0.7 kg/cm^2.
• The maximum speed should be 20 kph.
• The system must have enough fuel to run for 6 hours.
• The system must be able to cross a 4.5 meter wide trench.
• The system must be able to ford a 1-1,1 meter deep water hazard.
• The height of the tow hook must be 1 meter.
• Access to the engine and control mechanisms must be convenient.
• The SPG should fit within the dimensions of a railroad car.
• The chamber should accept existing 10 inch and 12 inch land and naval artillery shells."

V. Lehn Collection

Shell Quality

_tezka posted an interesting document, tests of the F-34's shells for robustness. The test was set up as follows: a 60 mm thick armoured plate was placed upright as normal, but it had three 2 mm plates (referred to as walls in the document) set up behind it. After being fired, the shell was measured to determine how deformed it was. Here are the results:

"Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 76-76 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and two walls. Dimensions: 110-130-140 mm. 

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 70-65 mm. The shell is in front of the plate. Dimensions: 100-130-120 mm.

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 76-76 mm. Exit diameter: 80-80 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and three walls. Dimensions: 120-135-150 mm.

The shell was stuck in the armour.

Penetration, less than a caliber. Entrance diameter: 70-70 mm, Exit diameter: 70-70 mm. The shell is in front of the plate. Dimensions: 145-160-150 mm.

Dent. Diameter: 60-60 mm. Depth: 3-5 mm. The shell was not found.

Dent. Diameter: 75-75 mm. Depth: 8-10 mm. The rear side of the plate has a bump. The shell is in front of the plate. Diameter: 135-155-145 mm.

Penetration, less than a caliber. Entrance diameter: 75-78 mm. Exit diameter: 70-80 mm. The shell was not found.

Penetration. Entrance diameter: 110-80 mm. Exit diameter: 130-100 mm. The shell penetrated the plate and three walls. Dimensions: 120-150-125 mm."

The quality of the shell seems decent. Most penetrations are the size of one caliber or larger, and the shell does not shatter after penetrating the armour or bouncing off.

Blockade Repairs

This listing of repair work works well to illustrate two things that I have mentioned in the past and one I have not. The first that I have mentioned is that the Leningrad Front was an odd mishmash of strange and obsolete vehicles, which you can see from mentions of BT-2s and machinegun-only BT-5s. The other is that it's a massive pain to keep track of how many vehicles were actually produced, as you can clearly see that it's not only the repair factories that are taking in damaged vehicles to restore them.

The thing I haven't mentioned yet is that Soviet factory nomenclature is incredibly annoying. This document lists all factories by their proper names, so you have both "Kirov factory" and "factory named after Kirov" (factory #185) mentioned on the same page. In order to prevent confusion, I refer to the latter by its number.

"Decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front #001311
Active Army
October 30th, 1942

Content: On the repairs of tanks, tank engines, and tractors at Leningrad factories

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decrees that:

1. The director of the Kirov factory, comrade Dlugach, must perform major repairs of 10 tank engines for factory #371 and 6 engines for Leningrad Front ABTU before December 1st, 1942.
2. The director of factory #371, comrade Kozharinov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Perform major and medium repairs on 10 KV-1 tanks.
2. Assemble upper and lower turret rings for BT and T-26 tanks in the following amounts:
1. For the Leningrad Front ABTU repair factory: 20 units.
2. For factory #185: 10 units.
3. Perform thermal conditioning and polishing of KV gearboxes for the Leningrad Front ABTU in the following amounts:
1. Item #12-355: 50 units.
2. Item #12-322: 50 units.
3. Item #12-266: 30 units.
4. Item #12-167: 30 units.
3. The director of factory #185, comrade Muromets must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major and medium repairs on BT-5 tanks (5 units).
4. The director of Yegorov factory, comrade Kolesnikov, must provide major repairs for 10 T-37 and T-38 tanks by December 1st, 1942.
5. Repair factory #4 chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Smirnov, must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Produce 10 new tanks.
2. Provide major repairs for T-26 and T-60 tanks (5 items).
3. Provide major repairs for T-26 engines (5 items) and gearboxes (10 items).
4. Provide major repairs for 30 STZ tractors.
6. Repair factory #27 chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Hoprov must, before December 1st, 1942:
1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
2. Perform major repairs on 3 medium tanks (3 units).
3. Perform major repairs on tank engines (5 units).

Coal, lubricant, fuel, electricity, and repair inventory is being distributed among factories.

Leningrad Front Commander, Lieutenant Govorov

Military Council Member, Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), A. Zhdanov

Military Council Member, N. Solovyev

Military Council Member, T. Shtykov"

V. Lehn Collection

Object 701 Complaints

"Notes on the fighting compartment of the Object 701

On the installation of the 122 mm S-34 gun:

1. The upper travel lock is inconvenient, needs constant observation during travel, and does not take the load off the elevation mechanism. Similar locks were used on the SU-85, and did not show themselves well. It is inconvenient to use the lock on short marches. A new simpler and more convenient lock must be designed.
2. The elevation mechanism handle is positioned poorly. It is too low, and makes it hard to use for the gunner. It is necessary to turn the handle towards the gunner and introduce grooves into the flywheel for aiming by grasping the flywheel itself.
3. The electric machinegun trigger on the turning mechanism flywheel is inconvenient to use.

On the crew and ammunition positions:

1. Move the seat height adjustment pedal underneath the seat to prevent accidental presses. Improve the reliability of the seat stopper.
2. The commander's cupola cannot rotate unless all sights are in their forward-most position, as the clips will catch on the stopper base.
3. The hatches do not have a way to lock them in the open position.
4. The MK-4 devices installed in the cupola do not fully provide observation and fire correction at 1500-3000 meters.
5. Replace one of the commander's MK-4 devices with an optical fire correction device.
6. The ammunition rack for 122 mm shells is not finished. The cells are not rigid enough and are not attached securely. Increase the thickness of the cassettes and tolerances on the internal diameter. Reinforce the cassette springs and ensure that shells are held securely.
7. Improve the shell holders on the side of the turret.
8. Add clips for holding individual shells on the floor of the fighting compartment.
9. Add a handle on the top of the turret in front of the gunner to make exiting the turret easier.
10. Add markings on the turret ring for placing the turret in travel position.
11. There is no ventilation in the fighting compartment. Install a fan.
12. There are not enough machineguns in the 701. The number of machineguns is less than that of the IS.
13. The AA DShK machinegun is not installed.
14. 12.7 mm DShK rounds and 50 mm smoke grenades are not installed.
15. Having shells on the floor of the fighting compartment limits the gun elevation to 16 degrees, while not guaranteeing the shells will not be hit by the recoiling breech.
16. The commander cupola angle markings are hard to see. They need to be illuminated or applied with glowing paint.
17. The water-tightness of hatches and vision devices is unsatisfactory, it does not prevent permeation of water and dust.
18. There are no means for clearing the vision ports from dust and water. In the rain, visibility is decreased.
19. The loader's optics need to be more comfortable to use.
20. Install a torsion bar on one half of the commander's hatch in order to make it easier to open.
21. Cover the commander's hatch with porous rubber on the inside.

Engineer-Colonel Kovalev

Lieutenant-Colonel Bragin

Engineer-Major Mashkov

Peperushin

Muravyev"

CAMD RF 81-12104-483

World of Tanks History Section: Tank Spies of the First World War

When the first British MkI tanks reached the battlefield, intelligence workers all over the world found their hands full. Placed as observers, military attaches, or as spies behind enemy lines, agents began exploring the topic of "land battleships". Since 1910, intelligence and counterintelligence in Russia was controlled by the Special Department of the General Quartermaster of the Chief Directorate of the General Staff. Its office was the one receiving information from foreign agents.

After the debut of tanks in September of 1916 at the Somme, Russian intelligence passed on information found in British press on these new events. Their opinions were, at first, very critical. For instance, a message written on December 10th, 1916: "All data on English tanks, both from a mechanical and a tactical point of view, shows that they do not present a significant interest, which is further confirmed by the English abandoning them". When he talked of abandonment, the author meant that British engineers already began work on modernization of the first tank and other types of this weapon.

Scepticism to Interest

Two months is not a lot of time. However, it was a new year, and tank building made a step forward. One Russian military attache was able to attend British tank trials. His report was different from previous ones: "Trials were carried out on clay soil, soft from rain, with a fairly sound foundation. Tanks crossed huge steep holes up to 8 feet deep, a robust parapet, and an ordinary brick English house. The tank broke up its walls and crossed over the wreckage ... Trials went very well." The use of the word "tank" as a feminine word is curious, but remember that the English word "tank" came into military use only a few months before that. It will be a while before it enters the vocabulary of people all over the world.

In this document, another section is of interest. "Tanks have been improved compared to what I saw in September on the English front." As it is unlikely that an agent would confuse early fall of 1916 with November, this means that Russian intelligence already knew about its ally's work on tanks long before they were used in battle.

The message included news that the vehicles were armed with Lewis guns. It can be said without a doubt that the nameless scout observed MkIV tanks, as they were the first to carry these weapons. Their side and top armour was improved. It is important to note that these tanks arrived to the front lines in April of 1917, and fought their first battle on June 7th. Again, Russian military intelligence was aware of the newest vehicles months before they reached the battlefield.

Behind Enemy Lines

The most interesting intelligence work was targeting German tanks. One of the residents wrote: "Various sources report that there are two types of tanks, big and small... Tanks have a rounded shape in front, with a 35 degree slope."

The Germans indeed had a number of tank designs, but this description matches the famous Colossal. The same title would be given to Krupp's superheavy gun that shot at Paris in 1918. A weapon of such magnitude was needed on tracks. The Colossal, or K-Wagen, was created as a superheavy breakthrough tank that would sweep away French defenses with its 150 tons of mass.

The rhombus shape of British was smoothed out to armoured ovals in the front and rear. The project was approved at the end of June 1917, and not even a model was made until next year. Thanks to intelligence professionals, Russian high command obtained sketches of the Kaiser's "vengeance weapon".

They also retrieved information on another German tank which actually got to fight: the A7V. "Another type [of tank] was very large, the size of a railroad car", an agent in Ogenkwar wrote. This was a good comparison. The 30-ton tank was also symmetric, and carried a record of 18 men. Each one had it rough due to the heat inside the tank. The heavyweight A7V was clumsy, heavily armoured, and had poor visibility and cripplingly small firing angles, even worse on the MkI. Only 20 of these tanks were built, and they had little influence on the battlefield of WWI.

Kamikaze Tankettes and the best anti-tank weapons

Russian intelligence also intercepted information about German work on early transporters of explosive charges, something like Borgward tankettes used in WWII. "Sources indicate that the Germans propose the use of small automobiles, akin to English "tanks", to destroy enemy wire and trenches. Loaded with explosive or poisonous substances, they are directed towards the enemy with no crew. The explosion is controlled by a clockwork mechanism", one agent wrote.

There is only one vehicle of this type known to be built in WWI, the French Torpille Terrestre, or "land torpedo". Controlled by wire, this tankette would approach enemy lines and destroy them with explosives. A prototype was built in 1915, but that was it. It is difficult to say what the German analogue would have been like, as information is lacking.

Obviously this information on new tanks caused development of methods to fight them. Here, specialists of the Entente matched each other. "Our artillery, same as the English, is considered the main method of combat with heavy armoured cars." The 37 mm trench cannon firing AP grenades at short ranges was considered the most effective weapon.

It is known that the Russian military had no tanks. However, Austrian WWI reports include a mention of Russian attacks on Austro-Hungarian positions at Bukovina, allegedly supported by two tanks. These were likely Garford armoured cars equipped with cannons, but the enemy faced those before, and it is difficult to confuse tracked and wheeled vehicles. What could they have been? It looks like another mystery of early tank building.

Sources and literature:

• RGVIA 802-4-1477
• S.L. Fedoseev, Tanki Pervoy Mirovoy, Moscow, 2012
• Das Kriegsjahr 1917; 6. Das Kriegsjahr 1917

Article author: Yuri Bakhurin. Yuri Bakhurin is a military historian, an author of many publications in regional and central scientific press: "Questions of History" magazine, "Military-Historical Magazine", "Military-Historical Archive", "Motherland", "Anthology of War", the "Reitar" almanac, and many more. He is also the author of the "Panzerjager Tiger (P) Ferdinand: Use in Combat" book.
Original article available here.

T-40 APC

The Red Army may have fought the war without any domestically produced APCs, but that wasn't from a lack of trying. The T-40 could have been the platform for an artillery tractor/APC combination.

"Tactical-technical requirements for a tracked armoured carrier.

1. Purpose:
1. Transporting a squad (12 men) of motorized infantry with armament in a motorized division and to transport ammunition to combat zones.
2. Towing artillery systems and tractor trailers weighing up to 4000 kg.
2. Characteristics:
1. Mass (with live weight of 1400 kg): no more than 6 tons.
2. Armour: front armour is 13 mm, side armour is 10 mm.
3. Armament: one turret for shooting at ground targets, one PPSh.
4. Capacity: 14 men (two in the cockpit).
5. Maximum grade and performance of the vehicle should be no less than those of a T-40 tank.
6. Ground pressure without submerging: 0.5 kg/cm^2.
7. Clearance: 300 mm.
8. Fuel range: 300-350 km.
9. Maximum tilt: 30 degrees.
10. Fording depth: up to 800 mm.
11. Engine: 85-90 hp ZiS-16
3. Components:
1. T-40 suspension.
2. ZiS-16 gearbox.
3. T-40 and ZiS transmission.
   The design of the hull and transmission layout should be made with the consideration that an unarmoured transport with a platform, an AA gun, or other specialized vehicles will be built on this platform.
4. Requirements for components of the APC:
1. The engine must start reliably at all times of year.
2. The cooling system must guarantee reliable engine performance in the external temperature range of -45 to +45 degrees.
3. The gearbox and main clutch demultiplexor must both be currently produced at ZiS.
4. The suspension must guarantee:
1. Reliable function for 5000 kilometers over various types of terrain.
2. Movement of the tractor off-road at maximum speed.
3. Tracks do not fall off.
5. The armoured hull must be designed with an open top and a rear that flips open. The driver and gunner's compartment must be armoured.
6. The design of the hull must enable the troops to load and unload in 20-30 seconds.
7. The design of the seats must enable the troops to carry their rifles and submachineguns, as well as other loads. When designing the hull, keep in mind the need to affix stretchers carrying heavily wounded men.
8. The transport must have a shock-absorbing trailer hitch that allows rapid and reliable connections with existing artillery systems and tractor trailers.
9. All mechanisms must be easily accessible for adjustments, lubrication, and repairs.
10. Tactical-technical requirements will be revised after the inspection of the GABTU technical project.

Deputy Chief of GABTU, Major-General of Technical Forces, Lebedev

Deputy Chief of the Red Army Armoured Directorate, Military Engineer First Class, Alymov"

CAMD RF 38-11355-190

Cheating at Statistics 10: Liars at Lisow

There is a Russian saying, "fear has large eyes", meaning that when you are already afraid, everything you see becomes even more fearsome. MS-1s become T-34s, BT-7s become T-34s, T-26es become KVs. During the Vistula-Oder Offensive, a similar event happened. First, the German version of events, from Schneider's Tigers in Combat:

"13 January 1945: New direction of attack is Lisow.
...
The battalion is ambushed by Josef Stalin tanks and hidden antitank guns in Lisow and is almost completely destroyed. The battalion commander's tank is also knocked out. The desperately fighting Tigers destroy 50-60 enemy tanks on that day."

At least three whole regiments of IS-2 tanks plus a hidden battery of AT guns! That is definitely a fearsome force required to completely destroy a battalion of Tiger IIs. However, seeing as how this is part 10 in this series of articles, it's a bit premature to take these figures as gospel truth. Let's take a look at Aleksei Isayev's lecture on the Vistula-Oder Offensive. He covers this episode starting at 21:10.

"Isayev: ...there was an episode where a heavy tank battalion armed with King Tigers attacked at Lisow. They were stopped by a tank brigade with T-34-85s. Practically all T-34 tanks by the start of the Vistula-Oder operation were armed with 85 mm guns and could face German heavy tanks almost as equals. There was a paradoxical situation where the Germans thought they were fighting IS tanks, Joseph Stalin, and destroyed 50 IS tanks, and the Soviet tank brigade, Fomichev's brigade, thought they were fighting not heavy tanks, but normal Panthers. In the after action reports...

Varshavchik: So one side overclaimed and the other underclaimed?

Isayev: Yes, it turns out that the Germans, who performed poorly, as their heavy tank battalion was destroyed, they overclaimed, told a tale of 50 destroyed IS tanks, but in reality they destroyed maybe 20-30 T-34-85s. The Soviet side, having destroyed a fresh heavy tank battalion, just wrote "some Panthers attacked us, we shot them up, we kept driving further.""

A Soviet tank brigade in 1945 consisted of 65 T-34-85 tanks. As far as the artillery battery the Germans envisioned, a brigade only carried 4 45 mm guns and 6 82 mm mortars, hardly a powerful adversary for Tiger tanks. The fresh German battalion (the diary lists its numbers at 51 operational tanks on December 21st, and does not list any losses until January 13th) was destroyed by a T-34-85 unit with a negligible numerical advantage that did not even realize what they were fighting.

PzIII Skirt Effectiveness

The Germans were fans of putting extra armour on the PzIII and PzIV. First, screens were bolted on or welded on, later they introduced skirt armour for hulls and turrets. This armour was very thin, only 5 mm, but it was placed some distance away from the tank's main armour. The result was significant deformations of brittle fast-moving projectiles, such as APCR shells and anti-tank rifle bullets. The following scans are from Andrei Ulanov's lecture on infantry anti-tank measures.

"Photo #14. PzIII with screens after being shot in the side by 15P-II and RKS anti-tank rifles."

"Photo #15. Side. Armour thickness: 30 mm. 15P-II anti-tank rifle, OKB-44 bullets.

1 and 2: range of 100 meters. Dents in the main armour after penetrating the 5 mm armour screen."

As you can see, this measure was very effective against rifles. However, by the time these armour screens were introduced, the original reason for anti-tank rifles (to supplement losses of light anti-tank guns) was remedied, and infantry units could face enemy tanks with 45 mm cannons, which were unaffected by 5 mm screens.